State of Maine v. Jason Servil

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2025 ME 73
Docket: SRP-24-198
Argued: March 5, 2025
Decided: August 7, 2025

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

JASON SERVIL

LAWRENCE, J.

[¶1] Jason Servil appeals from a principal sentence of forty-five years of

incarceration imposed as part of a judgment of conviction for murder (Class M),

17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2025), and for aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A

M.R.S. § 208(1)(B) (2025), entered by the trial court (Somerset County,

Mullen, C.J.) after Servil pleaded guilty to both charges. Because the court relied

on impermissible information during sentencing and we cannot say that this

error was harmless, we must vacate Servil’s sentences.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the procedural record. State v.

Gordon, 2021 ME 9, ¶ 2, 246 A.3d 170.
2

[¶3] On July 18, 2022, Servil was charged by criminal complaint with

murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), and aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.

§ 208(1)(B). The charges stemmed from Servil’s repeated stabbing of his

ex-girlfriend (the murder victim) with a knife, causing her death, and Servil’s

use of a crowbar to attack a man (the assault victim) who was with the murder

victim. On August 25, 2022, Servil was indicted by a grand jury for intentional,

knowing, or depraved indifference murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) & (B), as to

the murder victim,1 and aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 208(1)(B),

as to the assault victim.

[¶4] Servil and the State eventually reached a plea agreement, and the

court held a Rule 11 hearing on January 17, 2024. The parties agreed to a

forty-five-year cap on the murder charge, with the understanding that Servil

could argue for a lesser sentence. The court accepted Servil’s guilty pleas as to

both charges and scheduled the sentencing hearing for April 12, 2024.

[¶5] At the sentencing hearing, the court heard statements from the

victim’s grandfather, brother, sister-in-law, and mother. The court also heard

statements from a Department of Corrections Intensive Mental Health Unit

1 Although there are two victims in this case, we refer to the murder victim as “the victim” for the

remainder of this opinion in addressing the issues on appeal presented by the sentencing on the
murder conviction.
3

employee who treated Servil after he was arrested, two members of Servil’s

family, and Servil himself.

[¶6] The court engaged in the two-step sentencing analysis applicable to

murder convictions. See State v. Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶ 25 n.1, 995 A.2d

243; 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(2) (2025). Under step one, the court determined a

basic sentence of forty-five years of incarceration. Under step two, the court

assessed the aggravating and mitigating factors. During this analysis, after

requesting permission from the victim’s family, the court read into the record

the victim’s obituary, which the court obtained on its own. The court said that

it found the obituary “very moving.” Afterward, the court stated that, because

it did not find a significant difference in weight between the aggravating and

mitigating factors,2 the sentence should remain at forty-five years’

incarceration. The court also ordered a concurrent sentence of ten years’

incarceration on the aggravated assault charge, and $2,320 in restitution.

2 For aggravating factors, the court considered the subjective effect on the victim, the viciousness

of the crime, the need to protect the public interest, and the defendant’s volatility at the time of the
offense. For mitigating factors, the court considered Servil’s lack of criminal record, his young age,
his taking responsibility for the crime, his expressed remorse, and his background and struggles with
mental health issues.
4

[¶7] The court entered the judgment on April 23, 2024. Servil timely

filed an application for leave to appeal his sentence, and the Sentence Review

Panel granted the application on July 31, 2024. See M.R. App. 2B(b)(1), 20(b).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶8] Servil argues that the court abused its sentencing discretion and

violated his due process rights when it acquired the victim’s obituary through

its own independent research and then read it into the record. 3 We need not

reach Servil’s due process argument because we agree that the court abused its

discretion in its retrieval and use of the obituary, and we cannot say that the

error was harmless.

3Servil raises two additional arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the court violated his
due process and first amendment rights by reading a psalm into the record during the sentencing
hearing. Because the court read the psalm during its closing remarks, after it had completed its
analysis and imposed sentences on both charges, we conclude that the court’s sentencing analysis
was not based in any part on the psalm, and therefore the court did not err. See State v. Moore, 2023
ME 18, ¶ 25, 290 A.3d 533 (explaining that a sentence may not be “based in part” on an impermissible
consideration (emphasis added)).

