CourtListener 10620989

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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2025 ME 57
Docket: Cum-24-282
Argued: May 6, 2025
Decided: June 26, 2025

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

DAMION L. BUTTERFIELD

LIPEZ, J.

[¶1] Damion L. Butterfield appeals from a judgment of conviction of

murder and other offenses, entered by the trial court (Cumberland County,

MG Kennedy, J.) following his plea of guilty. He contends that the court abused

its discretion by denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea, which was

entered after trial but before the jury announced its verdict, and by denying his

motion for a new trial. Butterfield also appeals from his sentence of thirty-five

years in prison. See State v. Butterfield, No. SRP-24-283 (Me. Sent. Rev. Panel

Jul. 31, 2024) (granting leave to appeal the sentence). We disagree that the

court abused its discretion and affirm Butterfield’s conviction. We dismiss

Butterfield’s appeal of his sentence because discretionary review is unavailable

for a sentence imposed pursuant to a joint recommendation of the parties. See
2

15 M.R.S. § 2151(2) (2025); M.R.U. Crim. P. 11A(a)(4); State v. Bean, 2018 ME

58, ¶ 20, 184 A.3d 373.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

[¶2] We draw the following facts from the evidence admitted at trial as

well as the State’s recitation of the evidence at the time of Butterfield’s guilty

plea.1 See State v. Weyland, 2020 ME 129, ¶ 2, 240 A.3d 841; M.R.U.

Crim. P. 11(b)(3), ©.

[¶3] Shortly after midnight on April 26, 2022, Jonathan Geisinger,

Thomas McDonald, and Damion Butterfield dropped off Anthony Osborne at

Burger King in Portland. Osborne was there to meet the two victims in this

case—a man and a woman—who had contacted Osborne earlier in the night

looking to obtain drugs. As it turned out, Osborne did not have drugs and

instead hoped to obtain drugs from the victims.

[¶4] A short time later, Osborne sent a text message directing Geisinger,

McDonald, and Butterfield to an address in Portland. Upon arriving at that

address, Geisinger, McDonald, and Butterfield encountered Osborne and the

Because Butterfield entered his guilty plea after the jury had reached a verdict, but before the
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verdict was read, the court considered the trial evidence in finding a factual basis for the plea.
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two victims. A scuffle ensued involving Geisinger, McDonald, Butterfield, and

the male victim.

[¶5] The female victim then saw a tall male, later identified as Butterfield,

pull out a gun and shoot the male victim twice while the other two men involved

in the scuffle ran away. Butterfield then approached the female victim, ordered

her to get down on her knees, and shot at her twice before he, too, ran away.

[¶6] The male victim died from gunshot wounds to his abdomen. The

female victim, who sustained an injury to her arm and had bullet holes in her

hat and coat, survived.

B. Procedure

[¶7] Butterfield was charged with murder and attempted murder by

criminal complaint on June 8, 2022, and arrested the same day. One month

later, the grand jury returned an indictment charging Butterfield with

intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2025) (Count 1);

aggravated attempted murder with a firearm (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.

§ 152-A(1)(A)-(B) (2025) (Count 2); possession of a firearm by a prohibited

person (Class C), 15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1)(1) (2022)2 (Count 3); and robbery

2 Title 15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1)(1) has since been amended to make the crime a Class B crime. See
P.L. 2023, ch. 491, § 1 (effective Aug. 9, 2024).
4

(Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 651(1)© (2025) (Count 4). Butterfield entered a plea

of not guilty at his arraignment.

[¶8] The court held a jury trial starting on December 6, 2023. On the

evening of December 14 (the night before closing arguments), the court

informed the parties via email that it intended to grant the State’s request to

instruct the jury on accomplice liability. The next day, the court gave the

instruction over Butterfield’s objections that it was not generated by the

evidence and represented an unfair late-in-the-game shift from the State’s

theory that Butterfield was the shooter.

