Mary L. Doherty v. Board of Assessors of the Town of Lee (March 12, 2013)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPELLATE TAX BOARD

MARY L. DOHERTY               v.         BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF 
								 THE TOWN OF LEE
Docket No. F310962				      Promulgated:
								 March 12, 2013

	This is an appeal filed under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65 from the refusal of the Board of Assessors of the Town of Lee ("assessors" or "appellee") to abate taxes on certain real estate owned by and assessed to Mary L. Doherty ("appellant") under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal year 2011 ("fiscal year at issue").
	Commissioner Mulhern ("Presiding Commissioner") heard the appeal and issued a single-member decision for the appellee in accordance with G.L. c. 58A, § 1A and 831 CMR 1.20. 
	These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a request by the appellant under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.

Mary L. Doherty, pro se, for the appellant

Dayton DeLorme, assessor for the appellee


FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
	Based on the testimony and exhibits offered into evidence at the hearing of this appeal, the Presiding Commissioner made the following findings of fact.
	On January 1, 2010, the appellant was the assessed owner of an improved 0.92-acre parcel of real estate located at 25 Rose Avenue in the Town of Lee ("subject property"). The subject property is improved with a single-story, ranch-style dwelling that contains 1,248 square feet of living space. The dwelling has three bedrooms, one bathroom, an unfinished basement, and a 240-square-foot front porch. For the fiscal year at issue, the subject property was located in "neighborhood 5," one of six neighborhood classifications employed by the assessors in Lee. 
	For the fiscal year at issue, the assessors valued the subject property at $224,300 and assessed a tax thereon at the rate of $13.06 per thousand, in the total amount of $2,929.36. Of the subject property's total assessed value, $78,000 was allocated to the land and $146,300 to the dwelling. 
	On December 27, 2010, Lee's Collector of Taxes mailed the town's actual real estate tax bills for the fiscal year at issue. In accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 57C, the appellant paid the tax due without incurring interest. On January 28, 2011, the appellant timely filed an abatement application with the assessors, which the assessors denied on February 9, 2011. The appellant seasonably filed an appeal with the Appellate Tax Board ("Board") on April 28, 2011. On the basis of these facts, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the Board had jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal.
	At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant argued that the subject property was overvalued for the fiscal year at issue. In support of her argument, the appellant submitted assessment and sales data relating to properties she deemed comparable to the subject property. The appellant also noted that the subject property's assessed value had increased significantly relative to the prior fiscal year, while the assessed values of other properties in her area that were improved with ranch-style dwellings had not. Finally, the appellant asserted that the subject property's overvaluation resulted, in large measure, from the incorporation of former neighborhood 10 into neighborhood 5. 
	As a threshold matter, the Presiding Commissioner found that the appellant provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the subject property's neighborhood reclassification was dispositive. In fact, while all of neighborhood 10 had been reclassified as part of neighborhood 5, the subject property was the only property presented for consideration that had been part of neighborhood 10 and had a significant increase in assessed value after its incorporation into neighborhood 5. Absent a correlation between the significant increase in the subject property's assessed value and its inclusion in neighborhood 5, the Presiding Commissioner could not infer that the change in neighborhood was the cause of the increase. The Presiding Commissioner therefore gave no weight to the appellant's argument that the neighborhood reclassification resulted in overvaluation of the subject property.
	The appellant presented assessment data for thirteen properties in neighborhood 5, each of which was improved with a ranch-style dwelling. The appellant emphasized that for the fiscal year at issue, the cited properties did not increase in assessed value as did the subject property. There were significant differences between the subject property and the appellant's purportedly comparable properties, such as the age and condition of the dwellings as well as lot sizes. With the exception of one property, however, the appellant failed to make any adjustments to account for these differences. The sole property for which the appellant made adjustments was 55 Rose Avenue. The adjustments, however, were limited, and the Presiding Commissioner found that they were not sufficiently probative to derive an indicated value for the subject property. Lacking appropriate adjustments, the Presiding Commissioner found that the appellant's assessment data did not provide persuasive evidence of overvaluation. 
	The appellant also submitted sales data relating to seven properties located in neighborhood 5. The properties were improved with ranch-style dwellings and sold between 2008 and 2010. While the appellant made adjustments to the properties, the adjustments were presented simply as a range of proposed values accompanied by a vague explanation of the differences to which the adjustments related. Moreover, in her analysis, the appellant incorrectly applied her adjustments to the properties' assessed values rather than their sale prices. When appropriately applied to the sale prices of the properties, the appellant's adjustments supported rather than undermined the contested assessment. Accordingly, the Presiding Commissioner did not find the appellant's comparable-sales data persuasive.  
	For their part, the assessors presented jurisdictional documentation and submitted comparable-sales data relating to three properties located in close proximity to the subject property. Unlike the appellant, the assessors made extensive and specific adjustments to their chosen properties, having taken into account differences in the dwellings' condition, lot size, living area, number of bedrooms, basement type, heating system,
and garage type. The Presiding Commissioner found that the assessors' adjustments had significantly more probative value than the vague adjustments made by the appellant and that the adjusted values derived by the assessors provided credible support for the assessed value of the subject property. Further, the assessors' analysis, taken together with the balance of the record, indicated that the substantial increase in the value of the subject property for the fiscal year at issue most likely resulted from undervaluation of the subject property in the prior fiscal year.
	In sum, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the subject property was overvalued for the fiscal year at issue and that the assessors presented credible evidence that supported the contested assessment. Accordingly, the Presiding Commissioner issued a single-member decision for the appellee.  

OPINION
	Assessors are required to assess real estate at its fair cash value. G.L. c. 59, § 38. Fair cash value is defined as the price at which a willing seller and a willing buyer in a free and open market will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion. Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).	 
	The appellant has the burden of proving that the property has a lower value than that assessed. See Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974). "The burden of proof is upon the petitioner to make out its right as [a] matter of law to [an] abatement of the tax." Id. (quoting Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 47, 55 (1922)). In appeals before the Board, a "'taxpayer may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation.'" General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 600 (1984) (quoting Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 (1983)). 
	In the present appeal, the appellant argued that the assessors had overvalued the subject property for the fiscal year at issue. In support of her argument, the appellant submitted	assessment data relating to thirteen properties. Pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 12B, "at any hearing relative to the assessed fair cash valuation or classification of property, evidence as to fair cash valuation or classification of property at which assessors have assessed other property of a comparable nature or class shall be admissible." The appellant also introduced sales data for several properties. See Graham v. Assessors of West Tisbury, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2007-321, 394 ("The fair cash value of property may often best be determined by recent sales of comparable properties in the market."), aff'd, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1107 (2008). 
	Adjustments must be made to both assessed values and sales data to account for differences between the subject property and the properties offered for comparison. Lareau v. Assessors of Norwell, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2010-879, 889-90 (citing Graham, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2007-402 ("The assessments in a comparable-assessment analysis, like the sale prices in a comparable-sales analysis, must also be adjusted to account for differences with the subject.")); Lupacchino v. Assessors of Southborough, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2008-1253, 1269 ("[W]ithout appropriate adjustments . . . the assessed values of [comparable] properties [do] not provide reliable indicator[s] of the subject's fair cash value.") 
	While the appellant presented assessment data for thirteen ranch-style properties in neighborhood 5, she made no adjustments to twelve of the properties and only limited adjustments to one, despite the existence of significant differences between the subject property and each of the purportedly comparable properties. Absent appropriate adjustments, the Presiding Commissioner found that the appellant's comparable-assessment data did not provide reliable indicators of the subject property's fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue. 
The appellant also presented sales data relating to seven properties. Although the appellant made adjustments in an attempt to account for the differences between these properties and the subject property, she presented only a range of proposed adjustment values accompanied by a vague explanation of the basis for the adjustments. Moreover, the appellant mistakenly applied her proposed range of adjustments to the properties' assessed values rather than their sale prices. See the appraisal institute, the appraisal of real estate 141-42 (13th ed. 2008) ("Dollar or percentage adjustments are . . . applied to the known sale price of each comparable property to derive an indicated value for the subject property."). Indeed, when the appellant's adjustments were properly applied to the sale prices of the properties, the adjustments supported the contested assessment. Accordingly, the Presiding Commissioner found that the appellant's comparable-sales data did not provide persuasive evidence of overvaluation.  

In support of the assessment, the assessors presented a comparable-sales analysis that included three properties located near the subject property, one of which was a property presented by the appellant. Unlike the appellant, however, the assessors made extensive and specific adjustments to their chosen properties, which yielded adjusted values that the Presiding Commissioner found credibly supported the subject property's assessed value.
	Finally, the Presiding Commissioner found the appellant's argument regarding the subject property's neighborhood reclassification unavailing. More specifically, the Presiding Commissioner found that the evidence presented failed to establish a correlation between the subject property's increased assessed value and its incorporation into neighborhood 5. Thus, the Presiding Commissioner rejected the appellant's argument that the neighborhood reclassification resulted in overvaluation of the subject property.
	On the basis of the evidence presented, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the appellant failed to establish that the fair cash value of the subject property was less than its assessed value as of the assessment date for the fiscal year at issue.  The Presiding Commissioner also found that the assessors presented credible evidence that supported the contested assessment. 
	Accordingly, the Presiding Commissioner issued a single-member decision for the appellee.


 THE APPELLATE TAX BOARD

   By:	_____	   ________________	       Thomas J. Mulhern, Commissioner 

A true copy,

Attest:				_____undefinedundefinedundefinedundefined______
	   Clerk of the Board

  Prior to the fiscal year at issue, the subject property had been part of neighborhood 10, which was incorporated into neighborhood 5 as part of a town-wide plan that consolidated thirteen neighborhoods into six.
 The properties included 36 Rose Avenue, which the assessors also used in their comparable-sales analysis.

ATB 2013-174