Smothers, Damion v. Harvey

Circuit Court for Harford County
Case No. C-12-CV-25-000468
*This is a per curiam opinion. Under Rule 1-104, the opinion is not precedent within the
rule of stare decisis nor may it be cited as persuasive authority.
UNREPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 2263
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
DAMION SMOTHERS
v.
VERIK HARVEY
______________________________________
Graeff,
Ripken,
Eyler, Deborah S.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
PER CURIAM
______________________________________
Filed: October 15, 2026

‒Unreported Opinion‒
Damion Smothers, appellant, filed a complaint for breach of contract and negligence
against Verik Harvey, appellee, in the Circuit Court for Harford County. 	Following a
bench trial, the court found that appellant had failed to meet his burden of proof as to both
claims and entered judgment in favor of appellee. Appellant raises three issues on appeal,
which reduce to one: whether the court erred in declining to enter a judgment against
appellee based on the evidence he presented at trial. For the reasons that follow, we shall
affirm.
The evidence at trial demonstrated that appellee rented a townhome from appellant.
The lease was month-to-month, and appellant had asked appellee to vacate the property at
the end of March 2025. 	Appellant testified that in early March 2025, he received a call
from the Harford County Sheriff’s Office, stating that they were conducting a wellness
check to investigate a neighbor’s complaint about dogs that had been barking at his
property. He then called appellee, who met him and the sheriff at the townhouse. Appellee
went inside and brought four dogs out of the home to show that they were fine and in good
health. After the sheriff left, appellant informed appellee that she was not supposed to have
dogs at the house under the terms of the lease. Appellee acknowledged this fact, but said
they were only there for her kids, and that they were going to be moved out of the house
soon. Appellant did not go into the house on that date and indicated he had not been in the
house since 2024. At that time, he had not noticed any damage or seen any dogs inside the
home.
Appellant testified that he then received a call from appellee on March 24, 2025,
stating that the house had been broken into and was “tore up.” 	When he arrived at the

‒Unreported Opinion‒
2
house, he observed extensive damage inside that appeared to have been caused by both
dogs and neglect, including dog feces and urine on the floor, holes in the wall, damaged
doors, damaged walls, a damaged vanity, and damaged blinds. 	Appellant introduced
multiple photographs into evidence, which he claimed showed the condition of the home
before and after appellee’s tenancy. Vincent Petty, an unlicensed contractor who had done
work on the property, also testified about the extent of the damages and the repair costs,
which amounted to approximately $60,000.
Appellee testified that she moved to Arizona in February 2025 but had returned to
the townhouse intermittently to finish removing her belongings. 	She acknowledged that
she had allowed her children’s therapy dogs to be in the house during that time to deter
intruders but testified that they were always crated and never allowed to roam free inside
the house. 	She further testified that she had paid for the house to be cleaned before she
moved out and introduced a receipt for $400 that she allegedly paid to a cleaning service
in mid-February. 	With respect to the damages, appellee admitted being responsible for
minor things such as two holes in the wall, damaged blinds, a nick in the window, and a
railing that was painted pink by her daughter. However, she denied that either she or the
dogs had caused the other damage. 	She instead attributed that damage to the unknown
persons who had broken into the house, who she believed had been living there after she
moved out. Appellant further testified that the house was not in the condition that appellant
claimed it was when she moved in, and that there were multiple pre-existing issues such as
roaches, mice, water leaks, and dry rot.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
3
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court found that appellee had breached the
lease by having dogs on the property. However, it was not persuaded that she or the dogs
had caused most of the damage as claimed by appellant. The court therefore ruled in favor
of appellee, finding that the security deposit was sufficient to cover the minor damages that
appellee had admitted responsibility for.
On appeal, appellant contends that the court erred in not entering judgment in his
favor because it “discount[ed] [his] direct evidence of lease breach and property damage[,]”
“improperly rejected critical damages evidence[,]” failed to give proper weight to his
testimony and exhibits, and the record supports his claim that appellee’s dogs caused the
damage to his property. We disagree.
“[W]here, as here, an action has been tried without a jury, [we] will review the case
on both the law and the evidence.” Friedman v. Hannan, 412 Md. 328, 335 (2010). But
we “will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly
erroneous[.]” 	Md. Rule 8-131(c). 	Here, the evidence at trial consisted of conflicting
testimony between the parties about the cause of damage to the townhouse. 	To be sure,
there was evidence from which the court could have found that appellee caused the damage
as some of the damage appeared to have been caused by dogs, and she admitted to having
dogs on the property towards the end of her lease term. 	However, the court was not
required to make that inference or to accept appellee’s testimony that she was not
responsible for the damage.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
4
As we have said previously,
[i]t is far easier to sustain as not clearly erroneous the decisional phenomenon
of not being persuaded than it is to sustain the very different decisional
phenomenon of being persuaded. Actually, to be persuaded of something
requires a requisite degree of certainty on the part of the fact finder (the use
of a particular burden of persuasion) based on legally adequate evidentiary
support 	(the 	satisfaction 	of 	a 	particular 	burden 	of 	production 	by 	the
proponent). There are with reasonable frequency reversible errors in those
regards. Mere non-persuasion, on the other hand, requires nothing but a
state of honest doubt. It is virtually, albeit perhaps not totally, impossible to
find reversible error in that regard.
Angelini v. Harford Cnty., 144 Md. App. 369, 378 (2002) (cleaned up) (emphasis in
original). 	See also Goicochea v. Goicochea, 256 Md. App. 329, 353 (2022) (observing
that “it is almost impossible for a judge to be clearly erroneous when he or she is simply
not persuaded of something” (cleaned up)). Put simply, the bare fact that the court was not
persuaded that appellant had sufficiently proven the elements of causation and damages
does not render its decision clearly erroneous. We shall therefore affirm its judgment.
JUDGMENT 	OF 	THE 	CIRCUIT
COURT 	FOR 	HARFORD 	COUNTY
AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.