Lanctot v. Town of Brewster

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22-P-259 Appeals Court

DANIEL LANCTOT & others1 vs. TOWN OF BREWSTER.

No. 22-P-259.

Barnstable. January 10, 2023. – June 22, 2023.

Present: Sullivan, Shin, & Hodgens, JJ.

Civil Service, Police. Police, Compensation, Hiring. Police
Officer. Public Employment, Police, Salary. Massachusetts
Wage Act. Labor, Wages. Statute, Construction.
Administrative Law, Agency's interpretation of statute,
Agency's interpretation of regulation. Practice, Civil,
Summary judgment. Declaratory Relief.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
April 3, 2017.

The case was heard by Mark C. Gildea, J., on motions for
summary judgment.

Alan H. Shapiro for the plaintiffs.
Paul J. Hodnett for the defendant.
Eric R. Atstupenas, for Massachusetts Chiefs of Police
Association, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

1 Brandon Rice and Morgan Vermette. As is our practice, we
use the caption as it appears in the underlying complaint.
2

HODGENS, J. When sending an employee to a police academy,

a municipality must pay that person "regular wages provided for

the position to which he was appointed." G. L. c. 41, § 96B.

This case clarifies the meaning of that phrase. We hold that a

municipality must pay its employee attending a police academy

the "same basic pay as regular sworn officers." Cambridge v.

Cambridge Police Patrol Officers Ass'n, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 522,

526 (2003). Accordingly, we vacate the entry of summary

judgment in favor of the town of Brewster, and remand this

matter to the Superior Court for entry of declaratory relief in

favor of the plaintiffs.2

Background. As set forth in an agreed statement of facts

submitted on summary judgment, Brewster hired the plaintiffs,

Daniel Lanctot, Brandon Rice, and Morgan Vermette, sent them to

a police academy, and ultimately appointed them as police

officers. More specifically, Brewster solicited applications

for a "Police Officer Entrance Examination." The plaintiffs

passed the entrance examination and applied for the position of

"Police Officer." Brewster hired the plaintiffs to a position

designated in the municipal bylaws as "Cadet." According to

individual employment contracts with Brewster, each plaintiff

would be compensated as a "dispatcher/cadet" while attending the

2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the
Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association, Inc.
3

police academy and would "be sworn in as a Police Officer" upon

completion of the required education and training. In

accordance with the individual contracts, Brewster paid the

plaintiffs at the hourly wage rate for "Cadet" as set by the

bylaws, ranging from $19.08 to $20.19 per hour. Each plaintiff

successfully completed the academy, and Brewster hired them as

probationary police officers at the regular wage rate for police

officers set by the collective bargaining agreement -- $23.06 or

$23.41 per hour, depending on when each plaintiff was hired -- a

higher rate of pay than they received as cadets.

The plaintiffs filed a complaint against Brewster in the

Superior Court seeking declaratory relief and alleging a

violation of G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150 (Wage Act). The parties

filed cross motions for summary judgment on an agreed statement

of facts. The plaintiffs claimed that under G. L. c. 41, § 96B,

they were entitled to be paid as police officers while attending

the academy, and Brewster countered that the statute allowed the

plaintiffs to be paid a lesser wage because they were hired as

cadets. The judge denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary

judgment and entered judgment in favor of Brewster.

Discussion. We review motions for summary judgment "de

novo." Masonic Temple Ass'n of Quincy, Inc. v. Patel, 489 Mass.

549, 553 (2022). When cross motions for summary judgment are

filed on an agreed statement of facts, we review the documentary
4

record to determine whether judgment may issue as a matter of

law. See Kewley v. Department of Elementary & Secondary Educ.,

86 Mass. App. Ct. 154, 158 (2014); Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as

amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). The proper construction of a

statute is a question of law. See Meyer v. Veolia Energy N.

Am., 482 Mass. 208, 211 (2019). As summary judgment turned

entirely on an agreed statement of facts and the interpretation

of G. L. c. 41, § 96B, the present case is "especially suited

for summary disposition and de novo review." Kewley, supra.

The dispute in this case arises from two lengthy sentences

in the text of G. L. c. 41, § 96B:

"Every person who receives an appointment to a position on
a full-time basis in which he will exercise police powers
in the police department of any city or town, shall, prior
to exercising police powers, be assigned to and
satisfactorily complete a prescribed course of study
approved by the municipal police training committee. The
provisions of chapter thirty-one [civil service] and any
collective bargaining agreement notwithstanding, any person
so attending such a school shall be deemed to be a student
officer and shall be exempted from the provisions of
chapter thirty-one and any collective bargaining agreement
for that period during which he is assigned to a municipal
police training school [police academy], provided that such
person shall be paid the regular wages provided for the
position to which he was appointed and such reasonable
expenses as may be determined by the appointing authority
and subject to the provisions of chapter one hundred and
fifty-two [worker's compensation]" (emphases added).

