Commonwealth v. David M. Strachan.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-517

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

DAVID M. STRACHAN.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a police officer found the defendant, David Strachan,

unresponsive from an apparent drug overdose, the officer

requested emergency medical assistance; the defendant recovered

and thereafter was charged with possession. A District Court

judge dismissed the charges, concluding that G. L. c. 94C,

§ 34A (b), immunized the defendant from prosecution. We affirm.

1. Background. We briefly recite the undisputed facts.

In the early morning hours of October 17, 2021, Officer Michael

Ramsey of the Pembroke Police Department was on routine patrol

when he observed a vehicle with its lights on and the driver,

later identified as the defendant, slumped over the steering

wheel. Officer Ramsey noticed that drool was coming out of the

defendant's mouth. Although the defendant was still breathing,

Officer Ramsey's multiple attempts to wake him up were
unsuccessful. Officer Ramsey saw what he believed to be drug

residue and paraphernalia in the defendant's car and, believing

that the defendant was overdosing, called dispatch for

assistance. Several other police officers arrived at the scene

and attempted unsuccessfully to wake up the defendant. Officer

Ramsey broke the car window and administered Narcan to the

defendant. Emergency responders with the Pembroke Fire

Department, who soon appeared on the scene, twice more

administered Narcan to the defendant.1

After the defendant was transported to the hospital, police

conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, which resulted in

the seizure of drugs found in the center console. The defendant

was charged with one count of possession of a class A substance

(heroin), in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 34, and one count of

possession of a class B substance (crack cocaine), also in

violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 34.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that

because he was suffering from a drug-related overdose, and

because the drugs were found as a result of a call for medical

attention, he was immune from prosecution under G. L. c. 94C,

§ 34A (b). The Commonwealth argued that the defendant was not

1 While en route to the hospital, the defendant was revived.

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immune because the call for medical assistance was initiated by

a police officer.

2. Discussion. As it presents a question of statutory

construction, we review the judge's decision to dismiss the

criminal charges under G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b), de novo.

Commonwealth v. Wade, 475 Mass. 54, 60 (2016).

"[T]he meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be

sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that

is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it

according to its terms." Commonwealth v. Soto, 476 Mass. 436,

438 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 Mass. 555, 557

(2014). If a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, and

if its application does not lead to an absurd result, that

language is conclusive of legislative intent. Commonwealth v.

Wassilie, 482 Mass. 562, 573 (2019). We look at the language of

the entire statute, "not just a single sentence," so as to

interpret all of its terms "harmoniously to effectuate the

intent of the Legislature" (quotation omitted). Phillips v.

Equity Residential Mgt., L.L.C., 478 Mass. 251, 257 (2017).

Finally, if there is any ambiguity in the statute, the rule of

lenity requires that criminal statutes be strictly construed

against the Commonwealth and that any ambiguity be resolved in

favor of the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Wotan, 422 Mass.

740, 742 (1996).

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With this backdrop in mind, we begin our analysis by

reading the plain language of the statute. Commonwealth v.

Rossetti, 489 Mass. 589, 593 (2022). Relevant here, G. L.

c. 94C, § 34A (b), provides immunity from prosecution to a

person suffering from a drug overdose if that person, as a

result of receiving medical assistance, is found to be in

possession of drugs.2 This subsection states:

"A person who experiences a drug-related overdose and is in
need of medical assistance and, in good faith, seeks such
medical assistance, or is the subject of such a good faith
request for medical assistance, shall not be charged or
prosecuted for possession of a controlled substance under
said section 34 . . . if the evidence for the charge of
possession of a controlled substance or violation was
gained as a result of the overdose and the need for medical
assistance."

G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b). Under the plain words of the statute,

if a person experienced a drug overdose and made a good faith

request for medical assistance and, as a result, the police

found the person to be in possession of drugs, immunity would

apply. That same person would also be entitled to immunity if

they were in possession of drugs, experienced a drug overdose,

2 Subsection (a) provides immunity from prosecution to a person
who seeks medical assistance for someone experiencing a drug-
related overdose. G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (a). So, under this
subsection, a person who calls for help for someone overdosing,
but in the course of the incident is found to be in possession
of drugs, would be immune from prosecution. The Commonwealth
asks that we analyze G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (a), to give context to
specific language in G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b). Because, as
discussed below, we find G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b), to be
unambiguous, we do not examine G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (a).

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and did not seek medical assistance themselves but were instead

the subject of a good faith request by someone else for medical

assistance.

Turning to the facts of this case, the defendant was

undoubtedly experiencing a drug-related overdose when police

encountered him. The defendant, unresponsive and slumped over

the steering wheel, was in no condition to call for medical

assistance. He became the subject of a good faith request for

medical assistance when Officer Ramsey called dispatch for

assistance after numerous attempts to wake him were

unsuccessful. See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/good%20faith ("good

faith" means "honesty or lawfulness of purpose"). Emergency

responders were called and administered additional doses of

Narcan as a life-saving measure. Finally, while on the scene,

and after the defendant was being transported to the hospital,

drugs were found as a result of an inventory search. In other

words, drugs were discovered by police because the defendant's

overdose caused Officer Ramsey to seek medical assistance, which

caused the defendant to be transported to the hospital and

resulted in the need for his car to be towed and an inventory

search to be completed.

Based on the plain language of the statute, we conclude

that the defendant was immune from prosecution for possession

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under § 34 since the drugs were found as a result of his being

the subject of a good faith call for medical assistance while he

was experiencing a drug overdose. We are not persuaded by the

Commonwealth's argument that § 34A (b), when read as a whole,

does not apply when police officers request medical assistance

for an overdose victim. Nothing in the statute differentiates a

citizen seeking medical assistance for someone experiencing a

drug-related overdose from a police officer making that same

request. Contrary to the Commonwealth's position, it is not an

absurd or illogical result that the defendant in this case has

immunity. The Legislature unambiguously expressed its intent to

encourage people, whether it be the person suffering from an

overdose or someone witnessing said overdose, to call for

medical assistance in order to obtain lifesaving treatment. The

Legislative intent, to save the lives of individuals

experiencing a life threatening drug overdose, is accomplished

whether an ordinary citizen, a paramedic, or a police officer

calls for medical assistance to prevent death by overdose.

The Commonwealth asks us to interpret the language of the

statute to exclude police officers from the scope of § 34A (b).

However, as noted above, when the language of the statute is

clear and unambiguous, and when the result is not illogical, we

must apply the plain language of the statute. Our role

prohibits judicial construction when the language is clear.

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Nothing in the plain language of G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b),

requires that a person who calls for help for someone

experiencing a drug overdose be a nonpolice officer. Without

any ambiguity, we are prohibited from adding language to the

statute in order to effectuate what the Commonwealth argues is a

commonsense reading of the statute. Had the Legislature

intended to narrow the scope of immunity so that it did not

apply when law enforcement seeks medical assistance, it could

have specifically included such language. It did not do so.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin, Neyman &
Walsh, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: October 20, 2023.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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