Parks v. State

Brandon Parks v. State of Maryland, Nos. 26 & 27, Sept. Term 2023. Opinion by Tang, J.

CHILD SUPPORT – ENFORCEMENT – EVIDENCE – WEIGHT AND
SUFFICIENCY

Section 10-203(a) of the Family Law Article (“FL”), Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl.
Vol.) provides that “[a] parent may not willfully fail to provide for the support of his or her
minor child.” “Willful” is not defined in the statute. Considering the legislative history and
decisional law, we interpret “willful” under FL § 10-203(a) as an act done with deliberate
intention for which there is no reasonable excuse.

To support a conviction for willful failure to pay child support under FL § 10-203(a), there
must be evidence from which the trier of the facts can determine that the obligor parent
intentionally refused to support their child despite having the capacity to do so. Willful
failure to support presupposes the existence of, or the ability to obtain, the means of support
by the parent. In other words, the obligor parent must have the means of paying support or
the capacity to obtain the means of paying support. Willfulness may be proven by
circumstantial evidence and by inferences drawn therefrom.

The evidence was sufficient to establish that the appellant willfully failed to pay child
support under FL § 10-203(a) in two cases. In the first case, the evidence demonstrated that
the appellant worked about 10 to 15 monthly jobs, paid rent, and did not use any funds to
pay child support during the relevant period. The evidence also showed that the mother
prevented the appellant from contacting her and from visiting the child, from which the
jury could have inferred that the appellant chose not to pay support.

In the second case, the evidence established that the appellant worked for one employer,
earning about $500 a month during the relevant period, and he also worked for others.
Despite his income and ability to work, he made no child support payments during the
relevant period.
Circuit Court for Kent County
Case Nos.: C-14-CR-22-000092 & C-14-CR-22-000093

REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

Nos. 26 & 27

September Term, 2023

______________________________________

BRANDON PARKS

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________

Reed,
Tang,
Eyler, James R.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.
______________________________________

Opinion by Tang, J.
______________________________________

Filed: August 28, 2024

* Kehoe, S., J., did not participate in the Court’s
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
decision to designate this opinion for
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State publication pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1.
Government Article) this document is authentic.

2024.08.28
15:41:03
-04'00'

Gregory Hilton, Clerk
This consolidated appeal involves two cases in which the appellant, Brandon Parks,

was convicted in the Circuit Court for Kent County of willfully failing to provide child

support for two of his minor children in violation of § 10-203(a) of the Family Law Article

(“FL”), Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.). The sole issue in each case is whether

there was sufficient evidence of willfulness. 1 We hold that there was and affirm the

convictions in both cases.

BACKGROUND

The appellant has two minor children with different mothers. He was court-ordered

to pay monthly child support for each child. The Kent County Office of Child Support

Enforcement (“OCSE”) tracked the child support payments made by the appellant. There

is no dispute that, in both cases, the appellant made no child support payments during the

relevant periods.

In June 2022, the State charged the appellant with willfully failing to pay child

support in each case. The trials were scheduled in December 2022 to be tried one after

another. The first case, C-14-CR-22-000092, was a jury trial, while the second case, C-14-

CR-22-000093, was a bench trial. The cases were tried similarly: the State presented

testimony of the children’s mothers (“Mother 1” and “Mother 2”), Lindsay Blume (the

“OCSE representative”), and Philip Boudart, the appellant’s employer (the “employer”).

The appellant testified in the first case but not in the second case. Copies of the pertinent

1
As drafted, the appellant’s question presented is: “In C-14-CR-22-000092 and C-
14-CR-22-000093, was the evidence legally insufficient to establish that [the appellant]
willfully failed to provide for the support of his minor children?”
child support orders and OCSE payment records were admitted in each case. A summary

of the relevant evidence presented in each case is as follows:

First Case: C-14-CR-22-000092

The appellant is the father of a six-year-old child who lived with Mother 1 under

her sole custody. Mother 1 and the appellant had a brief relationship but have had little

contact since the child’s birth. When the child was one month old, the appellant bought

diapers. When the child was three months old, Mother 1 attempted to allow the appellant

visitation, but he knocked the child’s stroller over. Since then, Mother 1 has not permitted

the appellant to see the child. She testified that she did not want the child to “be around

[the appellant] because he was threatening [Mother 1] at the current time when [she] had a

protective order against him.” Mother 1 prevented the appellant from contacting her by

blocking him on social media.

A court order issued in April 2021 required the appellant to pay Mother 1 $780 in

monthly child support beginning in May 2021. The OCSE representative testified that the

appellant had been referred to a program aimed at helping him secure employment.

However, he failed to comply with the program requirements and became ineligible for its

services.

The appellant made no payments through the OCSE from May 2021 to May 2022

(“the nonpayment period”). During this period, no wages were garnished, and no cash was

collected directly from the appellant. The appellant also did not directly pay child support

to Mother 1 during that time.

2
During the nonpayment period, the appellant worked part-time for the employer

who owned properties in Kent County. The appellant performed various home

improvement projects on those properties, including landscaping, general labor, carpentry,

and construction. The appellant worked about 10 to 15 monthly jobs, which amounted to

one to four workdays per week. The employer paid the appellant through an electronic

payment application and testified that the appellant never indicated that he had not received

a payment.

The employer allowed the appellant to rent one of his homes beginning “in January

of last year.” 2 The appellant paid the employer $800 per month in rent, a reduced rate from

the property’s market value rent of around $1,700 a month due to undergoing renovations.

During the nonpayment period, the appellant did not have a valid driver’s license. The

employer testified that this limited the appellant’s ability to work for him, so he wrote a

letter supporting the appellant’s efforts to renew his license to increase his productivity.

When asked how the appellant would get to the job sites, the employer explained that the

appellant “owns a car now. Previously he would get rides from other workers or myself or

be working at my property that he is staying at.”

At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel made a motion for judgment of

acquittal, asserting that the State had failed to demonstrate the appellant’s ability to pay the

ordered child support. The defense argued that there was no evidence that the appellant

2
It seems that the employer meant January 2021 when he stated January “of last
year” at the trial in December 2022. In the second trial, infra, the employer testified that
the appellant started renting in January 2022.
3
made any money, no evidence of his finances, and thus no evidence that he was willful in

not paying child support during the nonpayment period.

The court denied the motion, explaining that although there was no testimony about

how much or when the appellant was paid, the evidence showed that he was employed

during the nonpayment period and that none of his payments went toward his child support

obligation.

The appellant proceeded to testify in his defense. He explained that during the

nonpayment period, he tried to exercise “visitation rights” with the child and “see if she

needed anything” multiple times, but Mother 1 did not allow him to see the child and

“blocked” his attempts to contact her. The appellant confirmed he was not disabled or

homeless during the nonpayment period. He also testified that he made a $1,150 payment

to OCSE with funds lent by the employer, but the payment was made after the nonpayment

period, likely in June 2022.

During closing arguments, the State argued that the appellant willfully failed to pay

child support despite being capable of making some payment during the nonpayment

period. Even though the appellant’s financial ability to pay child support is not an element

of the offense, the State emphasized that the appellant could work. He was not disabled or

homeless. He was employed and earning income from various jobs each month.

The defense argued that the appellant did not have the funds to pay child support.

There was no evidence of how much money he had made or that he could have made any

payments toward his child support obligation. The defense explained that the appellant

“can’t willfully not want to give her something he doesn’t have.” The appellant tried to

4
contact Mother 1 to see the child and check if she needed anything, but she did not allow

it. The defense explained that this “makes it hard for [the appellant] to try to support her.”

The jury convicted the appellant of willful failure to pay child support. The court

sentenced him to one year of incarceration and suspended all but 90 days, to be served on

weekends, followed by five years of probation.

Second Case: C-14-CR-22-000093

The appellant is the father of a second child, who was thirteen years old at the time

of trial. The child lived with Mother 2, who had sole custody of the child. Mother 2 and

the appellant were married for seven years. They divorced but maintained a “friendly”

relationship. The appellant was allowed visitation with the child, which amounted to one

or two weekends per month, some holidays, and some days over summer break.

By court order, entered June 2010, the appellant was required to pay $282 per month

in child support. According to OCSE’s records, the appellant made payments in 2019; the

last payment was in September 2021. No payments were made through OCSE from

October 2021 through May 2022 (“the nonpayment period”). Additionally, the appellant

had no wages garnished during this time and did not directly pay Mother 2 any child

support. The appellant often offered to help Mother 2 with the child’s clothing and school

supplies and would say to Mother 2, “[I]f you need anything, let me know. If I have it, I’ll

help you. If I don’t, then we’ll make arrangements.” Mother 2 did not accept his offers.

During the nonpayment period, the appellant worked part-time for the employer. At

this trial, the employer testified that he paid the appellant an average of $500 monthly. The

appellant worked for the employer consistently for about seven hours a week, with some

5
weeks requiring more hours for larger jobs. The employer paid the appellant using an

electronic payment application, and the appellant never indicated that he had not received

a payment. The employer also testified that the appellant “has worked for other people”

and may have been working for someone else about one day a week.

During this trial, the employer testified that the appellant started renting one of the

employer’s properties in January 2022. The employer stated that it was beneficial to have

a “skilled construction worker” live at the vacant property that needed repairs. As in the

first trial, the employer testified that he charged the appellant $800 in monthly rent, a

reduced rate from the property’s market value rent of about $1,700 monthly due to ongoing

renovations. At this trial, he added that between January and September 2022, the appellant

received assistance from social services to pay “some rent” for five months. Since the

appellant did not possess a valid driver’s license, the employer would pick him up on

workdays, or the appellant would arrange rides to the job sites from other workers.

At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal.

This time, defense counsel cited Ashford v. State, 358 Md. 552 (2000), asserting that, while

the case was “not directly on point,” “it is a criminal contempt case involving child support

in which case the [Supreme Court of Maryland] found in that case that the State had lacked

evidence that showed neither the individual had sufficient money to pay child support nor

that he had the ability to earn sufficient money and willfully failed to work and pay.”