The parties agree that Brewster had an obligation to pay the

plaintiffs while they were attending the police academy. They

disagree over what "regular wages" were due "for the position to
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which [the plaintiffs were] appointed." Id. The plaintiffs

contend that they were entitled to be paid as police officers

because they "were hired to become full-time police officers."

Brewster contends that the statute allowed the plaintiffs to be

paid as cadets because that is the "position to which [the

plaintiffs were] appointed" while attending the academy.

To resolve this dispute, we look to the language of the

statute as "the primary source of insight into the intent of the

Legislature." International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass.

841, 853 (1983). "Clear and unambiguous language in a statute

is conclusive as to legislative intent." Monell v. Boston Pads,

LLC, 471 Mass. 566, 575 (2015). In our view, the unambiguous

language of the statute requires that the plaintiffs should have

been paid as sworn police officers while attending the academy.

The statute requires training for anyone who "will exercise

police powers." G. L. c. 41, § 96B. The statute further

requires that "any person so attending such [police academy]

shall be deemed to be a student officer." Id. Student officers

are exempt from civil service as well as collective bargaining,

"provided" that they are "paid the regular wages provided for

the position to which [they were] appointed." Id. Because

student officers, hired by a municipality, are appointed for the

ultimate purpose of exercising police powers, student officers

must logically be paid the "regular wages" for the "position" of
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a sworn police officer who exercises such powers. Id. The

statute assures "that police recruits who are in training will

receive the same basic pay as regular sworn officers."

Cambridge, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 526.

An alternative construction of the statute risks exalting

form over substance. Brewster contends that the plaintiffs were

hired as cadets who lacked any prospect of exercising "police

powers" in that limited capacity. The record also shows,

however, that Brewster hired the plaintiffs so that they would

become police officers who would exercise police powers.

Brewster solicited applications for a "Police Officer Entrance

Examination." The plaintiffs passed the entrance examination

and applied for the position of "Police Officer." Brewster

entered into employment contracts with all three plaintiffs and

agreed that upon completion of the required education and

training each would "be sworn in as a Police Officer." The

plaintiffs completed the training at the police academy and were

sworn in as probationary police officers. Thus, the plaintiffs

received "appointment[s] to a position on a full-time basis in

which [they] will exercise police powers." G. L. c. 41, § 96B.

They were entitled to "regular wages" for the "position[s] to

which [they were] appointed." Id. They were not hired to

attend the academy for the purpose of becoming cadets; they were

hired to attend the academy for the very purpose of becoming
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police officers and should have been paid the "regular wages" of

police officers. Id.

Brewster also contends that Municipal Police Training

Committee regulations governing the academy lend support to its

position. To be enrolled at the academy, student officers do

not have to be appointed as sworn police officers. See 550 Code

Mass. Regs. § 3.06 (2013) (student officers must be twenty-one

years of age, pass physical ability test, and satisfy medical

examination). The regulations permit a student to be

"sponsored" by a police or law enforcement department, id.,

instead of being "employed by a law enforcement agency." 550

Code Mass. Regs. § 3.02 (2013) (definition of "Sponsored

Candidate"). The regulations also recognize that a student

officer might not be employed as a police officer at the time of

graduation: "any student officer who does not become employed

as a police officer within two years must re-attend the

applicable police academy or reserve/intermittent training

program prior to exercising police powers." 550 Code Mass.

Regs. § 3.03(3) (2013). Contrary to Brewster's argument, none

of these regulations conflicts with our view of the plain

language of § 96B. A sponsored candidate or one otherwise not

employed by a municipality is not a "person who receives an

appointment" while attending the academy. G. L. c. 41, § 96B.

When a municipality chooses to hire a full-time employee who
8

becomes a "student officer" at the academy, the municipality is

required to pay "regular wages" of a sworn police officer. Id.

Brewster contends that the language of the statute "did not

prohibit" the hiring process it used to appoint and pay the

plaintiffs as cadets. For the reasons already stated, we take a

different view. Our conclusion is reinforced by the requirement

in the statute, added by amendment in 1994, that "any person so

attending such a school shall be deemed to be a student

officer." G. L. c. 41, § 96B, as amended through St. 1994,

c. 333. Brewster's bylaw creating a "cadet" position (with a

discretionary rate of pay) conflicts with the plain language of

the statute creating a "student officer" position (with a police

officer rate of pay). G. L. c. 41, § 96B. "[A] municipality

may not enact a bylaw, policy, or regulation that is

inconsistent with State law." Cioch v. Treasurer of Ludlow, 449

Mass. 690, 699 (2007). See G. L. c. 147, § 21A (establishing

process for appointing "police cadets"). Thus, the plain

language of G. L. c. 41, § 96B, prohibits precisely the sort of

special classification that Brewster has tried to create.

Even if § 96B were susceptible to some ambiguity, however,

we discern no legislative intent to pay municipal employees who

become student officers at a rate different than sworn officers.

