State v. Santamaria-Landaverde

State of Maryland v. Jose Antonio Santamaria-Landaverde, No. 0608, Sept. Term 2024.
Opinion by Arthur, J.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE UNDER BRADY V.
MARYLAND

Evidence is deemed to be suppressed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), if it
is known to the State, but unknown to the defense. Thus, where a defendant has actual or
constructive knowledge of favorable information that the State has allegedly withheld, or
where such information was available to the defense through reasonable and diligent
investigation, there is no Brady violation.

In this case, the State inadvertently failed to disclose two pieces of exculpatory evidence
until the day before trial—a recording of the victim’s interview and a DNA report.
Defense counsel had, at the very least, constructive knowledge of both pieces of
evidence; he had notice that the victim participated in a recorded interview and that DNA
samples were taken during the investigation. Defense counsel also admitted that he chose
not to ask the State for the missing evidence so he could attempt to persuade the circuit
court to exclude the evidence or dismiss the charges altogether.

The Appellate Court of Maryland held that the State did not suppress evidence within the
meaning of Brady. The defense had sufficient knowledge of the allegedly withheld
evidence before the State’s delayed disclosures, and it strategically refrained from
informing the State of its errors to hopefully gain a tactical advantage at trial. The
defense cannot acknowledge its intention to exploit the State’s omissions in one breath
and claim that the State suppressed evidence in the next.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS

When the State’s failure to disclose evidence falls short of a Brady violation, it may still
violate Maryland’s discovery rules. In exercising its discretion to impose a discovery
sanction, a trial court should consider why the disclosure was not made, whether the
defendant was prejudiced by the violation, whether a continuance could cure the
prejudice, and any other relevant circumstances. Whether the State commits a discovery
violation or a Brady violation, a trial court should impose the least severe sanction. The
sanction of dismissal, which should be used sparingly, if at all, is reserved for the
extraordinary case where no less drastic remedy is available.

In this case, the circuit court incorrectly determined that the State’s failure to disclose
evidence was a Brady violation. The court concluded that dismissal of the indictment
was appropriate because no less drastic remedy could alleviate the prejudice that resulted
from the State’s delayed disclosures.
The Appellate Court of Maryland held that the circuit court failed to employ the proper
standard for imposing discovery sanctions. Under the correct standard, the court could
not have concluded that dismissal was appropriate. A continuance would have allowed
the defense to review the evidence and recalculate it case—all of which it could have
accomplished well before trial had it informed the State of its (inadvertent) omissions and
requested the evidence.
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No. C-16-CR-23-002069

REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 0608

September Term, 2024

______________________________________

STATE OF MARYLAND

v.

JOSE ANTONIO SANTAMARIA-LANDAVERDE

______________________________________

Arthur,
Leahy,
Eyler, Deborah S.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.
______________________________________

Opinion by Arthur, J.
______________________________________

Filed: May 30, 2025

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.

2025.05.30
15:13:06 -04'00'
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
Jose Antonio Santamaria-Landaverde was charged with committing various sexual

offenses against a child. Before trial, Santamaria-Landaverde moved to dismiss the

indictment as a sanction for the State’s inadvertent discovery violations. The Circuit

Court for Prince George’s County granted the motion.

The State appealed, as it is entitled to do under section 12-302(c)(2) of the Courts

and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.). We

reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Investigations and Indictment

The charges against Santamaria-Landaverde stem from alleged sexual misconduct

with a girl who was 12 or 13 years old at the time. The incidents allegedly occurred

between August 2021 and September 2022 in Prince George’s County. Some of them

allegedly occurred in Santamaria-Landaverde’s car.

The Prince George’s County Police conducted an initial investigation. In the

course of that investigation, the County Police discovered that they lacked jurisdiction

because the events allegedly occurred in a recreational area administered by the

Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission. Consequently, the County

Police transferred the case to the Maryland Park Police, which completed a separate

investigation.

In June 2023, during the County’s investigation, the Child Advocacy Center

(“CAC”) interviewed the victim and her father. A County detective took notes during
both CAC interviews, and the prosecutor participated via Zoom. Both interviews were

recorded on video.