Defense counsel asserted that, under Ashford, the motion should be granted because

“[t]here isn’t any evidence shown that [the appellant] had any money additional to pay any

child support in this matter.”

6
The court denied the motion, explaining that the facts in Ashford were

distinguishable. The court noted that, in Ashford, the State’s sole witness was unaware of

the defendant’s financial or personal situation during the period of nonpayment. In contrast,

the employer in this case testified about the appellant’s “work for him, potential work for

others, and availability.”

During closing argument, the State argued that although the appellant “may not be

making a ton of money[,]” he was employed and had the ability and capacity to work more.

Thus, the appellant could make regular payments under the child support order. On the

other hand, the defense argued that the appellant did not have the financial means to pay

child support due to his meager monthly income and rental obligation. The defense asserted

that there was no evidence about the appellant’s ability to work and earn more than his

current income.

The court found the appellant guilty. It imposed a sentence of one year of

incarceration and suspended all, to run consecutive to the sentence in the first case,

followed by five years of probation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our Maryland appellate courts apply “a deferential standard when reviewing

sufficiency of evidence that asks whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. McGagh, 472 Md. 168, 193

(2021) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In so doing, “[w]e do not

measure the weight of the evidence[.]” Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 457 (1997). Nor do

7
we ask ourselves if we “believe[] that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275, 281 (1993) (citations omitted).

Instead, “[i]f the evidence ‘either showed directly, or circumstantially, or supported

a rational inference of facts which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the defendant’s

guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt[,]’ then we will affirm the

conviction.” Bible v. State, 411 Md. 138, 156 (2009) (quoting State v. Stanley, 351 Md.

733, 750 (1998)). In accordance therewith, we view “the evidence in a light most favorable

to the State, [and] also all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence in a light most

favorable to the State.” Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 185-86 (2010).

DISCUSSION

FL § 10-203(a) provides that “[a] parent may not willfully fail to provide for the

support of his or her minor child.” “Willful” is not defined in the statute. 3 When construing

a statutory term, “[o]ur chief objective is to ascertain the General Assembly’s purpose and

intent when it enacted the statute.” Berry v. Queen, 469 Md. 674, 687 (2020). The Supreme

Court of Maryland summarized the pertinent guiding principles of statutory interpretation:

We assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed in the statutory language
and thus our statutory interpretation focuses primarily on the language of the
statute to determine the purpose and intent of the General Assembly. We
begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the
language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word,

3
“[T]here are two acceptable spellings” of willful, “‘willful’ and ‘wilful[,]’” and
“[t]he preferred spelling appears to be the former.” Deibler v. State, 365 Md. 185, 188 n.1
(2001). In this opinion, we follow the convention used in Deibler: when quoting law using
the one-l spelling, we shall quote the word as it appears, and “[o]therwise, we shall use the
preferred spelling.” Id. As noted supra, FL § 10-203(a) uses the preferred, two-ll spelling
of the word.
8
clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless
or nugatory.

Our inquiry is not confined to the specific statutory provision at issue on
appeal. Instead, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the
statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim or policy
of the Legislature in enacting the statute. To this end, it may be beneficial to
analyze the statute’s relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and
other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative
purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the
particular language before us in a given case.

While not necessary in every instance, we often find it prudent to scrutinize
the legislative history to confirm that our interpretation of the statute’s plain
language accords with the legislature’s intent.

Id. at 687-88 (cleaned up and citations omitted).

A.

Meaning of “Willful”

We begin by discerning the ordinary meaning of “willful.” When statutory terms

are not defined in a statute, “we may consult a dictionary and give words their ordinary

meaning.” Angel Enters. Ltd. P’ship v. Talbot Cnty., 474 Md. 237, 271 (2021). “This is an

essential starting point because the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English

language dictates interpretation of [the statute’s] terminology.’” Berry, 469 Md. at 688-89.

When FL § 10-203(a) was enacted in 1984, the legal definition of “willful” was

“[p]roceeding from a conscious motion of the will; voluntary. Intending the result which

actually comes to pass; designed; intentional; not accidental or involuntary.” WILLFUL,

Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). “A willful act may be described as one done

intentionally, knowingly, and purposefully, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished

from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly, or inadvertently.” Id.; see Romeka

9
v. RadAmerica II, LLC, 485 Md. 307, 325-26 (2023) (considering the dictionary definition

in effect at the time the relevant statute was enacted); Hannah v. State, 260 Md. App. 701,

720 n.9 (2024) (same).

The Supreme Court of Maryland has “attempted to define what ‘willful’ or

‘willfully’ means on several occasions.” Frazier v. McCarron, 466 Md. 436, 450 (2019).

The Court noted that the word “willful,” in one form or another, appeared 547 times in the

Maryland Constitution, Code, and Rules in various contexts. Deibler v. State, 365 Md. 185,

192 (2001). It also noted that the United States Supreme Court had declared the word a

“word of many meanings” and that its context often influenced its construction. Id. (citation

omitted). From a survey of our prior cases, the Supreme Court of Maryland observed that

most, though not all, of the interpretations required “only that the act be committed

intentionally, rather than through inadvertence.” Id. at 195. The Court ultimately

concluded, however, that when construing the word as a statutory term, we must give the

term “the contextual meaning most probably intended by the Legislature, and, if the term

is not susceptible to a single common meaning, we must look at relevant legislative history

in an attempt to discern that intent.” Id.

Before exploring the relevant legislative history, we find it helpful to look to the

context in which the word has been used in situations involving nonpayment of child

support. See Berry, 469 Md. at 690 (“In order to interpret a word’s specific meaning in a

particular statute we look to the context in which the word is used.” (citation omitted)).

10
i.

Dorsey v. State & Ashford v. State

Our Supreme Court has examined willfulness in the context of criminal contempt

for nonpayment of child support. Criminal contempt is a common law offense “inherent in

all courts as a principal tool to protect the orderly administration of justice and the dignity

of that branch of government that adjudicates the rights and interests of the people.” 4 Smith

v. State, 382 Md. 329, 337 (2004). “Criminal contempt[] may be direct or constructive.”

Ashford, 358 Md. at 563. “Direct” criminal contempt has been defined as conduct that

occurs in the court’s presence or so near the court that it interferes with its proper function

and authority. Id. (citing Md. Rule 15-202(a)). An “indirect” or “constructive” criminal

contempt is any contempt other than a direct contempt. Id. (citing Md. Rule 15-202(a)).

“[I]n order to convict an accused of constructive criminal contempt, [the State] has

the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, a deliberate effort or a willful act of

commission or omission by the alleged contemnor committed with the knowledge that it

would frustrate the order of the court[.]” Dorsey v. State, 356 Md. 324, 352 (1999) (citation

and internal quotations omitted). Only conduct “that is willful or intentional may constitute

a criminal contempt.” Ashford, 358 Md. at 563 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court of Maryland explained the mens rea requirement in a case

involving an alleged failure to comply with an order to pay child support:

4
Maryland Rule 15-205(a) provides that “[a] proceeding for constructive criminal
contempt shall be docketed as a separate criminal action.” The State’s Attorney is among
those who may initiate a proceeding for constructive criminal contempt. Md. Rule 15-
205(b).
11
Whether a defendant has failed to pay court[-]ordered support when he or
she had the ability to do so and whether that defendant has, in bad faith,
caused his or her own . . . inability to comply, with the intent of frustrating
the court order, are material, and, indeed, necessary, considerations bearing
on whether a defendant should be punished [for contempt.]

Lynch v. Lynch, 342 Md. 509, 528-29 (1996).

While ability to comply with a court order at the time of the alleged criminal
contempt is not directly an element of the offense, evidence of an ability to
comply, or evidence of a defendant’s conduct purposefully rendering himself
unable to comply, may, depending on the circumstances, give rise to a
legitimate inference that the defendant acted with the requisite willfulness
and knowledge. By contrast, evidence of an inability to comply during the
relevant period may, again depending upon the circumstances, support an
inference that the defendant lacked a contumacious intent.

Dorsey, 356 Md. at 352 (citing Lynch, 342 Md. at 528-29). “These mens rea elements must

be established by evidence, and cannot simply be assumed. Nevertheless, like scienter

generally in criminal cases, they may be proven by circumstantial evidence and by

inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).

Two cases applied this framework for willfulness: Dorsey v. State, 356 Md. 324

(1999), and Ashford v. State, 358 Md. 552 (2000). Dorsey involved two defendants, Dorsey

and Craft, who had been convicted of criminal contempt for their failure to pay court-

ordered child support. 356 Md. at 354. Dorsey was convicted based on the lack of support

payments for ten months, the absence of employment information in the agency’s records,

and the fact that the agency’s records reflected an incorrect address for Dorsey. Id. The

Supreme Court of Maryland held that these facts could not support an inference that

Dorsey’s failure to make support payments was willful and done with contumacious intent.

Id. The Court explained that there was a lack of evidence of Dorsey’s ability to pay:

12
The only evidence relating to the period was Dorsey’s testimony that he
worked “a couple of weeks at Wendy’s,” that the pay was “[n]ot that much,”
and that, during the remainder of the period since August 1996, he was either
incarcerated or, when not incarcerated, he was unable to find work and
“basically” did “nothing.”

Id. at 354-55.

Craft was convicted on the theory that he could have obtained a better job despite

losing his driver’s license. Id. at 355. The only evidence supporting this finding was the

trial court’s purported judicial notice that Craft could “probably make $240 a week working

at one of the fast food places.” Id. The Supreme Court noted, however, that:

There was no “evidence” relating to the employment opportunities at the fast
food places, Craft’s qualifications for a job at these establishments, the wages
available at such places, the distance between Craft’s residence and the fast
food places, or the availability of public transportation.

Id. Accordingly, the Court determined that the evidence was “wholly insufficient to support

an inference that Craft’s failure to comply was accompanied by a contumacious intent.” Id.

Similarly, in Ashford v. State, 358 Md. 552 (2000), the Court held that the evidence

could not support a criminal contempt conviction for nonpayment of child support:

[T]he State’s evidence showed neither that [Ashford] had sufficient money
to pay the child support order nor that he had the ability to earn sufficient
money and wilfully failed to work and pay. In fact, the State’s sole witness
testified that she was not aware of [Ashford’s] financial or personal situation
since . . . the time that [Ashford] made his last child support payment. Thus,
in limiting its proof to lack of compliance with the order, the State has failed
to offer sufficient evidence to prove the crime of constructive criminal
contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 574. The Court concluded that “[t]he record [was] simply devoid of any evidence

that [Ashford’s] failure to pay was deliberate or wilful.” Id. at 572.

13
ii.

Walker v. State

In Walker v. State, 234 Md. App. 160 (2017), this Court examined willfulness in a

case in which the defendant was charged with criminal contempt for not paying court-

ordered child support and the statutory offense for willfully failing to pay child support

under FL § 10-203(a). Id. at 163-64. Although we did not expressly define “willful” under

FL § 10-203(a), we concluded that there was sufficient evidence of willfulness to support

the convictions for both offenses. See id. at 168-71. We analyzed the evidence as follows:

Although establishing an affirmative intent to not do something is a difficult
task, there was enough evidence for the jury to infer willfulness on
[Walker’s] part. . . . [Walker] signed two consent orders acknowledging the
existence and magnitude of his obligation. Nevertheless, despite being fully
aware of his obligation, he repeatedly failed to make the required payments
and allowed the amount he owed to increase up to $68,000.

Furthermore, unlike [in Dorsey and Ashford], there was evidence regarding
[Walker’s] financials during some of the relevant periods. Testimony at trial
established that [Walker] worked for a landscaping company and earned
income during at least seven of the months that he did not pay child support.
In contrast with Dorsey and Ashford, we know that [Walker] was earning
income at certain points and still not paying child support. Meanwhile,
[Walker] was living with his mother and paying her rent.

During periods of unemployment, [Walker] claimed that he was always
looking for work, but when questioned about it he said he looked for jobs
only two or three times a month. Looking for a job only two or three times a
month is not equivalent to always looking for work. For someone who owes
such a substantial amount in child support, that is not an adequate effort at
obtaining employment.

Moreover, [the mother’s] testimony about her communications with
[Walker] also show a pattern of deliberate non-payment. [The mother]
testified that she would tell [Walker] over the phone that he needed to make
his child support payments, and that he also promised her that he would.
Nevertheless, he repeatedly failed to honor these promises to pay. . . .

14
[Walker’s] regular awareness that he was supposed to do so, his guarantees
that he would do so, and his consistent and repeated failure to do so,
permitted an inference that he knowingly and intentionally did not do so.

Id. at 170-71 (cleaned up and emphasis added). We held that “[t]aken all together,

[Walker’s] knowledge of his obligations, promises to pay, employment history, and

repeated failure to pay supports the jury’s conclusion that [he] willfully failed to pay his

required child support.” 5 Id. at 171.

Although undefined in Walker, we characterized “willful” under FL § 10-203(a) as

an act done “knowingly and intentionally.” See id. This is consistent with the legal

definition of the word. See WILLFUL, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (“A willful

act may be described as one done intentionally, knowingly, and purposefully, without

5
Although we combined the analysis of the evidence for both the common law
offense of criminal contempt and the statutory offense under FL § 10-203(a), we noted that
“the two crimes serve different purposes.” Walker, 234 Md. App. at 172. The purpose of
the child support statute is “to assist spouses and children in directly procuring support and
thereby preventing them from becoming public burdens, to punish the offense of failing to
provide support, and, by the fear of punishment, to prevent the commission of such an
offense.” State v. Berry, 287 Md. 491, 497 (1980). Criminal contempt is a common law
offense “inherent in all courts as a principal tool to protect the orderly administration of
justice and the dignity of that branch of government that adjudicates the rights and interests
of the people.” Smith, 382 Md. at 337.

As stated, to prove criminal contempt, the prosecutor has the burden of proving “a
deliberate effort or a wilful act of commission or omission by the alleged contemnor
committed with the knowledge that it would frustrate the order of the court[.]” Dorsey,
356 Md. at 352 (citation omitted and emphasis added). Dorsey appears to use “wilful”
interchangeably with “contumacious intent.” Id. (“[E]vidence of an inability to comply
during the relevant period may, again depending upon the circumstances, support an
inference that the defendant lacked a contumacious intent.” (Emphasis added)). As the
State observes, to the extent that the analyses of willfulness and contumacious intent
overlap, contumacious intent to frustrate the court’s order is specific to the contempt
context and is lacking from the statutory offense under FL § 10-203(a).
15
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly,

or inadvertently.”).

We now turn to the legislative history of FL § 10-203(a) to confirm that our

interpretation of “willful” accords with the legislature’s intent.

B.

Legislative History of FL § 10-203(a)

FL § 10-203(a) shares a common origin with its statutory counterpart for

nonpayment of spousal support under FL § 10-201(a) (“A spouse may not willfully fail to

provide for the support of the other spouse, without just cause.”). In 1896, Maryland

enacted § 47A to criminalize the desertion and non-support of wives and children. 1896

Md. Laws, Ch. 73, § 47A (“Desertion of Wife or Child”). “While one purpose underlying

the criminal non-support laws was to protect wives and children from becoming public

charges, the primary objective was ‘to provide directly for unsupported wives and children,

and to punish this offense [of non-support] against them, and by fear of punishment to

prevent the committing of such offenses.’” Cruickshank-Wallace v. Cnty. Banking and Tr.

Co., 165 Md. App. 300, 325 (2005) (citation omitted).

Section 47A made it a misdemeanor for a person to “without just cause desert or

wilfully neglect to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife or minor child[.]”

1896 Md. Laws, Ch. 73, § 47A (emphasis added). In the 19th century, although not defined

in Section 47A, the term “willful neglect” had a specific meaning. The 1891 edition of

Black’s Law Dictionary defined the term as “the neglect of the husband to provide for his

wife the common necessaries of life, he having the ability to do so; or it is the failure to do

16
so by reason of idleness, profligacy, or dissipation.” WILLFUL NEGLECT, Black’s Law

Dictionary (1st ed. 1891). 6

i

Recodification into Article 27, § 96

In 1951, the criminal non-support laws were recodified in Article 27, § 96, and the

section criminalizing the nonsupport of wife and child was divided into two subsections.

See Md. Code (1951), Art. 27, § 96(a), (b). Section 96(a) criminalized the desertion and

nonpayment of spousal support: “Any person who shall without just cause desert or wilfully

neglect to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife shall be deemed guilty of a

misdemeanor[.]” (Emphasis added). Subsection (b) criminalized the desertion and

nonpayment of child support: “Any parent who shall desert or wilfully neglect to provide

for the support and maintenance of his or her minor child shall be deemed guilty of a

misdemeanor[.]” (Emphasis added).

In Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288 (1955), the Supreme Court of Maryland interpreted

the term “wilfully neglect” under Art. 27 § 96(a) in a case involving the nonpayment of

spousal support. Id. at 293. There, the husband had not paid spousal support due to a lack

of funds. Id. at 298. The husband’s testimony suggested that he refused to pay support

because his wife would not grant him a divorce. Id. The husband had made constant efforts

6
The word “wilful” by itself was then defined as “[p]roceeding from a conscious
motion of the will; intending the result which actually comes to pass; designed; intentional;
malicious.” WILFUL, Black’s Law Dictionary (1st ed. 1891) (“In common parlance,
‘willful’ is used in the sense of ‘intentional,’ as distinguished from ‘accidental’ or
‘involuntary.’”); see also WILFULLY, Black’s Law Dictionary (1st ed. 1891) (“willfully”
defined as “[i]ntentionally”).
17
to obtain employment and had been unable to find any. Id. at 299. The evidence also

established that the husband rented an apartment but did not occupy it, and he maintained

a club membership without giving any financial support to his wife. Id. His testimony

indicated that he could have paid his wife $20 monthly during that period. Id. In a bench

trial, the court found the husband guilty of willful failure to pay spousal support. Id. at 291.

In determining whether the husband’s failure to support his wife was “wilfull,” the

Court construed the term “wilfully neglect” under § 96(a) to mean “wilfully fail”:

To be guilty under the statute, the husband must wilfully fail to provide for
his wife without just cause. The term “wilfully” in criminal statutes has been
said “to characterize an act done with deliberate intention for which there is
no reasonable excuse.”

If the conviction is to be sustained, there must have been testimony from
which the trier of the facts could have determined that the husband
intentionally refused to support his wife, although he had the capacity to do
so. The cases have held that wilful failure to support presupposes the
existence of, or the ability to obtain, the means of support by the husband.
He must have the means or the capacity to obtain them. . . . [R]egardless of
the small amount actually being earned by the husband, if he has earning
power, he must support his wife. . . . [T]he court may consider the earning
power of the husband and is not restricted to his actual earnings.

Id. at 299 (cleaned up and emphasis added).

Based on the evidence, the Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the husband

willfully failed to pay support to his wife. Id. at 301. It explained:

The evidence in this case shows that the husband had been successful all of
his life in earning relatively large sums of money. There is no showing that
his health would not permit him to work and the trial court, taking into
account his experience and intelligence, could not unreasonably have found
that employment, which would afford reasonable compensation to him, was
available if he earnestly desired it. Too, we cannot say that the trial court was
clearly erroneous in its conclusion that the appellant’s failure to support his
wife was because he neither desired nor intended to do so as long as she

18
refused to divorce him. These two findings would sustain the conclusion that
his conduct was wilful within the meaning of the statute.

Id.

ii.

Recodification into Article 27, § 88

In 1957, the General Assembly recodified the non-support statutes in Article 27, §

88. Md. Code (1957), Art. 27, § 88. Section 88(a) continued to criminalize the nonpayment

of spousal support. After various non-substantive changes to the text over the years, the

section read: “Any person who without just cause wilfully neglects to provide for the

support and maintenance of his or her spouse is guilty of a misdemeanor.” 7 Md. Code

(1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 88(a) (emphasis added).

Section 88(b) continued to criminalize the nonpayment of child support. After

various non-substantive changes to the text over the years, it read: “Any parent who deserts

or wilfully neglects to provide for the support and maintenance of his or her child under the

age of 18 is guilty of a misdemeanor[.]” Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 88(b)

(emphasis added).

iii.

Recodification into the Family Law Article

In 1984, the General Assembly recodified Art. 27, § 88(a) and (b) in Title 10,

Subtitle 2 of the Family Law Article. Section 88(a) for the nonpayment of spousal support

7
The text was changed to remove the criminal prohibition against desertion of the
wife (see 1977 Md. Laws, Ch. 213 at 1852) and extend the criminal prohibition against
non-support to all spouses, not just to the wife (see 1978 Md. Laws, Ch. 921 at 2703-04).
19
was recodified without substantive change in FL § 10-201(a). See 1984 Md. Laws Ch. 296

at 2134. The Revisor’s Note explains that the word “fail” was substituted for the former

word “neglects” “in light of Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288 (1955)[,]” supra. Id. FL § 10-

201(a) thus reads, “A spouse may not willfully fail to provide for the support of the other

spouse, without just cause.”

Section 88(b) for the nonpayment of child support was recodified without

substantive change in FL § 10-203(a). See 1984 Md. Laws Ch. 296 at 2136. FL § 10-203(a)

currently reads: “A parent may not willfully fail to provide for the support of his or her

minor child.” (Emphasis added). Notably, the Revisor’s Note explains that the word “fail”

replaced the former word “neglects” “to conform to [FL] § 10-201[.]” Id. The word

substitution is significant because it reflects the General Assembly’s intent to interpret the

term “willfully fail” consistently under FL § 10-201(a) and § 10-203(a). See Davidson v.

Koerber, 454 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (D. Md. 1978) (“Although the Revisor’s Notes are not

law, . . . they are strong and persuasive evidence of the legislative intent.”).

Based on the legislative history of the non-support statutes, we conclude that

“willfully” under FL § 10-203(a) describes “an act done with deliberate intention for which

there is no reasonable excuse[,]” as interpreted in Ewell. See Ewell, 207 Md. at 299. The

interpretation aligns with the legal definition and our characterization in Walker as an act

done “knowingly and intentionally.” This conclusion also adheres to well-established

canons of statutory interpretation. See Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 673 (1995) (“When

we are called upon to interpret two statutes that involve the same subject matter, have a

common purpose, and form part of the same system, we read them in pari materia and

20
construe them harmoniously.”); Westminster Mgmt., LLC v. Smith, 486 Md. 616, 644

(2024) (noting that after looking to the dictionary definition of an undefined statutory term,

the Court “broaden[s] [its] analysis to consider the other language of the provisions in

which the terms appear” within the statute).

C.

“Willful” Under FL § 10-203(a)

In considering the legislative history and decisional law, we interpret “willful”

under FL § 10-203(a) just as the Ewell Court did, meaning “an act done with deliberate

intention for which there is no reasonable excuse[.]” See Ewell, 207 Md. at 299; accord

Walker, 234 Md. App. at 171 (characterizing willfulness as an act done “knowingly and

intentionally”); WILLFUL, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (“A willful act may be

described as one done intentionally, knowingly, and purposefully, without justifiable

excuse[.]”). Accordingly, consistent with Ewell, we hold that to support a conviction for

willful failure to pay child support under FL § 10-203(a), there must be evidence from

which the trier of the facts can determine that the obligor parent intentionally refused to

support their child despite having the capacity to do so. See Ewell, 207 Md. at 299. Willful

failure to support presupposes the existence of, or the ability to obtain, the means of support

by the parent. See id. In other words, the obligor parent must have the means of paying

support or the capacity to obtain the means of paying support. See id. Willfulness may be

proven by circumstantial evidence and by inferences drawn therefrom. See Dorsey, 356

Md. at 352.

21
Our holding clarifies and confirms how this Court in Walker understood willfulness

under FL § 10-203(a), consistent with the considerations outlined in Ewell. In concluding

that the evidence in Walker was sufficient to support willfulness under FL § 10-203(a), we

took into account the fact that the obligor parent earned income for at least seven months

without paying support and used his income to pay rent (means of paying support). We

also considered his employment history (capacity to obtain the means for paying support),

among other relevant evidence of his knowing and intentional failure to pay child support

(i.e., unfulfilled promises to pay).

We now turn to the two cases and evaluate whether the evidence in each was

sufficient to prove willfulness under FL § 10-203(a).

D.

Analysis

i.

First Case: C-14-CR-22-000092

The appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove his failure to pay

child support was willful. He contends there was neither evidence of “substantial financial

assets” from which he could have made payments nor evidence of “willful unemployment

with the purpose of avoiding making support payments.”

As stated, willfulness is an act done with deliberate intention for which there is no

reasonable excuse. There must be evidence—direct or circumstantial—from which the trier

of the facts can determine that the obligor parent intentionally refused to support their child

despite having the capacity to do so (means of paying support or the capacity to obtain the

22
means of paying support). While a showing of “substantial financial assets” or “willful

unemployment” to avoid making support payments can be compelling evidence of a parent

intentionally refusing to support their child, neither is a prerequisite of proving the offense

under FL § 10-203(a), as the appellant suggests. As the Ewell Court explained, “regardless

of the small amount actually being earned by the husband, if he has earning power, he must

support his wife. . . . [T]he court may consider the earning power of the husband and is not

restricted to his actual earnings.” Ewell, 207 Md. at 299 (citation omitted). We see no

reason why the same principle should not apply in a case involving the willful failure to

pay child support under FL § 10-203(a), especially considering the General Assembly’s

intent to construe “willfully fail” consistently with FL § 10-201(a).

The evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that the appellant willfully failed to pay

child support despite having the capacity to do so during the nonpayment period of May

2021 and May 2022. The appellant worked between one to four days per week, which

amounted to about 10 to 15 monthly jobs. Although there was no evidence about the exact

amount of his monthly income, the jury could have concluded that he earned or otherwise

had the means to pay $800 monthly rent. Despite having funds to pay rent, none was used

to pay the child support obligation during the nonpayment period. See, e.g., Walker, 234

Md. App. at 170 (father worked and earned income that he did not use to pay child support

during the relevant period; meanwhile, he was paying rent); Ewell, 207 Md. at 299

(husband willfully failed to pay spousal support where he rented and continued his

membership in a club while he was paying his wife nothing).

23
The appellant argues that his lack of a driver’s license prevented him from going to

work. The employer, however, testified that the appellant had been able to get rides to work

and back or work at the employer’s property that the appellant was renting. Despite the

appellant’s lack of a driver’s license, he was consistently working 10 or 15 jobs per month.

Moreover, the evidence showed a strained relationship between the appellant and

Mother 1. The appellant had not seen their child, who was six at the time of trial, since the

child was a few months old. The appellant testified that he had made multiple attempts to

contact Mother 1 during the nonpayment period to request “visitation rights” with the child.

But his attempts to contact Mother 1 were unsuccessful because she had “blocked” him. A

jury could have easily inferred that the appellant chose not to pay child support due to his

frustration over Mother 1’s refusal to allow him to see the child. See, e.g., Ewell, 207 Md.

at 301 (husband’s failure to support wife because she refused to divorce him would sustain

the conclusion that his conduct was willful). For the reasons stated, the totality of the

evidence supports the inference that the appellant’s failure to pay child support during the

nonpayment period was willful.

ii.

Second Case: C-14-CR-22-000093

The appellant argues that the evidence in the second case was insufficient to

establish that he was willful in failing to pay child support. He again contends that the State

failed to prove the existence of “substantial financial assets” or that he willfully failed to

work with the intent to avoid making payments. As explained above, such evidence is not

a prerequisite to proving willfulness under the statute.

24
The evidence was sufficient to establish that the appellant willfully failed to pay

child support despite having the capacity to do so during the nonpayment period of October

2021 through May 2022. As the circuit court found:

[The appellant’s] employer and landlord . . . testified that during the period
of time for which [the appellant] is charged with nonsupport, [the appellant]
worked for [the employer]. That [the appellant] was making approximately
$500 a month. [The employer] was paying [the appellant] $19 an hour. That
[the employer] paid him through a cash app.

There was no indication that [the appellant] wasn’t paid, and that [the
employer] was aware, although he couldn’t get any specific indication, that
[the appellant] was doing jobs for other people and certainly that he had the
ability to do jobs for other people and that [the employer] would like to see
him do jobs for other people.

So the [c]ourt thinks that there is sufficient evidence based on all that to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that [the appellant] willfully failed to provide
child support for his minor child.

And he clearly–he is working. He clearly has the ability to work. He works
for both [the employer] and for others. He is making some money a month. I
guess it could be argued or is in dispute exactly the amount of that money
but he does have income. He does have the ability to work, and for the
months for which he is charged with nonsupport, he made absolutely no
payment at all toward the support of his child.

The appellant again claims that his lack of a driver’s license prevented him from

working, but the employer testified that he and others would transport him to work. Despite

working and earning money, the appellant chose not to use any of his income to pay child

support. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that

the evidence adduced in the second case was sufficient for the court to find that the

appellant willfully failed to pay child support under FL § 10-203(a).

25
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR KENT COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS
TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

26