Keri Lee Connolly Aldred v. Stephen James Aldred, Jr.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-30

KERI LEE CONNOLLY ALDRED

vs.

STEPHEN JAMES ALDRED, JR.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, wife, sued the defendant, her husband, in

the Probate and Family Court, seeking separate support. Around

six months after the plaintiff's initial complaint, the

defendant filed a motion to disqualify the plaintiff's attorney

from continuing to represent her in those proceedings. The

Probate and Family Court judge granted the defendant's motion,

seemingly on the ground that, because the plaintiff's attorney

had previously represented the parties jointly in the

defendant's adoption of the plaintiff's minor child, a conflict

of interest in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9 (a), as
amended, 490 Mass. 1305 (2022), existed.1,2 The plaintiff

appeals from that decision. Concluding that the attorney should

not have been disqualified, we reverse.

Discussion. "A lawyer who has formerly represented a

client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person

in the same or a substantially related matter in which that

person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of

the former client unless the former client gives informed

consent, confirmed in writing." Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9 (a).

"Not every successive representation presents a conflict arising

from the representation of a former client." Slade v. Ormsby,

69 Mass. App. Ct. 542, 546 (2007), citing Adoption of Erica, 426

Mass. 55, 61 (1997).

"Under the substantial relationship test, the Supreme
Judicial Court has set forth two criteria to test a claim
that an attorney should be disqualified because of a
conflict arising from the representation of a former
client: (1) the current representation must be adverse to
the interests of the former client; and (2) the matters of
the two representations must be substantially related"
(quotations and citation omitted).

Slade, supra.

"A party generally enjoys the right to the counsel of his

or her choice, and courts should not lightly interrupt the

1 The judge did not issue written findings.

2 The plaintiff submitted uncontroverted affidavits from
herself and her attorney asserting that the adoption proceedings
were uncontested. The record before us supports that claim.

2
relationship between a lawyer and [a] client" (quotations and

citations omitted). Steinert v. Steinert, 73 Mass. App. Ct.

287, 288 (2008). "The burden . . . rests on the party seeking

disqualification to establish the need to interfere with the

relationship." Id. "Where, as here, it is opposing counsel who

seeks disqualification, we must 'be alert that the Canons of

Ethics are not brandished for tactical advantage.'" Id.,

quoting Serody v. Serody, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 414 (1985).

"When disqualification occurs after employment has begun, it

temporarily (and possibly permanently) disables the litigant in

[her] effort to prosecute a claim or mount a defense." Borman

v. Borman, 378 Mass 775, 787 (1979).

"Under the present execution doctrine, a disqualification

order, as we have here, is treated as a final judgment that is

immediately appealable." Slade, 69 Mass. App. Ct. at 544,

citing Borman, 378 Mass. at 780. "We review the

disqualification order for an abuse of discretion." Steinert,

73 Mass. App. Ct. at 288. "[A] judge's discretionary decision

constitutes an abuse of discretion where we conclude the judge

made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant

to the decision, such that the decision falls outside the range

of reasonable alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted).

L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

3
In this instance, we conclude that the judge abused his

discretion by granting the defendant's motion to disqualify. In

order to grant the motion, the judge was required to consider

both branches of the substantial relationship test. See Slade,

69 Mass. App. Ct. at 546. It is a foregone conclusion that the

first branch, inquiring whether "the current representation [is]

adverse to the interests of the former client" was satisfied, as

the parties oppose each other in the present case. Id. The

judge was therefore required to turn to the second branch and

consider whether the previous matter was "substantially related"

to the present matter such that disqualification was

appropriate. Id.

Such an analysis is "intensely fact specific." Coke v.

Equity Residential Props. Trust, 440 Mass. 511, 516 (2003).

Here, however, there was no evidence offered in support of the

motion. The defendant did not file an affidavit or other

documentary evidence, and, although a hearing was held, neither

party nor any other witness testified. The only support the

defendant offered was a brief and conclusory statement by his

attorney at the hearing that "there [are] some issues between

[the defendant] and that particular child in this case, and so

that . . . is going to be . . . extremely relevant as to

parenting schedule, custody, in this case." We are left to

wonder, as was the judge below, what those issues could be, how

4
they could become relevant in the present case, or, indeed, what

information plaintiff's counsel possessed about them. See

Wessell v. Mink Brook Assocs., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 747, 752 (2015)

("For matters to be 'substantially related,' courts have

consistently found that counsel must possess confidential

information that could be used against the former client in the

current representation"). The defendant did not provide an

answer to those questions in any of his filings or in his

statements before the judge.3,4 Indeed, counsel for the

defendant went as far as to say that "[she] doesn't know what

was communicated between the parties and their former counsel."5

As "courts should not lightly interrupt the relationship between

a lawyer and [a] client,"6 (quotation and citation omitted),

Steinert, 73 Mass. App. Ct. at 288, the defendant fell well

short of meeting his burden of establishing the requirements

3 The defendant did not submit a brief in opposition to this
appeal.

4 We note that the defendant never asserted that any
communications between himself and the child were confidential.
See Wessell, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 752.

5 Plaintiff's counsel, in his affidavit, asserted that "no
confidential information or secrets were obtained by me in [the
adoption] proceedings."

6 The plaintiff stated in her affidavit that counsel had
represented her in other matters and that she was satisfied with
his representation and wished him to represent her in these
proceedings as well.

5
necessary to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel. Without more,

we agree with the plaintiff that the judge abused his discretion

by granting the scantly supported motion.7,8

Order disqualifying
plaintiff's counsel
reversed.

By the Court (Desmond, Shin &
Singh, JJ.9),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: June 13, 2024.

7 We have said in a past case that "[i]t is not for this
court to make the initial fact-finding inquiry into whether the
disqualification order was proper," Slade, 69 Mass. App. Ct. at
547-548, and remanded the case for further findings. In that
case, the record contained considerably more evidence that
suggested disqualification was possibly appropriate. See id. at
543-544. The defendant in this case has presented no evidence
in support of his motion, and, accordingly, we consider that
remedy unsuitable here.

8 The plaintiff has requested appellate attorney's fees but
provided no basis therefor. Accordingly, we decline to order
attorney's fees. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as
appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019) ("The argument shall contain
. . . the contentions of the appellant . . . and the reasons
therefor").
9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

6