Shontae Praileau v. Oliver Ibe.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-1171

SHONTAE PRAILEAU

vs.

OLIVER IBE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Shontae Praileau, was employed as an

academic advisor at the Francis College of Engineering at the

University of Massachusetts Lowell ("UML"). She was hired in

the fall of 2016 and began work in January 2017. During that

time, the defendant, Oliver Ibe, held the position of Associate

Dean of Undergraduate Studies and was Praileau's direct

supervisor. In June 2019, Praileau filed a nine-count complaint

in the Superior Court alleging, among other things, that Ibe had

subjected her to a hostile work environment on the basis of
sexual harassment, race, 1 and national origin, in violation of

G. L. c. 151B, § 4. Following a jury-waived trial, the judge,

having heard substantial evidence of sexual harassment, found in

favor of Praileau and awarded her $250,000 in compensatory

damages for emotional distress. 2 The judge further concluded

that Ibe's "behavior was outrageous and the result of malicious

motive and reckless indifference," and awarded Praileau an

additional $100,000 in punitive damages. The total award, which

included costs and prejudgment interest, was $440,092. In

addition, the judge allowed Praileau's motion for attorney's

fees pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 9, in the amount of $114,100.

Ibe appeals. He contends that the judge erred by admitting

in evidence prejudicial hearsay, which included third-party

opinions of his liability, and by permitting counsel for

Praileau to cross-examine him about allegations that he sexually

harassed other women (students) at UML and at Georgia Tech,

where he previously had been employed. He further contends that

certain records, which he characterizes as medical records, were

not properly certified and that the award of attorney's fees was

excessive. We affirm.

1 Praileau is a Black woman and Ibe is a Black man from
Nigeria.

2 Ultimately, Praileau voluntarily dismissed counts two
through nine and proceeded solely on count one, which alleged a
hostile work environment on the basis of sexual harassment.

2
Background. The judge could have found the following.

Praileau's first day of work at UML was January 17, 2017. That

day, Ibe invited Praileau to lunch and the two went to a nearby

restaurant. During their conversation, Ibe asked Praileau

inappropriate questions about her sexual orientation and

preferences for sexual partners. Soon thereafter, Ibe began to

refer to Praileau as his "girlfriend," declared his love for

her, and put what he referred to as their anniversary date on an

office whiteboard. Ibe also engaged in unwanted physical

contact with Praileau. He frequently hugged and touched her and

kissed her on the forehead. Ibe often insisted on walking

Praileau to her car after work and called her at home. During

one telephone conversation he told Praileau that he wanted to

"put a baby inside of [her]." When Praileau attempted to avoid

Ibe, he reminded her that he was her supervisor and could

"erase" her at any time. Ibe, who was married, also told

Praileau that in his "Ibo" culture of Nigeria, which was his

native country, older men like himself had multiple wives and

relationships with younger women like Praileau. These overtures

and sexual advances caused Praileau stress and anxiety.

However, because Praileau was a new employee and on probation

for the first ninety days of her employment, she did not tell

anyone about Ibe's behavior.

3
The situation changed for Praileau when she visited her

family over the Easter holiday in April and told her relatives

about Ibe's behavior. As she put it during her testimony at

trial, that discussion "empowered" her to confront Ibe and also

to seek out other Black women at UML to determine if they too

had been subjected to sexual harassment by Ibe.

Praileau met with two women a few weeks later on May 5,

2017. One of them, Francine Coston, testified at trial. 3

Following this meeting, Praileau and Coston filed complaints

against Ibe with UML's office of Equal Opportunity and Outreach

["EOO"]. That office conducted an investigation, which resulted

first in a directive that Ibe have no contact with Praileau, and

then with Ibe's removal from his position as Associate Dean.

UML also relocated Praileau's office twice, but because Ibe

still found ways to see her, UML transferred Praileau to a

different department that was located in another area of campus.

Praileau was upset by this decision because it required her to

advise students who were studying the arts and humanities and

not science and math, which were the subjects in which she had

been trained and for which she had a passion.

3 At trial, Coston relayed that she had similar experiences
with Ibe, who referred to her as his "girlfriend" and told her
that he loved her. She claimed that he touched her
inappropriately on one occasion. Coston did not report Ibe's
conduct to UML until after her conversation with Praileau in May
2017.