Second, Servil argues that the court erred by concluding that 17-A M.R.S. § 1608 (2025) does not
authorize consecutive sentences for his convictions, and consecutive sentences would have allowed
for a period of probation tied to the aggravated assault charge. We conclude that the court did not
err in determining under section 1608(1)(A) that the convictions were not based on different
conduct or criminal episodes that would authorize a consecutive sentence. Even if the court had
determined otherwise, the court still had no obligation to impose consecutive sentences under the
discretionary language of section 1608(1). See 17-A M.R.S. § 1608(1) (“The sentences must be
concurrent except that the court may impose the sentences consecutively [if certain factors are met].”
(emphasis added)); see also State v. Ketcham, 2024 ME 80, ¶ 41, 327 A.3d 1103.
5

[¶9] “Criminal sentencing is one of the most difficult responsibilities” of

a court. State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 10, 745 A.2d 368. “[S]entencing is such

an awesome and difficult task for [the court] because of the competing

purposes of sentencing.” State v. Stanislaw, 2011 ME 67, ¶ 14, 21 A.3d 91

(quotation marks omitted). This is because multiple factors, such as the

“differences among defendants, victims, and circumstances,” must be

considered in each case. Id. Within certain parameters, the court is given the

discretion to fashion an individual sentence. Id. “Because it can be challenging

in a given case to reconcile potentially disparate sentencing goals, the trial court

is generally afforded significant leeway in determining which factors are

considered and the weight a factor is assigned.” State v. Watson, 2024 ME 24,

¶ 22, 319 A.3d 430 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶10] For similar reasons, courts also “are afforded wide discretion in

determining the sources and types of information to consider when imposing a

sentence.” State v. Butsitsi, 2015 ME 74, ¶ 25, 118 A.3d 222 (quotation marks

omitted). However, there are limits on what information a sentencing court

may rely on in its analysis. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶¶ 25-27, 290

A.3d 533 (concluding that a defendant’s decision to exercise his constitutional

right to a jury trial may not be considered during sentencing); State v. Ellis, 2025
6

ME 56, ¶ 27, --- A.3d --- (explaining that a sentence may not be increased

because a defendant asserted his right to a trial and his right not to testify). “We

review the determination of the maximum sentence at step two for an abuse of

discretion.” State v. Ketcham, 2024 ME 80, ¶ 35, 327 A.3d 1103.

[¶11] Here, the sentencing court first announced a basic sentence of

forty-five years of incarceration under step one, and then explained how it

would proceed in the second step of its analysis, stating: “This second step

requires me to examine all relevant mitigating as well as aggravating factors

relating to the character and criminal history of the defendant, [the] subjective

effect of the crime on the victim, and the protection of the public interest.”

[¶12] After identifying the applicable mitigating factors in this case, the

court began its consideration of aggravating factors by assessing the subjective

effect on the victim. The court explained that it thought this part of the

sentencing process required it to gain some insight about the victim. To that

end, the court indicated that it “obtained a copy of the [victim’s] obituary” and

then read the obituary into the record. After identifying and assessing other

aggravating factors, the court found the aggravating and mitigating factors

were about equal and thus set the maximum sentence at the same forty-five

years’ incarceration as the basic sentence.
7

[¶13] Although the court correctly addressed the subjective effect on the

victim during step two of its analysis, see 15 M.R.S. § 2155(1) (2025), it also

relied, in part, on the victim’s obituary. The court read the obituary into the

record while analyzing the “subjective effect on the victim,” and specifically

noted that the obituary “was very moving to me.” This statement demonstrates

that the obituary was a discrete and significant consideration in step two of the

court’s sentencing analysis, regardless of any overlap between the information

in the obituary and the content of the victim impact statements submitted to

the court. Moreover, the court also said during this step that it obtained the

obituary on its own, and Servil’s counsel confirmed that the State did not

provide a copy of the obituary to Servil before the sentencing hearing. It is clear

that given the court’s comment that the obituary was “very moving,” the court’s

analysis of the aggravating factors was affected by its independent research.

[¶14] Despite its laudable goal of thoroughly considering the “subjective

effect on the victim” factor, the court’s step-two sentencing analysis relied upon

information from an extrajudicial source that was independently obtained, was

not provided to the defense ahead of sentencing, and, by the court’s requesting

the family’s permission to read it, appeared less than impartial. Although the

court also referenced the multiple victim impact statements provided to the
8

court, that does not diminish the supervening impact of its reliance on the

obituary in weighing the aggravating factor of victim impact as a part of the

determination of Servil’s maximum sentence. See Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶ 25, 290

A.3d 533 (“A sentence based in part on an impermissible consideration is not

made proper simply because the sentencing judge considered other

permissible factors as well.” (alterations and quotation marks omitted)); see

also Ellis, 2025 ME 56, ¶ 28, --- A.3d ---.

[¶15] Accordingly, we conclude that the court abused its discretion by

incorporating, and potentially giving weight to, information obtained from its

own independent research, and we cannot say that this error was harmless.

Emphasizing that “[o]ur decision is a narrow one, limited to these

extraordinary facts,” Evans v. State, 2020 ME 36, ¶ 7, 228 A.3d 156, we vacate

Servil’s sentences and remand for resentencing before a different judge. See id.

¶¶ 6-7.

The entry is:

Sentences vacated. Remanded for resentencing
before a different judge.
9

Jeremy Pratt, Esq. (orally), and Ellen Simmons, Esq., Camden, for appellant
Jason Servil

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Katie Sibley, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally),
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Somerset County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2022-764
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY