Diane Marie Pagano v. Board of Assessors of the Town of Swampscott (February 7, 2012)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD

DIANE MARIE PAGANO         v.	       BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF 
				  THE TOWN OF SWAMPSCOTT

Docket No. F309859	 			  Promulgated:  
		  					  February 7, 2012				 					
	This is an appeal originally filed under the informal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7A and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal of the appellee, Board of Assessors of the Town of Swampscott ("assessors" or "appellee"), to abate taxes on certain real estate located in Swampscott owned by and assessed to Diane Marie Pagano (the "appellant") under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal year 2010 (the "fiscal year at issue").
	Commissioner Mulhern ("Presiding Commissioner") heard the appeal and, in accordance with G.L. c. 58A, § 1A and 831 CMR 1.20, issued a single-member decision for the appellee.
These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to the appellant's request under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.
Diane Marie Pagano, pro se, for the appellant.

 	Donna Champagne O'Keefe, assessor, for the appellee.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
On the basis of the testimony and exhibits offered into evidence at the hearing of this appeal, the Presiding Commissioner made the following findings of fact.
On January 1, 2009, the appellant was the assessed owner of a 7,938-square-foot parcel of real estate located at 5 Bates Road in Swampscott (the "subject property").  The subject property was improved with an "old-style" wood-framed, single-family dwelling, built in 1870, with a hip-style asphalt roof and asbestos exterior covered in vinyl shingle-styled siding.  The subject dwelling contained 1,866 square feet of living area with 6 rooms, including 3 bedrooms, as well as 2 full bathrooms.  The subject dwelling was equipped with forced hot-water heating fueled by oil.  The primary level's floor was carpet, and the secondary level's floor was hardwood.  The subject dwelling also included a 168-square-foot open porch and an 80-square-foot screened-in porch.  The property record card on file with the assessors indicated that the subject dwelling's kitchen was in "fair" condition and that the subject dwelling was in "average" overall condition, with a grade of "C."
For the fiscal year at issue, the appellee valued the subject property at $350,700 and assessed a tax thereon, at the rate of $16.48 per $1,000 of value, for a total tax of $5,779.54.  In accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 57C, the appellant timely paid the tax due without incurring interest.  On January 26, 2010, in accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 59, the appellant timely filed an abatement application with the assessors, which the assessors denied by vote on April 15, 2010.  On July 13, 2010, the appellant seasonably filed her appeal with the Appellate Tax Board (the "Board").  On the basis of these facts, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the Board had jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal.
The appellant contended that the subject property was overvalued.  In support of her claim, she maintained that: market values were decreasing at the time of the relevant assessment date; the subject dwelling had not been updated in the past fifty years; the subject dwelling did not have a fireplace as was indicated on the assessors' property record card; and there was an underground brook which ran beneath the subject dwelling.  The appellant's opinion of fair market value for the fiscal year at issue was $305,000.
The appellant presented her case through her testimony and exhibits which included: Multiple Listing Service ("MLS") listings and printed pictures downloaded from the internet for seven purportedly comparable-sale properties located in Swampscott; a chart detailing the assessed value of the subject property, with a breakdown of the separate building and land values, for each fiscal year from 1989 through the fiscal year at issue, as well as for fiscal years 1955 and 1910; two copies of the property record card for the subject property for the fiscal year at issue, with one omitting any reference to, and valuation for, a fireplace; photocopied pictures of the subject dwelling's interior; photographs of the sump-pump system, surrounded by water, located under the subject dwelling's basement; and a town plan of the brook's drainage system from Shelton Road to Phillips Park, which depicted the brook running underneath the subject dwelling. 
The appellant's purportedly comparable sales occurred between February, 2008 and September, 2009, with sale prices ranging from $230,000 to $330,000.  The appellant submitted computer printout copies of MLS listings and "unofficial" property record cards for each of her purportedly comparable properties.  However, she did not detail the differences between the subject property and the purportedly comparable properties, nor did she make adjustments to the purportedly comparable properties' sale prices to compensate for how those differences would impact fair market value. 
The appellant further contended that the error on the property record card for the presence of a fireplace had resulted in an assessed value that exceeded the subject property's actual value.  In support of this argument, the appellant pointed to the property record card without the value for a fireplace, which listed the subject property's value at $348,600, which was $2,100 less than the assessed value for the fiscal year at issue.