"[A] statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the

Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the
9

ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in

connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or

imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be

accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be

effectuated." Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of

Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006), quoting Hanlon v.

Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). A review of the long

history of G. L. c. 41, § 96B, shows that the Legislature has

consistently required municipal employees attending a police

academy to be paid as police officers.

In order to provide a uniform, Statewide training program

for municipal police officers, the Legislature enacted "An Act

establishing a municipal police training council and requiring

police officers in cities and in certain towns to attend a

police training school." St. 1964, c. 564, §§ 1-5. This

legislation added G. L. c. 41, § 96B, and instituted a training

requirement for "[e]very person who receives an appointment as a

regular police officer on a permanent full-time basis" in cities

and towns with 5,000 or more inhabitants. St. 1964, c. 564, § 3

(adding G. L. c. 41, § 96B). The appointee would enjoy a grace

period of one year to complete the training and would be "paid

his wages as police officer." St. 1964, c. 564, § 3.

Starting in 1967 and continuing for a decade thereafter,

the Legislature systematically expanded the reach of the
10

training mandate under § 96B. Amendments between 1967 and 1972

reduced the grace period to complete training,3 added in-service

training requirements,4 expanded training requirements for

additional police agencies,5 and maintained the requirement of

police wages for those attending training.6 Through an amendment

in 1977, the Legislature eliminated the grace period, extended

training requirements to "[e]very person who receives an

appointment to a position on a permanent full-time basis in

which he will exercise police powers," and added a training

requirement for anyone "appointed as a reserve, or intermittent

police officer, in a city or town." St. 1977, c. 932. The 1977

amendment further added to the patchwork of police agencies

3 See St. 1967, c. 504 (reduced grace period to six months).

4 St. 1968, c. 742 (added "in-service" training
requirement).

5 St. 1968, c. 742 (extended in-service training requirement
to include "metropolitan district commission police [and] the
capitol police"); St. 1971, c. 172 (extended in-service training
requirement to include "Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority police"); St. 1972, c. 697 (extended initial training
and in-service training to include all full-time municipal
police, "the metropolitan district commission police, the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority police, the capitol
police, [and] . . . an employee of the registry of motor
vehicles having police powers").

6 St. 1967, c. 504 (trainee "shall be paid his wages as
police officer"); St. 1968, c. 742 (in-service trainee shall be
paid "his regular wages as a police officer"); St. 1972, c. 697
(initial and in-service trainee shall be paid wages as "police
officer").
11

within the sweep of the training requirement by including the

"division of law enforcement within the office of the secretary

of the executive office of environmental affairs." Id. The

1977 amendment also added the language that is central to the

instant dispute: "Any person so attending such a school shall

be paid the wages provided for the position to which he was

appointed and such reasonable expenses as may be determined by

the appointing authority" (emphasis added). Id.

When read in the context of the prior amendments and

existing statutes regarding police powers, the language in the

1977 amendment is a clear effort to mandate training for those

who would be exercising police powers (regardless of the formal

occupational title). See, e.g., St. 1970, c. 534, § 2 (granting

police powers to Registry of Motor Vehicles "supervising

inspectors . . . , supervisors of special services and assistant

supervisors of special services, investigators, examiners and

safety instructors") (amending G. L. c. 90, § 29; partially

repealed by St. 1991, c. 412, § 58); St. 1938, c. 249, § 5

(granting police powers to "superintendent [of buildings] and

his capitol police") (amending G. L. c. 8, § 12; repealed by St.

1984, c. 413, § 12); St. 1939, c. 441, § 1 (granting police

powers to "call officer" of Metropolitan District Commission)

(amending G. L. c. 92, § 62A; repealed by St. 1991, c. 412,

§ 65). Because of the various formal titles assigned to those
12

entrusted with police powers in the diverse law enforcement

landscape of 1977, the amendment necessarily included the broad

phrase, "position to which he was appointed," as a mechanism to

include all the wide-ranging personnel included under the new

training mandate. St. 1977, c. 932. We do not read this phrase

as an effort by the Legislature to deprive student officers from

receiving wages of a police officer or as an invitation to

municipalities to craft an alternative wage structure. See

Everett v. Revere, 344 Mass. 585, 589 (1962), quoting Walsh v.

Commissioners of Civ. Serv., 300 Mass. 244, 246 (1938) (proper

statutory construction requires interpretation "with reference

to the pre-existing law" that results in "harmonious and

consistent body of law").

Conclusion. The judgment of the Superior Court is vacated,

and judgment shall enter for the plaintiffs on Count I of their

complaint seeking declaratory relief. The case is remanded to

the Superior Court for entry of a declaration that the town of

Brewster violated G. L. c. 41, § 96B, by failing to pay the

plaintiffs regular wages as police officers while they attended

the police academy, and for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.7

7 The parties have not briefed, and we do not reach, any
issue as to Count II of the plaintiffs' complaint concerning the
town's liability under G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150, or as to the
issue of damages.
13

So ordered.