4
Ibe provided a different version of events at trial. He

denied the allegations of sexual harassment and explained that

he did not contest his removal as Assistant Dean, which he

acknowledged was predicated on UML's finding that he had engaged

in sexual harassment, because he did not have the resources to

fight the decision and not because the allegations were true.

In addition, Ibe explained that he did not challenge the

allegations lodged by Praileau or Coston because "culturally" he

could not insult "two [B]lack women" in public because he was

from Nigeria "[where one does not] wash . . .dirty linens in

public." Although Ibe acknowledged that he called Praileau his

girlfriend, and that he "joke[d]" with Praileau about the fact

that she was on probation and that he could "erase" her, he

maintained that he never touched or kissed Praileau and had no

reason to do so. He testified that Praileau's claim that he

said he wanted to put a baby inside of her was "absolutely

false." In response to questions posed by Praileau's counsel,

Ibe acknowledged that he had been previously employed at Georgia

Tech as an assistant professor and left after he was accused of

sexually harassing four women graduate students, but claimed

that he was not fired, but rather was asked to leave and did so.

He asserted that those allegations also were false and were the

result of discrimination.

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Discussion. As an initial matter, with the exception of

his claim that the award of attorney's fees was excessive, none

of the issues Ibe raises on appeal were preserved by a proper

objection at trial. 4 Accordingly, the issues are waived, and we

need not address them. See Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446

Mass. 270, 285 (2006). Furthermore, contrary to Ibe's

assertions, he does not raise any arguments of "public

importance" that would prompt us to exercise our discretion to

address his claims. See Costo v. Brait Bldrs. Corp., 463 Mass.

65, 70 (2012). Nor are we persuaded that we should excuse the

absence of proper objections on the ground that Ibe represented

himself at trial. It is well settled that pro se litigants are

held to the same standards as practicing attorneys. E.g.,

Jackson v. Commonwealth, 430 Mass. 260, 264 (1999), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 1194 (2000). Nevertheless, in the interests of

justice, we have reviewed the record carefully, and discern no

basis for granting Ibe a new trial. In addition, we conclude

that the judge did not abuse her discretion in calculating the

appropriate amount of attorney's fees.

1. Hearsay and opinion evidence. Ibe first argues that

two letters, one dated June 28, 2017, and one dated July 11,

2017, sent to him by the Director of EOO and the Dean of the

4 Ibe either did not object or did so on grounds different
from those he presses on appeal.

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Francis College of Engineering respectively, were improperly

admitted in evidence because they contained hearsay and the

opinions of UML officials regarding his conduct.

The first letter, introduced as Exhibit 2, included a

"[s]ummary of inquiry into concerns of inappropriate sexual

behaviors presented by Ms. Shontae Praileau and Ms. Francine

Coston." The letter notified Ibe of EOO's conclusion that he

had violated university policies regarding sexual harassment. 5

The second letter (or memorandum), introduced as Exhibit 3,

informed Ibe that, effective immediately, he was to be removed

from the position of Associate Dean and would return to the

faculty as a professor. The letter also instructed Ibe to not

engage in any further misconduct and warned him of the

consequences should he do so.

To be sure, both letters contained hearsay and conclusions

reached by UML officials about Ibe's conduct. However, the

judge recognized this was so and explicitly ruled that she would

not consider either letter for the truth of the matter asserted.

When Praileau's counsel sought to introduce the first letter,

Ibe objected on the ground that the letter was "confidential."

The judge explained that confidentiality was not a proper basis

5 The letter also addressed Ibe's inappropriate comments to
Praileau regarding her race. EEO concluded that Ibe had made
the remarks, but that they did not rise to the level of a
violation of the university's guidelines on nondiscrimination.

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for excluding the letter, and then raised the issue of hearsay

sua sponte. After a discussion with counsel, the judge admitted

the letter in evidence solely "for the purpose of notice to the

defendant, going to the defendant's state of mind and his

knowledge but not for the truth of the matter asserted." Ibe

objected to the second letter on the same ground, stating that

it was confidential. This objection also was overruled, and the

judge again explained that the letter would be considered solely

for "the purpose of notice to the defendant as it goes to his

state of mind and understanding at that time but not as to the

truth of the matter asserted therein."

We discern no error in admitting the two letters for the

limited purposes described by the judge. See Zucco v. Kane, 439

Mass. 503, 507 (2003) ("We do not disturb a judge's decision to

admit evidence absent an abuse of discretion or other legal

error"). The judge's rulings left no question that she

considered the letters to have minimal probative value and that

she would decide the issues before her without regard to the

opinions expressed by EEO or the dean.

2. Testimony regarding additional allegations of sexual

harassment. Ibe resigned from UML on July 30, 2019. Counsel

for Praileau asked Ibe questions about his reasons for resigning

and in doing so implied that Ibe resigned after a student

accused him of sexual harassment. Counsel also asked questions

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about Ibe's resignation from Georgia Tech decades earlier after

Ibe was accused of sexual harassment by four women graduate

students. Ibe answered these questions and denied any

wrongdoing. Ibe now argues, in effect, that he should not have

been asked these questions and that any testimony about

allegations of sexual harassment concerning other women at

Georgia Tech or UML had no probative value and was

"devastatingly prejudicial" to his defense.

Even if we were to conclude, as Ibe contends we should,

that the questions posed to him and his responses cast him in a

bad light, that conclusion would not be a sufficient basis on

which to grant Ibe a new trial. As Ibe acknowledges, this was a

jury-waived trial, and we therefore are less concerned about the

possibility of prejudice than we otherwise would be. See

Rabinowitz v. Schenkman, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 538, 542 (2023). In

addition, the judge was acutely attuned to the possibility of

prejudice and, in fact, admonished Praileau's counsel for

soliciting testimony about Ibe's alleged sexual harassment of

other women several times. For example, at one point while

counsel was questioning Ibe about whether he had touched a

student inappropriately, the judge interjected stating that the

evidence was not relevant and subsequently reminded counsel that

questions are not evidence, "it is the answers that matter." In

addition, at a later point in the trial the judge explained that

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she "allowed the Georgia Tech information [allegations of sexual

harassment] to come in during the examination of Mr. Ibe based

upon the idea that it was notice to him, that similar behavior

had been demonstrated to him to be unacceptable and

inappropriate." Given these circumstances, we are confident

that contrary to Ibe's assertions, the judge, as finder of fact,

was not impermissibly influenced by the line of questioning he

now challenges. Indeed, the judge made this abundantly clear

when she informed counsel: "I am here to decide Ms. Praileau's

case."

3. Medical records. Praileau's counsel introduced a

preprinted form required to be completed by a health care

provider in connection with a request for leave under the Family

and Medical Leave Act. The form was completed by a licensed

social worker who treated Praileau for post-traumatic stress

disorder resulting from Ibe's conduct. The social worker also

wrote a letter to UML requesting that Praileau be excused from

attending a workshop in May 2018 due to her ongoing stress. Ibe

argues that both documents were inadmissible because they were

not properly certified as medical records pursuant to G. L.

c. 233, § 79G, and were not completed by an authorized

physician. There was no error.

First, neither document was described or introduced as a

medical record and therefore we need not address the question

10
whether the requirements of G. L. c. 233, § 79G, were met.

Second, the documents were relevant to the question whether

Praileau suffered emotional distress. Thus, even had there been

an objection, the judge did not abuse her discretion in

admitting either document in evidence.

4. Award of attorney's fees. Ibe argues that the award of

attorney's fees is excessive and claims that the judge abused

her discretion by not properly calculating the reasonable amount

of labor and time required in determining the amount of a

reasonable fee. We review an award of attorney's fees for abuse

of discretion. Lydon v. Coulter, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 914, 914

(2014). Based on the record provided to us, we discern no abuse

of discretion. The judge considered the hourly rate ($500) to

be consistent with counsel's level of experience and expertise

and similar to the hourly fee charged by other attorneys

practicing in the same field. She also found the time spent to

be reasonable. The judge was in the best position to determine

the amount of time reasonably required in the circumstances and

we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge.

5. Request for appellate attorney's fees. Praileau

requests an award of attorney's fees for work performed on her

behalf during the appellate proceedings pursuant to G. L.

c. 151B, § 9. As the prevailing party, she is entitled to such

an award. Praileau may, within fourteen days of the issuance of

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this decision, submit a detailed and supported petition in

accordance with the procedures set forth in Fabre v. Walton, 441

Mass. 9, 10-11 (2004).

Ibe will have fourteen days thereafter to file a response.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono,
Wolohojian 6 & Toone, JJ. 7),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: May 20, 2024.

6 Justice Wolohojian participated in the deliberation on
this case while an Associate Justice of this court, prior to her
appointment as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial
Court.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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