State of Maine v. Angelena Quirion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2025 ME 75
Docket: Pen-23-461
Argued: September 11, 2024
Decided: August 14, 2025

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

ANGELENA QUIRION

STANFILL, C.J.

[¶1] Angelena Quirion appeals from a judgment of conviction for several

drug offenses entered by the trial court (Penobscot County, Mallonee, J.) after a

jury trial.1 Quirion argues that the court abused its discretion when it sustained

the State’s objection to a portion of her closing argument.2 We agree, but

because we conclude that the error is harmless, we affirm the convictions.

1 Quirion was convicted of three counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class A),

17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(D), (G), (M) (2025), and one count of unlawful possession of scheduled drugs
(Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 1107-A(1)(C) (2025). In addition, the court adjudicated and entered
judgment on seven counts of criminal forfeiture of property. See 15 M.R.S. § 5826 (2021). The
criminal forfeiture statute has been amended since the crimes were committed, but not in a way that
affects this appeal, see P.L. 2023, ch. 196, § 1 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 15 M.R.S. § 5826(6)
(2025)), and the forfeiture counts are not at issue on appeal in any event.

2 Quirion also argues that her constitutional rights to due process and compulsory process were
violated based on various improper communications to a witness and a potential witness about the
possibility that their testimony could result in exposure to criminal charges. We are not persuaded.
The record here cannot support a determination that anyone communicated to either witness in a
way that “threaten[ed] and intimidate[d] the witness into refusing to testify,” State v. Fagone,
2

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] Viewing the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to

the verdicts, the jury rationally could have found the following facts beyond a

reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Harding, 2024 ME 67, ¶¶ 2, 13, 322 A.3d

1175.

[¶3] On December 1, 2021, a police officer in Bangor stopped a vehicle

with a loud exhaust. Quirion was the driver. The officer saw drug

paraphernalia in the vehicle and conducted a search. In a purse on Quirion’s

lap, police found about $3,000 in cash separated by denomination, a

hypodermic needle, a glass pipe, a plastic bag commonly used for packaging

small quantities of illegal drugs, and 32 hydromorphone pills. Elsewhere in the

vehicle, police found about 34 grams of fentanyl, 7 grams of methamphetamine,

1.4 grams of cocaine, many unused baggies, and a scale. Quirion had a

concealed firearm on her person. Quirion had two passengers, but she told the

police that all of the drugs were hers, and she claimed that she had purchased

them for an amount far lower than the street value.

[¶4] On January 20, 2022, law enforcement officers responded to the

Androscoggin County Jail after Quirion used a counterfeit bill to post bail for

462 A.2d 493, 497 (Me. 1983); see also Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 95-98 (1972); State v. Berry,
1998 ME 113, ¶¶ 6-8, 711 A.2d 142.
3

someone incarcerated there. Quirion was in the driver’s seat of a vehicle

parked outside the jail. After discovering that Quirion and her passenger, Adam

Jalbert, were subject to bail conditions, an officer searched the vehicle and

discovered large quantities of illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia. Under the

passenger seat and between the passenger seat and the center console, officers

found 3.4 grams of fentanyl, 2.4 grams of methamphetamine, and 1.4 grams of

cocaine. In various bags and containers in the backseat area and the trunk,

including a “Walmart bag” found on the floorboard right behind the center

console, officers found about 300 grams of fentanyl, 495 grams of

methamphetamine, and 245 grams of cocaine. These drugs had a street value

of approximately $115,000 and were packaged in ways commonly used for bulk

resale. During the search of the vehicle, officers also found a firearm, a scale,

and unused baggies commonly used for packaging illegal drugs for sale.

[¶5 ] The next day, January 21, 2022, Maine Drug Enforcement Agency

agents executed a search warrant on Quirion’s home in Bangor. In Quirion’s

bedroom, agents discovered what appeared to be a drug sales ledger, several

firearms, a “finger”—which is approximately ten grams packaged together—of

fentanyl laying on the floor, and an envelope labeled “Money from Guy for Fing.”

A locked and concealed door in the hallway led to a stairway, at the top of which
4

was a concealed safe. In the safe, officers found about 850 grams of fentanyl,

800 grams of methamphetamine, and $30,000 in cash, including $20,000

wrapped together and labeled “Angel’s 20!” The drugs in the safe were

packaged in bulk and had an estimated street value of over $200,000.

