Cnty. Cncl. of Wicomico Cnty. v. Giordano

County Council of Wicomico County, Maryland v. Julie Giordano, No. 2146, September
Term 2023. Opinion by Eyler, James R. Filed March 5, 2025.

CHARTER INTERPRETATION

This appeal arose from a dispute between Julie Giordano, the County Executive for
Wicomico County (“the County Executive”), appellee, and the County Council of
Wicomico County (“the Council”), appellant, over the meaning of § 315(A) of the
Wicomico County Charter (“the Charter”), governing the confirmation of executive
appointments. In the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, the County Executive filed suit
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief relative to her contested appointment of a
candidate to the position of Assistant Director of Administration and the Council’s
subsequent vote to reject that candidate and the passage of legislation defunding that
position. The County Executive and the Council filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of the County Executive, ruling that
the candidate was properly appointed, confirmed by inaction of the Council under
§ 315(A), and that the Council was without authority to defund the candidate’s position.

Held: Under § 315(A) of the Charter, the County Executive must formally name a
candidate for any position requiring Council confirmation and request action by the
Council on that candidate at a legislative session. Because the County Executive failed to
do so with respect to the Assistant Director of Administration, the candidate was not
approved by inaction of the Council.

Consequently, the Council acted within its authority when it deleted the budget item
for that position until a candidate was formally submitted and approved consistent with the
Charter. We thus vacate the grant of declaratory relief in favor of the County Executive,
remand for the entry of a new declaratory judgment in favor of the Council, and dissolve
the injunction suspending the effect of the bill defunding that position as of the date of the
filing of our mandate.

MOOTNESS

Appellant argued that the circuit erred in not holding a hearing on post-judgment
motions. The circuit court’s opinion and declaratory judgment was dated November 15,
2023. Because the circuit court relied upon a superseded version of § 315(A) in its opinion
and declaratory judgment, on November 17, 2023, the County Executive filed a motion to
revise and did not request a hearing. On November 20, 2023, the Council filed a motion to
alter or amend and requested a hearing. On November 23, 2023, the circuit court stayed
the declaratory judgment “pending further court proceedings.” On December 13, 2023, the
circuit court issued a corrected supplemental opinion and declaratory judgment. It denied
the County Executive’s motion to revise and the Council’s motion to alter or amend as
“moot.”
The Council argued that, in fact, the court granted the County Executive’s motion
to revise, constituting reversible error because the change in the opinion was not the
correction of a clerical error. The Council also argued that the court denied the Council’s
motion to alter or amend, constituting reversible error because it was done without a
hearing.

The County Executive argued that the court’s changes were an exercise of the
court’s revisory power over its nonfinal rulings.

Held: The reasonable inference to be drawn from the record is that the changes were
not a sua sponte exercise of revisory power in the absence of post-judgment motions, as in
Maryland Board of Nursing v. Nechay, 347 Md. 396, 399 (1997), but rather were in
response to either or both of the parties’ motions. The motions were not moot. In effect,
the court granted the County Executive’s motion to revise and denied the Council’s motion
to alter or amend. Thus, the post-judgment Rules applied.

Rule 2-311(e) provides that a motion to alter or amend under Rule 2-534 may not
be granted without a hearing. Even if we regard the court’s action as a ruling on the Rule
2-534 motion, the ruling was effectively a denial of that motion. There was no substantive
change in the ruling. Thus, no hearing was required.

With respect to the County Executive’s motion to revise, no hearing was requested,
and thus, none was required. Rule 2-311(f).

Finally, any error in failing to hold a hearing would be harmless because we have
decided the issues de novo, as a matter of law.
Circuit Court for Wicomico County
Case No.: C-22-CV-23-000298
REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 2146

September Term, 2023

______________________________________

COUNTY COUNCIL OF WICOMICO
COUNTY, MARYLAND

v.

JULIE GIORDANO
______________________________________

Reed,
Tang,
Eyler, James R.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.
______________________________________

Opinion by Eyler, James R., J.
______________________________________

Filed: March 5, 2025

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.

12:43:04 2025.03.19
'00'04-

Gregory Hilton, Clerk
This appeal arises from a dispute between Julie Giordano, the County Executive for

Wicomico County (“the County Executive”), appellee, and the County Council of

Wicomico County (“the Council”), appellant, over the meaning of § 315(A) of the

Wicomico County Charter (“the Charter”), governing the confirmation of executive

appointments. In the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, the County Executive filed suit

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief relative to her contested appointment of a

candidate to the position of Assistant Director of Administration and the Council’s

subsequent vote to reject that candidate and the passage of legislation defunding that

position. The County Executive and the Council filed cross-motions for summary

judgment. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of the County Executive, ruling that

the candidate was properly appointed and confirmed by inaction of the Council under

§ 315(A), and that the Council was without authority to defund the candidate’s position.

The circuit court’s opinion and declaratory judgment were dated November 15,

2023. Because the circuit court relied upon a superseded version of § 315(A) in its opinion

and declaratory judgment, on November 17, 2023, the County Executive filed a motion to

revise, and on November 20, 2023, the Council filed a motion to alter or amend. On

November 23, 2023, the circuit court stayed the declaratory judgment “pending further

court proceedings.” On December 13, 2023, the circuit court issued a corrected

supplemental opinion and declaratory judgment. It denied the County Executive’s motion

to revise and the Council’s motion to alter or amend as “moot.”

The Council appeals, presenting three questions, which we rephrase:
I. Did the circuit court err in determining that the Charter did not require the
County Executive to submit the candidate for Assistant Director of
Administration at a legislative session of the Council?

II. Did circuit court err by ruling that the Council could not defund the
position of Assistant Director of Administration?

III. Did the circuit court err by granting the motion to alter or amend
judgment without a hearing?

For the following reasons, we hold that under § 315(A) of the Charter, the County

Executive must formally name a candidate for any position requiring Council confirmation

and request action by the Council on that candidate at a legislative session. Because the

County Executive failed to do so with respect to the Assistant Director of Administration,

the candidate was not approved by inaction of the Council. Consequently, the Council acted

within its authority when it deleted the budget item for that position until a candidate was

formally submitted and approved consistent with the Charter. We thus vacate the grant of

declaratory relief in favor of the County Executive, remand for the entry of a new

declaratory judgment in favor of the Council and dissolve the injunction suspending the

effect of the bill defunding that position as of the date of the filing of our mandate. We also

conclude that the circuit court did not err in failing to hold a hearing on the parties’ post-

judgment motions, and regardless, any error is harmless.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Giordano was elected as County Executive in November 2022 and took office

on December 6, 2022. Under the Charter, within six months of her taking office, she was

required to appoint officers to head executive departments and agencies, including the

Director of Administration and the Assistant Director of Administration. See Wicomico

2
County Charter (hereinafter “Charter”), Art. IV, § 413. These appointments are subject to

confirmation by the Council as set out in § 315(A):

Appointment by the County Executive of the Director of Administration, the
Assistant Director of Administration, department heads or the initial
appointment of a deputy director of a department in the executive branch of
the county government shall be subject to confirmation by the County
Council. If the Council fails to act to confirm or reject any appointment
within 45 days of its submission to the County Council, at its legislative
session, by the County Executive, the appointment shall stand approved.

Charter, Art. III, § 315(A) (emphasis added). A legislative session is defined in the Charter

as the twice monthly meetings of the Council that are open to the public. 1 Charter, Art. III,

§§ 310(A), 311(A). The Council can also sit in “non-legislative sessions at such other times

and places as it may determine.” Charter, Art. III, § 310(B).

On April 4, 2023, Bunky Luffman, Director of Administration, sent a memorandum

to Laura Hurley, Council Administrator, with the subject line, “Proposed Agenda Item.”

The body of the memorandum states: “The County Executive is requesting a closed work

session to discuss a personnel matter.” Attached to the memorandum was the resume for

Matthew Leitzel, the individual the County Executive was planning to appoint as Assistant

Director of Administration. Ms. Hurley sent the memorandum, the resume, and a job

description for that position to the Council.

The next Council legislative session was held on April 18, 2023. According to the

agenda for that day, at the end of the legislative session, the Council went into a closed

1
This definition also is consistent with Article XI-A, § 3 of the Maryland
Constitution, which requires charter counties to have legislative bodies (generally county
councils but also the Baltimore City Council) and for those legislative bodies to have
specific legislative sessions.
3
work session, i.e., a non-legislative session, to discuss: “Personnel Matter – Appointment

of an Assistant Director of Administration.”

Following that closed session, Ms. Hurley sent an email to Mr. Luffman, copying

the County Executive, stating that “the consensus of the County Council was not to move

forward with the appointment of [Mr. Leitzel] as Assistant Director of Administration

introduced to the Council during the Closed Session.”

The next morning, April 19, 2023, the County Executive sent an email with the

subject line, “Reconsideration,” to the Council members, copying Ms. Hurley and Mr.

Luffman. She asked the Council members to “reconsider Matt Leitzel for the Assistant

Director of Administration.” She stated that she had spoken to the vice president of the

Council by telephone the night before, and he had expressed a willingness to reconsider

the candidate for the position. The County Executive’s email highlighted Mr. Leitzel’s

relevant experience and closed with the following: “Based on this new information, I am

asking for a favorable report for Matt Leitzel to move forward as the Assistant Director of

Administration. Thank you for your time and consideration.”

The Council did not respond to that email or take any further action.

Sixty-five days later, on June 22, 2023, the County Executive wrote to the Council

as follows:

On April 5, 2023,[2] the Executive Office submitted Matt Leitzel to the
Wicomico County Council for confirmation as the Assistant Director of
Administration for Wicomico County. The County Council met in closed
session and sent an email stating “there was not a consensus by Council to

2
The memorandum requesting a closed work session to discuss Mr. Leitzel was sent
to Ms. Hurley on April 4, 2023.
4
move forward with Captain Leitzel for the position.” By definition, a
consensus is not a vote, especially when Council is in closed session. Per
legislative guidelines and the Charter, the [C]ouncil failed to confirm or
reject the appointment in a legislative session within 45 days of the
appointment submission date. Therefore, his appointment stands approved
per the Wicomico County Charter, Section 315 A, (Amended 08.02.2016 by
Res. No. 101-2016).

Mr. Leitzel’s first day of work will be on June 26, 2023. We look forward to
him joining our team.

If you have any questions, please refer them to Paul Wilber, County
Attorney[3] for Wicomico County.

(Emphasis in original.)

At the next legislative session, on July 5, 2023, the Council considered a resolution

to confirm Mr. Leitzel for the position of Assistant Director of Administration. The

resolution failed by a vote of 6-1.

At the same session, Bill No. 2023-11 was introduced. That bill proposed removing

funding for the positions of Assistant Director of Administration, Director of Public Works,

and Deputy Director of Public Works until such time as an appointee for each position was

submitted to the Council by the County Executive and confirmed.

3
An opinion letter addressed to the County Executive and the Council drafted by
Mr. Wilber appears in the record extract. In it, Mr. Wilber concludes that the April 4, 2023
letter was the submission of the appointment of Mr. Leitzel to the Council and,
consequently, he was confirmed by inaction on May 19, 2023.
The letter is dated June 8, 2023, which is before the County Executive’s letter to the
Council. On the second page of the letter, however, Mr. Wilber references the June 22,
2023, letter to the Council from the County Executive. We thus presume that this letter is
misdated and was drafted at some point after the County Executive’s letter was sent.
5
The following day, the Council sent a letter to Mr. Leitzel, copying the County

Executive, Mr. Luffman, and Mr. Wilber. The letter informed Mr. Leitzel that he had been

rejected for appointment by a vote of the Council and directed him to “immediately

discontinue serving in the unauthorized capacity as Assistant Director of Administration.”

At the August 1, 2023 legislative session, the Council passed Bill No. 2023-11. The

County Executive vetoed the bill on August 22, 2023. The Council overrode the veto on

September 5, 2023. Bill No. 2023-11 would take effect sixty days after the override vote

(November 4, 2023). Charter, Art. III, § 311(G).

The Declaratory Judgment Action

Ten days later, the County Executive filed her complaint in circuit court seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief. After reciting the above facts, she alleged that Matthew

Leitzel was submitted to the Council for appointment to the position of Assistant Director

of Administration on April 4, 2023, when Mr. Luffman requested a closed work session to

discuss a personnel matter; that the Council took no action for more than forty-five days;

and that Mr. Leitzel was approved by inaction effective May 19, 2023. The complaint

asserted that the Council’s email of April 18, 2023, informing the County Executive that

there was no consensus to move forward with Mr. Leitzel’s appointment was not a rejection

of the appointment under § 315(A) because it did not occur at a legislative session. In Count

I, the County Executive asked the court to declare that Mr. Leitzel “stands approved” in

his position and that Bill No. 2023-11 was an improper use of the Council’s appropriation

powers. In Count II, she asked the court to enjoin enforcement of Bill No. 2023-11

preliminarily and permanently.

6
The Council answered the complaint and moved for summary judgment. It argued

that § 315(A) plainly and unambiguously obligated the County Executive to submit her

candidate for the positions identified therein, including Assistant Director of

Administration, for approval or rejection at a legislative session. Consequently, because

she only proposed Mr. Leitzel’s name for consideration at a closed work session, the forty-

five-day period during which the Council was obligated to act never began. It supported its

motion with exhibits demonstrating that the County Executive had generally followed a

two-step process for her other appointments: 1) a memorandum from her or Mr. Luffman

to Ms. Hurley requesting a closed work session to discuss a personnel matter, and 2) a

second memorandum to Ms. Hurley recommending the candidate by name and requesting

appointment or confirmation of the candidate. The Council asserted that, though the first

step was a “courtesy” to the County Executive, the second step was a prerequisite under

§ 315(A).

The County Executive opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for summary

judgment. She maintained that § 315(A) was “neither plain nor unambiguous and invites

multiple interpretations[,]” necessitating the use of interpretative tools to resolve that

ambiguity. Specifically, she urged that § 315(A) must be harmonized with § 303, which

gives the Council exclusive control over its legislative agenda, making it illogical to require

the County Executive to submit a candidate at a legislative session.

The County Executive also attached exhibits demonstrating the way appointments

had been made previously, maintaining that the “submission process has been informal and

varied over the last several years[.]” She noted that, prior to 2020, confirmation resolutions

7
were primarily prepared by the Council Administrator and, more recently, by the County

Attorney or the Council Administrator. The County Executive highlighted the appointment

of Jaclyn Curry to the position of Director of Human Resources in 2020 by expiration of

the forty-five-day period under § 315(A). The minutes from a legislative session in January

2022 reflect that, after a resolution to confirm Ms. Curry was introduced, the Council

President raised concerns that the County Executive had not formally submitted her name

for confirmation and argued that the Council should not act on the resolution until such

time as Ms. Curry’s name was submitted. Other members questioned whether the Council

was legally permitted to vote on a resolution to confirm a candidate if her name had not

been submitted. Ultimately, after a lengthy discussion, the resolution was tabled. The

County Executive argued that the discussion at the legislative session underscored the

ambiguity in § 315(A).

Opinion and Declaratory Judgment

On November 15, 2023, the circuit court issued an opinion and declaratory

judgment granting judgment to the County Executive on both counts of the complaint. The

court observed that there was no dispute that, on April 4, 2023, the County Executive

expressed interest in appointing Mr. Leitzel to the position of Assistant Director of

Administration. The parties did dispute whether the memorandum requesting a closed work

session amounted to a submission and a request for Council confirmation of Mr. Leitzel.

The court then turned to the language of § 315(A), which it quoted in its entirety from a

superseded version of the Charter as follows:

8
A. Director of Administration and department heads. Appointment by the
County Executive of the Director of Administration or of the head of a
department in the executive branch of the county government shall be
subject to confirmation by the County Council. If the Council fails to act
to confirm or reject any appointment within forty-five[4] days of its
submission to the County Council by the County Executive, the
appointment shall stand approved.

The court reasoned that the above language did not establish a “set methodology for how

the proposal for confirmation is to occur, only that the proposed appointment ‘shall be

subject to confirmation by the County Council.’” It followed that “communication through

a brief memorandum is facially sufficient to initiate the process.”

The court rejected the Council’s argument that § 315(A) incorporated Md. Code,

Local Gov’t § 9-101(b), which prohibits the “governing body of a county” from

“adopt[ing] an ordinance, a resolution, a rule, or a regulation at a meeting not open to the

public, except in accordance with the Open Meetings Act.” It reasoned that

[i]f this were true, then all executive appointments would have to be
conducted at public legislative hearings. An analysis of § 315(A), however,
does not require such a conclusion. There is no textual requirement that
Wicomico County executive branch confirmations must qualify as an
ordinance, resolution, rule, or regulation. All that is required according to the
plain reading of the Charter is that notice be provided to the Council to
initiate any future action.

4
By footnote, the court noted that this period was amended from thirty days to forty-
five days by Resolution No. 101-2016. This same resolution added the language “at its
legislative session” between “County Council” and “by the County Executive” in the
second sentence, but this amendment was not reflected in the language quoted by the court.
Also, in 2018, the first sentence was amended to expressly add the Assistant Director of
Administration. That amendment was not reflected in the language quoted by the court.
These amendments are discussed below.
9
It observed that, although past practice was consistent with a “tradition” of appointing

executive branch nominees through a resolution at a public legislative session, there was

no set procedural mechanism for initiating the resolutions. The court noted that the process

followed for the appointment of Ms. Curry supported the County Executive’s position that

“the appointment process is not a formal matter requiring all actions to take place in a

public legislative forum” and ruled that the text of § 315(A) did not “support the

requirement of any formal action except a notice of intent from the County Executive to

the Council.”

Turning to the Council’s authority to pass Bill No. 2023-11 defunding the Assistant

Director of Administration position, along with two other vacant positions, until such time

as a candidate were submitted and approved by the Council, the circuit court observed that

the Council has authority to amend the annual budget to decrease or eliminate a previously

approved budgetary expenditure. Charter, Art. VII, § 705(F)(1). It concluded that the

Council’s authority to do so was constrained by § 314(A)(3), 5 however, which bars the

5
§ 314(A) states:

A. Generally. Neither the County Council nor any of its members shall:

1. Attempt to supervise, direct, administer or interfere with any of the
functions or the personnel of the executive branch;

2. Attempt to influence the head of any department of the county
government concerning the appointment of any person to, or his/her
removal from, any office or employment; or

3. In any way take part in the appointment of or removal of any officer
or employee of the county except as specifically provided in this
Charter.
10
Council from interfering with the executive branch, including by acting to remove an

officer or employee of that branch except as permitted by the Charter. Because the circuit

court concluded that Mr. Leitzel properly was approved by inaction of the Council, it

followed that the Council could not remove him from that position by using its budgetary

powers. The court reasoned that the remainder of Bill No. 2023-11 – which removed

funding for two vacant positions – was not in violation of the Charter.

The court declared the following:

1. The April 4, 2023, memorandum was legally sufficient to trigger the forty-
five-day window for the Council to act under § 315(A).

2. Matthew Leitzel was confirmed as Assistant Director of Administration
because the Council failed to act to reject his appointment within forty-five
days after that memorandum was received (May 19, 2023).

3. Matthew Leitzel is entitled “to all of his salary without any interruption
that may have been caused by application of Legislative Bill No. 2023-11[.]”

4. The provision of Legislative Bill No. 2023-11 eliminating the “budgetary
line allocation for the position of Assistant Director of Administration is
stricken and severed and permanently enjoined from enforcement as to the
appointment of Matthew Leitzel[.]”

5. The remainder of Legislative Bill No. 2023-11 is lawful and permitted to
go into effect.

11
Post-Judgment Motions

Two days later, the County Executive moved to revise the opinion and declaratory

judgment under Rule 2-535(d), 6 arguing that the court made a clerical mistake by quoting

an outdated version of § 315(A).

The Council responded to that motion and filed a motion to alter or amend under

Rule 2-534, requesting a hearing. It attached to its motion a copy of Resolution 101-2016,

which proposed amending the Charter to lengthen the time in which the Council must act

under § 315(A) from thirty days to forty-five days and to add “at its legislative session,”

along with a copy of the ballot question for the Charter Amendment. It also included a copy

of Resolution 65-2018, which proposed modifying § 315(A) to make the Assistant Director

of Administration subject to the confirmation requirements. Both Charter amendments

were approved by the voters.

Corrected Supplemental Opinion and Declaratory Judgment

On December 13, 2023, the court issued a corrected supplemental opinion and

declaratory judgment. The supplemental opinion was substantively the same as the original

opinion except that the court quoted the current version of § 315(A) and reasoned that the

inclusion of the phrase “at its legislative session” did not alter its analysis of the law. The

court observed that the addition of that language:

only contemplates how the County Council is to proceed upon receiving a
candidate for confirmation. The County Executive is free to forward to the
County Council their candidates during a legislative session, a non-

6
That Rule states, in pertinent part: “Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other
parts of the record may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative, or on
motion of any party after such notice, if any, as the court orders.” Md. Rule 2-535(d).
12
legislative session, or during any other period. The County Council,
however, is bound to respond on the record during a legislative session within
forty-five days of receiving their confirmation, no matter the method of
proposal.

Because the Council received the “name and intent for confirmation on April 4, 2023[,]”

the circuit court concluded that its obligation to act at a legislative session within forty-five

days was triggered on that date.

The declaratory judgment was unchanged except that the court declared that the

original opinion and judgment were superseded by the revised opinion, “which serves only

to clarify the [c]ourt’s decision and does not result in any substantive change.”

By separate orders, the court denied the motions to revise and to alter or amend as

“moot.”

This timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Whether summary judgment was granted properly is a question of law.” Lightolier,

A Div. of Genlyte Thomas Grp., LLC v. Hoon, 387 Md. 539, 551 (2005). “The standard of

review is de novo and we are concerned with whether the trial court was legally correct.”

Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “We review the record in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be

drawn from the facts against the moving party.” Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md.

469, 479 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

13
DISCUSSION

I.

The central issue in this case concerns the construction of § 315(A) of the Charter.

Our canons of statutory construction “apply with equal force to the interpretation of a

charter provision.” Prince George’s Cnty. v. Thurston, 479 Md. 575, 586 (2022). The

Supreme Court of Maryland has explained:

It is a well-settled principle that the primary objective of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.
The first step in this inquiry is to examine the plain language of the statute,
and if the words of the statute, construed according to their common and
everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning,
we will give effect to the statute as it is written. Thus, where the statutory
language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and
simple meaning, courts do not normally look beyond the words of the statute
itself to determine legislative intent. Furthermore, words may not be added
to, or removed from, an unambiguous statute in order to give it a meaning
not reflected by the words the Legislature chose to use.

Montgomery Cnty., Md. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Montgomery Cnty. Lodge 35, Inc.,

427 Md. 561, 572-73 (2012) (cleaned up). “Occasionally we see fit to examine extrinsic

sources of legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of a statute’s plain language.

In such instances, we may find useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme,

and archival legislative history of relevant enactments.” SVF Riva Annapolis LLC v. Gilroy,

459 Md. 632, 640 (2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

As a threshold matter, the parties disagree as to whether § 315(A) is ambiguous.

The first sentence of that provision is not in dispute. The 2018 amendment established that

14
the Assistant Director of Administration is “subject to confirmation by the County

Council.” 7 The second sentence is our focus. It states:

If the Council fails to act to confirm or reject any appointment within 45 days
of its submission to the County Council, at its legislative session, by the
County Executive, the appointment shall stand approved.

The parties focus upon the placement of the phrase “at its legislative session[.]” In

the Council’s view, that phrase modifies “submission” and requires the County Executive

to submit an appointment for consideration by the Council at a legislative session. The

County Executive contends that the placement of this phrase is ambiguous but that by

reference to other interpretive tools, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of her position

that the Council must act to reject or confirm the appointment at a legislative session, not

that the County Executive must submit it for consideration at a legislative session.

The circuit court construed the provision consistent with the County Executive’s

position, reasoning that the phrase “at its legislative session,” which was added to § 315(A)

in 2016, imposes a duty upon the County Council to act on a submission at a legislative

session and does not dictate the way the County Executive may submit a candidate for

approval.

We begin with the plain language of § 315(A). The second sentence contains a

conditional clause – “If the Council fails to act to confirm or reject any appointment within

45 days of its submission to the County Council, at its legislative session, by the County

7
The circuit court’s first opinion and declaratory judgment assumed that § 315(A)
applied to that position even though the version quoted in that opinion did not include the
2018 language.
15
Executive,” – and a main clause – “the appointment shall stand approved.” Both clauses

use the term “appointment.” “When statutory terms are undefined, we often look to

dictionary definitions as a starting point, to identify the ‘ordinary and popular meaning’ of

the terms[.]” Westminster Mgmt., LLC v. Smith, 486 Md. 616, 644 (2024) (quoting

Comptroller v. FC-GEN Operations Invs. LLC, 482 Md. 343, 390 (2022)). Merriam-

Webster defines the word “appoint” to mean “to name officially[.]” Appoint, MERRIAM-

WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/appoint (last visited Jan. 15,

2025); see also Appoint, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/

dictionary/english/appoint (last visited Jan. 17, 2025) (“[T]o choose someone officially for

a job or responsibility[.]”); Appoint, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (“To

choose or designate (someone) for a position or job, esp. in government.”). We conclude

that the term “appointment” refers to a person officially named by the County Executive

for a particular position.

We now turn to the placement of the phrase “at its legislative session” within

§ 315(A). If, as the circuit court ruled, that phrase governed the manner in which the

Council must act to confirm or reject an appointment, it naturally would appear after

“confirm or reject any appointment,” as follows: “If the Council fails to act to confirm or

reject any appointment, at its legislative session, within 45 days of its submission to the

County Council[ ] by the County Executive, the appointment shall stand approved.”

(Bolded emphasis reflects added language; brackets reflect deleted language.) Instead, it

appears after “submission to the County Council[.]” By placing the new language here, the

16
phrase governs the manner of the submission of the appointment, not the way the Council

may act upon it.

We thus construe § 315(A) to unambiguously require the County Executive to

formally submit the name of a candidate for a particular position to the Council for

consideration at a legislative session. This construction ensures that the Council is on notice

when the forty-five-day window in which it must act opens. The necessity of establishing

this date is readily apparent here, where the County Executive requested a closed work

session in a memorandum on April 4, 2023, but that session did not occur until fourteen

days later. Under the County Executive’s construction of § 315(A), the Council had just

thirty-one days left to act after it informally vetted Mr. Leitzel and found his qualifications

lacking. See FC-Gen Operations, 482 Md. at 380 (“In every case, the statute must be given

a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common

sense.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)).

The legislative history of § 315(A) confirms our construction. Prior to the 2016

amendments, the second sentence of § 315(A) read: “If the Council fails to act to confirm

or reject any appointment within 30 days of its submission to the County Council by the

County Executive, the appointment shall stand approved.” In 2016, the Council approved

a resolution to amend § 315(A) to extend the time in which it had to act by fifteen days and

added “at its legislative session” between the phrases “submission to the County Council”

and “by the County Executive.” Consistent with § 1002(B) of the Charter and Art. XI-A,

17
§ 5 of the Maryland Constitution, that proposed Charter Amendment appeared on the ballot

for approval by the voters as Question C, 8 which stated:

To amend the County Charter to extend the time for the Council to act to
confirm or reject any appointment by the County Executive of the Director
of Administration, the head of a department in the executive branch, or a
member of a board or commission from 30 days to 45 days from submission
and to require submission at a legislative session of Council.

The language of the ballot question is consistent with our plain language construction

because it specifies that the phrase “at its legislative session” clarifies the manner of the

submission of an executive appointment, not the manner the Council must act upon a

submission.

The County Executive argues that this construction of § 315(A) would allow the

Council to refuse to place a candidate’s name on the legislative agenda and “prohibit the

County Executive from ever making an appointment.” We disagree. Though the Council

alone is empowered to set its legislative agenda, Charter, Art. III, § 303, the Council may

not interfere with any of the “functions . . . of the executive branch[.]” Charter, Art. III,

§ 314(A)(1). One such function that is specifically enumerated in the Charter is the

appointment power. Charter, Art. IV, § 413. It follows that if the County Executive

formally submits a name for appointment to an executive office, the Council must act on

that appointment under § 315(A) by placing the candidate on the agenda for a vote or the

candidate would be confirmed by inaction. In other words, the date of a formal request for

action on a candidate starts the clock under § 315(A).

8
The County Attorney drafted the ballot question.
18
Given our construction of § 315(A), it is clear that the April 4, 2023 memorandum

requesting a closed work session to discuss a personnel matter fell short. First, the

memorandum did not name Mr. Leitzel or identify the position the County Executive

sought to fill. Second, the memorandum did not request action by the Council to confirm

a candidate at a legislative session, but rather requested a private discussion at a non-

legislative session. 9 For both reasons, the April 4, 2023 memorandum was not the

submission of an appointment to the Council for action at a legislative session and did not

start the running of the forty-five-day period in which the Council was required to act. 10

9
Though not necessary to our analysis, the history of past practices by the current
County Executive and prior County Executives that was supplied by both parties on
summary judgment demonstrates that formal submission of a candidate’s name and a
request for action was the routine procedure followed. The language varied, but the
memoranda in the record reflect requests for “confirmation” of a candidate by the Council,
“recommend[ing] the appointment” of a candidate, and “request[ing] the appointment” of
a candidate. All of these methods are adequate to submit an appointment to the Council
under § 315(A).
Additionally, the unique circumstances of the appointment of Ms. Curry do not
support the County Executive’s position. In that instance, the Council introduced a
resolution to confirm a candidate despite the lack of an appointment memorandum. Having
acted at a legislative session to approve or reject that candidate, the Council effectively
waived the requirement of an appointment memorandum for that candidate. By then tabling
the resolution, the Council failed to act on the appointment within forty-five days. Here,
there was no resolution introduced until after the County Executive advised the Council
that Mr. Leitzel had been confirmed by inaction and the resolution was put to a vote and
failed.
10
For the same reasons, the County Executive’s follow-up email requesting
reconsideration of the consensus following the closed work session could not amount to a
formal submission of Mr. Leitzel as a candidate. In any event, the County Executive never
argued before the circuit court that the April 19, 2023 follow-up email triggered the forty-
five-day clock.
19
Consequently, Mr. Leitzel was not confirmed to the position of Assistant Director of

Administration by the Council’s inaction.

II.

We now turn to the circuit court’s ruling that the Council was not empowered to

defund the position of Assistant Director of Administration by its passage of Bill No.

2023-11. It reasoned that § 705(F)(1) of the Charter 11 empowered the Council to amend

the budget to delete previously approved budgetary expenditures. Bill No. 2023-11 deleted

the budget allocations for three positions – Assistant Director of Administration, Director

of Public Works, and Deputy Director of Public Works – all of which the County Executive

must fill within six months of taking office, until such time as a candidate were submitted

and approved. The court concluded that the County Council was within its authority to

delete the budget allocations for Director of Public Works and Deputy Director of Public

Works because both positions were vacant. It was without authority, however, to delete the

11
That provision states:

After the public [budget] hearing, the Council may decrease or delete any
items in the budget except those required by the laws of this state or of this
county, and except any provisions for debt service on obligations then
outstanding or for estimated cash deficits. The Council shall have no power
to change the form of the budget as submitted by the County Executive, or
to alter the revenue estimates except to correct mathematical errors, or to add
any items to the budget or to increase any expenditure recommended by the
County Executive for current expense or capital purposes. In the event the
Council decreases or deletes any item(s) and the Executive and Council do
not agree upon the expenditure of the surplus, then upon adoption of the
budget the surplus shall be placed in the undesignated fund balance for future
appropriation.
20
budget allocation for the Assistant Director of Administration because Mr. Leitzel had been

confirmed for that position.

The court declared that the provision of Bill No. 2023-11 defunding the Assistant

Director of Administration position was “stricken and severed and permanently enjoined

from enforcement as to the appointment of Matthew Leitzel” but that the remainder of the

bill, defunding two vacant positions, was lawful and could go into effect. The County

Executive did not appeal from the circuit court ruling that the Council was empowered to

defund the two vacant positions. As a consequence of the trial court’s ruling, Mr. Leitzel

continued working as Assistant Director of Administration during the pendency of this

appeal.

Because we have held that Mr. Leitzel was not confirmed to the position of Assistant

Director of Administration, that position remained vacant when the Council enacted Bill

No. 2023-11. Thus, the court erred by enjoining the Council’s implementation of Bill No.

2023-11 with respect to the Assistant Director of Administration vacancy. Effective the

date of our mandate, the circuit court’s order enjoining that section of Bill No. 2023-11 is

dissolved and the section may take effect. 12

III.

The County Executive filed a motion to revise pursuant to Rule 2-535(d) in which

it requested the court to revise its opinion to quote the then current version of § 315(A). It

did not challenge the court’s reasoning or its conclusion. The County Executive did not

12
We note that the Council did not file a counterclaim or otherwise raise any issue
of disgorgement of salary and benefits received by Mr. Leitzel.
21
request a hearing. The Council filed a motion to alter or amend in which it referenced the

inaccurate quote but also argued that the court’s conclusion was not consistent with the

Charter. The Council requested a hearing.

In its brief on appeal, as a question presented, the Council asks whether the circuit

court erred in granting the motion to alter or amend without a hearing. The argument does

not track the question, however. In its argument, after asserting that the post-judgment

motions were not moot, it argues that, in fact, the court granted the County Executive’s

motion to revise, constituting reversible error because the change in the opinion was not

the correction of a clerical error. The Council also argues that the court denied the Council’s

motion to alter or amend, constituting reversible error because it was done without a

hearing.

The circuit court ruled that both motions were moot. The County Executive argues

that changes then made were an exercise of the court’s revisory power over its nonfinal

rulings. The reasonable inference to be drawn from the record, however, is that the changes

were not a sua sponte exercise of revisory power in the absence of post-judgment motions,

as in Maryland Board of Nursing v. Nechay, 347 Md. 396 (1997), but rather were in

response to either or both of the parties’ motions. The motions were not moot. In effect,

the court granted the County Executive’s motion to revise and denied the Council’s motion

to alter or amend. Thus, the post-judgment Rules apply.

Rule 2-311(e) provides that a motion to alter or amend under Rule 2-534 may not

be granted without a hearing. Even if we regard the court’s action as a ruling on the Rule

22
2-534 motion, the ruling was effectively a denial of that motion. There was no substantive

change in the ruling. Thus, no hearing was required.

With respect to the County Executive’s motion to revise, no hearing was requested,

and thus, none was required. Rule 2-311(f).

Finally, any error in failing to hold a hearing would be harmless because we have

decided the issues de novo, as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we vacate the declaratory judgment and remand for the entry of

a new declaratory judgment declaring that 1) the April 4, 2023 memorandum was not

legally sufficient to initiate the forty-five-day appointment window pursuant to § 315(A);

2) that Mr. Leitzel was not confirmed as Assistant Director of Administration by the

Council’s inaction; 3) that Mr. Leitzel, who has been serving as Assistant Director of

Administration since June 26, 2023, is entitled to his salary until the effective date of our

mandate; 4) that the provision of Legislative Bill No. 2023-11 providing for the elimination

of the budgetary line allocation for the position of Assistant Director of Administration was

lawful and will take effect when our mandate issues.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
WICOMICO COUNTY VACATED. CASE
REMANDED FOR THE ENTRY OF A
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID
BY APPELLEE.

23
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:

https://www.mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/cosa/2146s23cn.pdf