Commonwealth v. Stacey Vancia Harriette.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-40

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

STACEY VANCIA HARRIETTE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury trial in the Boston Municipal Court, the

defendant, Stacey Vancia Harriette, was convicted of reckless

operation of a motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 90,

§ 24 (2) (a), and failing to stop for police, in violation of

G. L. c. 90, § 25. On appeal, the defendant argues that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury

instruction on a necessity defense. We affirm.

Background. We recite the facts in the light most

favorable to the defendant to determine whether she was entitled

to a jury instruction on the necessity defense. See

Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 396 (1998). The defendant

testified in her own defense.
On January 21, 2023, at approximately 7 P.M., the defendant

returned to her home in Boston to the sound of gunshots and the

sight of her husband getting hit by a stolen Hyundai occupied by

two people. The Hyundai also hit the defendant's vehicle,

though it did "[n]ot really" damage it, and then drove off.

After the defendant's husband was hit by the Hyundai, he pursued

the Hyundai in his Jaguar with their sixteen year old son in the

car. The defendant followed and called the police. The

defendant was pursuing the vehicles to "make sure [her] son was

okay." She used a global position system (GPS) tracker that she

had on the son to guide her to his location.

Meanwhile, Boston police Officer Lea Allen was responding

to a report of shots fired on Garfield Avenue in the Hyde Park

section of Boston when she received a separate call concerning

two vehicles racing on Hyde Park Avenue. She was driving a

marked cruiser. Allen saw a silver Jaguar sedan chasing a dark

Hyundai sedan that was traveling without headlights, despite the

nighttime conditions. Both vehicles were traveling toward

Cleary Square, a commercial and residential area in Hyde Park,

at a high rate of speed, running red lights, and narrowly

avoiding multiple collisions.

As Allen pursued the two vehicles, she noticed a black

Mercedes, which was later determined to be operated by the

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defendant, following her cruiser. Because the defendant was

closely following Allen's cruiser, Allen braked, and the

defendant pulled alongside the cruiser's passenger side. Allen

rolled down her window and spoke with the defendant, whose

teenage daughter was seated in the front passenger seat. The

defendant told Allen that her husband and son were in the Jaguar

and that two people who had been harassing her son were in the

Hyundai, which the defendant believed to be stolen. The

defendant asked whether Allen was pursuing the vehicles, to

which Allen responded that she was.

As the defendant and Allen were talking, the Jaguar and

Hyundai passed them going the opposite direction on Hyde Park

Avenue. The defendant pointed them out to Allen, made a U-turn,

and again began pursuing them. Allen followed the defendant as

the defendant chased the two vehicles at a "fast speed," but not

"too much over the speed limit."1 During that stretch, the

defendant drove through several traffic lights that, in the

defendant's words, "may have been green" and some "may have been

red." The defendant continued to follow the Hyundai and Jaguar

despite seeing Allen's cruiser lights activated.2

1 The speed limit on the road was thirty miles per hour.

2 The defendant was not sure if the cruiser sirens were on.

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After briefly losing sight of the defendant in traffic,

Allen saw the defendant standing outside her Mercedes, which was

parked diagonally in the middle of the intersection of Harvard

Avenue and Hyde Park Avenue, waving Allen toward her. Allen

stopped, and the defendant told her that the Jaguar and Hyundai

had crashed on River Street. The defendant then returned to her

vehicle and drove toward River Street, with Allen following.

When Allen arrived at River Street, she noticed that the

Hyundai had collided with a large, white pickup truck, and the

Jaguar was blocking the Hyundai's path. The defendant also was

present.

At trial, the defendant argued that she had "no choice" but

to follow the vehicles. Trial counsel did not request a jury

instruction on the necessity defense.

Discussion. On appeal, the defendant argues that her trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury

instruction on the necessity defense. We disagree.

"[O]ur case law strongly disfavors raising ineffective

assistance claims on direct appeal." Commonwealth v. Zinser,

446 Mass. 807, 809 n.2 (2006). We may nevertheless resolve

ineffective assistance claims where "the factual basis of the

. . . claim appears indisputably on the trial record."

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Commonwealth v. Diaz, 448 Mass. 286, 289 (2007), quoting Zinser,

supra at 811.

"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the defendant must show, first, that there has
been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of
counsel . . . falling measurably below that which might be
expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer and, second, that
counsel's conduct has likely deprived the defendant of an
otherwise available, substantial ground of defence"
(quotations and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Rogers, 494 Mass. 629, 639 (2024). Where the

defendant is not entitled to an instruction, "it follows that,

by failing to request it . . . counsel did not provide

ineffective assistance." Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 444 Mass.

678, 685 (2005).

The necessity defense is available if the "harm sought to

be avoided far exceeds the harm resulting from the crime

committed." Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 408 Mass. 347, 349

(1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Hood, 389 Mass. 581, 590 (1983).

The defense requires evidence that

"(1) the defendant is faced with a clear and imminent
danger, not one which is debatable or speculative; (2) the
defendant can reasonably expect that his action will be
effective as the direct cause of abating the danger;
(3) there is [no] legal alternative which will be effective
in abating the danger; and (4) the Legislature has not
acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate
choice regarding the values at issue."

Hood, supra at 591, quoting Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 13 Mass.

App. Ct. 373, 379 (1982). "A judge should instruct the jury on

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necessity only if the defendant has presented 'some evidence on

each element of the defense.'" Pike, 428 Mass. at 400, quoting

Hood, supra at 595.

Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

defendant, the evidence did not warrant a necessity instruction.

The defendant could not have reasonably expected to abate the

danger posed by the fleeing vehicles. Contrast Commonwealth v.

Livington, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 745, 749 (2007) (quickly driving

away to seek medical help after being shot "abated the immediate

risk of being shot again"). Rather, by speeding through red

lights and engaging in a prolonged high-speed chase on busy

public streets, particularly while the police also were in

pursuit, the defendant compounded the risk of harm to the

fleeing vehicles, the police, and the public.

Moreover, the record demonstrates that multiple lawful

alternatives existed. In fact, the defendant pursued one such

alternative: calling the police. The defendant also could have

pulled over when directed by Allen and provided information

regarding the vehicles' location, including any GPS tracking

available to her. She also could have remained in contact with

police by phone and relayed updates without pursuing the fleeing

cars herself. Given the availability of these alternatives that

did not involve a violation of the law, the defendant was not

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justified in committing reckless operation. See Pike, 428 Mass.

at 401.

Accordingly, where the defendant did not provide evidence

on every element of the necessity defense, trial counsel was not

ineffective for not requesting an instruction on the necessity

defense. See DeMarco, 444 Mass. at 685.

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Henry, Hand &
Allen, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: June 29, 2026.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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