Steve L. Michaud v. Caribou Ford-Mercury, Inc.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2024 ME 74
Docket: WCB-23-313
Argued: April 11, 2024
Decided: October 1, 2024
Revised: November 5, 2024

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

STEVE L. MICHAUD

v.

CARIBOU FORD-MERCURY, INC., et al.

LAWRENCE, J.

[¶1] Steve L. Michaud appeals from a decision of the Workers’

Compensation Board (WCB) Appellate Division affirming the decision of an

Administrative Law Judge (Pelletier, ALJ) holding that interest on Michaud’s

specific-loss benefits for a work-related eye injury sustained in 2014 did not

begin to accrue until 2021, when Michaud’s recovery of vision from the injury

reached maximum medical improvement and the benefit became due. The

record conclusively establishes, however, that there was no material

improvement in Michaud’s vision after the date of injury, and therefore the

benefit became due when the injury occurred. We therefore vacate the

Appellate Division’s decision and remand the matter for entry of a decree
2

ordering Michaud’s employer, Caribou Ford-Mercury, Inc.,1 to pay interest on

Michaud’s specific-loss benefits accruing from the date of his injury.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts, which are drawn from the procedural record,

the ALJ’s findings, and the parties’ agreed-to statement of facts, are supported

by the record. See 39-A M.R.S. § 318 (2024); Huff v. Reg’l Transp. Program, 2017

ME 229, ¶ 2, 175 A.3d 98.

[¶3] On December 26, 2014, Michaud sustained a traumatic injury to his

left eye while working as an auto mechanic. The injury immediately resulted in

a loss of more than eighty percent of vision in that eye. Between the date of the

injury and September 8, 2019, Caribou intermittently paid incapacity benefits

to Michaud. During that same period, Michaud received regular treatment,

including multiple surgeries, for his injury with the goal of improving his vision.

The surgeries included removal of a vitreous hemorrhage on February 18,

2015, an intra-ocular lens implant and a corneal transplant on August 24, 2015,

and a second corneal transplant on August 12, 2019, after the first proved

ineffective.

Caribou Ford-Mercury, Inc., also does business as Griffeth Ford. The other named party is the
1

Maine Auto Dealers’ Association Workers’ Compensation Trust.
3

[¶4] In September 2021, Michaud filed petitions for an award of

compensation and for specific-loss benefits.2 Shortly thereafter, on October 14,

2021, a doctor issued a report stating that the doctor had reviewed Michaud’s

medical records and Michaud “seem[ed] to be at a point of maximum medical

improvement.”3 The doctor’s report summarized Michaud’s treatment history,

including various reported improvements in his sight in his left eye over the

course of treatment, and concluded that Michaud had suffered, as of the date of

the report, a ninety-four percent loss of vision in his left eye.

[¶5] On March 10, 2022, the parties participated in mediation on

Michaud’s petitions, resulting in a partial agreement that Michaud is entitled to

162 weeks of specific-loss benefits for the loss of more than eighty percent of

vision in his left eye. See 39-A M.R.S. § 212(3)(M) (2024). The parties further

agreed that Caribou would receive a credit for the intermittent payments that

it had voluntarily made to Michaud between the date of his injury and

2 Pursuant to 39 M.R.S. § 213, “specific loss benefits" arise from work-related injuries that cause
the actual loss of certain body parts or bodily functions, for which the injured employee is deemed to
be incapacitated for the period listed in the schedule contained in section 213(3) and due
compensation based on a calculation from the date of injury, subject to the maximum benefit set in
section 211.

3 “Maximum medical improvement (MMI)” is “the date after which further recovery and further
restoration of function can no longer be reasonably anticipated, based upon reasonable medical
probability.” 39-A M.R.S. § 102(15) (2024). An injured employee must reach MMI before he can
receive partial incapacity benefits, id. § 102(16); 39-A M.R.S. § 213 (2024), which are not at issue in
this case.
4

September 8, 2019. The agreed-upon benefit amount was $59,905.33, which

Caribou paid to Michaud on March 22, 2022.

[¶6] Mediation did not resolve, however, the issue of when Michaud

became entitled to specific-loss benefits or, by extension, the amount of interest

owed on Michaud’s specific-loss benefits. See 39-A M.R.S. § 205(6) (2024). The

parties therefore referred Michaud’s petition for specific-loss benefits to an ALJ

to determine the interest due on the award. See 39-A M.R.S. § 315 (2024). In

lieu of a hearing, the parties stipulated facts to the ALJ, see id. § 318,

establishing, inter alia, that Michaud “sustained more than [eighty percent]

vision loss at the time of his initial injury” and that the doctor’s October 14,

2021, report determining that Michaud’s final vision loss was ninety-four

percent was “the first time there was an assessment of a numerical percentage

of vision loss with respect to the injury.”

[¶7] On December 1, 2022, the ALJ entered a decree stating that “[u]ntil

surgical intervention aimed at restoring vision had occurred and progress

could be assessed, the degree of permanent loss could not be determined.”

Because the doctor reported on October 14, 2021, that Michaud had reached

MMI, the ALJ concluded that Michaud’s specific-loss benefits became due on

that date. Interest was therefore owed on the award from that date to the date
5

that the benefits were paid, March 22, 2022. See id. § 205(6). Michaud moved

for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, id. § 318, arguing that his

actual loss of eighty percent of the vision in his left eye occurred on the date of

his injury and interest was therefore owed as of that date. The ALJ denied the

motion.

[¶8] Michaud then appealed the ALJ’s decree to the Appellate Division,

see 39-A M.R.S. § 321-B (2024), arguing that the ALJ erred by concluding that,

although Michaud’s injury immediately resulted in more than eighty percent

vision loss in his left eye and medical intervention had been unsuccessful,

Michaud’s specific-loss benefits became due only after his doctor reported that

he had reached MMI. Relying on our decision in Tracy v. Hershey Creamery

Co.,1998 ME 247, 720 A.2d 579, the only case in which we have dealt with a

claim for specific-loss benefits arising from a work-related eye injury, the

Appellate Division (Chabot, ALJ) affirmed the ALJ’s decree. Michaud petitioned

for review, and on December 8, 2023, we granted his petition. See 39-A M.R.S.

§ 322(1), (3) (2024); M.R. App. P. 23.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶9] Michaud makes two arguments as to why the Appellate Division

erred by affirming the ALJ’s decree. First, he contends that his specific-loss
6

benefits became due not on the date that his doctor reported that he had

reached MMI and had sustained a post-treatment vision loss of ninety-four

percent, but on the date of his injury. He argues that although, pursuant to our

decision in Tracy, the determination of whether an employee qualifies for

specific-loss benefits for loss of an eye4 cannot be made until the injury has

reached its reasonable medical endpoint, when the employee’s vision loss

remains above the eighty percent loss threshold from the time of injury, the

benefit is due on the date of the injury. Caribou argues that Tracy dictates that

specific-loss benefits for the loss of an eye are not due until an employee’s eye

injury has reached its reasonable medical endpoint, the employer receives

notice that the injury is at its endpoint, and the employee’s vision loss at that

point exceeds the statutory eighty percent loss threshold.

[¶10] Second, Michaud argues that the Appellate Division could not

affirm the ALJ’s decree because the ALJ effectively allowed Caribou to credit its

voluntary incapacity payments made before Michaud was entitled to

specific-loss benefits pursuant to the decree, despite a prohibition on offsets

4For the purposes of the specific-loss benefits provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act, an
eighty present loss of vision in one eye constitutes the loss of that eye. 39-A M.R.S. § 212(3)(M)
(2024)
7

from specific-loss benefits for payments made before specific-loss benefits

become due.

[¶11] For the reasons explained below, we agree with Michaud that his

specific-loss benefits became due on the date of his injury, December 26, 2014,

and note that the settlement agreement governed whether Caribou was

entitled to offset the award of specific-loss benefits with the voluntary

incapacity benefits it had paid to Michaud.

A. Standard of Review and Statutory Framework

[¶12] We review decisions of the Appellate Division “according to

established principles of administrative law, except with regard to the . . . ALJ’s

factual findings,” Bailey v. City of Lewiston, 2017 ME 160, ¶ 9, 168 A.3d 762,

which are final in the absence of fraud, 39-A M.R.S. § 318. We “afford

appropriate deference to the Appellate Division’s reasonable interpretation of

the workers’ compensation statute and will uphold the Appellate Division’s

interpretation unless the plain language of the statute and its legislative history

compel a contrary result.” Bailey, 2017 ME 160, ¶ 9, 168 A.3d 762 (citation and

quotation marks omitted). In interpreting the Workers’ Compensation Act, we

“look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, and construe that language

to avoid absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results.” Freeman v. NewPage Corp.,
8

2016 ME 45, ¶ 5, 135 A.3d 340 (quotation marks omitted). The Act must be

construed neutrally so as not to favor either the employee or the employer.

Marsella v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 585 A.2d 802, 804 & n.5 (Me. 1991); see also

39-A M.R.S. § 153(3) (2024).

[¶13] Although we afford appropriate deference to the Appellate

Division’s reasonable interpretation of the workers’ compensation statute,

when the ultimate issue is the proper interpretation of judicial precedent, we

are not obligated to defer to the Appellate Division’s interpretation of that

precedent. See NLRB. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 660 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2011)

(explaining that an appellate court is not compelled to defer to an agency’s

interpretation of judicial precedent); cf. Van Houten v. Harco Const., Inc., 655

A.2d 331, 333 (Me. 1995) (reviewing de novo WCB’s determination that a party

was not collaterally estopped from raising an issue because the question of

collateral estoppel did not “involve an interpretation of the [Workers’

Compensation] Act” or “fall within the [WCB’s] traditional area of expertise”).

Accordingly, we interpret judicial precedent de novo. See Me. Pub. Serv. Co. v.

Fed. Power Comm’n, 579 F.2d 659, 665 (1st Cir. 1978) (stating that a court “may

pass judgment independently” of an agency’s interpretation of judicial

precedent); cf. Bates v. Dep’t of Behav. & Developmental Servs., 2004 ME 154,
9

¶ 38, 863 A.2d 890 (“The trial court’s interpretation of its own judgment will be

reviewed de novo on questions of law . . . .”).

[¶14] Specific-loss benefits are a species of total-incapacity benefits that

compensate injured employees for “actual loss” of a body part. 39-A M.R.S.

§ 212(3). For specific losses, “the incapacity is considered to continue for the

period specified” in the statutory schedule of benefits. Id. Specific-loss benefits

are available for an employee who suffers “total loss” of an eye, which is defined

as an “[e]ighty percent loss of vision of one eye.” Id. § 212(3)(M). Under the

statutory schedule, an employee who has lost at least eighty percent vision in

one eye due to a workplace injury is entitled to 162 weeks of compensation. Id.

[¶15] For most injuries included in the schedule, “actual loss” has been

construed as “amputation” of the body part. E.g., Gibbs v. Fraser Paper, Ltd.,

1997 ME 225, ¶¶ 6-7, 703 A.2d 1256 (distinguishing between “physical loss”

and “loss of function” of a finger and concluding that section 212(3) generally

requires amputation of the member); see also 39-A M.R.S. § 212(3)(A)-(L).

Thus, in Scott v. Fraser Papers, Inc., 2013 ME 32, ¶¶ 11, 13, 65 A.3d 1191, we

explained that an employee who suffered a work-related injury to his hand was

not entitled to specific-loss benefits for loss of a finger until several months
10

after the injury, when his condition had deteriorated and his finger had to be

amputated.

[¶16] Because the loss of an eye is defined by statute as the loss of a

certain percentage of vision in the eye, as opposed to the “physical loss” of the

eye, it is more difficult to assess whether an employee has suffered an eye injury

that qualifies for specific-loss benefits than to assess whether injuries to other

body parts entitle an employee to specific-loss benefits. We have addressed

specific-loss benefits in regard to an injury of an eye only once, in Tracy.

Whether that decision prescribes the outcome of Michaud’s appeal is the

central issue before us.

B. Applicability of Tracy v. Hershey Creamery Co.

[¶17] In Tracy, we held that “the determination as to whether an

employee’s loss of vision exceeds [eighty percent] for purposes of [section]

212(3)(M) should be made when the work-related condition has reached a

reasonable medical endpoint.” 1998 ME 247, ¶ 9, 720 A.2d 579. In reaching

this conclusion, we recognized that specific-loss benefits, under the former

Workers’ Compensation Act,5 were “intended as compensation for permanent

The Workers’ Compensation Act was repealed and replaced in its entirety in 1992. P.L. 1991,
5

ch. 885, §§ A-7, -8, -11 (effective Jan. 1, 1993) (codified as amended at 39-A M.R.S. §§ 101-909
(2024)).
11

impairment” and that the determination of permanent vision loss “was made at

the point of maximum medical improvement.” Id. ¶ 8 (quotation marks

omitted). We observed that even though the current section 212(3), governing

specific-loss benefits, contains no reference to MMI, it does contain “similar

concepts” to permanent-impairment benefits—which are determined by

reference to MMI—“expressed by use of the term[] . . . ‘actual loss.’” Id. ¶ 9. We

grafted the MMI concept onto the specific-loss provision for loss of an eye for

the limited purpose of ensuring that specific-loss benefits were not awarded to

employees whose vision loss was merely temporary and could be restored to a

point below the statutory threshold through reasonable medical intervention.

Id. ¶ 12 (recognizing that permitting compensation for specific-loss benefits for

only temporary injuries “would be directly contrary to the Legislature’s intent

to allow specific-loss benefits only in instances of a total, catastrophic loss”).

[¶18] Avoiding the award of specific-loss benefits when an employee’s

vision loss can be restored to a point below the statutory threshold by

reasonable medical intervention comports with the Workers’ Compensation

Act. Were we to overrule Tracy’s requirement that the determination of

whether an employee qualifies for specific-loss benefits be made only after

medical efforts to restore vision, we would necessarily disregard the legislative
12

mandate to construe the Workers’ Compensation Act neutrally. 39-A M.R.S.

§ 153(3). We also would, effectively, open the door to awarding the

specific-loss benefit to any employee who suffers an eye injury that causes an

immediate eighty percent vision loss, even if medical intervention could restore

the employee’s vision loss to a point below that statutory benefit threshold.

This would impermissibly favor employees, place a burden on employers to

compensate injuries that do not amount to the “total loss” of an eye, and conflict

with the statutory language of section 212(3)(M) that loss of an eye is

considered to continue for 162 weeks. See id. §§ 153(3), 212(3)(M); Freeman,

2016 ME 45, ¶ 5, 135 A.3d 340.

[¶19] Thus, the determination of whether Michaud qualified for

specific-loss benefits could be made only after his eye injury had reached its

reasonable medical endpoint. Because his doctor did not determine that he had

reached MMI until October 14, 2021,6 his entitlement to specific-loss benefits

could not be decided until that date.

For purposes of this appeal, we consider the doctor’s report that Michaud had reached MMI as
6

of the date of the report as a determination that his injury was at a reasonable medical endpoint as
of the same date. In other cases, however, those dates may not be the same. MMI “is a prediction
that an employee’s condition will not improve.” Williams v. E.S. Boulos Co., 2000 ME 40, ¶ 9, 747 A.2d
181. It is essential to the calculation of partial incapacity benefits because it signifies the date on
which an employee’s ongoing impairment is permanent, rather than temporary. See 39-A M.R.S.
§ 102(16) (defining “permanent impairment” as “any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss
13

[¶20] Contrary to the Appellate Division’s conclusion, Tracy is not

dispositive here. In Tracy, the employee’s vision was significantly restored

through medical intervention such that at the eye injury’s reasonable medical

endpoint, the employee had only a sixty to seventy percent vision loss. 1998

ME 247, ¶ 2, 720 A.2d 579. Therefore, the employee in Tracy did not qualify for

specific-loss benefits. Id. ¶ 12. By contrast, Michaud’s injury immediately

resulted in more than eighty percent loss of vision in his left eye, but as of the

injury’s reasonable medical endpoint, he had a ninety-four percent vision loss

in his left eye—well above the threshold for specific-loss benefits. Tracy does

not address when specific-loss benefits become due under these circumstances.

existing after the date of [MMI] that results from the injury”); id. § 213; Bailey v. City of Lewiston, 2017
ME 160, ¶ 15, 168 A.3d 762.

In the specific-loss-benefit context, MMI has limited significance, because specific-loss benefits do
not depend on whether the employee’s loss of vision will be restored at all, but whether the
employee’s vision will be restored to a point below an eighty percent loss. 39-A M.R.S. § 212(3)(M)
(2024). So, although an eye injury will always have reached its reasonable medical endpoint if it has
also reached MMI, the converse is not necessarily true. Rather, the reasonable medical endpoint for
the specific loss of an eye is the time at which an eye injury can no longer reasonably be anticipated
to improve to less than an eighty percent loss. That may occur before MMI if, for instance, the
employee immediately loses ninety-five percent of his vision and treatment can reasonably be
anticipated to restore vision to a ninety percent loss but not to a seventy-nine percent loss. As the
WCB has noted, Tracy recognized overlap in the concepts of MMI and entitlement to specific-loss
benefits, but it does not require an employee to prove he has reached MMI to qualify for specific-loss
benefits. See Robinson v. Goodall Landscaping, Inc., W.C.B. No. 11002357, at 1-2 (Me. 2018).
14

C. When Michaud’s Benefits Became Due

[¶21] The date that an employee’s specific-loss benefits become due for

loss of an eye, and from which interest accrues, when reasonable medical

treatment does not adequately restore vision is an issue of first impression.

Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, “[w]hen weekly compensation is paid

pursuant to an award, interest on the compensation must be paid at the rate of

10% per annum from the date each payment was due, until paid.” 39-A M.R.S.

§ 205(6); see also Guiggey v. Great N. Paper, Inc., 1997 ME 232, ¶ 10, 704 A.2d

375. Specific-loss benefits are “due and payable within 14 days after the

employer has notice or knowledge of the injury.” 39-A M.R.S. § 205(2). An

“injury” for specific loss of an eye is one that results in “total loss” of the eye,

which is defined as an eighty percent loss of vision in that eye. 39-A M.R.S.

§ 212(3)(M).

[¶22] Although, pursuant to Tracy, an eye injury must undergo

reasonable medical treatment before it can be determined whether an

employee qualifies at all for specific-loss benefits, it does not follow that the

date that the reasonable medical endpoint is confirmed is the date that benefits

become due, as the ALJ (Pelletier, ALJ) concluded here. That date has no bearing

on when the employee in fact suffered an injury constituting the actual loss of
15

an eye. See Bailey, 2017 ME 160, ¶ 9, 168 A.3d 762 (recognizing arbitrary

decision-making as a basis for rejecting a decision of the WCB). Rather, when

an employee’s vision at the reasonable medical endpoint still exceeds the

statutory loss threshold, the date that specific-loss benefits became due is

retrospective, potentially to the date of injury. Evaluators must look backward

to determine when the eye injury damaged the employee’s vision to the

threshold of eighty percent vision loss, whether treatment later restored the

employee’s vision, and the extent of any restoration.

[¶23] Michaud’s injury occurred on December 26, 2014. Caribou was

aware of his injury on that date and began paying Michaud incapacity benefits

effective the following day. There is no dispute that the injury immediately

resulted in more than eighty percent vision loss in Michaud’s left eye. There is

also no dispute that extensive surgical intervention failed to restore his vision,

and, at the reasonable medical endpoint of his treatment, Michaud’s condition

had further deteriorated to a ninety-four percent vision loss. Although Michaud

reported, and visual acuity tests reflected, improvements in his vision at

various times during his treatment, nothing in the record suggests that his

vision loss was restored to a point below the threshold of an eighty percent

vision loss or could reasonably have been anticipated to do so. Nor does the
16

record contain any documented assessment or estimate of a numerical

percentage of Michaud’s vision loss during his treatment. Considering these

facts, and looking backward from the reasonable medical endpoint, Michaud

suffered actual loss of his left eye on the date of his injury, December 26, 2014,

and there was never an assessment that his vision loss was restored to a point

below the eighty percent threshold after that. Thus, Michaud became entitled

to specific-loss benefits on the date of his injury, and Caribou owes interest on

the award of specific-loss benefits accruing from that date until March 22, 2022,

when Caribou paid the benefit . See 39-A M.R.S. §§ 205(2), (6), 212(3)(M).

[¶24] Caribou contends that this conclusion is untenable because, until

the doctor’s report on October 14, 2021, it lacked notice that Michaud’s injury

gave rise to an obligation to pay specific-loss benefits. It cites our decision in

Carroll v. Gates Formed Fibre Prods., 663 A.2d 23, 25 (Me. 1995), to support this

argument. In that case, we held that “although the employee may not be

required to give affirmative notice of a claim in all cases, the employer must

have some knowledge, either from the employee or from the circumstances of

the injury, that it has an obligation to pay incapacity benefits before it will be

deemed to have accepted an injury by failing to controvert a claim.” Id.
17

[¶25] That decision is inapposite. The issue in the present case is not, as

it was in Carroll, whether Caribou has an obligation to pay even though it lacked

notice that Michaud’s petition for benefits resulted from a workplace injury. Id.

at 24. Caribou unquestionably had notice that Michaud suffered a work-related

injury and that the injury may be compensable, as evidenced by the fact that it

began voluntarily paying benefits shortly after that. Moreover, we have made

clear that “[a]wareness of the compensable nature of the injury . . . [is] required

only with respect to triggering the notice and limitations period, and not to set

a date of injury.” Jensen v. S.D. Warren Co., 2009 ME 35, ¶ 26, 968 A.2d 528; see

also 39-A M.R.S. § 302 (2024) (“Want of notice is not a bar to proceedings under

this Act if it is shown that the employer . . . had knowledge of the injury.”).

[¶26] Our distinction between the date on which an employee’s

entitlement to specific-loss benefits for loss of an eye may be determined and

the date on which the benefits became due reflects the Legislature’s mandate

that the workers’ compensation statute be construed neutrally “so as to ensure

the efficient delivery of compensation to injured employees at a reasonable cost

to employers.” 39-A M.R.S. § 153(3). Because eligibility for specific-loss

benefits cannot be determined until an employee has undergone reasonable

medical treatment, employees will seek care that may restore their vision,
18

thereby eliminating any likelihood that employers will pay benefits to

employees who suffered only temporary vision loss. See Tracy, 1998 ME 247,

¶ 12, 720 A.2d 579. At the same time, by compensating employees for the full

period that they have suffered vision loss above the statutory threshold, this

rule recognizes the “human factors . . . attendant with the traumatic loss of a

body part or vision resulting from a work-related injury,” id. ¶ 7 (quotation

marks omitted); see also 39-A M.R.S. § 221 (2024), and the minimal costs to the

workers’ compensation system imposed by these injuries, see Richard B.

Dalbeck et al., Report of Blue Ribbon Commission to Examine Alternatives to the

Workers’ Compensation System and to Make Recommendations Concerning

Replacement of the Present System (Aug. 31, 1992),

https://lldc.mainelegislature.org/Open/Rpts/kf3615_z99m243_1992_v1.pdf

[https://perma.cc/VRS8-C9K4] (noting that scheduled impairment benefits,

from which specific-loss benefits derive, are available for injuries that make up

only a “small percentage” of workers’ compensation claims). Similarly,

although employers will be required to pay interest on specific-loss benefits for

traumatic eye injuries dating as far back as the date of injury, that requirement

is consistent with the purposes of interest on workers’ compensation awards
19

to compensate the employee for delay in payment and to discourage employers

from contesting valid claims. Guiggey, 1997 ME 232, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 375.

[¶27] The Appellate Division affirmed a decree that is inconsistent with

the plain language of the Workers’ Compensation Act and legislative intent.

Based on a misconception of our precedent, it used an arbitrary date to

calculate the interest owed on Michaud’s specific-loss benefits. See Bailey, 2017

ME 160, ¶ 9, 168 A.3d 762. We therefore vacate its decision. Under the facts

stipulated to by the parties, Michaud’s award became due on the date of his

injury, and Caribou owes interest on the award accruing from that date.7

The entry is:

Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Appellate
Division with instructions to remand to the ALJ
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Norman G. Trask, Esq. (orally), Currier, Trask & Dunleavy, Presque Isle, for
appellant Steve L. Michaud

John J. Cronan III, Esq. (orally), Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP,
Portland, for appellees Caribou Ford Mercury, Inc., and the Maine Automobile
Dealers’ Association Workers’ Compensation Trust

Workers Compensation Board Appellate Division case number 23-0003
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY

7 Considering our holding and Michaud’s agreement during mediation to an offset from his

specific-loss benefit, Caribou was entitled to credit the voluntary incapacity benefits it paid to
Michaud between the date of his injury and September 8, 2019. See Boehm v. Am. Falcon Corp., 1999
ME 16, ¶ 11, 726 A.2d 692.