[¶6] In total, the state seized about 1300 grams of methamphetamine,

1200 grams of fentanyl, and 247 grams of cocaine.

[¶7] The State charged Quirion by indictment with one count of

aggravated trafficking of fentanyl, one count of aggravated trafficking of

methamphetamine, one count of aggravated trafficking of cocaine, and one

count of unlawful possession of hydromorphone. See 17-A M.R.S.

§ 1105-A(1)(D), (G), (M) (2025); 17-A M.R.S. § 1107-A(1)(C) (2025). The

indictment also included seven counts seeking criminal forfeiture of five

firearms and $33,404 in cash. See 15 M.R.S. § 5826 (2021). In each of the three

Class A aggravated trafficking charges, the State alleged that the conduct

occurred “pursuant to one continuing scheme and course of conduct” and

sought to aggregate the quantities of scheduled drugs involved in the three

incidents described above. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1106-A(1) (2025).3

3 Section 1106-A(1) states, in relevant part: “Quantities of scheduled drugs involved in violations

of section 1103, 1105-A, 1105-B, 1105-C or 1106 committed pursuant to one scheme or course of
conduct and confiscated within a 6-month period may be aggregated to charge a single violation of
appropriate class.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1106-A(1) (2025).
5

[¶8] The court held a four-day jury trial in October 2023. Part of the

defense theory was that the State’s evidence left reasonable doubt as to

whether Quirion intentionally or knowingly possessed the illegal drugs found

by law enforcement. See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1105-A(1), 1103(1-A) (2025)

(including intentional or knowing trafficking as an element of aggravated

trafficking); 17-A M.R.S. § 1101(17)(C)-(D) (2025) (defining “traffick” to

include “[t]o possess with the intent to” sell). During closing argument, while

discussing the vehicle search outside the Androscoggin County jail, defense

counsel suggested in various ways that the illegal drugs belonged to Quirion’s

passenger, Jalbert. For example, defense counsel stated,

And this is where the definition of possession comes in. You have
to know what’s in there to be convicted of possessing it. . . . What
happened when [Quirion] got out of the car? . . . They take her out,
and before that who had they seen? Jalbert. He’s on the driver’s
side in the back seat where the Wal-Mart bags are. Cop said he’s
checking the Wal-Mart bags. And then what do we hear during the
arrest and stop? Those are Jalbert’s Wal-Mart bags. . . . So is that
possession by my client because Jalbert has drugs in her car?

This part of the closing argument drew no objection from the State. Later in the

argument, defense counsel returned to the topic of the drugs in the Walmart

bag, and the prosecutor objected:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did the State prove who owned this stuff
or did they just go, wow, this is a lot of
drugs? And [Jalbert’s] statement that he
6

owned the drugs in the front and the
comment that the—what are you doing,
this is all part of the evidence. The Wal-
Mart bags were Jalbert’s.

[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, arguing facts not in evidence,
Your Honor.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That was in evidence. That was exactly
what the cop said.

[PROSECUTOR]: That was not in evidence, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The objection’s sustained. Please move on.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Tell me what proof there is she knew what
was in that bag—those bags and in the
Wal-Mart bags? Tell me. Next they get a
search warrant . . . .

In the State’s rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor referred back to this

exchange, stating:

Now, Jalbert did have a few items at his chair and under him, all of
user size. But there is a mass quantity [in a] common place behind
both of them, both of them in reach of. And despite what [defense
counsel] said during argument that we objected to, there’s nothing
in the record to suggest that . . . Jalbert claimed ownership of the
Wal-Mart bags. I do not know where that’s coming from other than
wishful thinking that was not in the testimony you heard.

[¶9] After closing arguments, Quirion moved for a mistrial, contending

primarily that the State’s rebuttal closing argument was too lengthy and

wide-ranging in scope. She also stated that the jury had heard evidence
7

supporting counsel’s statements relating to Jalbert’s ownership of some of the

drugs. The court responded,

I do not have an independent memory of all the testimony upon
which these factual disputes are based, and so I’m unable to rule on
that one way or another. The instructions I’m going to give will
emphasize that opening and closing are not evidence, as I’ve told
them several times before, and that they will have to remember and
evaluate the evidence given them.

The court’s jury instructions included the following statement: “[N]othing I

have said or done in presiding at trial . . . should be taken as an indication about

the facts of the case because those facts are for you and you alone to decide

based on the evidence presented.” The court also instructed the jury that it was

required to “focus solely on deciding the facts from the evidence,” that it was

required to “consider only the evidence in the case in reaching [a] verdict,” and

that “closing arguments are not evidence.” The court added, “It was proper for

counsel to comment, but you must remember what was said, and you must

evaluate what you all collectively remember.”

[¶10] The jury returned guilty verdicts on all four of the drug charges,

and the court ordered forfeiture of five firearms and $33,404 in cash. The court
8

imposed sentence and entered a judgment on the verdicts.4 Quirion timely

appealed. See M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶11] Quirion argues that the trial court erroneously sustained the

State’s objection during her closing argument and that by doing so it

improperly indicated to the jury that her attorney’s argument was not

supported by the evidence. She argues that the ruling usurped the jury’s roles

of determining what the trial witnesses said and finding facts in the face of

competing evidence, and that the ruling therefore constituted an improper

expression of opinion on a fact issue and violated her constitutional rights to an

impartial trial by jury and to an effective closing argument. See State v.

Bachelder, 403 A.2d 754, 758 (Me. 1979) (discussing the right to an impartial

trial); State v. Gilman, 489 A.2d 1100, 1102 & n.2 (Me. 1985) (discussing the

right of a criminal defendant to present closing argument); 14 M.R.S. § 1105

(2025) (prohibiting the court from “express[ing] an opinion upon issues of fact

arising in the case”). We review a court’s ruling on an objection to closing

4 On one of the aggravated trafficking counts, the court sentenced Quirion to thirty years in prison

with all but twenty-five years suspended and four years of probation. The court imposed concurrent
sentences on the remaining charges, as well as fines totaling $655. The Sentence Review Panel denied
Quirion’s application for leave to appeal from her sentence. See State v. Quirion, No. SRP-23-462 (Me.
Sent. Rev. Panel Jan. 30, 2024); M.R. App. P. 20.
9

argument for an abuse of discretion, State v. Winslow, 2007 ME 124, ¶¶ 17-18,

930 A.2d 1080, and we interpret statutes and constitutional provisions de novo,

State v. Labbe, 2009 ME 94, ¶ 2, 979 A.2d 693.

[¶12] Title 14 M.R.S. § 1105 provides “definitive protection to an

accused’s constitutional right to have an impartial trial,” Bachelder, 403 A.2d at

759; see State v. Philbrick, 669 A.2d 152, 155-56 (Me. 1995), and it also serves

to protect the constitutional right to a trial by jury, State v. Edwards, 458 A.2d

422, 424 (Me. 1983). The statute provides as follows:

During a jury trial the presiding justice shall rule and charge
the jury, orally or in writing, upon all matters of law arising in the
case but shall not, during the trial, including the charge, express an
opinion upon issues of fact arising in the case, and such an expression
of opinion is sufficient cause for a new trial if either party aggrieved
thereby and interested desires it, and the same shall be ordered
accordingly by the law court on appeal in a civil or criminal case.

14 M.R.S. § 1105 (emphasis added). We have interpreted section 1105 to

prohibit a trial court from directly or indirectly “suggesting that [it] endorses

the cause of one side over that of the other side by emphasizing specific

evidence in the case” or “by giving the jury a one-sided summation of the

evidence,” from “disparag[ing] in the minds of the jury the accused’s theory of

the case,” and from “creat[ing] the impression with the jury that [the court]

entertains doubts as to the defendant’s veracity.” Bachelder, 403 A.2d at 759.
10

Comment on the evidence by the trial court in the jury’s presence is rarely

necessary or advisable, and rulings by the court that require commentary on

the state of the evidence can usually be announced outside of the presence of

the jury. See Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 5-5 at 5-14 (2025 ed.)

(“Comments on the evidence made outside the presence of the jury do not

generate similar concerns.”); State v. Just, 2007 ME 91, ¶ 15, 926 A.2d 1173.

[¶13] “[T]he right of a defendant to have counsel deliver a proper closing

argument on the evidence and the applicable law is part and parcel of his right

to effective assistance of counsel . . . .” State v. Liberty, 498 A.2d 257, 259-60

(Me. 1985); see State v. Robert R., 262 A.3d 810, 815-16, 819-21 (Conn. 2021)

(holding that when the trial court improperly sustained an objection to the

defense closing, the court deprived the defendant of his right to the assistance

of counsel). Although the scope of factual assertions made during closing

arguments must be circumscribed by the evidence before the fact finder, State

v. Daluz, 2016 ME 102, ¶ 64, 143 A.3d 800; State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125,

1128-29 (Me. 1982), attorneys must also be allowed to attempt to convince the

jury to make reasonable inferences in favor of the party they represent, Liberty,

498 A.2d at 259-60; State v. Gould, 2012 ME 60, ¶¶ 19-21, 43 A.3d 952. “An

attorney does not reference evidence outside the record, or evidence contrary
11

to the record, when arguing for any conclusion based on facts and testimony in

evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence.”

Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 5-7 at 5-22 (2025 ed.).

[¶14] When, in the presence of the jury, the state objects that a particular

closing argument is based on facts that were not admitted in evidence, the trial

court must balance the risk of permitting improper closing argument against

the risk of violating the defendant’s rights to a trial by jury, to an impartial trial,

and to present closing argument. See Liberty, 498 A.2d at 259-60; Edwards,

458 A.2d at 423-25. Proper jury instructions will frequently cure any prejudice

caused by improper argument, especially where the impropriety is not

egregious. See, e.g., State v. Farley, 2024 ME 52, ¶¶ 29-33, 319 A.3d 1080; State

v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 55, 58 A.3d 1032; State v. MacLean, 560 A.2d 1088,

1090-91 (Me. 1989). A mischaracterization of the evidence by the court,

however, presents a greater risk of prejudice. See 14 M.R.S. § 1105; Edwards,

458 A.2d at 424 (“It is for the jury, and the jury alone, to determine . . . what

witnesses said at trial.”); State v. Brown, 142 Me. 16, 18-22, 45 A.2d 442, 443-45

(1946) (explaining that the “damage” caused when a court provided to the jury

a one-sided “summary of the testimony” was not remedied by “telling the jury

that they are the judges of the facts”); Robert R., 262 A.3d at 815-16, 819-21
12

(concluding that a defendant’s right to present a closing argument was violated

when the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection that defense counsel’s

argument was not supported by the evidence). In response to such an

objection, therefore, unless the court is certain that no evidence has been

presented that could support the inference suggested by the defendant’s

closing argument, the court may simply remind the jury that closing arguments

are not evidence and that the jury’s memory of the evidence controls. If the

objection is erroneously sustained, the court risks misleading the jury and

undercutting the defendant’s right to present closing argument.

[¶15] Here, as set forth above, the objection—“arguing facts not in

evidence”—was to defense counsel’s assertion that there was evidence that

“the Wal-Mart bags were Jalbert’s.” In fact, a law enforcement officer had

testified that Quirion “claim[ed] ignorance about everything in the vehicle” and

that she “blame[d] it all on Jalbert.” The officer also testified that Quirion stated

that Jalbert had brought “a Wal-Mart bag” into the vehicle. This evidence was

sufficient to support defense counsel’s argument that the Walmart bags were

Jalbert’s, and the court therefore erred when it sustained the State’s objection.5

5As noted above, in responding to Quirion’s motion for a mistrial the court later acknowledged
that it could not be sure whether the evidentiary record included any evidence supporting defense
counsel’s assertion, further highlighting the need for caution in sustaining an objection to the defense
13

See Winslow, 2007 ME 124, ¶ 18, 930 A.2d 1080; State v. Covington, 2023 ME

72, ¶ 12, 304 A.3d 290.

[¶16] We agree with Quirion that the court’s ruling generated the

concerns that section 1105 serves to protect against. See Brown, 142 Me. at

18-22, 45 A.2d at 443-45; Bachelder, 403 A.2d at 759; State v. Linnell, 408 A.2d

693, 694-95 (Me. 1979); Edwards, 458 A.2d at 423-25. Unlike other rulings a

court may have occasion to issue during closing argument, a ruling on an

objection that defense counsel has argued facts not in evidence is necessarily a

comment on the state of the evidence. Thus, special care is required to guard

against the risk posed by a mischaracterization of the evidence by the court.

When a court states that an assertion made during closing argument is not

grounded in the evidence, the court communicates to the jury that the jury

cannot make the inference counsel suggested because no evidence supports it.

