Ronald White v. Real Deal Auto Sales & Service Center, LLC

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2024 ME 18
Docket: And-23-28
Submitted
On Briefs: September 27, 2023
Decided: March 7, 2024

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.*

RONALD WHITE et al.

v.

REAL DEAL AUTO SALES & SERVICE CENTER, LLC

STANFILL, C.J.

[¶1] After Ronald and Karen White encountered problems with a used

car they had just bought from Real Deal Auto Sales & Service Center, LLC, they

asked Real Deal to either replace the car’s catalytic converters or allow them to

return the car for a refund. Real Deal refused, and the Whites had the repairs

done elsewhere. The Whites then sued Real Deal in a small claims action. After

trial, the District Court ordered Real Deal to pay the Whites $6,000 to reimburse

them for the repairs, plus costs. Real Deal appealed to the Superior Court, and

the Superior Court reversed. We agree with the Whites that the Superior Court

erred in doing so, and we therefore remand for reinstatement of the small

* Although Justice Jabar participated in this appeal, he retired before this opinion was certified.
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claims judgment in favor of the Whites.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] Viewed in the light most favorable to the Whites, the prevailing

party in the small claims action, the evidence presented to the District Court

supports the following facts.1 See Yarcheski v. P&K Sand & Gravel, Inc., 2015 ME

71, ¶ 5, 117 A.3d 1047; Withers v. Hackett, 1998 ME 164, ¶ 7, 714 A.2d 798;

M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(1)-(3); M.R. Civ. P. 76F(a). In March 2021, the Whites signed a

contract agreeing to purchase a 2011 Volvo vehicle from Real Deal for $8,995.

Real Deal is in Auburn. The parties’ contract stated that the vehicle was being

sold “as is,” with “a warranty of inspectability” but without any other

warranties. A “used vehicle buyer’s guide” provided to the Whites stated that

1 The Superior Court’s order vacating the small claims judgment contains several paragraphs of
factual assertions beginning with the statement “The following facts could be drawn from the record
before the District Court.” It is therefore unclear whether the Superior Court viewed the evidence
presented to the District Court in the light most favorable to the Whites, as was required where the
Superior Court was acting in an appellate capacity and examining questions of law only.
See M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(1)-(2) (providing that an appeal by a small claims defendant must be on
questions of law only when the defendant has not requested a jury trial de novo); Taylor v. Walker,
2017 ME 218, ¶ 6, 173 A.3d 539 (“[T]he Superior Court may not decide facts in a small claim appeal
when acting in a purely appellate capacity . . . .”); Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Bickford, 2017 ME
140, ¶ 9, 166 A.3d 986 (“Legal issues do not include questions of weight to be given to evidence.”);
Cote v. Vallee, 2019 ME 156, ¶ 10, 218 A.3d 1148 (explaining that “[t]here is no option for a second
bench trial” for a defendant appealing to the Superior Court from a small claims judgment); Withers
v. Hackett, 1998 ME 164, ¶ 7, 714 A.2d 798 (indicating that an appellate court views the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party when reviewing whether the evidence was sufficient
to support the judgment on appeal).
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there were no known “mechanical defects.” The vehicle had a current state

inspection sticker on it.

[¶3] The vehicle’s check-engine light came on as the Whites were driving

the vehicle home from Real Deal. The next morning, the Whites brought the

vehicle back to Real Deal. A diagnostic code reader indicated a problem with

the catalytic converters. A Real Deal employee told the Whites that he did not

think there was a problem with the catalytic converters and that he believed

the problem might be related to the spark plugs. He reset the check-engine light

and told the Whites that if the light came on again, they should come back, and

he would replace the spark plugs.

[¶4] The check-engine light came on again shortly after the Whites left

Real Deal that day. The Whites were concerned that Real Deal was minimizing

the significance of the issue, so they sought a second opinion. They took the

vehicle to three mechanics, all of whom told them that using the vehicle without

fixing the catalytic converters could damage the engine. One of these mechanics

also told them that the catalytic converters, “flex pipes,” and exhaust manifolds

needed to be replaced, at a cost of about $8,000; that the pipes were rusted and

“probably leaking”; and that the vehicle had been tampered with—“spacers” or

“cheaters” had been installed to prevent sensors from activating.
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[¶5] The Whites asked Real Deal to either replace the catalytic

converters or allow them to return the vehicle for a full refund. Real Deal

refused.

