Massachusetts Youth Soccer Association, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of the Town of Lancaster (May 16, 2012)

  COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD


MASSACHUSETTS YOUTH 	   v.    	BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF        SOCCER ASSOCIATION, INC.			THE TOWN OF LANCASTER		     
 
Docket Nos. F299524	   			Promulgated:
		  F299525				May 16, 2012	  		   			   

	These are appeals under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal of the Board of Assessors of the Town of Lancaster ("assessors" or "appellee") to abate taxes and exempt certain real estate located in the Town of Lancaster owned by and assessed to Massachusetts Youth Soccer Association, Inc. ("MYSA" or "appellant") under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal year 2009 ("fiscal year at issue").
Commissioner Mulhern heard these appeals.  Chairman Hammond and Commissioners Scharaffa, Egan and Rose joined him in the decision for the appellee.   
These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a request by the appellant under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.  

Donna M. Truex, Esq. and Joshua Lee Smith, Esq. for the appellant.  

Ellen M. Hutchinson, Esq. for the appellee.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
	On July 1, 2008 ("determination date"), the relevant date for qualification for the exemption under G.L. c. 59, § 5, Third ("Clause Third") for the fiscal year at issue, MYSA was the assessed owner of two parcels of real estate located at 0 Old Union Turnpike and 512 Old Union Turnpike in Lancaster (collectively, "subject property" or "complex").  
The subject property consists of 142.17 acres of land improved with a soccer complex that includes a total of sixteen fields, comprised of eleven grass fields and five synthetic fields.  Pursuant to a marketing and sponsorship agreement that MYSA entered into with Citizens Bank of Rhode Island ("Citizens Bank") on May 18, 2006 ("sponsorship agreement"), the subject property is identified as "Citizens Bank Fields at Progin Park."  Located on the subject property is an approximately 5,000-square-foot main office building, which is used for administrative offices and meeting rooms, as well as staging and storage areas for tournaments and other events.  In addition, there are two accessory buildings that have storage, office, and concessions areas, as well as bathroom facilities.  There are also six lightning-protection shelters located throughout the subject property.
For the fiscal year at issue, the assessors valued the subject property and assessed taxes thereon as follows.
Docket No.	
Location	Assessed Value	Tax Rate/$1000	Tax Assessed	
F299524	512 Old Union Tpke	$2,576,100	$14.84	$38,229.32	
F299525	  0 Old Union Tpke	$   33,600	$14.84	$   498.62	

In accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 57C, the appellant paid the taxes due without incurring interest and, on January 20, 2009, in accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 59, the appellant timely applied to the assessors for a full abatement of the taxes based on its claim of exemption for the subject property under Clause Third.  The assessors denied both of the appellant's abatement applications, and the appellant seasonably filed petitions with the Appellate Tax Board ("Board").  The pertinent filing and denial dates are set forth in the following table. 

Docket No.	Abatement 
Application Filed	Abatement Application Denied	Appeal Filed with Board	
F299524	01/20/2009	02/05/2009	04/23/2009	
F299525	01/20/2009	02/05/2009	04/23/2009	

	Based on these facts, the Board found and ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide these appeals.
	The appellant presented its case-in-chief through the testimony of Carl J. Goldstein, treasurer of MYSA, and Michael Singleton, associate executive director and also director of coaching of MYSA.  The appellant also offered into evidence numerous exhibits, including: MYSA's Articles of Organization, its Restated Articles of Organization, its Constitution and Bylaws dated May 12, 2009, and its Mission Statement; several aerial photographs of the subject property; a copy of the marketing and sponsorship agreement with Citizens Bank; a sample facility-use agreement; a sample membership form; and two coaching manuals.  The appellant's primary contention for fully abating the real estate taxes assessed on the subject property was that, at all relevant times, the appellant was a charitable educational organization entitled to the Clause Third charitable exemption for the subject property, which it claimed to use in furtherance of its stated charitable purpose.
	For their part, the assessors did not offer any witnesses but did submit into evidence the requisite jurisdictional documents, the appellant's answers to the assessors' interrogatories, MYSA's Constitution and Bylaws dated February, 2007, a copy of MYSA's President's Handbook, and also printouts from MYSA's website describing the TOPSoccer ("TOPS") and GOALS programs.    
	Based on the testimony and documentary evidence, the Board made the following findings of fact.
At all relevant times, MYSA was a Massachusetts non-profit corporation organized in 1977 under the provisions of G.L. c. 180 "to foster, encourage, develop and promote the game of soccer among youth in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."  The appellant was granted federal tax-exempt status under Internal Revenue Code ("Code") §  501(c)(3), on September 1, 1981.  In January, 2008, the appellant filed Restated Articles of Organization, pursuant to G.L. c. 180, § 7, which re-defined the corporate purpose simply "to foster, develop, encourage and promote the game of soccer."  The appellant's Constitution, as amended in February, 2007, states that the appellant's purpose is to "foster, encourage, develop and promote the game of soccer."  The appellant's fiscal year 2009 Form 3ABC, filed with the assessors, states that the appellant's primary purpose is to "provide[] services for affiliated local independent soccer clubs and promote[] the game of soccer" in Massachusetts.
MYSA has approximately 180,000 registered player members and more than 25,000 registered adult volunteer members.  Individuals become members of MYSA indirectly by registering with their local soccer organizations and paying the requisite registration fee.  In turn, the local organizations register their entire membership, including all adult volunteers, and pay MYSA $11.00 per person.  The $11.00 membership fee is used by MYSA for the following: $3.00 for insurance for organization officials and excess medical coverage for players; $3.00 toward the payoff of the mortgage on the subject property; $1.00 to U.S. Youth Soccer; $1.00 to Region 1; and $3.00 toward MYSA overhead costs.  MYSA's membership is comprised of more than 427 separate soccer organizations which, according to the testimony, "administer their own local programs."  Membership in MYSA is not a pre-requisite or requirement for soccer teams or leagues in the state.  Moreover, Mr.  Singleton testified that although MYSA's services may make it "easier" for local organizations, MYSA's services are not essential for children to play organized soccer.  The vast majority of member games are held at the local level, not at the subject property. 
At all relevant times, MYSA also generated revenue from various other sources, including advertising and sponsorship agreements, tournaments, coaching programs, camps and clinics, and field rentals.  Pursuant to the sponsor agreement with Citizens Bank, MYSA received $600,000 for the construction of the soccer fields located at the subject property.  In exchange, MYSA granted to Citizens Bank the naming rights for the fields and also listed Citizens Bank on the sponsor page of MYSA's website with Citizen Bank's logo and a direct link to its website.         
During the relevant time period, MYSA hosted at the subject property several tournaments, including the State Cup, the Tournament of Champions, the Kohls Cup and the Columbus Day Tournament.  The State Cup is open only to premier-level teams.  Teams wishing to compete in this tournament, which takes place in the spring, must submit an entry form by September 1 of the previous year and pay an entry fee.  In 2008, a total of 281 teams entered the tournament and paid entry fees ranging from $460 to $510 per team; only the final eight teams in each age group played at the subject property.  The Tournament of Champions is for local "travel" teams.  In 2008, 188 teams played in this tournament and each of the ten eligible leagues, members of MYSA, paid $475 per team.  All elimination games were played at the local level and only the "bracket" winners played at the subject property.  The one-day Kohls American Cup and Columbus Day Tournament are fee-based recreational tournaments played at the complex, and they are open to any affiliate of MYSA.   
MYSA also offered four different levels of coaching courses: the G course, which is "designed to give the beginner coach an introduction to the game of soccer";  the F course, which begins to "present the coach with more of the development of player's individual and team skills"; the E course, which "focuses on game tactics, strategy and specific coaching for goalkeeper skills"; and the D course, which "provides the committed coach with a modern, advanced approach to comprehensive player and team development for older aged players."  Although the courses were taught by MYSA instructors, the G, F, and E courses were conducted at local sites using local coordinators, and the D course was held at regional sites.  No courses were conducted at the subject property.  Course fees ranged from $30.00 to $300.00.  The course handbooks in evidence indicate that the vast majority of the instruction dealt with soccer skills, techniques, and strategies.  In addition, MYSA offered, for a fee, on-field training and specialty clinics for coaches of affiliated organizations.
