Farmhouse Lane Realty Trust, John R. Serafini, Jr. and John E. Darling, Trustees v. Board of Assessors of the Town of Rowley (April 5, 2011)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

		      APPELLATE TAX BOARD

FARMHOUSE LANE REALTY TRUST,   v.     BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF 
JOHN R. SERAFINI, JR. AND 		   THE TOWN OF ROWLEY
JOHN E. DARLING, TRUSTEES
			   
Docket Nos. F294842-F294854,          Promulgated:
		  F299674-F299686	        April 5, 2011
				   

	These are appeals filed under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal of the appellee, Board of Assessors of the Town of Rowley ("assessors" or "appellee"), to abate taxes on certain real estate located in the Town of Rowley, owned by and assessed to the appellant, Farmhouse Lane Realty Trust ("Trust" or "appellant") under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 ("fiscal years at issue").
	Commissioner Egan heard these appeals.  Chairman Hammond and Commissioners Scharaffa, Rose and Mulhern joined her in decisions for the appellee.   
These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a request by the appellant under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32. 

	John R. Serafini, Jr., Esq. for the appellant.

	Gary S. Brackett, Esq. for the appellee.  
FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
On the basis of the testimony and exhibits offered into evidence at the hearing of these appeals, the Appellate Tax Board ("Board") made the following findings of fact.
On January 1, 2007 and January 1, 2008, the appellant was the assessed owner of a 53.8-acre parcel of real estate located in the Town of Rowley, which was separately assessed and taxed as thirteen residential building lots (collectively, the "subject property").  For fiscal year 2008, the assessors separately assessed the subject property's individual lots in the total amount of $2,801,200.00 and assessed a tax thereon, at the rate of $10.38 per $1,000, in the total amount of $29,948.75.  The appellant timely paid the tax in full without incurring interest.  On January 31, 2008, the appellant timely applied to the assessors for abatement, claiming that the subject property was overvalued.  By a vote on February 11, 2008, the assessors granted a partial abatement reducing the subject property's valuation to $1,038,100.00, resulting in final taxes of $11,098.78.  By written notice dated February 12, 2008, the assessors notified the appellant of their decision.  The appellant seasonably filed petitions with the Board on May 8, 2008.  On the basis of these facts, the Board found and ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeals for fiscal year 2008.
For fiscal year 2009, the assessors separately assessed the subject property's thirteen individual lots in the total amount of $972,200.00 and assessed a tax thereon, at the rate of $11.34 per thousand, in the total amount of $11,355.50.  The appellant timely paid the tax in full without incurring interest.  On January 30, 2009, the appellant timely applied to the assessors for abatement, claiming that the subject property was overvalued.  By notice dated February 9, 2009, the assessors informed the appellant that its abatement application had been denied by vote on that same day.  The appellant seasonably filed petitions with the Board on April 30, 2009.  On the basis of these facts, the Board found and ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeals for fiscal year 2009.
The appellant presented its case-in-chief through the testimony of the following witnesses:  Charles Wear, a Massachusetts Registered Professional Engineer and Vice President of Meridian Associates, Inc., whom the Board qualified as an expert in the field of civil engineering and subdivision and land-use planning; Ann Marton, Director of Ecological Services and President of LEC Environmental Consultants, Inc., whom the Board qualified as an expert in the areas of wetlands and rare species covered under the Massachusetts Endangered Species Act ("MESA") as these subjects affect land development; and Robert Noone, Appraiser and Chairman of the Board of Assessors of Peabody, Massachusetts, whom the Board qualified as an expert in the field of real estate valuation.    
The parties agreed that the subject property had previously received approval for a 4-lot subdivision plan in 1994, the year that the appellant acquired the property.  On September 13, 2000, the Rowley Planning Board ("Planning Board") granted subdivision approval, under G.L. c. 41, § 81L et seq., for the subject property to be divided into thirteen separate residential building lots ("13-lot subdivision plan").  The appellant filed Notices of Intent under the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act, G.L. c. 131, § 40, with the Rowley Conservation Commission ("Conservation Commission") for the roads and subdivision lots, but the Conservation Commission never approved them.  Rowley subsequently adopted its own set of wetlands bylaws in 2004 ("Rowley Wetlands Bylaws").  
As a result of the concerns raised by the Conservation Commission with respect to wetlands surrounding the access point at Wilson Pond Road, the appellant sought amendment of the 13-lot subdivision plan.  In the fall of 2000, the Planning Board approved the amendment, which shifted the internal access road, known as "Road A" or "Farmhouse Lane," about twenty feet to the south near the Wilson Pond crossing, in order to use part of the historic location of Meetinghouse Road.  However, an abutter to the subject property appealed the amendment to the Land Court.  
The 13-lot subdivision plan expired in September, 2006, and the appellant filed at the Land Court for an extension of the plan.  However, after the abutter's appeal, the appellant withdrew the Notices of Intent from the Conservation Commission and never pursued any other permits.  The Planning Board refused to extend endorsement of the 13-lot subdivision plan by letter dated October 2, 2006.  The abutter's appeal at the Land Court was still active as of the date of the hearing of these appeals.
The subject property is assessed and taxed as 13 separate lots, each classified as class 131 "potentially developable" property.  It is undisputed that the 13-lot subdivision plan has expired and its appeal is pending at the Land Court.  The appellant contends that the subject property is overvalued, because given the history of the appellant's efforts to develop the subject property, as well as the application of regulations under MESA, the appellant would not be able to obtain permits to develop the subject property at any time in the foreseeable future.  Therefore, the argument continues, the subject property should be assessed as equivalent in value to conservation land, regardless of its designation.  The appellant does not challenge the subject property's designation as class 131 "potentially developable."
The appellant's first witness, Mr. Wear, testified to the history and challenges surrounding development of the subject property.  Mr. Wear opined that the expired 13-lot subdivision plan could not be duplicated as of the subject assessment dates, because the current zoning, wetlands and MESA regulations were different or did not originally apply to the subject property at the time of the 13-lot plan's development.  He also detailed the multiple permits that would be required to cross Wilson Pond, including a "Chapter 91 License" to be issued by the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") under G.L. c. 91, a "Section 401 water quality certification" to be issued by DEP, an additional permit to be issued by the U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, a permit to be issued under MESA, and one under the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act ("MEPA").  Mr. Wear projected that the many permits required at the local, state and federal levels would be nearly impossible to obtain and, even if they were approved, the project would be very expensive.  He further opined that accessing the subject property from alternate directions posed additional challenges, including the refusal of an abutting owner to grant a right to pass over adjoining property, steep grade changes in the subject property, and the requirement for a dimensional variance from the Rowley Board of Appeals.  He further testified that access from Cindy Lane was not viable, because it was a private way. 
Mr. Wear detailed further issues, including: the requirement that a subdivision plan meet the Rowley Wetlands Bylaw, which is more restrictive than the standards under the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act; physical changes to Wilson Pond caused by extensive beaver activity, resulting in the expansion of the wetlands area as part of the subject property has become submerged; changes to the Rowley zoning bylaws, which, at the time of the original 13-lot subdivision's approval, required 125 feet of frontage and 60,000 feet of lot area but now require 150 feet of frontage and 40,000 feet of lot area; issues relating to septic systems, including the percolation tests which revealed that Title V septic system requirements are not met in some areas of the subject property; and finally, the MESA restriction on development of the subject property to protect the habitat of the blue-spotted salamander, which has been discovered on the property.  Mr. Wear acknowledged, however, that the Trust never proceeded with the Notices of Intent before the Commission nor with any of the permits required for development of the subdivision.  