In July 2023, about 10 months after the last of the incidents allegedly occurred, the

Park Police swabbed Santamaria-Landaverde’s car for the presence of semen or seminal

fluids. A DNA report became available to the Park Police and, it appears, to the

County’s lead detective, on October 30, 2023. The report found no trace of Santamaria-

Landaverde’s semen or seminal fluid inside of his car. Although reports of this type are

ordinarily sent to the prosecutor, the prosecutor in this case did not receive the report at

the time it was generated.

Meanwhile, on July 27, 2023, the State indicted Santamaria-Landaverde on

charges of sexual abuse of a minor, second-degree rape, sexual solicitation of a minor,

and third-degree sexual offense. He was held in pretrial detention, without bond, until

the trial date in February 2024.

Discovery and Motions

On October 18, 2023, Santamaria-Landaverde moved to compel the production of

discovery. The court ordered full disclosure by November 1, 2023.

In accordance with that order, the State provided defense counsel with what it

believed was all the discovery material. Amongst the discovery materials provided were

(1) the County detective’s bullet-point notes taken during the victim’s and her father’s

CAC interviews, (2) a video file labeled “Victim CAC,” and (3) property records

indicating that DNA samples were taken from Santamaria-Landaverde and his car in July

2023.

2
Although the State disclosed that DNA samples had been taken from Santamaria-

Landaverde and his car, the State’s initial disclosures did not include the actual DNA

report on those samples. In addition, in the video file labeled “Victim CAC,” the State

mistakenly included the video file of the victim’s father’s interview with the CAC. The

State did not produce the video file of the victim’s interview.

During a status conference on November 15, 2023, the prosecutor informed the

judge that no other discoverable information was outstanding. The parties then jointly

moved to postpone the trial, which had been scheduled to begin later that month. The

case was reset for a motions hearing on February 16, 2024, and a two-day trial beginning

on February 28, 2024.

During case preparation, defense counsel learned of a potential investigation into

similar claims by the victim against a different person who worked for the same employer

as Santamaria-Landaverde. On January 13, 2024, defense counsel emailed the State,

requesting suspected Brady1 material.

On February 6, 2024, Santamaria-Landaverde moved to dismiss the charges on the

ground that the State had failed to respond to his email request and produce the requested

Brady evidence. The motion did not mention the victim’s CAC interview, the DNA

report, or any other missing discovery.

1
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (establishing a criminal defendant’s
federal constitutional right to the pretrial disclosure of exculpatory information).

3
At a motions hearing on February 16, 2024, the State informed the defense that the

investigation did not occur and, thus, that there was no evidence to produce. The court

accepted the State’s representation and deemed Santamaria-Landaverde’s motion to

dismiss to be moot. Again, the defense did not mention the victim’s CAC interview, the

DNA report, or any other missing discovery.2

On Monday, February 27, 2024—the day before the trial was to begin—the State

moved for a continuance. As grounds for the motion, the State asserted that its lead

detective would be out of town until the following week. The State also asserted that the

prosecutor would need additional time to prepare because of scheduling conflicts,

including a trial that had lasted longer than expected and a second trial that had been

specially set for two weeks, but had just ended with a guilty plea.

On the day before the trial was to begin, the prosecutor realized that she had the

video of the victim’s father’s CAC interview, but that she did not have the video of the

victim’s interview. That evening, the prosecutor obtained the video of the victim’s

interview from a Prince George’s County detective. She immediately sent the video,

which is one hour and 45 minutes long, to defense counsel.

Also on the day before the trial was to begin, the prosecutor learned that she had

not received (and thus that the State had not produced) the results from the DNA swab of

Santamaria-Landaverde’s car. Although the County’s lead detective had apparently had

2
During this motions hearing, the defense sought some of the victim’s medical
records. The court ordered that certain personal information be turned over to defense
counsel only. This discovery matter is not germane to the issue on appeal.

4
this DNA report since October 30, 2023, neither he nor the Park Police, which procured

the report, had sent a copy of it to the prosecutor. The County’s lead detective sent the

report to the prosecutor at 11:00 p.m. on the evening before trial. She received it the

following morning and produced it to defense counsel.

On the morning of February 28, 2024, defense counsel again moved to dismiss the

charges as a sanction for the State’s discovery violations. The court opted to resolve the

discovery issues in Santamaria-Landaverde’s motion to dismiss before considering the

State’s motion for a continuance.

Santamaria-Landaverde’s attorney claimed that he was never informed that the

victim’s CAC interview was recorded or that a DNA report existed. He argued that the

State’s failure to produce that evidence until just before trial was an inexcusable

discovery violation, as the discovery deadline was November 1, 2023. Defense counsel

characterized the DNA report as exculpatory evidence and argued that the State’s failure

to provide the report was an “egregious Brady violation” that impinged on Santamaria-

Landaverde’s due process rights and prejudiced the defense by leaving insufficient time

to review the results and hire an expert. Defense counsel also argued that dismissal of the

indictment was the proper sanction, but requested, in the alternative, that the court

exclude testimony from “all law enforcement [officers]” and “the child[.]”

The State conceded that it had violated the discovery rules by failing to produce

the DNA report and the video of the victim’s interview by the discovery deadline. The

State contended, however, that its discovery violations did not violate Brady and, thus,

that the court should impose the least severe sanction. It argued that a brief continuance

5
would be adequate to allow defense counsel time to review the recently disclosed

evidence, recalibrate the defense, and cure any prejudice that the belated disclosure might

have caused.

The State also argued that the initial discovery materials put the defense on notice

that the CAC had recorded its interview with the victim. The State pointed out that the

detective’s contemporaneous notes of the CAC interview and the video file labeled

“Victim’s CAC” clearly informed the defense that the CAC had conducted a recorded

interview with the victim. The State also pointed out that a second detective’s notes refer

to the victim’s forensic interview at the CAC.

In addition, the State observed that its disclosures put the defense on notice of the

existence of a DNA report. The State argued that it had disclosed the lead detective’s

case file, which showed that swabs had been taken from Santamaria-Landaverde’s car

and, thus, informed defense counsel that a report would follow.3

The State explained that it had inadvertently failed to produce the video of the

victim’s interview with the CAC and the DNA report. It called a detective (not the lead

detective), who testified that, through “human error,” “the victim’s interview was

mislabeled.” The prosecutor told the court that she had received only one video—the

video of the father’s interview, which was mislabeled as the victim’s interview. The

3
In fact, defense counsel said, at the outset of the hearing, “I readied my defense
based on that understanding”—i.e., the understanding that the detectives had swabbed the
car and gotten DNA samples.

6
prosecutor said that she discovered that error in trial preparation when she opened the

video file and saw that it contained the interview of the father, not the interview of the

victim.

The State also explained why it had inadvertently failed to produce the final DNA

report. According to the prosecutor, DNA reports are typically sent, by email, both to the

prosecutor and the lead detective. In this case, however, the Park Police, which obtained

the DNA samples, apparently did not include the prosecutor on the email chain.

Consequently, the prosecutor did not receive the report when it was generated and did not

know of it. The lead detective was not present to explain what he knew about the failure

to forward the report to the prosecutor, but the circumstances suggest that he erroneously

assumed that the prosecutor had received the report by email, because that is what

typically occurs.

The trial court rejected the State’s arguments and granted Santamaria-

Landaverde’s motion to dismiss. The court began by expressing its recognition that the

State has a great number of criminal cases, that the State’s Brady obligations are

extensive, and that “people make mistakes.” The court, however, denied that it was

“harping on an oops.”

The court offered its perspective on what it called the procedural history of the

case. It conveyed its displeasure about the lead detective’s absence. It observed that

Santamaria-Landaverde had been held without bond since July 2023. It noted that the

defense had filed a motion to compel in October 2023, that the court had ordered the

State to produce all discovery by November 1, 2023, and that the State had later

7
represented that discovery was complete. It remarked that the State had not responded in

writing to various motions.

The court agreed with both parties that the State’s failure to provide the recording

of the victim’s CAC interview and the DNA report by the discovery deadline were

indisputable discovery violations. But the court also agreed with the defense and

determined that, because the delayed disclosures included exculpatory evidence, the

State’s discovery violation reached constitutional magnitude and violated Santamaria-

Landaverde’s Brady rights.

Having concluded that the State had violated its Brady obligations, the circuit

court looked to Smith v. State, 484 Md. 1 (2023), the Supreme Court of Maryland’s most

recent decision concerning Brady. Smith dealt with the intentional concealment of highly

exculpatory evidence over the course of several decades. Smith also dealt with whether a

Brady violation had caused such irreparable prejudice at an earlier trial that the ordinary

remedy of a new trial was inappropriate, not with whether the court should dismiss an

indictment before a trial had ever occurred. Nonetheless, the trial court resolved to apply

Smith v. State to this case because, it said, the case “specifically addressed this issue

regarding using Brady exculpatory information . . . [and] that not providing that is a

violation of due process.”

The court prefaced its ruling by acknowledging, correctly, that dismissal is the

“most severe” discovery sanction and the appellate courts “encourage” lower courts not

to employ that “draconian” remedy. The court determined, however, that no less drastic

sanction was feasible in this case. The court cited the State’s “piecemeal” disclosures. It

8
was, the court said, “inexcusable” that Santamaria-Landaverde had been “held without

bond” while the State had failed to meet its discovery obligations. The court took

umbrage at the lead detective’s absence, even as it recognized that the State had no

obligation to call him as a witness at trial. The court declared that it had “absolutely zero

confidence that everything has been provided.”

The court proceeded to address the young victim, who was in the courtroom.

Once again, the court described the remedy of dismissal as a “drastic measure.” It said

that the dismissal of the charges was “fundamentally unfair” to the victim, because she

would be “unable to have her day in Court.” But, the court said, it was “important for the

victim to hear” that “everyone needs to be held accountable.” With that, the court

concluded that it had no choice but to grant the motion to dismiss.

The State’s timely appeal followed.4

QUESTION PRESENTED

The State presents one question: “Did the lower court abuse its discretion, mis-

applying settled law, when it dismissed the indictment against Appellee as a sanction for

a discovery violation?”

We answer this question affirmatively, reverse the judgment, and remand this case

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

4
The victim did not note an appeal, but she filed a brief and a reply brief in the
purported capacity of an appellant. Upon the State’s motion, we treated the victim’s brief
as that of an amicus.

9
STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellate court reviews without deference a trial court’s determination of

whether the State violated its disclosure obligations under Brady. Canales-Yanez v.

State, 472 Md. 132, 156 (2021) (citing Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 48 (1997)). A

defendant alleging that the State committed a Brady violation bears the burden of

production and persuasion regarding the alleged violation. Yearby v. State, 414 Md. 708,

720 (2010).

“Generally, we review a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment

for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Grafton, 255 Md. App. 128, 143 (2022). But even

when the State has violated Brady, “‘dismissal of an indictment as a sanction is

appropriate only where less drastic alternatives are not available.’” Id. at 150 (quoting

Williams v. State, 416 Md. 670, 693 n.8 (2010)).

This Court may reverse a circuit court’s decision on discovery sanctions only if we

find an abuse of discretion. In this context, as in others, an abuse of discretion does not

occur simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling as the

circuit court. See, e.g., McLennan v. State, 418 Md. 335, 353 (2011). Nonetheless, in

imposing discovery sanctions in a criminal case, the circuit court’s discretion is far from

unbounded: “the court should impose the least severe sanction that is consistent with the

purpose of the discovery rules[]” (Thomas v. State, 397 Md. 557, 571 (2007)), and the

“exclusion of evidence should be ordered only in extreme cases.” Id. at 573.

10
DISCUSSION

The trial court’s error in this case is two-fold. First, the court erred by concluding

that the State committed a Brady violation, rather than an ordinary discovery violation.

Second, the court abused its discretion in dismissing the charges as a sanction for the

State’s discovery violation, instead of imposing a less severe sanction, such as a

continuance.

A. Brady

“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must

be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching;

that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently;

and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999);

accord Williams v. State, 416 Md. 670, 692 (2010); Yearby v. State, 414 Md. 708, 717

(2010); Adams v. State, 165 Md. App. 352, 362 (2005). Here, even if the evidence was

favorable to the accused and even if prejudice ensued because of the delayed disclosure,

the finding of a Brady violation is, nonetheless, incorrect as a matter of law. The

suppression element is dispositively unmet.

Suppression is a multifaceted element of a Brady violation. “Evidence will be

deemed to be suppressed within the meaning of Brady if it is ‘information which had

been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.’” Conyers v. State, 367 Md.

571, 601 (2002) (quoting Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 557 (4th Cir.

1999)) (further citation omitted); accord Diallo v. State, 413 Md. 678, 704 (2010).

11
“[S]uppression is inextricably intertwined with . . . the defendant’s independent

duty to investigate, especially in a situation where the defense ‘was aware of the

potentially exculpatory nature of the evidence as well as its existence.’” Yearby v. State,

414 Md. at 722-23 (quoting 6 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure, § 24.3(b), at

362 (3d ed. 2007))). “[T]he Brady rule was not intended ‘to displace the adversary

system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered.’” Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19,

38-39 (1997) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985)); accord Yearby

v. State, 414 Md. at 723. “Accordingly, the Brady rule does not relieve the defendant

from the obligation to investigate the case and prepare for trial.” Ware v. State, 348 Md.

at 39.

“Brady offers a defendant no relief when the defendant knew or should have

known facts permitting [the defense] to take advantage of the evidence in question or

when a reasonable defendant would have found the evidence.” Id.; accord Diallo v.

State, 413 Md. at 705. Thus, “[i]f the defendant has actual or constructive knowledge of

the allegedly withheld exculpatory information, there cannot be a Brady violation.”

Yearby v. State, 414 Md. at 724; accord Williams v. State, 416 Md. at 691. “The

prosecution cannot be said to have suppressed evidence for Brady purposes when the

information allegedly suppressed was available to the defendant through reasonable and

diligent investigation.” Ware v. State, 348 Md. at 39.

“[T]he necessary inquiry is whether the defendant knew or should have known

facts that would have allowed [the defense] to access the undisclosed evidence.” Id.;

12
accord Yearby v. State, 414 Md. at 724. The defendant’s constructive knowledge is

assessed under a reasonable person standard. Yearby v. State, 414 Md. at 724.

Santamaria-Landaverde had, at the very least, constructive knowledge of both

pieces of evidence that were allegedly suppressed—the video of the victim’s interview

and the DNA report. Defense counsel had notice that the CAC had interviewed the

victim because he received a detective’s notes of the interview and because he received a

video file that was labeled (incorrectly) as the video of the victim’s interview. In fact,

defense counsel told the circuit court that he had opened the video file and discovered

that the State had sent him the father’s interview and not the victim’s interview. In oral

argument in this Court, counsel reiterated that he knew that the video was the father’s—

i.e., he knew that the State had mistakenly sent him the wrong video and had meant to

send the right one—the video of the victim.

Defense counsel also had notice that the State would have a DNA report, because

the State had produced documentation showing that it had taken DNA samples from

Santamaria-Landaverde’s car. Counsel told the circuit court that he had “readied [his]

defense based on” the understanding that the detectives had swabbed the car and gotten

DNA samples. In oral argument in this Court, counsel flatly stated that he “knew that

they were withholding the DNA report.” If defense counsel was surprised, it was only

because he had not expected that the report would be helpful to his client.

If “[t]he ease with which [defense counsel] could have obtained the information

and the obviousness of its sources [do not] all but confirm that [the defense] made a

‘tactical decision’ not to inquire about the” missing video and DNA report, defense

13
counsel’s concessions certainly do. Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 976-77 (4th Cir.

1995) (holding that the defense “either knew or easily could have discovered the location

of the victim’s gun through ‘a reasonable and diligent investigation[,]’” like asking the

State or reviewing the co-defendant’s trial transcript, where the defendant admittedly

knew the gun was recovered but simply did not know where it was found at the crime

scene). Counsel appears to have refrained from informing the State of its omissions

because he hoped to gain some tactical advantage, such as the suppression of the

evidence or even the dismissal of the charges, if the State belatedly discovered its errors

and attempted to correct them. When asked at oral argument, “So instead of doing

something to try and get it, because you knew DNA had been collected, you just wanted

to wait and argue that it shouldn’t be admitted?,” defense counsel responded,

“Absolutely.” Later he said, “I knew coming in on the [trial date] that I had a full bag of

ammunition to exclude evidence.” The defense cannot acknowledge its intention to

exploit the State’s omissions in one breath and claim that the State suppressed evidence

in the next.

“‘[T]here can be no Brady violation where there is no suppression of evidence.’”

Diallo v. State, 413 Md. at 704 (quoting Diallo v. State, 186 Md. App. 22, 73-74 (2009),

aff’d in part, vacated in part, 413 Md. 678 (2010)). In this case, no evidence was

“suppressed” for purposes of Brady, so no due process violation occurred. The trial

court’s contrary conclusion is legally erroneous.

14
B. Discovery Violation

Maryland Rule 4-263 governs the parties’ discovery obligations in criminal cases.

When the State’s conduct “fails to rise to the level of a Brady violation” it “may still be a

violation of Maryland’s discovery rules.” Vanderpool v. State, 261 Md. App. 163, 197,

cert. denied, 487 Md. 461 (2024).

“To implement the objectives of the Rule, it is within the discretion of the trial

court to impose sanctions if the Rule is violated.” Thomas v. State, 397 Md. 557, 570

(2007). Rule 4-263(n) enumerates the sanctions the court may impose after a discovery

violation. They include “grant[ing] a reasonable continuance, prohibit[ing] the party

from introducing in evidence the matter not disclosed, grant[ing] a mistrial, or enter[ing]

any other order appropriate under the circumstances.” Id.

“In exercising its discretion regarding sanctions for discovery violations, a trial

court should consider: (1) the reasons why the disclosure was not made; (2) the existence

and amount of any prejudice to the opposing party; (3) the feasability [sic] of curing any

prejudice with a continuance; and (4) any other relevant circumstances.” Thomas v.

State, 397 Md. at 570-71 (footnote omitted).

No matter the type of discovery violation committed—whether a mere violation of

the rules or a violation of Brady—the cases are legion that trial courts should impose the

least severe sanction and that “the sanction of dismissal should be used sparingly, if at

all.” Thompson v. State, 395 Md. 240, 261 (2006); accord State v. Graham, 233 Md.

App. 439, 459 (2017); see also Mason v. State, 487 Md. 216, 242 (2024); Smith v. State,

484 Md. at 13; Vanderpool v. State, 261 Md. App. at 199; State v. Grafton, 255 Md. App.

15
at 150; Myers v. State, 243 Md. App. 154, 174 (2019); Steck v. State, 239 Md. App. 440,

466 (2018); Correll v. State, 215 Md. App. 483, 514 (2013); Raynor v. State, 201 Md.

App. 209, 228 (2011); Morton v. State, 200 Md. App. 529, 543 (2011); Williams v. State,

416 Md. at 698; In re Caitlin N., 192 Md. App. 251, 272 (2010); Thomas v. State, 397

Md. at 571.

Hence, even in a Brady case, which this is not, dismissal is almost never the

appropriate remedy. Smith v. State, 484 Md. at 16. Indeed, the Court in Smith v. State

made clear that “[a] court may . . . dismiss an indictment as a sanction in an extraordinary

case of misconduct by the State where no less drastic remedy is available.” Id.

(emphasis added).

Had the circuit court applied the correct standard in this case—the standard that

governs violations of the discovery rules that do not rise to the level of a Brady

violation—the court could not have dismissed the charges.

Under the correct standard, the court would look first to the reasons why the

disclosure was not made. Thomas v. State, 397 Md. at 570. In this case, it is beyond any

serious dispute that the State failed to disclose the DNA report and the video of the

victim’s interview because of a pair of inadvertent oversights. The prosecutor was

unaware of the DNA report until the eve of trial, apparently because the Park Police

departed from protocol by sending the report only to the Prince George’s County police

detective and not to the prosecutor as well. In addition, the prosecutor believed

(mistakenly) that the State had produced the victim’s interview because it had produced a

file labeled (incorrectly) as the victim’s interview. There is not a shred of evidence in the

16
record that these discovery violations were anything other than inadvertent, and the

circuit court judge did not find (and could not have found) otherwise.

Under the governing standard, the court would look next to “the existence and

amount of any prejudice to” Santamaria-Landaverde. Thomas v. State, 397 Md. at 570-

71. In this case, the discovery violation did not prejudice Santamaria-Landaverde to any

significant extent, because he was neither “‘unduly surprised’” by the belated disclosures

nor deprived of an “‘adequate opportunity to prepare a defense[.]’” State v. Graham, 233

Md. App. at 458 (quoting Thomas v. State, 397 Md. at 574). Defense counsel was on

notice that the State had failed to disclose the victim’s interview and the DNA report, but

he chose not to request them. Instead, counsel chose to lie in wait until the State

discovered its errors and then to attempt to persuade the court to dismiss the case or at

least to exclude the evidence. By employing this strategy, the defense chose to walk into

a trial without evidence it knew it could have had.

Under the governing standard, the court would also look to “the feasability [sic] of

curing any prejudice with a continuance[.]” Thomas v. State, 397 Md. at 571. A brief

continuance would have afforded Santamaria-Landaverde’s counsel the time to study the

victim’s CAC interview video, review the DNA report, and recalculate his defense—all

of which he could have accomplished well before trial had he requested the missing

evidence. The court easily could have accounted for the State’s discovery violations

without affording the defense the windfall of a dismissal.5

5
When asked at oral argument “Why wasn’t a continuance a viable alternative [to
dismissal] in the circumstances?[,]” defense counsel responded that a postponement

17
Defense counsel has argued that granting a continuance would reward the State for

its errors. But “the purpose of the discovery rules ‘is to give a defendant the necessary

time to prepare a full and adequate defense’” (Raynor v. State, 201 Md. App. at 228

(quoting Ross v. State, 78 Md. App. 275, 286 (1989)), not to punish the State for its

oversights. “[B]ad faith on the part of the State can justify exclusion of evidence or serve

as a factor in granting a harsher sanction” (Thomas v. State, 397 Md. at 57 n.8), but there

is no evidence of bad faith in this case. And even where a discovery violation is willful

or in bad faith, “‘the court should consider sanctioning the lawyer individually’” (id.

(quoting ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury, Standard 11–

7.1, Commentary, p. 114 (3d ed. 1996))), because remedies “‘besides dismissal, such as a

contempt of court or attorney disciplinary proceedings, allow the court to focus on the

behavior of the prosecutor instead of granting a windfall to an unprejudiced

defendant[.]’” Id. (quoting State v. Deleon, 143 Md. App. 645, 663 n.4 (2002)).

Defense counsel also argued that a continuance would prolong Santamaria-

Landaverde’s pretrial detention. We do not discount that concern. But Santamaria-

Landaverde’s counsel could have asked the court to grant him conditional pre-trial

release in order to alleviate the prejudice that he would have suffered from a continuance

that he did not want. Or, counsel could have pressed the court to reschedule the trial for

the earliest date possible. Ultimately, though, our preference is that cases be decided on

would “give the State a second bite at the apple.” The State, however, has not even had a
first bite at the apple.

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the merits, which is why we again stress that “the sanction of dismissal should be used

sparingly, if at all.” Thompson v. State, 395 Md. at 261.

The trial court’s decision to dismiss the indictment was based on legal error and is,

therefore, an abuse of discretion. The dismissal decision is reversed. Imposing any

sanction for the State’s discovery violations under the appropriate standard is now both

impractical and unnecessary. Because this case has stood dormant for over a year

pending this opinion, both parties have had time to review all the evidence and prepare

their cases. The indictment is revived, and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court for

Prince George’s County.6

JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
REVERSED. CASE REMANDED. COSTS
TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.

6
As mentioned above, the victim purported to file a brief and a reply brief, which
we have treated as an amicus brief. Among other things, the victim argued that, under
§ 11-403(b) of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code (1984, 2018 Repl.
Vol.), she had the right to address the court before the court dismissed the indictment.
That argument is not before us for several reasons. First, the victim did not note an
appeal, as she was entitled to do under § 11-103(b) of the Criminal Procedure Article.
Second, even if she had noted an appeal, she did not preserve the issue, because she did
not raise it in the circuit court. See Md. Rule 8-131(a).

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