During the relevant time period, MYSA ran the District Select Program ("DSP") for adolescents who wanted to continue playing soccer during the summer; the entry fee was $115.  MYSA formed teams from each county in Massachusetts, who then played one another.  Games were not played at the subject property.  MYSA also operated the Olympic Development Program ("ODP"), to "identify and train the 'best of the best' players in the state."  Interested players were required to "try-out."  Those chosen were placed on a pool team and required to pay a $250 registration fee.  Pool teams practiced at various indoor facilities, not owned by MYSA, from January through March.  Eventually, the pool teams were narrowed down.  The paired-down teams paid MYSA $1,000 to participate in the program and practiced once per week at the subject property from April through June.    
At various times, MYSA also rented the fields at the subject property to both affiliated and non-affiliated organizations, such as Bain Capital, the Bancroft School, and various adult soccer and Frisbee leagues, teams, and associations.  MYSA operated both day and overnight camps at the subject property and at other locations.  MYSA allowed some teams from Lancaster to use some of the fields for no charge.  Other than for the above uses, including tournaments, DSP and ODP play, field rentals, clinics and camps, and the use by some Lancaster teams, the subject property is not "open" to the public.        
Mr. Singleton suggested that MYSA donated a substantial amount of time and services by providing opportunities for adolescents not otherwise able to play a sport.  He testified that MYSA supports TOPS, a community-based program that focuses on providing soccer opportunities for youths with disabilities.  Although MYSA encouraged all of its affiliated organizations to structure a TOPS program, MYSA itself did not play a part in the operations of the TOPS program.  MYSA participated in the GOALS summer camps program, which helps to coordinate soccer camps in urban communities throughout Massachusetts.  MYSA hires and trains college students to work at the GOALS camps, which are located at various inner-city locations. MYSA also offered some players the opportunity to participate in certain programs or events at reduced fees.        
Based on the foregoing, and to the extent it is a finding of fact, the Board found that the appellant failed to meet its burden of proving that it was a charitable organization occupying the subject property for charitable purposes under Clause Third.  In particular, the appellant failed to demonstrate that it was organized and used the subject property for traditional charitable purposes or to further an accepted charitable purpose under Clause Third.
The Board found that, at all relevant times, MYSA was a voluntary association of more than 400 separate and independent soccer organizations, organized and operated to enhance and promote the game of soccer within the Commonwealth.  There was no specific mention of an educational purpose in any of the organizational documents offered into evidence by the parties.  Rather, these documents consistently state a purpose of promoting and developing the game of soccer.  Additional corporate documents, such as MYSA's Mission Statement and the statements which outlined MYSA's involvement with the TOPS and GOALS outreach programs, consistently state that MYSA is dedicated to "promoting and enhancing the culture of soccer" or to simply "promote the game of soccer."  While the appellant contended that the promotion of soccer at least implies an educational purpose, the Board disagreed.  Promotion and development of a game does not fit easily within the concept of "education" which, as the cases discussed in the following Opinion attest, involves developing and expanding the mind and heart.  
Accordingly, the Board found that MYSA failed to demonstrate that its promotion of the game of soccer was a traditional or an accepted charitable purpose under Clause Third.  The Board therefore found that MYSA was not organized for charitable purposes under Clause Third.
From an operational standpoint, each affiliated organization operated its own program independently, despite its relationship with MYSA, and the vast majority of these organizations' games were played at the local level.  While MYSA also offered several coaching courses and clinics, most were for a substantial fee, were held off site, and dealt primarily with soccer skills and technical aspects of the game.  The Board found that while these courses may have offered to the participants some small educational benefit, any educational component was minimal compared to the primary focus of the courses which was to promote the game of soccer through the development of soccer skills and techniques.  Further, the fact that the courses and clinics were not held at the subject property underscores the fact that MYSA did not occupy the subject property in furtherance of an educational or charitable purpose.
The Board further found that MYSA's primary purpose for offering various tournaments and summer camps at the subject property was to promote the game of soccer, often for only elite players.  In making this finding, the Board also found that, under the circumstances here, even the free use of some of the fields by some of Lancaster's soccer teams was consistent with MYSA's primary mission of promoting the game of soccer, as was any reduction in fees charged for a player's or team's enrollment in a MYSA sponsored event.  MYSA's use of the subject property, therefore, was consistent with its corporate mission - to promote the game of soccer.  Consequently, the Board concluded that MYSA was not an organization whose mission or use of the subject property was predominantly educational or charitable under Clause Third; rather, the Board determined that MYSA's primary purpose, functions, and operations were to promote the game of soccer and its use of the subject property corresponded to that non-charitable purpose.
On the basis of these findings of fact, the Board found that the subject property was not owned and occupied by a charitable organization in furtherance of a charitable purpose under Clause Third.  As a result, the Board found and ruled that the subject property was not exempt under Clause Third.  The Board therefore issued a decision for the appellee in these appeals.

OPINION
Clause Third provides in pertinent part that "real estate owned by or held in trust for a charitable organization and occupied by it or its officers for the purposes for which it is organized" is exempt from taxation.  There is no dispute here that MYSA owns the subject property.  Therefore, to qualify for the exemption, MYSA must prove that (1) it is a charitable organization and (2) it occupies the subject property in furtherance of its stated charitable purposes.  See Jewish Geriatric Services, Inc. v. Longmeadow. Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2002-337, 351, aff'd, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 73 (2004) (citing Assessors of Hamilton v. Iron Rail Fund of Girls Club of America, 367 Mass. 301, 306 (1975)).  
The burden of establishing entitlement to the charitable exemption lies with the taxpayer.  New England Legal Found. v. Boston, 423 Mass. 602, 609 (1996).  "Any doubt must operate against the one claiming an exemption, because the burden of proof is upon the one claiming an exemption from taxation to show clearly and unequivocally that he comes within the terms."  Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Assessors of Boston, 294 Mass. 248, 257 (1936).  "'Exemption from taxation is a matter of special favor or grace.  It will be recognized only where the property falls clearly and unmistakably within the express words of a legislative command.'"  Mass. Med. Soc'y v. Assessors of Boston, 340 Mass. 327, 331 (1960) (quoting Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Assessors of Boston, 315 Mass. 712, 718 (1944)).  
An organization will be considered a charitable organization for the purposes of Clause Third if:
the dominant purpose of its work is for the public good and the work done for its members is but the means adopted for this purpose.  But if the dominant purpose of its work is to benefit its members or a limited class of persons it will not be so classed, even though the public will derive an incidental benefit from such work. 

Harvard Community Health Plan v. Assessors of Cambridge, 384 Mass. 536, 544 (1981) (quoting Mass. Medical Soc'y, 340 Mass. at 332).
In New Habitat, Inc. v. Tax Collector of Cambridge, 451 Mass. 729 (2008), the Supreme Judicial Court offered a new "interpretive lens" through which to view Clause Third exemption claims.  See Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp. v. Assessors of Framingham, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 701, 703 (2009).  Specifically, New Habitat "conditions the importance of previously established factors on the extent to which 'the dominant purposes and methods of the organization' are traditionally charitable."  Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp., 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 703 (quoting New Habitat, 415 Mass. at 733).  In other words, "[t]he closer an organization's dominant purposes and methods are to traditionally charitable purposes and methods, the less significant these factors will be in [the] interpretation of the organization's charitable status . . . [t]he farther an organization's dominant purposes and methods are from traditionally charitable purposes and methods, the more significant these factors will be."  Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp., 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 705.   
The court in New Habitat, quoting language from a mid-nineteenth century case, characterized the "traditional objects and methods" of a Clause 3 charity as follows: 
"A charity in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government."

New Habitat, 451 Mass. at 732 (quoting Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 14 Allen 539, 556 (1867) (emphasis added).
	The Board found that MYSA's purposes and activities did not constitute traditionally charitable objects or methods.  During the relevant time period, MYSA offered various fee-based coaching classes, clinics and camps for adults and youths who wished to improve their soccer coaching skills and play.  MYSA argued that through its numerous coaching, training and educational classes, MYSA teaches coaches, referees and administrators skills that are important to the development of the mind, body and spirit of youths, including issues of nutrition, physical fitness, gender and child development.  
Although promoting the game of soccer and the proper instruction of coaches and players may have some benefit, it cannot be said that MYSA's activities "bring the minds or hearts [of persons] under the influence of education or religion," "reliev[e] their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint," "assist[] them to establish themselves in life," or "otherwise lessen[] the burden of government."  Id.  
MYSA's purported "educational" activities fall far short of the educational activities found to be "charitable" under Clause 3.  "[A]n educational institution of a public charitable nature falls within" the exemption provided by Clause 3. Lasell Village, Inc. v. Assessors of Newton, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 414, 419 (2006) (quoting Cummington Sch. of the Arts, Inc. v. Assessors of Cummington, 373 Mass. 597, 602, (1977)).  In order to be exempt under Clause 3, the educational institution: (1) must "make a contribution to education;" and (2) education or the advancement of education must be its "dominant activity." Id. at 603. 
	A contribution to education may include providing a general benefit to society.  See, e.g., Boston Symphony Orchestra, 294 Mass. at 255 (recognizing that fulfilling a general purpose to educate the public in the knowledge of music might well be charitable by advancing the culture); Molly Vanum Chapter, D.A.R. v. Lowell, 204 Mass. 487, 493 (1910) (recognizing preservation of historical data concerning Revolutionary War for education of the public is a charitable purpose); Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Boston, 142 Mass. 24, 27 (1886) (recognizing education of public on issues of animal cruelty as charitable).  
A contribution to education may also include providing education to a relatively small class of individuals as long as those receiving the benefit are drawn from an indefinite class of persons. Assessors of Dover v. Dominican Fathers Province of St. Joseph, 334 Mass. 530, 539 (1956) (recognizing that seminary for training of priests that provided study of theology, Scripture and Latin, although not a specific benefit to the public at large, was charitable because education provided to an indefinite class of persons who change from year to year); Assessors of Boston v. Garland School of Home Making, 296 Mass. 378, 386-89 (1936) (ruling that providing education in the principles of home making -- including courses on psychology, home nursing, literature, drama and current events - "is clearly educational" and, although not of benefit to the public at large, had a benefit to an indefinite class of persons).
MYSA's promotion of the game of soccer and providing classes on soccer coaching, skills and techniques do not qualify as a "contribution to education." Although the instruction of coaches, referees, and administrators may touch on subjects like nutrition, fitness, and child welfare, the clear focus of the instruction is on the technical aspects of the game, a subject that cannot reasonably be considered to be of benefit to the public.  Further, even assuming that the individuals MYSA trained comprised an "indefinite class" -- a proposition for which the appellant offered no evidence - disseminating information concerning the coaching and techniques of a sport is not "education" in any sense recognized in the above-cited cases.  
Moreover, on this record, the training offered was not the dominant purpose of MYSA.  Rather, the Board found that MYSA's dominant purpose was to promote the game of soccer and any "educational" activities were minimal and at best ancillary to its primary purpose.  See Lasell Village, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 421-22; Harvard Community Health Plan, 384 Mass. at 544.  Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, the Board ruled that the activities and methods of MYSA were not traditionally charitable under the relevant case law.  
However, notwithstanding the ruling that MYSA's activities and methods were not traditionally charitable, it may still have qualified for the Clause 3 exemption, but "̔the more remote the objects and methods are from traditionally charitable purposes and methods [including education] the more care must be taken to preserve sound principles and to avoid unwarranted exemptions from the burdens of government.'"  New Habitat, 451 Mass. at 733 (quoting Boston Chamber of Commerce, 315 Mass. at 718); see also Mass. Med. Soc'y., 340 Mass. at 331-32.  
	In the present appeal, MYSA was organized as a charitable corporation pursuant to G.L. c. 180 to "foster, encourage, develop and promote the game of soccer" in the Commonwealth and was granted tax-exempt status pursuant to Code § 501(c)(3).  Although an organization's § 501(c)(3) status is a factor in determining whether the organization is charitable for purpose of the Clause Third property tax exemption, it is not dispositive.  Harvard Community Health Plan, 384 Mass. at 536.  The mere fact that the organization claiming exemption has been organized as a charitable corporation does not automatically mean that it is entitled to an exemption for its property.  It "must prove that it is in fact so conducted that in actual operation it is a public charity" not a mere pleasure, recreation or social club or mutual benefit society.  Jacob's Pillow Dance Festival, Inc. v. Assessors of Becket, 320 Mass. 311, 313 (1946) (citing Little v. Newburyport, 210 Mass. 414, 415 (1912); see also Marshfield Rod & Gun Club v. Assessors of Marshfield, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1998-1130.  
	Classification as a charitable organization ultimately depends upon the language of its charter or articles of association, constitution and by-laws, and upon the objects which it serves and the method of its administration, that is, "upon the declared purposes and the actual work performed."  Mass. Med. Soc'y., 340 Mass. at 328 (citing Garland School of Home Making 296 Mass. at 384).  An institution will be classified as charitable "if the dominant purpose of its work is for the public good and the work done for its members is but the means adopted for this purpose."  Id. at 332.  If, however, the dominant purpose of its work is to benefit the members, such organization will not be classified as charitable, even though the public will derive an incidental benefit from such work. Id.  On the facts of this appeal, it is clear that the dominant purpose of MYSA's work is to benefit its members and any benefit derived by the public is at best incidental. 
	An important factor to be considered in determining if an organization is operating as a public charity is "'whether it perform[s] activities which advance the public good, thereby relieving the burdens of government to do so.'"  Home for Aged People in Fall River v. Assessors of Fall River, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2011-370, 400 (quoting Sturdy Memorial Foundation v. Assessors of North Attleborough, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2002-203, 224, aff'd 60 Mass. App. Ct. 573 (2004)).  "The fact that an organization provides some service that would, in its absence, have to be provided by the government, 'is frequently put forward as the fundamental reason for exempting charities from taxation.'"  Western Massachusetts Lifecare Corp. v. Assessors of Springfield, 434 Mass. 96, 102 (2001) (quoting Assessors of Springfield v. Cunningham Foundation, 305 Mass. 411, 418 (1940)).  The Board found, however, that MYSA failed to prove how its actions "advance[d] the public good, thereby relieving the burdens of government to do so."  Home for Aged People, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2011-403.  While it may be that the sport of soccer is popular and there may be some laudable benefits, both socially and personally, derived from participating in organized soccer activities, no burden of government is alleviated and no other charitable purpose is achieved.  "Thus, although many activities and services are commendable, laudable and socially useful, they do not necessarily come within the definition of 'charitable' for purposes of the exemption."  Western Massachusetts Lifecare, 434 Mass. at 103.  See also Skating Club of Boston v. Assessors of Boston, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2007-193, 211 (ruling that the property of a figure skating club with a mission "to foster good feeling among its members and promote interest in the art of skating" and whose activities focused on developing elite skaters was not entitled to the Clause Third exemption).
On the basis of all of the evidence and its findings and rulings, the Board ultimately found and ruled that the appellant failed to meet its burden of proving that it was a charitable organization for purposes of Clause Third and that it occupied and used the subject property in furtherance of a traditional or an otherwise accepted or acceptable charitable purpose within the meaning of Clause Third. 
	Accordingly, the Board issued a decision for the appellee in these appeals.

					APPELLATE TAX BOARD

				 By:					___________		 		         Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman

A true copy,


Attest:					
	  Clerk of the Board

 The appellant also timely filed its Form 3 ABC and its Form PC for the fiscal year at issue.  
 The record does not contain a description or definition of "Region 1."
 The previously established factors include, but are not limited to, whether the organization provides low-cost or free services to those unable to pay[;] whether it charges fees for its services and how much those fees are[;] whether it offers its services to a large or 'fluid' group of beneficiaries and how large and fluid that group is[;] whether the organization provides its services to those from all segments of society and from all walks of life[;] and whether the organization limits its services to those who fulfill certain qualifications and how those limitations help advance the organization's charitable purposes." New Habitat, 451 Mass. at 732-33 (citations omitted). 
 The appellant directed the Board's attention to a 1994 case decided by a three-judge panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals, with one member dissenting, The Most Reverend Ignatius J. Strecker, Archbishop for the Archdiocese of Kansas City in Kansas v. J. Mark Hixon, Shawnee County Appraiser ("Strecker v. Hixon"), 20 Kan. App. 2d 489 (1994).  The majority held that a 2.8-acre tract used exclusively as a soccer field qualified for an educational-use exemption under Kansas law.  The case is readily distinguishable from the present appeal because the Kansas soccer field was owned by a religious organization, was open to the public, and there was no charge for using the field.  In addition, the majority opinion relied on a broad definition of "educational use" ostensibly authorized by the Kansas Supreme Court in an earlier case,  National Collegiate Realty Corp. v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs, 236 Kan. 394 (1984).  By contrast, no such broad definition is consistent with Massachusetts law, which requires strict construction of exemption statutes.  See Massachusetts Med. Soc'y 340 Mass. at 331. Finally, the Board found more persuasive the observation of the dissent in Strecker: "[t]here is nothing inherently "educational," . . . in playing soccer on a vacant lot in Topeka."  Id. at 494.  
 

ATB 2012-660