Ms. Marton next testified with respect to the permitting procedures that applied to development of the subject property.  She explained that extensive procedures would apply to development, including at least six permits from the Conservation Commission, the DEP, and the Army Corps. of Engineers to cross Wilson Pond to provide access to the subject property, as well as three other permits with respect to interior wetlands.  Ms. Marton opined that permitting requirements have become more complex with the adoption of the Rowley Wetlands Bylaw in 2004 and the inclusion of the property under MESA.  Like Mr. Wear, Ms. Marton explained that in 2006, the subject property was designated as a priority habitat for the blue-spotted salamander under MESA, and this designation has a direct impact on permitting processes before the Conservation Commission and under MESA.  She testified that the planned areas for the road crossing of Wilson Pond and the cul-de-sac were closest to a vernal pool where a blue-spotted salamander breeding area was located.  
Ms. Marton acknowledged on cross-examination that, while the subject property's MESA designation presents permitting issues, the application of MESA would not necessarily result in the inability to develop the site, and in fact, it is not common for there to be a disqualification of development for an entire site.  Ms. Marton also admitted that she had not measured the size of the vernal pool on the subject property.  Documentation from the Conservation Commission admitted into evidence reveals that the size of the certified vernal pool occupied only 0.19 acres out of the 53-acre site.  Ms. Marton also admitted that the Division of Fisheries and Wildlife has never made a determination of a "take" (a potential destruction) of an endangered species on the subject property.  With respect to the extensive permitting procedures, Ms. Marton admitted that the Trust did not seek the permits which would be needed for completion of the crossing at Wilson Pond Road, and further, that the Conservation Commission never stated that it would deny the permit for the wetlands but only that it wanted the Trust to propose a means of access to the site other than Wilson Pond Road.  Like Mr. Wear, Ms. Marton testified that Cindy Lane was not a viable means of access to the site, because it was a private way.  Finally, Ms. Marton acknowledged that she had not been asked by the Trust to consider the development of the subject property as an Open Space Residential District.
The appellant's third witness, Mr. Noone, prepared an appraisal report for the subject property for each fiscal year at issue.  Mr. Noone opined that the subject property's development potential was speculative and remote, because of the many restrictions on the land.  He cited the restrictions imposed by MESA, because of the subject property's classification as a habitat for endangered species, as particularly limiting.  Therefore, in his opinion, the "highest and best use" of the subject property was as one large parcel of residentially zoned land having a possible, but speculative, potential for development as a residential subdivision with an undetermined number of lots.  Accordingly, Mr. Noone regarded the subject property as equivalent in value to conservation land, even though it had been classified as potentially developable.   
Mr. Noone's appraisal reports for both tax years at issue each included an identical comparable-sales analysis.  The comparable-sales analysis did not include any sales of land located in Rowley because Mr. Noone could not find any such comparable sales.    Instead, the analysis included four sales of land in neighboring communities -Ipswich, Salisbury, Newbury, and Newburyport at the Newbury/Newburyport line.
Sale One in Ipswich is comprised of two contiguous parcels of land that contain a total of 44.2 acres, which were purchased by Ipswich for conservation purposes on December 20, 2006.  The total sale price for both parcels was $110,000, which yields a price of $2,489 per acre.  The land features some wetland and some areas of upland.  The land is not equipped with utilities, and it has no street frontage.  It is zoned for residential use.  
Sale Two is comprised of 43.39 acres located in Salisbury.  Sale Two was actually a two-part sale, made from a family group of grantors to a private developer.  The various sales occurred on June 22, 2006 and July 12, 2006, for a total sale price of $46,593, which yields a price of $1,074 per acre.  The land has about 118 feet of frontage along Forest Road and also abuts the Little River.  The land near the river features salt marsh, while the upland portions are rolling and are covered with heavy scrub and tree vegetation.  Available utilities are water, electric, telephone and cable.  The land is zoned for Residential/Agricultural uses.  Mr. Noone testified that this comparable-sales property was "generally very inferior" to the subject in overall location, features and amenities and thus required "a substantial plus adjustment" for comparison with the subject property.  Mr. Noone did not specify any particular adjustments that he made with respect to Sale Two's sale price.
Sales Three and Four were both part of a large parcel of vacant land that is within both Newbury and Newburyport.  The total area of the large parcel is 170.168 acres, 46.734 acres of which are in Newbury and the remaining 123.434 acres of which are in Newburyport.  Mr. Noone describes the tract as a "wet meadow," a term of art referring to a meadow that is a wetland for much of the time, as large portions of the property feature wetlands.  The land was purchased on December 29, 2006 for conservation purposes.  Water, electric and telephone are available in certain portions of the property.  Sale Three, the 46.734-acre parcel in Newbury, was purchased by the Essex County Greenbelt Association, Inc. for $113,700, which yields a price of $2,861 per acre.  Sale Three has no road frontage and is zoned for residential/agricultural purposes.  Sale Four, the 123.434-acre parcel in Newburyport, was purchased by the City of Newburyport's Conservation Commission for $366,300, which yields a price of $2,968 per acre.  Sale Four has 451.62 feet of street frontage and is zoned for agricultural/open space purposes.
Mr. Noone's report noted that the comparable-sales properties had sale prices ranging from $1,074 per acre to $2,968 per acre.  After applying his adjustments, which he did not detail, Mr. Noone's comparable sales yielded adjusted-sale values between $2,500 and $3,000 per acre.  He settled on $2,750 per acre and applying this value to the subject's 52.91 acres, his comparable-sales analysis yielded a fair market value of $145,503, which he rounded to $145,500.  Mr. Noone's final estimate of value was $145,500 for the subject property for both fiscal years at issue.
Mr. Noone acknowledged on cross-examination that his comparable-sales properties were conservation properties having as their highest and best use being held as conservation land; only Sale Two was sold for the potential of future development, but he admitted that that property was "very inferior" to the subject.  Mr. Noone also admitted that the decision of the Planning Board denying the extension of the 13-lot subdivision was still being appealed before the Land Court and therefore was not final.  He further admitted that the subject property had sufficient frontage along Wilson Pond Lane and it satisfied the lot size requirement for a single building lot.  Finally, Mr. Noone was unaware of the existence of a so-called "tripartite agreement," detailed in a letter from the Chairman of the Planning Board to the Chairman of the Conservation Commission, by which a developer of a subdivision called Meetinghouse Village was required to extend Cindy Lane (referred to in the tripartite agreement as "Road A") to the boundary of the subject property, thereby providing an alternative access to the subject property.  This letter, admitted into evidence, continues as follows:
In the Planning Board's opinion, Road A  could be used as a means of accessing the Farmhouse site, regardless of whether access from Tenney Road would be feasible or economical.  Moreover, while the Planning Board's rules and regulations limit the length of a cul-de-sac to 500 feet, the [Planning] Board can grant a waiver of this limitation if the property is developed as an Open Space Residential Subdivision under section 6.4 of the Rowley Protective Zoning Bylaw.

Mr. Noone ultimately admitted that, although it may be "a long time coming," "the land at some point in time could be developed." 
The appellee presented its case-in-chief through the testimony of Sean McFadden, Principal Assessor for Rowley.  Mr. McFadden first testified to the method by which the assessors abated the subject property for fiscal year 2008.  He explained that he considered the subject property to be potentially developable property, which qualified for a 30% reduction from the assessors' previously determined fair cash value, but upon receiving the appellant's abatement request, he decided to adjust the subject's taxable value to approximately 70% of its fair cash value, in consideration of the appellant's arguments regarding the constraints on development.  However, Mr. McFadden rejected Mr. Noone's claim that the subject property should be valued on the basis of a highest-and-best use as conservation land.  He explained that the 13-lot subdivision plan and the earlier 4-lot subdivision plan would never have been filed if the 53-acre subject property were completely incapable of being developed.  He surmised that, at the very least, the subject property could be developed as a single-lot plan with Tenney Road as an access point.      
Mr. McFadden based the abatement for fiscal year 2009 on his own research, which included a comparable-sales analysis using eleven sales of individual residential lots, occurring during 2006 and 2007, which, collectively, he determined were comparable to the 13-lot subject property.  Mr. McFadden submitted a spreadsheet listing: the map/block/lot and address of each of his comparable properties; the size, date of sale, sale price and class of the properties; and the properties' assessments for fiscal years 2008 and 2009.  His spreadsheet did not include any adjustments.  As a result of his analysis, Mr. McFadden determined that property values had declined by about 3% from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2009.  He thus decided to reduce the subject property's fiscal year 2009 assessment to $972,200.00. 
On the basis of the evidence, the Board found that the appellant failed to prove that subject property could not be developed.  After the abutter's appeal, the Trust never proceeded with the Notices of Intent before the Commission, and it never pursued any of the several other permits which were required for the development of the subdivision.  All three of the appellant's witnesses were mistaken in their assumptions that Cindy Lane was a private road and unable to be used to access the subject property; as evidenced by the tripartite agreement, the use of Cindy Lane as an access point was, at the very least, a possibility.  Furthermore, Mr. Wear never developed a conceptual plan for development of the subject property based upon the changes to the Rowley Zoning Bylaw.  The Board thus found that he was not in a position to state definitively that development under those new guidelines was prohibited.  Moreover, Mr. Wear acknowledged that he thought it was still possible to reconfigure the thirteen lots on the site, or at the very least, to develop the subject property with at least one residential lot.  In addition, the prior 4-lot development supported the conclusion that the subject property has development potential.
Ms. Marton also did not establish that the subject property was unbuildable.  She, in fact, acknowledged that it was not common to disqualify development of an entire site under MESA requirements.  Like Mr. Wear, Ms. Marton also conceded that the Trust never sought the permits needed to develop the subject property.  She further admitted that no application was filed with MESA regarding the subject property and that Massachusetts Fisheries and Wildlife never made a determination of a "take" of an endangered species on the subject property.  Ms. Marton also acknowledged that the Commission never stated that it would deny the wetlands permit for the subject property, but only that it wanted the Trust to propose a means of access to the site other than Wilson Pond Road.  Finally, Ms. Marton conceded that she was never asked by the Trust to consider the development of the subject property as an Open Space Residential District under the Rowley Zoning Bylaw.  
On the basis of these findings, the Board found that the appellant failed to prove that the subject property was unbuildable and thus should be valued as conservation land.  
Additionally, the Board was not persuaded by the appellant's valuation evidence, specifically Mr. Noone's comparable-sales analysis.  The Board found that three of Mr. Noone's four purportedly comparable properties were purchased specifically for conservation purposes, with one of the properties, Sale One, being land-locked.  Only one property, Sale Two, was purchased for future development, and Mr. Noone admitted that that property was "very inferior" to the subject property and required substantial adjustment.  Moreover, Mr. Noone did not specify any of his adjustments to his purportedly comparable-sales properties for size, topography, frontage and other factors.  Because Mr. Noone did not use sales of land that were sufficiently comparable to the subject property, and because he failed to specify adjustments to account for differences between the subject property and the purportedly comparable properties, the Board found that the appellant's comparable-sales evidence did not constitute persuasive, credible evidence that the subject property was overvalued.  
On the basis of the evidence presented, the Board found that the appellant failed to meet its burden of proving that the subject property was overvalued.  Accordingly, the Board issued a decision for the appellee in these appeals. 

OPINION
Assessors are required to assess real estate at its fair cash value as of the first day of January preceding the fiscal year at issue.  G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38.  The fair cash value of a property is defined as the price upon which a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree if both are fully informed and under no compulsion. Boston Gas. Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).  
An assessment is presumed valid unless the taxpayer sustains its burden of proving otherwise.  Schlaiker v. Board of Assessors of Great Barrington, 356 Mass. 243, 245 (1974).  Accordingly, the burden of proof is upon the appellant to make out its right as a matter of law to an abatement of the tax.  Id.  The appellant must show that the assessed valuation of its property was improper.  See Foxboro Associates v. Board of Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 679, 691 (1982).  In appeals before this Board, a taxpayer "'may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation.'" General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 600 (1984)(quoting Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 (1983)).
"Prior to valuing the subject property, its highest and best use must be ascertained, which has been defined as the use for which the property would bring the most."  Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Assessors of Agawam, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2000-859, 874 (citing Conness v. Commonwealth, 184 Mass. 541, 542-43 (1903)); see also Irving Saunders Trust v. Assessors of Boston, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 838, 843 (1989) (and the cases cited therein).  A property's highest and best use is one that is legally permissible, physically possible, financially feasible, and maximally productive.  Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate 279 (13th ed., 2008).  See also Skyline Homes, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 362 Mass. 684, 687 (1972); Northshore Mall Limited Partnership et al. v. Board of Assessors of the City of Peabody, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2004-195, 247 ("In determining the property's highest and best use, consideration should be given to the purpose for which the property is adapted.") (citing Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate at 315-16 (12th ed., 2001); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2000-875).  
In the instant appeals, the appellant, while not challenging the subject property's classification as potentially developable, nonetheless contended that the subject property should be valued as akin to conservation property.  However, the Trust did not establish that the Commission definitively denied its 13-lot subdivision plan, much less any development of the subject property; it established only that the Trust needed to draw up a plan with an alternative point of access.  All three of the appellant's witnesses were mistaken in their belief that Cindy Lane could not be used as a point of access, yet as evidenced by the tripartite agreement, the use of Cindy Lane for access was at least a possibility.  Furthermore, after the abutter's appeal, the Trust never pursued the permits required for development of the subject property, and apparently never considered alternative development plans, like reconfiguration of the 13-lot development, revisiting the prior 4-lot subdivision plan, a one-lot residential development, or an Open Space Residential District.  The Board thus found and ruled that the appellant failed to meet its burden of proving that the subject property was in fact incapable of development and thus should be valued as akin to conservation land.
The appellant's valuation evidence was also deficient.  Generally, real estate valuation experts, the Massachusetts courts, and this Board rely upon three approaches to determine the fair cash value of property: income capitalization, sales comparison, and cost reproduction.  Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, 375 Mass. 360, 362 (1978).  Sales of comparable realty in the same geographic area and within a reasonable time of the assessment date generally contain probative evidence for determining the value of the property at issue.  Graham v. Assessors of West Tisbury, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2008-321, 400 (citing McCabe v. Chelsea, 265 Mass. 494, 496 (1929)), aff'd, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1107 (2008).  The properties used in a comparable-sales analysis must be comparable to the subject property in order to be probative of the fair cash value.  See Anne B. Sroka v. Assessors of Monson, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2009-835, 846 (citing Lattuca v. Robsham, 442 Mass. 205, 216 (2004)).  The appellant bears the burden of "establishing the comparability of . . . properties [used for comparison] to the subject property."  Fleet Bank of Mass. v. Assessors of Manchester, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1998-546, 554.  Accord New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 470 (1981). "Once basic comparability is established, it is then necessary to make adjustments for the differences, looking primarily to the relative quality of the properties, to develop a market indicator of value."  Id.  
In the instant appeals, Mr. Noone performed a comparable-sales analysis.  Three of Mr. Noone's four comparable-sales properties were conservation lands with no potential for development.  Yet, Mr. Noone admitted at the hearing that the 13-lot subdivision was still being appealed and therefore, denial was not final.  Mr. Wear also admitted that the subject property had sufficient frontage along Wilson Pond Lane and satisfied the lot size requirement for a one-lot development.  As for Mr. Wear's only potentially developable comparable-sales property, Sale Two, that property was, in his own words, "very inferior" to the subject property.  Therefore, the Board found and ruled that Mr. Noone's analysis failed to include a property sufficiently comparable to the subject property.  Moreover, Mr. Noone's analysis failed to specify adjustments to account for obvious differences between the subject property and its comparison properties where adjustments would have been required for meaningful comparison.  The Board thus found and ruled that Mr. Noone's comparable-sales analysis was not probative evidence of the subject property's valuation.  See, e.g., Diamond Ledge Properties Corp. v. Assessors of the Town of Swansea, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2009-1185, 1192.
On the basis of the evidence provided, the Board found and ruled that the appellant failed to meet its burden of proving a fair market value for the subject property that was lower than that assessed for the fiscal years at issue.  The Board therefore decided these appeals for the appellee.
					 APPELLATE TAX BOARD			


By:  __________________________undefinedundefinedundefinedundefinedundefinedundefined________
     Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman

A true copy,

Attest: ________________________
	   Clerk of the Board

 This amount includes a Community Preservation Act assessment of $872.29.
 This amount includes a Community Preservation Act assessment of $335.40.
 This amount includes a Community Preservation Act assessment of $330.75.

ATB 2011-226