Daniel Knight v. Attorney General.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-765

DANIEL KNIGHT

vs.

ATTORNEY GENERAL.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Daniel Knight, filed a complaint in the

Superior Court seeking compensation from the Commonwealth for

wrongful convictions, pursuant to G. L. c. 258D. He claimed

that he was entitled to compensation because a judge ultimately

vacated his convictions and dismissed the underlying

indictments. A Superior Court judge allowed the Commonwealth's

motion to dismiss, a judgment of dismissal entered, and the

plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

Background. On May 24, 2006, the plaintiff pleaded guilty

to three indictments charging possession of a class A controlled

substance and two counts of distribution of a class A controlled

substance. A Superior Court judge sentenced him to eleven

months in the house of correction followed by two years of

probation. The plaintiff later violated his probation, and
another judge sentenced him to an additional year in the house

of correction.

Twelve years after the convictions, the Supreme Judicial

Court issued an opinion in the case of Committee for Pub.

Counsel Servs. v. Attorney Gen., 480 Mass. 700, 704 (2018), that

resulted in the dismissal of thousands of convictions and

pending charges connected with the Amherst drug laboratory where

an employee tampered with evidence in criminal cases. In

accordance with that opinion, on November 2, 2018, a single

justice of the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the plaintiff's

convictions and dismissed the indictments with prejudice.

On April 15, 2021, the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking

compensation pursuant to G. L. c. 258D. Following a hearing, a

judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss. The judge

reasoned, "Nothing in the dismissal of the defendant's three

convictions, or the facts and circumstances underlying that

relief, tends to show that he was innocent. Therefore, the

plaintiff is not eligible to pursue a claim under G.L. c. 258D."

Discussion. "We review the allowance of a motion to

dismiss de novo" (citation omitted). Verveine Corp. v.

Strathmore Ins. Co., 489 Mass. 534, 538 (2022). "A motion to

dismiss will be granted unless the factual allegations in the

complaint are enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level based on the assumption that all the

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allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in

fact)" (quotation and citation omitted). Id.

To recover damages against the Commonwealth for a wrongful

conviction, the plaintiff must initially establish that he is

within a "class of persons eligible to obtain relief." G. L.

c. c. 258D, § 1 (B). As relevant here, that class of persons

includes "those who have been granted judicial relief by a state

court of competent jurisdiction, on grounds which tend to

establish the innocence of the individual." G. L. c. 258D,

§ 1 (B) (ii). Such grounds must rest "upon facts and

circumstances probative of the proposition that the [plaintiff]

did not commit the crime" (citation omitted). Guzman v.

Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 354, 362 (2010). Put another way, "a

plaintiff must first show that the grounds for judicial relief

were probative of his innocence." Riley v. Commonwealth, 82

Mass. App. Ct. 209, 212 n.3 (2012).

Here, the judicial relief granted by the single justice was

unrelated to the question of the plaintiff's innocence.

According to the record, the single justice vacated the

plaintiff's convictions by "SJC order." The origin of that

referenced order comes from Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs.,

480 Mass. at 723, 729, where the Supreme Judicial Court

disclaimed a case-by-case adjudication and opted instead for a

global remedy involving thousands of cases impacted by

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improprieties at the Amherst drug laboratory. Thus, far from

being "probative of his innocence," Riley, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at

212 n.3, the order of the single justice was based solely on the

fact that the class A substances in the plaintiff's case

happened to be analyzed at the subject lab during a certain time

period. Nothing in the single justice's order suggests any

"facts and circumstances probative of the proposition that the

[plaintiff] did not commit the crime[s]" (citation omitted).

Guzman, 458 Mass. at 362. Therefore, the plaintiff did not

establish that he is within a "class of persons eligible to

obtain relief." G. L. c. 258D § 1 (B).

We disagree with the plaintiff's contention that the global

remedy provided by the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in

Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. inferentially established his

innocence. He contends that the dismissal of the indictments

and the absence of any evidence from the Amherst drug laboratory

logically indicate innocence. He reasons, "if the necessary

element of possession cannot be established, a presumptive

inference should be given to [the plaintiff] that no crime was

committed." The Supreme Judicial Court has rejected similar

arguments.

In Commonwealth v. Caliz, 486 Mass. 888, 892 (2021), the

court recognized the egregious misconduct related to the Amherst

drub laboratory but declined to equate "government misconduct"

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with "actual innocence." Also, a judicial remedy that results

in the absence of an opportunity for retrial due to "dismissal

or nolle prosequi of the underlying criminal charge[s]" does not

equate with innocence. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 434,

439 (2017). Judicial remedies for "'procedural or evidentiary

errors or structural deficiencies at . . . trial[] that could

well be "consistent" with innocence without any tendency to

establish it' would not meet the statutory definition." Irwin

v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 846 (2013), quoting Guzman, 458

Mass. at 358. Because the plaintiff's convictions were not

vacated on grounds tending to establish innocence, he is not

eligible for relief under G. L. c. 258D. Contrast Renaud v.

Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 315, 319 (2015) (grounds for relief

pertained to insufficient evidence of "the identity of the

defendant"); Drumgold v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 367, 378

(2010) (grounds for relief probative of "reliability of the

identification of [the defendant] as one of the shooters");

Guzman, 458 Mass. at 365 (grounds for judicial relief tend to

establish innocence where "erroneously omitted evidence was

probative of the conclusion that the culprit was someone else").

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Finally, based on the result we have reached, we need not

consider whether the length of the plaintiff's sentences

qualified for relief under G. L. c. 258D.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Shin, Brennan &
Hodgens, JJ. 1),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: April 10, 2024.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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