Mt. Auburn Hospital v. Board of Assessors of the Town of Watertown (June 30, 2000)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD





MT. AUBURN HOSPITAL  		v.  BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF THE
    	   TOWN OF WATERTOWN

Docket Nos.:	F215575 (FY 1993)
F221036 (FY 1994)	Promulgated:
							June 30, 2000



	These are appeals under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65 from the refusal of the appellee to abate real estate taxes assessed under G.L. c. 59, § 38 for fiscal years 1993 and 1994.
	 Chairman Burns, former Chairman Gurge, Commissioners Scharaffa and Gorton, and former Commissioner Lomans, all joined in the decision for the appellant.
	These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to requests by both parties under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.

	Daryl J. Lapp, Esq. for the appellant.
	Joseph F. Dalton, Esq. and Ellen M. Hutchinson, Esq. for the appellee.


FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
Introduction and Jurisdiction
	On January 1, 1992 and January 1, 1993, the appellant, Mount Auburn Hospital, a charitable organization within the meaning of G.L. c. 59, § 5, clause third, was the assessed owner of approximately 11.297 acres of land that was improved with a 440,000 square-foot building ("subject property," "property" or "subject").  At all relevant times, the subject property was located at 705 Mt. Auburn Street in the Town of Watertown ("Watertown").  The appellant purchased the property in September 1991 from American Telephone & Telegraph intending to move part of its hospital functions there.  
In fiscal year 1993, the Board of Assessors of Watertown ("Assessors") valued the subject property at $10,290,600.  However, they determined that 84.62% of the property was tax exempt, and only 15.38% was taxable.  They based the taxable portion of the property on a commercial lease with the United States Postal Service.  The Assessors valued the taxable portion of the property at $1,582,509 and assessed a tax, at a rate of $21.50 per $1,000, in the amount of $34,023.94.  The appellant timely paid the tax without incurring interest.
On or about June 18, 1993, the Assessors issued a revised tax bill, pursuant to G.L. c. 59, § 76, increasing the total taxable valuation of the subject property to $5,145,300 or fifty percent of the overall value and assessed a revised tax, at the same rate of $21.50 per $1,000, in the amount of $110,623.95.  Previously, in April 1993, during the time period between the issuance of the original bill and the revised bill, the membership of the Assessors changed.  The new membership decided that the property should only be fifty-percent tax exempt.  The revised value reflected this change in the percentage of the property that the Assessors now considered tax exempt.  As discussed more fully in its findings below, the Board found that the appellant timely paid the revised tax without incurring interest.  
In fiscal year 1994, the Assessors valued the subject property at $9,448,500 and assessed a tax, at a rate of $22.08 per $1,000, in the amount of $208,622.88.  For this fiscal year, the Assessors decided that none of the property was tax exempt.  The appellant timely paid the tax without incurring interest.  
	In addition, the parties stipulated that the appellant filed with the Assessors by March 1, 1992 for fiscal year 1993, and March 1, 1993 for fiscal year 1994, the lists required under G.L. c. 59, §§ 5 and 29.  As summarized in the table below, the Appellate Tax Board ("Board") found that the appellant's appeals met all of the Board's other jurisdictional requirements for determining whether or not the subject property was overvalued and/or exempt.
Fiscal Year	Date Tax Bill Mailed	Date Application for Abatement ("AA") Filed	Date AA Denied or Deemed Denied	Date Petition Filed at Board	
1993	12/21/92	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	
1993	06/18/93	09/15/93	12/15/93	01/13/94	
1994	12/17/93	       01/12/94 	04/12/94	07/08/94	

With respect to the appellant's payment of the revised tax for fiscal year 1993, the Board found that the payment was due on Monday, July 19, 1993.  The Assessors, relying on an entry in a payment journal, argued that the payment was made on Tuesday, July 20, 1993, one day late.  However, the Board found that the evidence demonstrated that the payment was made on July 19, 1993.  
More specifically, the Board found that, during the relevant time period, the appellant had adopted a procedure 

to ensure the timely payment of its real estate bills and preservation of its real estate tax exemption.  This business practice included promptly forwarding each real estate tax bill to an accounts payable supervisor or clerk who would then post the due date on the appellant's computer to ensure that a check was timely issued in advance of the due date.  Once a payment check was issued, it was delivered to the Tax Collector's office by hand before 5:00 p.m. on the applicable due date.  The appellant had followed this business practice since it purchased the subject property in September of 1991.
The evidence also established that the check for the contested payment was issued on Friday, July 16, 1993.  This check was deposited by Watertown's Tax Collector in the town's bank on Tuesday, July 20, 1993.  According to the Tax Collector's testimony, any receipts collected after noontime on any given day were deposited in the bank on the next business day.  
After evaluating all of the evidence, the Board found that the payment at issue was most likely made after noontime but before 5:00 p.m. on July 19, 1993.  This finding acknowledged the appellant's business practice for tax payments and also addressed why the Tax Collector's deposit of the appellant's tax payment was actually made on July 20, 1993, and not July 19, 1993.  The entry in the Tax Collector's payment book of the appellant's tax payment for the revised tax bill was more of an extraordinary event, than a business practice.  The vast majority of real estate tax payments were not recorded in the Tax Collector's payment book because they were sent directly to a lock box at Watertown's bank.  Consequently, the Board found that the entry might not have reflected when the payment was actually received at the Tax Collector's office, but rather, when it was deposited or to be deposited in the bank.  Accordingly, the Board found that the revised tax bill was paid timely without incurring interest.                        
On this basis, the Board determined that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide the valuation and exemption issues raised by the appellant in these appeals.
The Revised Fiscal-Year 1993 Tax Bill
	G.L. c. 59, § 76, provides: 
If any property subject to taxation has been unintentionally valued or classified in an incorrect manner due to clerical or data processing error or other good faith reason, the assessors shall revise its valuation or classification and shall assess any additional taxes resulting from such revision in the manner and within the time provided by section seventy-five and subject to its provisions.  (Emphasis added.)

Therefore, assessors may issue revised bills if they have made an "unintentional" error in valuing or classifying a property because of a clerical or data processing type of mistake.  According to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1961), intentional means "[d]one by design" or "intended."  Id. at 438.  The prefix "un" signifies "not" or the contrary of the word that follows it.  Id. at 924.  According to The American Heritage Dictionary (2nd college ed. 1982), "intentional" is defined as "done deliberately" or "intended," id. at 669, while the prefix "un" means "contrary to" or the "opposite of."  Id. at 1313.  Accordingly, the Board found that the word "unintentional," as used in § 76, means "not done by design" or "not intended."  
In the present appeal, it is clear that the revised bill did not result from the correction of an unintentional error in valuing or classifying the subject property.  Rather, it resulted from a decision on the part of the Assessors to change the extent of the subject property's tax exemption mid-way through a fiscal year.  The evidence clearly shows that the original members of the Assessors, who first assessed the property for fiscal year 1993, considered the vast majority of the subject property as devoted to charitable uses and, therefore, only partially subject to a real estate tax in that fiscal year.  Subsequently, the membership of the Assessors changed, and the new members revoked the earlier 84.62% to 15.38% split of tax-exempt verses taxable real property in the middle of the fiscal year and assessed substantially more real estate taxes.  These facts are essentially undisputed.
The Board found that there was nothing unintentional about the earlier determination of tax-exempt versus taxable real property.  It was a conscious and intentional decision on the part of the then membership of the Assessors after a substantial investigation that included, among other things, meeting with and interviewing hospital personnel and viewing the subject property itself.  The Board concluded that the revised tax bill was not issued to correct an unintentional error.  
Moreover, § 76 requires that an unintentional mistake must be a mere "clerical or data processing error or other good faith reason."  This requirement clearly suggests a mechanical as opposed to judgmental miscalculation.  Consequently, the Board found that this type of error is one committed while performing a perfunctory task that requires little if any thought.    
In this appeal, the Board found that there were no "clerical or data processing error[s] or other good faith reason" for changing the original fiscal-year 1993 valuation or classification.  The revised real estate tax bill was issued to change what could only be called a reasoned and intentional decision by a previous majority of the membership of the Assessors.  The evidence did not reveal, and in fact ruled out, any clerical or data processing error or other good faith reason.  The change reflected on the revised bill was simply a difference of opinion.  Therefore, under the circumstances, the Board determined that the Assessors did not have the statutory authority to issue a revised tax bill.  Accordingly, the Board found that the Assessors revised assessment was not issued in accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 76, and, consequently, was null and void and without any legal effect.  On this basis, the Board found that the original valuation and tax assessment for fiscal year 1993 were valid and the additional $76,600.01 assessed by the revised bill should be abated.
The Fiscal-Year 1994 Valuation
	For fiscal year 1994, that is, as of January 1, 1993 for valuation and July 1, 1993 for exemption purposes, the Assessors valued the property at $9,448,500, but claimed that none of it was tax exempt.  The appellant did not dispute the Assessors' estimate of the subject property's value for fiscal year 1994.  Rather, the appellant took issue with the Assessors' failure to grant at least a partial tax exemption for the portion of the property that it believed was devoted to the appellant's charitable uses during that fiscal year. 
	On the basis of all of the evidence, the Board found that the appellant owned and operated a full-service hospital in Cambridge, Massachusetts.  In 1990, the appellant formed a Facilities Task Force ("task force") to evaluate the appellant's needs with respect to its physical plant and facilities.  By the spring of 1991, the task force had concluded and reported that the appellant required additional facilities at a different, but preferably nearby, location to alleviate pressing space constraints at its existing facility.  The task force had further   determined   that   the   appellant  should  move 
its outpatient facilities from its present location to a new site to allow the hospital's conversion of its in-patient accommodations from four-bed rooms to ones with only two beds.  These recommendations were incorporated into the task force's final Master Plan Report that was issued in written form in May of 1992.  The appellant purchased the subject property in September 1991 for $9.5 million to, at least partially, address its needs regarding facilities.
	Almost immediately after purchasing the subject property, the appellant formed a Project Coordinating Committee ("Committee") to formulate site-specific plans for removing some of the appellant's outpatient services to the subject.  The Committee was composed of senior hospital administrators and staff, health care consultants, and development professionals, including architects, engineers, developers, urban planners, and traffic consultants.  The appellant spent over $550,000 over three years for related studies performed by the development professionals.  At all relevant times, the Committee conducted its weekly meetings at the subject property.
	The appellant initially considered the possibility of converting all of the subject property for its outpatient services.  However, realistically, the appellant estimated that approximately one-half of the subject property would be needed for this purpose.  Throughout the course of its deliberations, the Committee did not limit its considerations to simply the removal of outpatient services to the subject property, but also contemplated various combinations of uses and space-allocations for many different purposes including medical offices, hospital and commercial storage, parking, and commercial uses.  Some of these uses were obviously non-exempt.  The Committee also considered demolishing or mothballing parts or all of the building located on the subject property.
	By late 1992 through the spring of 1993, the Committee and officers of the appellant focused on a development option that proposed using part of the building for tax-exempt hospital purposes, part for non-exempt medical offices, and then mothballing the remaining portion.  Replacing the mothballed portion of the building with a parking facility was also considered.  Ultimately, because of the rapid changes that were occurring in the health-care industry at the time, the appellant decided to defer its long-term planning for the facility.  Instead, it adopted a short-term strategy of removing part of its outpatient services to the subject property and either demolishing, mothballing, or leasing the remaining portion.  At all relevant times, the appellant used about eighteen percent of the building for medical record storage, another one percent for weekly meetings, and about seventy-five percent of the available parking spaces, that is, 375 out of 495 spaces, for hospital personnel.
	On this basis, the Board decided that, for fiscal year 1994, approximately one-half of the subject property was devoted to the appellant's tax-exempt charitable services.  The Board's determination in this regard comports with that of the Assessors' in their revised bill for fiscal year 1993.  The Board found that as of July 1, 1993, the appellant's actual physical use and occupation of the property for its charitable purpose was limited to medical record storage and weekly meetings in the building and possibly parking in seventy-five percent of the available parking spaces.  However, the Board further found that the appellant was planning to use a portion of the building for the relocation of part of its outpatient services, which was in furtherance of its charitable purpose for which it was organized.  
As of July 1, 1993, the Board found that the appellant was most likely to implement a development option that utilized about one-half of the subject property for its charitable purposes.  Other potential uses were still very much up in the air.  The Board was not able to discern whether or not those other possible uses were in furtherance of the appellant's charitable purpose.  On this basis, the Board found that the appellant was only planning on relocating to and using about one-half of the property in furtherance of its charitable purpose for which it was organized.  The Board found that the appellant never seriously considered appropriating the entire property in furtherance of its charitable purpose.  The requisite date for determining the appellant and the subject property's qualification for tax-exempt status in fiscal year 1994, under G.L. c. 59, § 5, clause third, was July 1, 1993, which was within two years of the appellant's purchase of the property.  Accordingly, the Board accepted the $9,448,500 assessed value that the Assessors' ascribed to the property, which was not in dispute, but, unlike the Assessors' determination for fiscal year 1994, found that fifty percent of the property was tax exempt.
Summary
	In sum, the Board decided these two appeals for the appellant and granted abatements for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 in the amounts of $76,600.01 and $104,311.44, respectively.  The bases for the Board's computations of these abatements are contained in the following table.
Docket
Number	Fiscal
Year	Location	Assessed
Value	Tax
Assessed	Fair Cash
Value	Over-Valuation	
F215575	1993	705 Mt Auburn St	$5,145,300	$110,623.95	$1,582,509	$3,562,791	
F221036	1994	705 Mt Auburn St	$9,448,500	$208,622.88	$4,724,250	$4,724,250	

OPINION
Jurisdiction over the Fiscal-Year 1993 Revised Tax Bill
	The Board generally considers an affidavit from a municipality's tax collect prima facie evidence of the date of a tax payment.  See, e.g., Fairview Associates v. Board of Assessors of Chicopee, 12 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 112, 112-13 (1990).  However, this date may be rebutted by the introduction of other competent evidence, which suggests a different date.  See generally id.; New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Board of Assessors of Framingham, 9 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 80 (1987).  Ultimately, it is for the Board to sift through and weigh the evidence and determine the more likely date under the circumstances.  
	With respect to the appellant's appeal of the fiscal-year 1993 revised tax bill, the Board weighed all of the relevant evidence and found that the contested tax payment was timely delivered to the Watertown Tax Collector's office on the afternoon of the last day for payment.  Accordingly, the Board ruled that the payment was timely.  Because the appellant had complied with all of its other jurisdictional requirements, the Board ruled that it had jurisdiction over this appeal.      
The Revised Fiscal-Year 1993 Tax Bill
	In fiscal year 1993, the Assessors issued a revised tax bill for the subject property that changed the percentage of the property considered exempt from real estate taxes from 84.62% to fifty percent.  The Board found that this change on the revised bill simply reflected a difference of opinion between the old and the new membership of the Assessors.  The new membership that issued the revised bill drew a different conclusion from the membership that issued the original one regarding the extent that the property should be considered exempt from real estate taxes.  The Board found that the Assessors' original determination of the property's tax-exempt status was an intentional and deliberate decision and not an incorrect valuation or classification resulting from a "clerical or data processing error" or "other good faith reason."  As a result, the Board found that the new membership of the Assessors did not have the necessary statutory authority to issue a revised bill, where, as here, they merely disagreed with the intentional decisions made by their predecessors.  Accordingly, the Board granted an abatement of the additional amount assessed in the revised bill.  
Pursuant to G.L. c. 59, § 76, assessors may revise their original valuation or classification of property if, among other requirements, they "unintentionally valued or classified [the property] in an incorrect manner due to clerical or data processing error or other good faith reasons."  Id.  The Board found that the Assessors could revise the original bill if they committed an "unintentional" error in valuing or classifying the subject property because of a clerical or data processing type of mistake.  The Board determined that the Assessors' original valuation, classification and evaluation were not "unintentional" as that term is used in G.L. c. 59, § 76.
The Board ruled that it was proper to consider the plain meaning and ordinary usage of the term "unintentional" to discern its connotation in § 76.  See Henry v. Board of Appeals of Dunstable, 418 Mass. 841, 843 (1994); Commissioner of Revenue v. AMIWoodbroke, Inc., 418 Mass. 92, 94 (1994).  "Unless the legislative usage of the word indicates that it has acquired a peculiar meaning in law, the Legislature is presumed to have intended to use the term in its ordinary sense."  National Fire Protection Association, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 23 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 157, 161 (1997), citing Casey v. Massachusetts Electric Co., 392 Mass. 876, 880-81 (1984).  When interpreting words used in a statute in their ordinary sense, the Board may rely on dictionary definitions to determine their plain meaning.  See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. Commissioner Revenue, 425 Mass. 670, 676 (1997); Healey v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 414 Mass. 18, 23 (1992); National Fire Protection Association, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 23 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. at 161; Stanley Home Products, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 7 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 29, 35 (1986) (citing G.L. c. 4, § 6, which states that "[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language.").  
The Board found and ruled that "unintentional," as used in § 76, means "not done by design" or "not intended."  The Assessors' original valuation and determination regarding the extent that the subject property was tax exempt for fiscal year 1993 clearly were done by design and were intended.  Moreover, there were no "clerical or data processing error[s] or other good faith reason[s]" offered for changing the original assessment or classification.  In the context of  § 76, the phrase "other good faith reason" suggests a mistake similar to a clerical or data processing type of error.  See Santos v. Bettencourt, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 90, 92 (1996) (a serial listing of specific words in a statute, that precede a final general word at the end of the list, serve to limit the scope of the general word); 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.17 (5th ed. 1992) ("where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the specific words").  On this basis, the Board ruled that the Assessors did not have the necessary statutory authority under G.L. c. 59, § 76, to issue a valid revised assessment of the subject property for fiscal year 1993.              
The Fiscal-Year 1994 Valuation
	Massachusetts cities and towns are authorized to impose a tax upon "all property, real and personal, situated within the commonwealth, . . . unless expressly exempt."  G.L. c. 59, § 2.  Section 5 of chapter 59 specifies various classes of property which "shall be exempt from [these property taxes]."  G.L. c. 59, § 5.  The Supreme Judicial Court has concluded that statutes granting exemptions, like § 5, are to be strictly construed.  Milford v. Commissioners of Worcester County, 213 Mass. 162, 165 (1912); Norwood v. Norwood Civic Association, 340 Mass. 518, 525 (1960); Assessors of Wilmington v. Avco Corp., 357 Mass. 704, 706 (1970); Children's Hospital Medical Center v. Assessors of Boston, 388 Mass. 832, 838 (1983). 
G.L. c. 59, § 5, clause third, provides in pertinent part:
Real estate owned by or held in trust for a charitable organization and occupied by it or its officers for the purposes for which it is organized     . . . [is tax exempt] and real estate purchased by a charitable organization with the purpose of removal thereto [is also tax exempt], until such removal, but not for more than two years after such purchase.

	
Pursuant to this clause, real property owned by a charitable organization and "occupied" by it for the purpose for which it is organized is exempt from real estate taxation.  In addition, real estate purchased by a charitable organization is also exempt if purchased "with the purpose of removal thereto."  There is a two-year limitation for this latter exemption provision.         G.L. c. 59, § 5, clause third.  The relevant date for determining whether property is entitled to a clause-third exemption for any given fiscal year is July 1 of the taxable year.  G.L. c. 59, § 5.  "It is the use of the property at [that] time . . . which determines whether it is exempt."  Trustees of Amherst College v. Assessors of Amherst, 193 Mass. 168, 178 (1906).  
The term "occupied," as used in first portion of the exemption contained in clause third, "signifies an active appropriation to the immediate uses of the charitable cause for which the owner was organized."  Babcock v. Morse Home for Infirm Hebrews and Orphanage, 225 Mass. 418, 421 (1917); see Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Assessors of Boston, 294 Mass. 248, 255 (1936).  But, real estate occupied by a charitable organization is not entitled to an exemption if it is used for other than charitable purposes.  Milton Hospital & Convalescent Home v. Assessors of Milton, 360 Mass. 63, 69 (1971).  Its predominant use must be charitable.  See Assessors of Boston v. Garland School of Home Making, 296 Mass. 378, 393 (1937); South Lancaster Academy v. Lancaster, 242 Mass. 553, 559 (1922); Emerson v. Trustees of Milton Academy, 185 Mass. 414, 418 (1904).  In the case of mixed uses, that is, both charitable and non-exempt uses carried on simultaneously at the property, "[t]he rule of proportionate exemption . . . is now recognized as generally applicable."  Lynn Hospital v. Board of Assessors of Lynn, 383 Mass. 14, 18 (1981).  In other words, "the tax exemption . . . is permissible only to the extent that the property [is] in actual use for charitable purposes during the tax years in question."  Id.  at 19-20.
	In the present appeal, the Board found that the appellant was a charitable organization located in Cambridge that functioned as a tax-exempt hospital.  The Board further found that the appellant purchased the subject property in September 1991 "with the purpose of remov[ing]" part of its existing charitable services to that location.  The Board found that, as of the purchase date, as well as July 1, 1993, the appellant intended to appropriate approximately one-half of the subject property for its existing charitable endeavors.  The Board found that the relevant date for determining whether the property was entitled to at least a partial exemption for fiscal year 1994 was July 1, 1993, a date within two years of the appellant's purchase of the subject property in September 1991.
	On this basis, the Board ruled that the appellant's plan to remove part of its charitable services to the subject property brought the property within the second part of the exemption authorized by G.L. c. 59, § 5, clause third ("real estate purchased by a charitable organization with the purpose of removal thereto [is also tax exempt] until such removal.").  This statutory section leaves the removal window open for up to two years from the date of purchase.  The Board ruled that for the fiscal year 1994 appeal here, the window for this exemption was open because the requisite date for determining the applicability of the exemption was July 1, 1993.  G.L. c. 59, § 5; see Trustees of Amherst College v. Assessors of Amherst, 193 Mass. at 178.  The purchase was in September 1991.  The Board further ruled that, under the proportionate exemption rule, only fifty percent of the subject qualified for the exemption because of the Board's finding that fifty percent was the extent that the appellant reasonably intended to use the subject property for the relocation of some of its charitable services.  See Lynn Hospital v. Board of Assessors of Lynn, 383 Mass. at 18.  
	The appellant urged the Board to exempt almost the entire property for fiscal year 1994, under the first part of the clause-third exemption, which provides in pertinent part that "[r]eal estate owned by . . . a charitable organization and occupied by it or its officers for the purpose for which it is organized . . . [is tax exempt]."  G.L. c. 59, § 5, clause third.  The appellant argued that the hospital included the entire property in its planning, a process, which it alleged, was part of the hospital's charitable purpose and constituted an "immediate use."  However, the Board found that the appellant considered not just charitable endeavors, but also commercial and non-exempt uses in its planning process that were clearly not part of the appellant's charitable purpose.  Consequently, the Board found that the appellant actually "occupied" the subject property "for the purpose for which it [was] organized" only for some medical storage, committee meetings, and possibly parking, all of which combined to comprise well less than fifty percent of the subject property's space.  The appellant did not prove otherwise.  "[This part of the clause-third] tax exemption . . . is permissible only to the extent that the property [is] in actual use for charitable purposes during the tax years in question."  Lynn Hospital v. Board of Assessors of Lynn, 383 Mass. at 19-20.  Under the circumstances, the Board applied clause third's two-year "removal" exemption for fiscal year 1994 and exempted one-half of the subject property that the appellant intended to use in furtherance of the charitable purpose for which it was organized.       
	The Assessors argued that the subject property was not entitled to an exemption in fiscal year 1994 under the "occupied" portion of the exemption contained in clause third because the dominant use of the property was for non-exempt purposes.  The Assessors further argued that the appellant did not qualify for the "relocation" portion of the exemption because part of fiscal year 1994 was beyond the two-year limitation, and, moreover, the appellant was not relocating its entire operation to the subject, which the Assessors interpreted as a clause-third requirement.  The Board ruled that the appellant's actual and immediate use of the property for its charitable purpose was well less than fifty percent in fiscal year 1994.  But, as previously discussed, the Board ruled that the requisite date for determining the qualifications for a clause-third exemption in fiscal year 1994 was July 1, 1993.  Accordingly, the subject property was within the two-year time limitation of clause-third's "relocation" exemption.  The Board also ruled that, under the circumstances, the appellant's intent to relocate a substantial portion of its existing charitable services to the subject property, and use at least fifty percent of it, was enough to bring it within the ambit of the "relocation" part of the exemption for fiscal year 1994.  The Board ruled that it was not necessary for the appellant to relocate all of its existing charitable operations from its Cambridge site to one hundred percent of the subject property to qualify for the "relocation" exemption.  The appellant's intended use of at least fifty percent of the subject property for the relocation of some of its existing charitable services, coupled with the proportionate exemption rule, was enough to qualify the property for a partial exemption.       
Conclusion
	The taxpayer must show that it has complied with the statutory prerequisites to its right of appeal.  Cohen v. Assessors of Boston, 344 Mass. 268, 271 (1962); Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Assessors of Boston, 311 Mass. 415, 416 (1942).  "The burden is on the taxpayer to show that it is entitled to the exemption claimed."  Children's Hospital Medical Center v. Assessors of Boston, 353 Mass. 35, 43 (1967) (citations omitted).  Exemptions are to be strictly construed.  Id.  The Board may presume that the Assessors' determinations are valid until proven otherwise.  See General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 598-600 (1984); Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974).  
The Board ruled here that the appellant met its burden and demonstrated that its contested tax payment was timely, and the revised tax bill for fiscal year 1993 was not issued in accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 76.  The Board further ruled that the appellant was entitled to a partial exemption for the subject property in fiscal year 1994 under the "relocation" part of the clause-third exemption coupled with the proportionate exemption rule.  On this basis, the Board ruled that the appellant was entitled to abatements for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 in the amounts of $76,600.01 and $104,311.44, respectively.

						  APPELLATE TAX BOARD


					By:_______________________________
						Abigail A. Burns, Chairman


A true copy,



Attest:_______________________
         Clerk of the Board

 This jurisdictional information pertains to the revised tax bill issued in fiscal year 1993 from which the appellant appeals.
 "[A] person aggrieved by a tax assessed upon him under section seventy-five or seventy-six or reassessed upon him under section seventy-seven [of chapter 59] may apply for [an] abatement at any time within three months after the bill or notice of such assessment or reassessment is first sent to him."  G.L. c. 59, § 59.
 July 18, 1993 fell on a Sunday.  When the last day of a payment period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the payment is still considered timely if it is made on the following business day.       G.L. c. 4, § 9.  Accordingly, the time within which the payment on the revised tax bill could still be timely made was extended by operation of law to Monday, July 19, 1993.
 Curiously, as previously recounted, in June 1993, about six months after the fiscal-year 1994 assessment for valuation purposes, but essentially at the same time as that fiscal year's determination for the tax exemption, the same membership of the Assessors issued the revised tax bill (for fiscal year 1993), which valued the subject property at $10,290,600 and considered 50% of the property exempt from real estate taxation.  The Assessors only evidentiary answer for this inconsistency was that they believed that the two-year period of time within which the appellant had to relocate its existing charitable services to the subject property to qualify for an exemption under G.L. c. 59, § 5, clause third, had expired.

ATB 2000-441