Donna Champagne O'Keefe, the assessor for Swampscott, testified and presented evidence on behalf of the appellee.  In support of the assessment, Ms. O'Keefe presented a narrative explaining the demographics of Swampscott together with her own comparable-sales analysis.  According to the narrative, Swampscott was a small, picturesque, seaside community with numerous homes and other structures of significant historical value.  Ms. O'Keefe admitted that real estate values in Swampscott had experienced a decline in recent fiscal years.  In recognition of the downward trend in real estate values, the assessors had trended real estate values downward starting in fiscal year 2007, with the largest downward trend occurring in the fiscal year at issue.    
For her comparable-sales analysis, Ms. O'Keefe selected seven purportedly comparable properties.  The sales occurred between December 27, 2007 and May 28, 2009, with sale prices ranging from $340,000 to $415,000.  Ms. O'Keefe provided adjustments to her comparable properties' sale prices for, among other variables: sale date; location; lot size; age of dwelling; condition of dwelling; square-foot living area; number of bedrooms; number of bathrooms; presence and size of a garage; and presence and size of a porch.  After adjustments, Ms. O'Keefe's comparable-sale properties yielded adjusted-sales prices ranging from $350,634 to $408,728.  Ms. O'Keefe claimed that the comparable-sales properties of 20 Shaw Road, 80 Banks Terrace and 80 King Street were the most comparable to the subject, requiring the least total adjustments.  The average adjusted-sale price of those three comparable-sales properties indicated a fair market value of $363,963 for the subject property.  At $350,700, the subject assessment was less than the average adjusted-sale price from those three comparable-sale properties.  
Ms. O'Keefe challenged the appellant's evidence, testifying that four of the appellant's comparable-sales properties lacked reliability for the following reasons: 11 Bank Street had a "very motivated" seller; 838 Humphrey Street was sold in connection with a divorce; 6 Elmwood Road was a bank-owned sale; and 25 Greenwood Terrace was a short sale.  She testified that short sales, bank sales, and other "distressed" sales, -- for example, a sale by a highly-motivated seller or one between owners in connection with a divorce -- were not sufficiently exposed to the market to qualify as arm's-length sales and thus should be excluded from a comparable-sales analysis.  Ms. O'Keefe further explained that the appellant's other comparable-sale properties had not been adjusted for any differences vis-à-vis the subject property, particularly for time of sale, which Ms. O'Keefe explained was an important adjustment for sales occurring prior to the particular fiscal year at issue.
Ms. O'Keefe agreed that the interior of the subject dwelling had not been updated as of the relevant valuation date.  However, she explained that the subject dwelling's exterior had been updated within the past five years with shingle-styled vinyl siding.  She maintained that the exterior of the subject dwelling was in average-to-good condition, with no signs of deferred maintenance, and that the subject assessment at $350,700 was based on the overall "average" condition of the subject property.  Ms. O'Keefe further explained that, as a corner-lot property, the subject property was one of the more desirable lots in its neighborhood.  Finally, Ms. O'Keefe admitted that the subject dwelling did not have a fireplace, as the original property record card had mistakenly reported, but she contended that the assessed value of $350,000 was nonetheless reasonable for the overall fair market value of the subject property.  
On the basis of the evidence presented, the Presiding Commissioner found flaws with the appellant's comparable-sales analysis.  First, the appellant failed to consider circumstances -- including a bank foreclosure and a short sale -- which prevent sufficient exposure to the market and thus may have rendered four of her sales non-arm's-length.  The Presiding Commissioner found that Ms. O'Keefe had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding these four sales, and found her testimony on this point to be credible.  The Presiding Commissioner thus found that the evidence suggested an element of compulsion in the sales of 11 Bank Street, 838 Humphrey Street, 6 Elmwood Road and 25 Greenwood Terrace.  The appellant did not present any evidence to counter the suggestion of compulsion.  Therefore, the Presiding Commissioner found that those four sales did not provide reliable or persuasive evidence of fair market value in this appeal.  Moreover, the appellant did not apply adjustments to the sale prices of her comparable properties to compensate for differences between those properties and the subject property, including:  time of sale; location of the property; lot size; size of living area; and condition of property.  Accordingly, the Presiding Commissioner found that the appellant's overall comparable-sales analysis lacked probative value.  
By contrast, the appellee provided ample evidence to support the subject assessment, particularly a comparable-sales analysis with seven arm's-length sales which included reasonable adjustments to compensate for key differences with the subject property that would affect fair market value.  As Ms. O'Keefe pointed out, the three comparable-sales properties that required the least adjustment together yielded an average fair market value of $363,963, which was higher than the subject assessment, even with consideration given to the lack of a fireplace at the subject property.  Ms. O'Keefe also explained to the satisfaction of the Presiding Commissioner that the subject dwelling, while not updated on the inside, was nonetheless well maintained, particularly its exterior, which had been recently vinyl sided.  Moreover, the subject property had a desirable location on a corner lot.  
Based on these findings, the Presiding Commissioner thus found that the appellant failed to meet her burden of proving that the assessed value of the subject property exceeded its fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue.  Accordingly, the Presiding Commissioner issued a decision for the appellee.

OPINION
The assessors are required to assess real estate at its fair cash value.  G.L. c. 59, § 38.  Fair cash value is defined as the price on which a willing seller and a willing buyer will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).  
The assessment is presumed valid unless the taxpayer sustains her burden of proving otherwise.  Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974).  Accordingly, the burden of proof is upon the appellant to make out her right as a matter of law to an abatement of the tax.  Id.  The appellant must show that the assessed valuation of the property was improper.  See Foxboro Associates v. Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 679, 691 (1982).  In appeals before this Board, a taxpayer "‛may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation.'"  General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 600 (1984) (quoting Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 (1983)). 
The appellant presented for comparison seven purportedly comparable properties located in Swampscott.  "[S]ales of property usually furnish strong evidence of market value, provided they are arm's-length transactions and thus fairly represent what a buyer has been willing to pay for the property to a willing seller."  Foxboro Associates, 385 Mass. at 682.  Sales of comparable realty should be within the same geographic area and within a reasonable time of the assessment date to be probative evidence for determining the value of the property at issue.  Graham  v. Assessors of West Tisbury, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2008-321, 400 (citing McCabe v. Chelsea, 265 Mass. 494, 496 (1929)), aff'd, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1107 (2008).  Moreover, when comparable sales are used, allowances must be made for various factors which would otherwise cause disparities in the comparable properties' sale prices.  See Pembroke Industrial Park Co., Inc. v. Assessors of Pembroke, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1998-1072, 1082 (and the cases cited therein).  
In the instant appeal, the appellant erred by failing to apply any adjustments to the sale prices of her purportedly comparable-sales properties to compensate for key differences that would impact fair market value, including time of sale, location of property, lot size, size of living area, and condition of the property and its dwelling.  The Board found that this omission rendered the appellant's comparable-sales analysis unpersuasive.
Furthermore, evidence of sales may be considered "only if they are free and not under compulsion."  Congregation of the Mission of St. Vincent dePaul v. Commonwealth, 336 Mass. 357, 360 (1957) (other citation omitted).  Any sale which "inherently suggests a compulsion to sell" will require "a proponent of evidence of such sale [to] show circumstances rebutting the suggestion of compulsion."  DSM  Realty, Inc. v. Assessors of Andover, 391 Mass. 1014, (1984).  The Presiding Commissioner found that, based on the assessor's credible testimony, a suggestion arose that four of the appellant's comparable-sales properties were not sold at arm's length.  Regarding 6 Elmwood Road, the Board has previously found that a bank-owned sale was not, in the absence of contrary evidence from the party offering the sale, reliable or persuasive evidence of fair cash value.  DSM Realty, 391 Mass. at 1014 (1984) ("A foreclosure sale inherently suggests a compulsion to sell"); see also Finigan v. Assessors of Belmont, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2004-533, 544 and Waters v. Assessors of Wayland, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2001-460, 469.  Additionally, Ms. O'Keefe's credible testimony raised a suggestion that the sales of 11 Banks Terrace, which involved a highly motivated seller, 838 Humphrey Street, which involved a sale between owners in connection with a divorce, and 25 Greenwood Terrace, which was a short sale, were also not sufficiently exposed to the market.  Without sufficient market exposure, the Board may infer that the relied-upon sales were not arm's-length transactions reflecting fair market value.  See American House, LLC v. Assessors of Greenfield, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2005-39, 53 (Where "there was insufficient evidence produced to show that the property was exposed to the market for a sufficient period to maximize the number of potential buyers," the Board found "that the circumstances surrounding the [ ] sale raised an inference that it was less than arm's-length.").  The appellant failed to introduce further evidence to counter the assessors' evidence of compulsion and lack of sufficient exposure to the market.  The Presiding Commissioner thus found that these four sales were not reliable or persuasive evidence of the fair cash value for the subject property. 
In light of the deficiencies in these four comparable-sales properties, and with the remaining three lacking any consideration of the appropriateness of adjustments, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the appellant's presentation of comparable sales lacked probative value for determining the subject property's fair market value.  In contrast, Ms. O'Keefe's comparable-sales analysis, which provided reasonable adjustments for key differences that affect fair market value, was credible evidence of the subject property's fair market value.  In particular, the comparable-sales properties of 20 Shaw Road, 80 Banks Terrace and 80 King Street, which required the least amount of adjustment, together yielded an average adjusted-sales price of $363,963.  The Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that these three comparable-sales properties in particular supported the subject assessment of $350,700.  
On the basis of all of the evidence submitted at the hearing of this appeal, and the conclusions drawn from that evidence, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the appellant failed to meet her burden of proving that the subject property's assessment exceeded its fair cash value.  Accordingly, the Presiding Commissioner issued a decision for the appellee in this appeal. 

    	    		      APPELLATE TAX BOARD

				   By:			_________undefinedundefined__________
				      Thomas J. Mulhern, Commissioner


A true copy,

Attest: _________________________
           Clerk of the Board

 Within thirty days of the service of the appeal, the Town of Swampscott, in accordance with G.L. c. 58A, § 7A, elected to have the appeal heard under the formal procedure. 

ATB 2012-68