[¶9] On December 19, 2023, while the jury was deliberating, Butterfield

elected to plead guilty as charged in return for a jointly recommended sentence

of thirty-five years’ imprisonment. He decided to accept the State’s offer after

several notes from the jury convinced him that the jury was likely to find him

guilty as an accomplice to murder. Defense counsel strongly opposed the

change of plea. Butterfield, however, proceeded with the unconditional plea3

even after being informed that the jury had reached a verdict. The court

conducted two change-of-plea colloquies on the record, one in chambers and

3“An unconditional guilty plea is tendered when, as here, a defendant does not reserve the right
to seek appellate review of a specified ruling of the court.” State v. Adams, 2018 ME 60, ¶ 1 n.1, 184
A.3d 875.
5

one in open court, before ultimately accepting Butterfield’s guilty plea. 4 The

jury was dismissed without announcing its verdict.

[¶10] Two weeks later, Butterfield timely moved to withdraw his plea

and for a new trial. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 32(d), 33. The court denied both motions

after hearing. At a sentencing proceeding held on June 13, 2024, the court

imposed the agreed-upon sentence of thirty-five years’ imprisonment. 5

[¶11] Butterfield filed a timely notice of appeal and application to allow

an appeal of sentence. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2151-2157 (2025); M.R.

App. P. 2B(b)(1), 20. The Sentence Review Panel granted the application, and

the sentence appeal proceeded as part of the appeal from the conviction. State

v. Butterfield, No. SRP-24-283 (Me. Sent. Rev. Panel Jul. 31, 2024); see M.R.

App. P. 20(g), (h).

4 During the colloquy in chambers, Butterfield declined to move forward with the guilty plea after

the State clarified that the agreed-upon thirty-five years would be consecutive to a sentence
Butterfield was already serving for a probation violation. Counsel continued to negotiate the terms
of the plea, however, and the parties ultimately agreed that Butterfield would serve no more than
thirty-five years from the day he was sentenced (including whatever remaining time he had pending
in other cases). With that agreement reached, Butterfield again decided to enter a guilty plea, which
the court accepted after conducting a formal colloquy in open court pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 11.
5 Specifically, the court sentenced Butterfield as follows: thirty-five years’ imprisonment for

murder (Count 1); thirty-five years’ imprisonment for attempted murder (Count 2) to be served
concurrently with Count 1; five years’ imprisonment for illegal possession of a firearm (Count 3) to
be served concurrently with Counts 1 and 2; and fifteen years’ imprisonment for robbery (Count 4)
to be served concurrently with Counts 1-3.
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II. DISCUSSION

[¶12] Butterfield contends broadly that “the trial and unusual plea

process” were not fundamentally fair and resulted in a due process violation.

As he acknowledged at oral argument, however, our appellate review of a

conviction entered upon an unconditional guilty plea is limited to an

examination of the denial of any subsequent motion to withdraw the plea.6 See

Weyland, 2020 ME 129, ¶¶ 16-32, 240 A.3d 841 (reviewing denial of motion to

withdraw guilty plea); State v. Adams, 2018 ME 60, ¶¶ 11, 13, 184 A.3d 875

(dismissing direct appeal of unconditional guilty plea in light of our

“long-standing jurisprudence strictly limiting direct appeal following a guilty

plea”); State v. Plummer, 2008 ME 22, ¶ 2, 939 A.2d 687 (dismissing appeal from

guilty plea “[i]n the absence of either a conditional guilty plea . . . , or a motion

to withdraw the guilty plea before sentencing”). We accordingly proceed to

review the denial of Butterfield’s motion to withdraw his plea as well as the

6There are narrow exceptions to this general rule, none of which is applicable here. See Adams,
2018 ME 60, ¶ 14, 184 A.3d 875 (identifying the “rare grounds for [direct] appeal” following a guilty
plea as “a lack of jurisdiction in the trial court or a sentence imposing unconstitutional punishment”).
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associated motion for a new trial. Finally, we address Butterfield’s appeal from

his sentence.