[¶6] The Whites filed complaints with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, the

Maine State Police, and the Office of the Maine Attorney General.2 They then

paid a mechanic $6,078.43 to replace several of the vehicle’s exhaust

components, including two catalytic converters. The mechanic stated a

“professional conclusion [that] the [catalytic] converters ha[d] been bad for

a[ ]while and should have been replaced before [the vehicle] was purchased or

[an] inspection [was] performed.”

[¶7] The Whites filed a small claims action against Real Deal in the

District Court (Lewiston). After holding an evidentiary hearing, the court

(S. Driscoll, J.) entered a judgment in favor of the Whites in the amount of

$6,000, plus $70 in costs. See M.R.S.C.P. 6, 8. The court did not include any

specific factual findings in its judgment, and neither party requested findings.

See M.R. Civ. P. 52(a); cf. M.R. Civ. P. 52(b); M.R.S.C.P. 15. Real Deal timely

2Maine State Police inspectors noticed the “spacers,” which appeared “to have been in place for
an extended time,” and noted that the catalytic-converter issue could damage the engine. They did
not remove the inspection sticker from the vehicle, however, because the sale took place in
Androscoggin County and they believed that ensuring the functionality of a vehicle’s catalytic
converters was required only for inspections performed in Cumberland County.
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appealed to the Superior Court (Androscoggin County), requesting review of

legal issues only and waiving its right to a jury trial de novo on questions of fact.

See M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(2); Ring v. Leighton, 2019 ME 8, ¶ 14, 200 A.3d 259. After

the parties filed briefs, the Superior Court (Stewart, J.) issued an order vacating

the District Court’s judgment and remanding the matter for entry of a judgment

in favor of Real Deal. The Superior Court concluded that the evidence presented

to the District Court could not, as a matter of law, support the judgment in the

Whites’ favor. The Whites timely appealed to us.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶8] Where, as here, a defendant appeals from a small claims judgment

without requesting a jury trial de novo, only legal issues are reviewable by the

Superior Court and by us. See M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(1)-(3); Portfolio Recovery Assocs.,

LLC v. Bickford, 2017 ME 140, ¶ 9, 166 A.3d 986; see also supra n.1. We review

questions of law de novo. Bickford, 2017 ME 140, ¶ 9, 166 A.3d 986. “Legal

issues do not include questions of weight to be given to evidence,” but

Real Deal’s argument that the Whites did not, as a matter of law, present

evidence on which the District Court could have determined that Real Deal was

liable is “cognizable on appeal.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Our task, therefore, is

to determine de novo whether the record evidence was sufficient, as a matter
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of law, to support the result the District Court reached. See id.; Withers,

1998 ME 164, ¶ 7, 714 A.2d 798; Yarcheski, 2015 ME 71, ¶ 5, 117 A.3d 1047

(noting that we “review the District Court’s judgment directly” when the

Superior Court has acted in its appellate capacity); see also supra n.1. We

conclude that it was.

[¶9] In Maine, “[a] dealer warrants that the motor vehicle the dealer sells

. . . has been inspected in accordance with” 29-A M.R.S. § 1751 (2023) “and with

the rules promulgated under that section.” 10 M.R.S. § 1474(1) (2023). This

means that a dealer must either warrant that the vehicle meets the state’s

inspection standards at the time of sale or provide a detailed disclosure

regarding what repair is needed. Id. § 1474(1), (4). This warranty of

inspectability, and any remedies for its breach, “may not be excluded, limited,

modified or waived by words or conduct of either the dealer or any other

person.” Id. § 1474(2).

[¶10] According to the statutory state inspection standards, the

“equipment subject to inspection” for any vehicle required to be registered in

Maine includes catalytic converters on 1983 and newer model vehicles.

29-A M.R.S. § 1751(2)(N). To meet the required standards, a catalytic converter

subject to inspection must, among other requirements, “meet the rules
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promulgated by the Chief of the State Police.” 29-A M.R.S. § 1756(2) (2023).

The rules promulgated by the Chief of the State Police include ten “rejection

standards,” including that an inspection sticker must not be issued “if there are

any loose or leaking joints or seams in the exhaust system” or “if the exhaust

system has been inadequately repaired.”3 16-222 C.M.R. ch. 1, § 170.1(6)(B)(1),

(4) (effective Jan. 31, 2022).

[¶11] Here, the Whites presented evidence to the District Court that a

mechanic who inspected the vehicle shortly after the sale “checked PCV box and

found slight leakage out of the vent (not causing issue),” and “found flex pipes

rusted and probably leaking” and needing replacement. The District Court also

heard evidence that the mechanic told the Whites that pieces of the catalytic

converters could break off and travel to the inside of the engine, ruining the

engine. If believed, this evidence could have supported an inference by the

District Court that there were loose or leaking joints in the exhaust system at

3 Title 29-A M.R.S. § 1751(2-A) (2023) also provides that a vehicle “required to be registered in
Cumberland County . . . must have an annual enhanced inspection,” which requires a test of the
vehicle’s on-board diagnostic system, 16-222 C.M.R. ch. 1, § 175(3), (4) (effective Jan. 31, 2022).
Before the District Court and the Superior Court, the Whites argued that these enhanced inspection
requirements applied to Real Deal and the vehicle in question in this case, because although Real Deal
is located in Androscoggin County, Real Deal was aware that the Whites would be registering the
vehicle in Cumberland County, where they lived. We need not address the legal issue of whether the
enhanced inspection requirements apply to inspections conducted outside of Cumberland County
because, as we discuss below, the evidence before the District Court was sufficient to support a
determination that Real Deal breached the warranty of inspectability even if only the standard
inspection requirements applied.
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the time of sale. See 16-222 C.M.R. ch. 1, § 170.1(6)(B)(1); 29-A M.R.S.

§ 1756(2). In addition, based on that evidence and the evidence, including

photos, regarding the spacers, the District Court could have inferred that the

exhaust system had been inadequately repaired. See 16-222 C.M.R. ch. 1,

§ 170.1(6)(B)(4); 29-A M.R.S. § 1756(2). Because the Whites presented

evidence that the catalytic converters should have been replaced for the vehicle

to pass inspection, the District Court could have found that the vehicle did not

meet the inspection standards in Androscoggin County, where the vehicle was

sold.

[¶12] Although the record might also have supported a determination

that the vehicle did meet the state inspection standards at the time of sale if the

District Court had placed significant weight on other evidence, neither we nor

the Superior Court are entitled to weigh the credibility or persuasiveness of

various pieces of evidence. See Bickford, 2017 ME 140, ¶ 9, 166 A.3d 986. As

the Whites point out, the specific factual basis for the District Court’s judgment

is unknown because findings were not required or requested after the

summary proceeding, and Real Deal did not request a jury trial de novo when

it appealed to the Superior Court. See id. ¶ 12 (“The purpose of small claims

proceedings is to provide ‘a simple, speedy and informal court procedure for
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the resolution of small claims.’” (quoting 14 M.R.S. § 7481 (2023))); M.R.S.C.P.

11(d)(2). We cannot say as a matter of law that the evidence presented to the

District Court could not support a determination that Real Deal breached the

warranty of inspectability. See 10 M.R.S. § 1474(1)(A); see also 10 M.R.S.

§ 1477(1) (2023) (providing that any violation of the warranty of inspectability

“shall constitute a violation of” the Unfair Trade Practices Act). Therefore, we

vacate the judgment and remand the matter to the Superior Court to enter a

judgment affirming the District Court’s small claims judgment in favor of the

Whites.4 See M.R.S.C.P. 11(f).

The entry is:

Judgment vacated. Remanded for the entry of a
judgment affirming the judgment of the District
Court.

4 We decline the Whites’ request that we direct the trial court to increase the amount of the small

claims judgment. See 14 M.R.S. §§ 7481, 7482 (2023) (setting the jurisdictional monetary limit for
small claims actions at $6,000, exclusive of interest and costs); see also Ahlgren v. Fabian, 1999 ME 6,
¶ 1, 722 A.2d 868. Costs associated with the appeal to us, however, may be allowed, see M.R. App. P.
13(c), and “a person who is awarded a money judgment in a small claims action is entitled to
post-judgment interest,” 14 M.R.S. § 7487 (2023), which “accrues from and after the date of entry of
judgment and includes the period of any appeal,” 14 M.R.S. § 1602-C(2) (2023).
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Ronald White, appellant pro se

Karen White, appellant pro se

Mitchel J. Roberge, Esq., Peters & Roberge, P.A., Lewiston, for appellee Real Deal
Auto Sales & Service Center, LLC

Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number AP-2022-8
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY