L.E. v. V.E.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1120

L.E.

vs.

V.E.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

At an ex parte hearing held on July 26, 2023, a Probate and

Family Court judge issued a temporary abuse prevention order

against the defendant (husband) at the request of the plaintiff

(wife). The docket reflects that the order was not extended and

that it expired by operation of law. Representing himself, the

husband nevertheless appealed the issuance of the order. We

affirm.1

There was an ample basis in the wife's affidavit and

testimony to support the judge's finding that the wife held an

objectively reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm by

the husband. Nothing more was required. See Ginsberg v.

1The expiration of the ex parte temporary order does not
appear to have mooted this appeal. See Wooldrige v. Hickey, 45
Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998).
Blacker, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 142-143 (2006). The husband is

left to argue that the judge did not sufficiently probe the

wife's allegations,2 and that, if she had done so, the judge

would not have credited those allegations. We discern no abuse

of discretion or other error in the degree of scrutiny that the

judge applied.3

Abuse prevention order
entered July 26, 2023,
affirmed.

By the Court (Milkey, Sacks &
Smyth, JJ.4),

Assistant Clerk
Entered: April 26, 2024.

2 For example, the husband argues that closer scrutiny of
the wife's allegations would have revealed internal
inconsistencies in them.
3 To ensure that our ruling is not misinterpreted, we note

that the husband filed a timely motion to terminate the ex parte
order and the docket appears to reflect that that motion remains
open. Any recourse the husband has with respect to the relief
he is seeking would be to pursue that motion. We express no
view of the merits of that motion or even whether it is moot,
except to add the following observations. Had the husband's
motion to vacate been allowed, the husband would have been
entitled to have copies of the abuse prevention order possessed
by certain law enforcement officials ordered destroyed. See
Quinn v. Gjoni, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 414 (2016). See also
Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. 153, 156-157 (1997) (destruction
of records in statewide domestic violence recordkeeping system
not required). Full expungement of all records is not relief to
which the husband would have been entitled absent proof,
"through clear and convincing evidence that the order was
obtained through fraud on the court." Quinn, supra at 414 n.14.
Nothing in the record suggests that the wife committed a fraud
on the court.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

2