A. Motion to Withdraw Plea

[¶13] “We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a plea

for an abuse of discretion.” Weyland, 2020 ME 129, ¶ 16, 240 A.3d 841. Factual

determinations are reviewed for clear error. Id. ¶ 19. We have explained that

‘‘‘[a]lthough relief should be granted liberally, a defendant does not have an

absolute right to withdraw a plea.’ Instead, the trial court’s decision must be

‘based upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case with the

ultimate purpose of furthering justice.’” Id. ¶ 17 (citations omitted) (first

quoting State v. Hillman, 2000 ME 71, ¶ 7, 749 A.2d 758; and then quoting State

v. Malo, 577 A.2d 332, 333 (Me. 1990)). The relevant factors, which the court

thoroughly analyzed, are “(1) the length of time between the defendant’s

entering the plea and seeking to withdraw it; (2) any prejudice to the State that

would result if the plea were withdrawn; (3) the defendant’s assertion of

innocence; and (4) any deficiency in the Rule 11 proceeding.” Id. ¶ 18. On

appeal, Butterfield focuses primarily on the fourth factor, arguing that the trial

court’s decision to “7xclude7i[e]” him with “an eleventh[-]hour accomplice

liability instruction” led to a “poisoned” process that ultimately rendered his
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plea involuntary. We reject his contentions and, upon review of all four factors,

affirm the court’s exercise of its discretion to deny Butterfield’s motion to

withdraw his plea.

[¶14] We turn first to the timing of the motion. Butterfield waited only

fourteen days before seeking to withdraw his plea. See id. ¶ 19 n.3 (noting that

“[w]e have held that nineteen days weighed in favor of granting a motion and

that three months weighed against granting a motion” (citations omitted)). The

court determined that the prompt filing of the motion was the sole factor that

lay in Butterfield’s favor but that it did not “outweigh the remaining factors and

other circumstances.” We agree with the trial court that although Butterfield

filed his motion quickly, his rapid change of heart is not dispositive. Instead,

we must examine the remaining factors. Cf. id. ¶ 21 (analyzing all four factors

even when motion was filed only twenty-two days after the plea); Hillman,

2000 ME 71, ¶ 9, 749 A.2d 758.

[¶15] We next consider whether allowing Butterfield to withdraw his

plea and proceed to trial—in this case, for a second time—would prejudice the

State by “seriously 8xclude8il[ing] the State’s case.” Weyland, 2020 ME 129,

¶ 22, 240 A.3d 841 (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Here, the court

found that although the State did not articulate any such prejudice, the
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deceased victim’s family and the surviving victim would endure trauma during

a second trial. The court was rightfully sensitive to this concern. Nonetheless,

we emphasize that we will consider “the retraumatization of victims” in this

context only if it “affect[s] the State’s ability to present its case,” id. ¶ 23, a

finding absent from this record. Even so, as discussed below, we conclude that

the court appropriately determined that the balance of factors weighed against

granting Butterfield’s motion. See id; Hillman, 2000 ME 71, ¶ 10, 749 A.2d 758.

[¶16] The third factor is whether the defendant has asserted his

innocence. Weyland, 2020 ME 129, ¶ 24, 240 A.3d 841. A credible claim of

innocence may tip the scale in favor of permitting a defendant to withdraw his

plea. See id. (explaining that “trial courts must assess the credibility of an

innocence claim in ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea” (quotation marks

omitted)); cf. State v. Newbert, 2007 ME 110, ¶ 17, 928 A.2d 769 (affirming the

denial of a motion to withdraw plea where the defendant’s “assertion of

innocence came without explanation”). Butterfield, however, made no such

claim. Instead, the record supports the court’s findings that Butterfield “ha[d]

not asserted innocence,” that “[d]efense counsel conceded at hearing that he

would not do so,” and that “the State submitted posttrial text messages from

Mr. Butterfield to his romantic partner in which he appears to admit to
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committing the crimes charged.” The court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that this third factor weighs against Butterfield. See Hillman, 2000

ME 71, ¶ 12, 749 A.2d 758 (observing that “the complete absence of a

protestation of innocence in support of a motion to withdraw weighs against a

defendant”).

[¶17] Finally, we consider the crux of Butterfield’s claim: whether there

was any deficiency in the Rule 11 proceeding. Weyland, 2020 ME 129, ¶ 29, 240

A.3d 841. “Rule 11 hearings establish a procedure to ensure that constitutional

and procedural prerequisites are met before a guilty plea is accepted. A plea is

valid if it is made voluntarily with knowledge of the elements of the crime, the

penalty that might be imposed and the constitutional rights relinquished by

foregoing trial.” State v. Lambert, 2001 ME 113, ¶ 12, 775 A.2d 1140 (citations

and quotation marks omitted). “We have never required strict compliance with

Rule 11 in order to uphold a guilty plea. Rather, a guilty plea is vitiated only if

the total record fails to establish adequately a factual matrix by which the plea

is affirmatively shown to have been 10xclude10ilyy and understandingly

made.” Weyland, 2020 ME 129, ¶ 29, 240 A.3d 841 (alterations, citations, and

quotation marks omitted).
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[¶18] Butterfield first argues that his guilty plea, entered after the jury

notified the court that it had reached a verdict but before that verdict could be

announced, was “rushed.” The record shows otherwise. The court supportably

found that Butterfield had “multiple opportunities over the course of several

hours to discuss his options with counsel,” “an additional opportunity to

. . . discuss with counsel after the jury reported that it had reached a verdict,”

and time to negotiate “at length” the details of the offer. Butterfield affirmed

during the Rule 11 colloquy that he had adequate time to consult with counsel

and, indeed, that he was “positive” he did not need more time. In short, nothing

in the record suggests that Butterfield’s will was overborne by time pressures.

See United States v. Marrero-Rivera, 124 F.3d 342, 350 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding

that time pressure did not render guilty plea entered within an hour of deadline

involuntary; facing such pressure “is common among criminal defendants, and

hardly exceptional enough to evince an overbearing of [a defendant’s] will”).

[¶19] Nor is there any record support for Butterfield’s contention that

his history of mental illness precluded a knowing and voluntary plea. To the

contrary, as the court found, Butterfield was “undoubtedly informed,” his

judgment was “unimpaired,” he was “assured in his decision,” and he was

“congenial and calm throughout the proceeding.” Because competent evidence
12

supports these findings, we will not disturb them on appeal. See Weyland, 2020

ME 129, ¶ 30, 240 A.3d 841 (rejecting defendant’s claims of “limited cognitive

capacity” where competent record evidence, including the trial court’s

“observations of [the defendant] at the Rule 11 hearing,” supported the court’s

finding that plea was knowing and voluntary); State v. Boone, 444 A.2d 438, 443

(Me. 1982) (“[T]he trial justice could reasonably infer from the rational and

coherent pattern of answers [at the Rule 11 hearing] that the defendant was

well-informed, knew exactly what he was doing and understood the

consequences of his tactical decision [to plead guilty].”).

[¶20] We also reject Butterfield’s assertion that supposed trial errors

effectively forced him to plead guilty. Although Butterfield urges us to review

the events of the trial, and specifically the court’s decision to instruct the jury

on accomplice liability, we decline to do so given the procedural posture of the

case.7 Even if we were to assume that the court erred or that the trial was

fundamentally unfair, that would not inevitably lead to a conclusion that

Butterfield’s plea was involuntary. Instead, the question we must answer is

whether “the plea is the product of the defendant’s free choice and not the

As the court appropriately advised Butterfield, a defendant who enters a guilty plea limits his
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options for appeal. See State v. Plummer, 2008 ME 22, ¶ 2, 939 A.2d 687; State v. Huntley, 676 A.2d
501, 503 (Me. 1996).
13

result of force, threats, or promises other than those in connection with a plea

agreement.” M.R.U. Crim. P. 11(d). While we do not doubt that Butterfield felt

immense pressure as he weighed his options in the face of a looming jury

verdict, such pressure does not require a finding of involuntariness. See

Morgan v. State, 287 A.2d 592, 607-09 (Me. 1972) (concluding there was ample

evidence of the “voluntariness and intelligence of petitioner’s plea” entered

while petitioner was “in process of being tried before a jury on a charge of

murder” and quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970) for the

proposition that “a guilty plea does not become ‘compelled’—i.e., deprived of

its voluntary character[—]merely because . . . the plea was ‘motivated by the

defendant’s desire to accept the probability of a lesser penalty’”(alterations

omitted)).

[¶21] Here, the court conducted not one but two thorough colloquies

with Butterfield about whether he understood his decision and its

consequences. Butterfield knew the elements of the crimes to which he was

pleading guilty as well as the elements of accomplice liability. He knew the

penalty that would be imposed. Finally, he was informed of the constitutional

rights that he relinquished by entering his guilty plea. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 11©;

Malo, 577 A.2d at 333 (“A valid plea is made with knowledge of the elements of
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the crime, the penalty that might be imposed and the constitutional rights

relinquished by foregoing trial.”).

[¶22] We agree with the court that its

inquiries went above and beyond the required inquiries of a
Rule 11 proceeding. The Court repeatedly reminded
Mr. Butterfield that he did not have to plead guilty that day and the
jury had reached a verdict which he was entitled to hear if he so
chose . . . . When asked a final time whether he was certain he
wanted to enter a guilty plea, Mr. Butterfield responded, “I’m
absolutely positive.”

[¶23] The record is simply devoid of evidence that Butterfield’s guilty

plea was “the result of force, threats, or promises” that would render it

involuntary. M.R.U. Crim. P. 11(d); cf. Malo, 577 A.2d at 334 (declining to accept

argument that plea allegedly “made under emotional duress” was involuntary

where trial court conducted questioning “to determine that the plea was the

product of the defendant’s free choice” (alterations and quotation marks

omitted)).

[¶24] We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion

in denying Butterfield’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

B. Motion for New Trial

[¶25] Having determined that the court did not err in denying

Butterfield’s motion to withdraw his plea, we quickly dispatch with
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Butterfield’s claim that the court should have awarded him a new trial.

Butterfield waived his right to a trial by jury through his guilty plea. M.R.U.

Crim. P. 11©(2); Cote v. State, 286 A.2d 868, 873 (Me. 1972). In the absence of

a successful motion to withdraw the plea, there was no new trial to be had. See

State v. Cardosi, 498 A.2d 599, 600-01 (Me. 1985) (“[A] necessary predicate for

any trial—the cancellation of the outstanding guilty plea—is here missing.”).

C. Sentence Appeal

[¶26] Finally, we dismiss Butterfield’s appeal of his sentence.8 By statute,

review of the propriety of a sentence is unavailable for sentences entered

pursuant to a joint recommendation of the parties. 15 M.R.S. § 2151(2); see also

Bean, 2018 ME 58, ¶ 20, 184 A.3d 373 (“[S]entences imposed as a result of the

court accepting a plea with an agreed-upon sentence” are “15xclude[ed] from

our discretionary review.”). Here, the court accepted the agreed-upon sentence

of thirty-five years’ imprisonment. We therefore do not have authority to

review Butterfield’s sentence and thus dismiss that portion of his appeal.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed. Sentence appeal dismissed.

8 On appeal, Butterfield identifies no specific impropriety in the sentence. However, we need not

address whether Butterfield waived discretionary sentence review, see State v. Peters, 2024 ME 33,
¶ 27 n.5, 314 A.3d 290 (explaining that undeveloped arguments are waived), in light of our
conclusion that his sentence appeal must be dismissed.
16

James P. Howaniec, Esq. (orally), Lewiston, for appellant Damion L. Butterfield

Aaron M. Frey, Esq., Attorney General, and Leanne Robbin, Asst. Atty. Gen.
(orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2022-2188
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY