Hoyt Ecker and another v. Board of Assessors of the Town of Chatham (February 7, 2003)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD



HOYT ECKER and another		v.	BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF 
							THE TOWN OF CHATHAM

Docket No. F262764				Promulgated:
							February 7, 2003



	This is an appeal under the formal procedure, pursuant to G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal of the appellee to abate taxes on certain real estate in the Town of Chatham owned by and assessed to the appellants under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal year 2001.  
	Commissioner Rose heard this appeal.  Chairman Burns and Commissioners Scharaffa and Egan joined him in the decision for the appellee.  
	These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a request by the appellants under G.L. c. 58A, § 13, and 831 CMR 1.32.  

	Hoyt Ecker and Deborah Stark Ecker, pro se, for the appellants.  

	Bruce Gilmore, Esq. for the appellee.  

FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
	On January 1, 2000, Hoyt Ecker and Deborah Stark Ecker were the assessed owners of a parcel of real estate, improved with a single-family home, located at 70 Seabeach Road in the Town of Chatham.  For fiscal year 2001, the Board of Assessors of Chatham ("assessors") valued the property at $1,105,300, and assessed a tax thereon, at the rate of $6.85 per thousand, in the amount of $7,571.31.  
	The tax bill was mailed on August 3, 2001.  The appellants paid all of the real estate taxes without incurring interest.  On August 31, 2001, the appellants timely filed an application for abatement with the assessors.  On November 28, 2001, the assessors denied the application, and on February 28, 2002, the appellants seasonably filed their appeal with the Appellate Tax Board ("Board").  On the basis of these facts, the Board found that it had jurisdiction over this appeal. 
	The appellants testified that their 30,400 square foot property is located in the Sears Point section of Chatham on a coastal bank bordering, and about forty feet above, the ocean.  It has "beautiful views" in all directions, as
well as approximately two hundred feet of beach frontage.  The subject parcel is also smaller than the neighboring properties, and because of the location of its septic system, it does not have sufficient space for the addition of a guest or boathouse as exist on neighboring oceanfront properties.  
	The appellants' sole argument in support of their overvaluation claim is that their property is disproportionately assessed compared to others in the neighborhood.  In support of this position, the appellants presented an analysis of the per-acre assessments of other Sears-Point-neighborhood oceanfront properties.  According to their analysis, the average neighborhood assessment for the land portion of the oceanfront parcels for the fiscal year at issue is $512,000 per acre, while their 0.7-acre parcel is assessed for $920,200 or $1,300,000 per acre.  On the basis of this analysis, the appellants asserted that their parcel was disproportionately assessed because, using a "proportional" assessment of $512,000 per acre, their parcel should be assessed at only $353,000.  They concurred, however, with the $185,100 building value, which the assessors placed on their 2,093-square-foot, six-room, three-bedroom home that was built in the 1920's and a two-car garage with a studio living space that was built in 1998 above it.  On this basis, the appellants were of the opinion that the fair cash value of their ocean and beachfront home, expanded garage, and land was $538,300.  
	Walter Brown, the deputy assessor, testified for the assessors.  Mr. Brown explained the methodology that the assessors have used to value ocean and beachfront property in Chatham since the 1980s.  According to Mr. Brown, the first 20,000 square feet of a parcel are valued as the primary building site while the remaining square footage is considered back or excess land.  The excess land is valued at a flat acreage rate, which is significantly lower than the value assigned to primary building sites.  The parcel is then adjusted for its neighborhood, topography, and quality of view.  The improvements are then valued and adjustments are made, if appropriate, for their siting on the parcel.  Mr. Brown testified that all similar oceanfront properties have the same value for their  20,000-square-foot primary building site.  For the past twenty years, every oceanfront property in Chatham has been assessed in this way.  The value of the oceanfront properties in Chatham, like the subject property, is more a function of their location than their size.  Accordingly, Mr. Brown concluded that this property was properly assessed for the fiscal year at issue, and the assessment not only reflected its fair cash value, but also was proportionate to other similarly situated properties in Chatham.  
	On the basis of all of the evidence, the Board found that the appellants did not meet their burden of proving that their property was disproportionately assessed.  The Board found that the evidence introduced by the appellants in support of their disproportion theory fell far short of demonstrating an intentional widespread scheme of disproportionate or discriminatory assessments in Chatham.  The Board further found that the value ascribed to the parcel associated with the subject property was proportionate and similarly developed by the assessors to others in the neighborhood.    
The Board also found that the valuation methodology consistently used by the assessors to value ocean or beachfront property in Chatham, which is to value the 20,000-square-foot primary building site at a higher rate than the remaining lower-valued excess land, was appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances.  The Board found that this technique properly recognized the greater value inherent in the primary building site of ocean or beachfront property and the lesser value attendant to the excess land.  The assessors' application of this methodology to ocean or beachfront properties was consistent, and, after the valuation for each property's 20,000-square-foot primary building site, proportionate to similar parcels with only minimal variations for other necessary adjustments.  
Most importantly, the appellants failed to prove that the land associated with their parcel or the overall assessed value of their property, including land and building values, exceeded the fair cash value of the property.  The evidence presented by the appellants regarding comparable land assessments, coupled with the assessors' explanation of their methodology for valuing ocean or beachfront property, actually supported the subject property's land and overall assessment.  The appellants did not introduce any evidence, other than their unsubstantiated opinion of value, concerning the fair cash value of the entire property, having focused solely on the land assessment.  Even if, arguendo, their land assessment were too high, the appellants failed to demonstrate that the overall assessment of the entire property consisting of land and improvements was excessive.  For these reasons, the Board found that the appellants failed to meet their burden of proving that the subject property was disproportionately assessed or over-valued and, therefore, decided this appeal for the appellee.
  
OPINION
	The assessors have a statutory and constitutional obligation to assess all real property at its full and fair cash value.  Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth; art. 10 of the Declaration of Rights; G.L. c. 59, §§ 38, 52.  See Coomey v. Assessors of Sandwich, 367 Mass. 836, 837 (1975) (citations omitted).  Fair cash value means fair market value, which is defined as the price on which a willing seller and a willing buyer will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).
	 "If the taxpayer[s] can demonstrate in an appeal to the Board that [they] ha[ve] been the victim[s] of a scheme of discriminatory, disproportionate assessment, [they] 'may be granted an abatement . . . which will make . . . [their] assessment proportional to other assessments, on a basis which reaches results as close as is practicable to those which would have followed application by the assessors of the proper statutory assessment principles.'"  Coomey v. Assessors of Sandwich, 367 Mass. at 836 (quoting Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 366, 377-78 (1971)).  The burden of proof as to the existence of a "scheme of discriminatory, disproportionate assessment" is on the taxpayer.  First National Stores, Inc. v. Assessors of Somerville, 358 Mass. 554, 559 (1971); see Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974).  If a taxpayer successfully demonstrates improper assessment of such a number of properties to establish an inference that such a scheme exists, the burden of going forward to disprove such a scheme shifts to the assessors.  Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. at 377.  "The ultimate burden of persuasion, of course, will remain upon the taxpayer."  First National Stores, Inc., 358 Mass. at 562.
In the present appeal, the appellants failed to meet their burden of proving and persuading the Board that a deliberate scheme of disproportionate assessment ever existed.  The evidence submitted was simply inadequate to prove that the assessors engaged in an "intentional widespread scheme of discrimination."  Stilson v. Assessors of Gloucester, 385 Mass. 724, 727-28 (1982).  In the present appeal, the appellants only analyzed a handful of neighboring oceanfront properties and their attendant land assessments for fiscal year 2001.  The finding of a widespread scheme would require far more data and analysis within the class of property, between classes of property, and among groups of taxpayers than that supplied by the appellants.  The Board found no evidence or inference of an intentional or deliberate scheme of disproportionate assessment on the part of the assessors.  Accordingly, the Board ruled that the appellants had failed to meet their burden in showing that a deliberate scheme of disproportionate assessment existed in this appeal.  Where assessments, even if wrong, are "consistent with honest mistake or oversight on the part of assessors" as opposed to a "deliberate scheme of disproportionate assessment" no relief for disproportionate assessment is appropriate.  Brown v. Assessors of Brookline, 18 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 83, 92 (1996), affirmed 43 Mass. App. Ct. 327 (1997) (quoting Stilson v. Assessors of Gloucester, 385 Mass. at 728).  
In addition, the Board found and ruled that the methodology used by the assessors in valuing ocean or beachfront property, including the appellants', was reasonable under the circumstances and supported by the evidence.  The Board further found and ruled that the assessors' methodology did not discriminate against smaller ocean or beachfront properties, like the appellants', but was consistent and appropriate in both its theory and application.  
Moreover, the Board found and ruled that the appellants failed to meet their burden in demonstrating that their property was over-valued by the assessors.  The Board found that the evidence actually supported the assessment placed on the land, and the record was completely devoid of any evidence, other than the appellants' bare opinion, showing that the overall assessment of the subject property in any way over-valued it. The assessment is presumed valid until the taxpayers sustain their burden of proving otherwise.  Schlaiker v. Board of Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. at 245.
	The burden of proof is upon the appellants to make out their right as a matter of law to an abatement of the tax.  Id.   The appellants must show that they have complied with the statutory prerequisites to their appeal, Cohen v. Assessors of Boston, 344 Mass. 268, 271 (1962), and that the assessed valuation of their property was improper.  See Foxboro Associates v. Board of Assessors of Foxborough,  385 Mass. 679, 691 (1982).  In appeals before this Board, taxpayers "may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation."  General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 600 (1984) (quoting Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 (1983)).	
Furthermore, a taxpayer does not conclusively establish a right to abatement merely by showing that his land is overvalued.  "The tax on a parcel of land and the building thereon is one tax . . . although for statistical purposes they may be valued separately."  Assessors of Brookline v. Prudential Insurance Co., 310 Mass. 300, 317 (1941).  In abatement proceedings, "the question is whether the assessment for the parcel of real estate, including both the land and the structures thereon, is excessive.  The component parts, on which that single assessment is laid, are each open to inquiry and revision by the appellate tribunal in reaching the conclusion whether that single assessment is excessive."  Massachusetts General Hospital v. Belmont, 238 Mass. 396, 403 (1921).  See also Buckley v. Assessors of Duxbury, 12 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 139 (1990); Jernegan v. Assessors of Duxbury, 12 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 74 (1990); Everhart v. Dalton, 6 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 7 (1985).
Although the appellants introduced evidence challenging the value of the land component of the subject assessment, the Board found and ruled that they introduced insufficient credible evidence showing that the overall assessment of the subject property exceeded its fair cash value as of the relevant assessment date.
In the present appeal, the Board found and ruled that the appellants did not "expose any flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation" and did not "present persuasive evidence of overvaluation" by any method or measure.  General Electric v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. at 600.  Accordingly, the Board found and ruled that the appellants failed to meet their burden of proving that their property was over-valued or disproportionately assessed.  

						THE APPELLATE TAX BOARD



					 By: _____________________________
				          Abigail A. Burns, Chairman



A true copy:




Attest: ____________________
	    Clerk of the Board

  The other appellant in this appeal is Deborah Stark Ecker.  
  An additional $227.13 appears on the tax bill for "Land Bank Tax." 

  The appellants first filed this appeal under the informal procedure.  The assessors timely removed it to the formal docket.  See G.L. c. 58A, § 7A.  

ATB 2003-92