If the ruling is incorrect, the court will have impaired both the defendant’s right

to make proper closing argument and the jury’s ability to exercise its duty to

determine what the evidence is and what facts it believes are true. See Liberty,

498 A.2d at 259-60; Robert R., 262 A.3d at 815-16, 819-21; Bachelder, 403 A.2d

at 759.

argument in front of the jury. To be clear, so long as the objection is well-founded, there is no error
in sustaining it. The problem arises when the argument is, in fact, supported by evidence.
14

[¶17] Courts in other states have also determined that erroneously

sustaining an objection to the defense closing may be considered an improper

comment on the evidence. The Court of Appeals of Oregon concluded that when

a trial court improperly sustained a prosecutor’s objection that statements

made during the defense closing argument were unsupported by the evidence,

the trial court effectively “told the jury to disregard evidence that was critical

to [the] defendant’s theory of the case.” State v. Sanders, 497 P.3d 1259,

1259-60 (Or. Ct. App. 2021). Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Washington

vacated a conviction where the trial court interrupted the defendant’s closing

argument and erroneously stated that defense counsel’s assertions were not

supported by the evidence. City of Seattle v. Arensmeyer, 491 P.2d 1305,

1307-09 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). When the trial court did so, “it commented on

the evidence by revealing what it believed the evidence to mean.” Id. at 1308.

[¶18] Here, the trial court’s erroneous ruling was tantamount to an

improper expression of opinion on the evidence. We must therefore determine

whether to apply harmless error review, and if so, whether the error here was

harmless. See. e.g., State v. Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 34, 239 A.3d 648.

[¶19] In State v. Kessler, a case involving a challenge under section 1105,

we expressly rejected the argument that “any expression of opinion upon issues
15

of fact automatically becomes sufficient cause for and mandates a new trial.”

453 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Me. 1983) (emphasis added). We explained that “the

nature and purpose of our rules of criminal procedure as well as our interest in

the fair administration of justice require that statutes such as section 1105 be

read in the context of the procedural rules,” including the rule governing

harmless and obvious error.6 Id. We concluded that the trial court’s improper

remark in the presence of the jury—describing an exhibit purported to be

cocaine as “a sizeable amount”—constituted harmless error because the

“quantity of cocaine was not in issue” in the case. Id. at 1175-77; see also

Edwards, 458 A.2d at 425 (expressly applying harmless error review). Other

states have also applied a harmless error analysis in this context. See State v.

Stokes, No. M1999-02252-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 776610, at *3 (Tenn. Crim.

App. June 9, 2000) (holding that a trial court erroneously sustained an objection

to defense counsel’s statement in closing argument, but the error was

harmless); State v. Hoops, 965 N.W.2d 396, 405-06 (Neb. Ct. App. 2021)

(determining that even if the trial court erroneously sustained the State’s

6 We also noted that section 1105 had been “interpreted to apply only to controverted facts,”
citing cases holding that it was permissible for trial courts to aid jurors by stating undisputed facts.
State v. Kessler, 453 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Me. 1983); see State v. Day, 79 Me. 120, 124-25, 8 A. 544, 545
(1887); State v. Jones, 137 Me. 137, 139-42, 16 A.2d 103, 104-06 (1940); Alexander, Maine Jury
Instruction Manual § 5-5 at 5-14 (2025 ed.) (“It once was widespread practice for judges to
summarize the evidence and the contentions of the parties for the jury.”).
16

objection during the defense closing argument, the error was harmless); see

also Sanders, 497 P.3d at 1260 (applying a harmless error analysis to the

improper sustaining of an objection to closing argument, but concluding that

the error was not harmless); Arensmeyer, 491 P.2d at 1309 (same). We

conclude that the error here is subject to harmless error review.7

[¶20] Under the harmless error standard, “[a]ny error, defect,

irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights shall be

disregarded.” M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(a). In general, a trial error is harmless “if it is

highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment.” State v. Guyette,

2012 ME 9, ¶ 19, 36 A.3d 916 (quotation marks omitted). A trial error that

violates constitutional rights “may be deemed harmless if we are satisfied

beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the trial record as a whole, that the error

7We have stated that “[i]n the absence of a waiver, the denial of the right to present closing
argument must result in reversal of the conviction without regard to whether the defendant was
prejudiced.” State v. Gilman, 489 A.2d 1100, 1103 (Me. 1985) (emphasis and quotation marks
omitted); see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 & n.25 (1984); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S.
853, 856-65 (1975). But see, e.g., Lake v. State, 532 S.W.3d 408, 410-18, 413 n.24 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017) (discussing the issue and disagreeing with our conclusion in Gilman). In Gilman, the trial court
found the defendant guilty without offering the defendant any opportunity whatsoever to present a
closing argument. 489 A.2d at 1101-02. This case does not present such circumstances, and we have
never held that an erroneous restriction on closing argument cannot be harmless. See State v. Liberty,
498 A.2d 257, 260 (Me. 1985) (applying a harmless error analysis in a case involving an erroneous
limitation on the right to present a closing argument); Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21, 24 (2014) (“[E]ven
assuming that Herring established that complete denial of summation amounts to structural error, it
did not clearly establish that the restriction of summation also amounts to structural error.”); Rushen
v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117 n.2 (1983) (stating that a violation of the right to counsel is “subject to
harmless error analysis unless the deprivation, by its very nature, cannot be harmless” (citations
omitted)).
17

did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 34,

239 A.3d 648 (quotation marks omitted); see State v. Judkins, 2024 ME 45,

¶¶ 19-27, 319 A.3d 443.

[¶21] Here, by sustaining the State’s objection during Quirion’s closing

argument, the court indicated that the jurors should not consider evidence that

Jalbert brought the Walmart bag full of drugs into Quirion’s vehicle before the

stop outside the Androscoggin County Jail. Although that evidence was relevant

to Quirion’s theory of the case and to a disputed fact, we are convinced that the

error was harmless.

[¶22] First, defense counsel had already argued to the jury—without

objection—that Jalbert brought the drugs in the Walmart bag into the car, when

he said: “They take her out, and before that who had they seen? Jalbert. He’s

on the driver’s side in the back seat where the Wal-Mart bags are. Cop said he’s

checking the Wal-Mart bags. And then what do we hear during the arrest and

stop? Those are Jalbert’s Wal-Mart bags. . . . So is that possession by my client

because Jalbert has drugs in her car?” Thus, the objected-to argument was in

fact presented to the jury. See Hoops, 965 N.W.2d at 406 (concluding that any

error was harmless where defense counsel was able to present the intended

argument to the jury notwithstanding the court’s ruling).
18

[¶23] Second, the court’s brief ruling did not suggest the court’s personal

opinion of the evidence. See State v. Jones, 137 Me. 137, 142, 16 A.2d 103, 106

(1940) (describing harmful comments by the court as those that embody an

“authoritative expression of the opinion of the presiding justice himself on

issues of fact”); Hoops, 965 N.W.2d at 406 (concluding that any error was

harmless where the court simply stated “[s]ustained” and “[t]he objection is

sustained,” without commenting further on the evidence). Cases in which we

have found judicial comments required vacatur involved a much greater

interference with the process. See Edwards, 458 A.2d at 423-25 (concluding

that the error was not harmless where the court, on its own accord and over

objections by the defendant and the State, provided to the jury for use during

deliberations a typewritten “chronology” of disputed, material facts consistent

with the testimony of the State’s witnesses); Brown, 142 Me. at 18-22, 45 A.2d

at 443-45 (holding that the trial court erred by providing its own one-sided

summary of the testimony that included comments “obviously” suggestive of

the weight the jury should give certain testimony).

[¶24] Third, the court instructed the jury that “nothing I have said or

done” is “an indication of my opinion about the facts because those facts are for

you and you alone to decide based on the evidence presented.” The court also
19

instructed the jury that the jury’s memory of the evidence was controlling: “It

was proper for counsel to comment, but you must remember what was said,

and you must evaluate what you all collectively remember.” See State v. Hauge,

79 P.3d 131, 140, 152 (Haw. 2003) (concluding that similar instructions cured

any prejudicial effect of improper comments by a trial court during the

defendant’s closing argument); Hoops, 965 N.W.2d at 406 (citing similar

instructions as contributing to a conclusion that any error in sustaining a

similar objection was harmless); accord State v. Sivins, 155 P.3d 982, 987

(Wash. Ct. App. 2007).

[¶25] Finally, each of the aggravated trafficking charges alleged that

Quirion was trafficking in a specific drug “[p]ursuant to one continuing scheme

and course of conduct beginning on or about December 01, 2021, and

continuing through January 21, 2022.” The charges were not based on a single

event or drug seizure. In addition, the court properly instructed the jury that

Quirion could be found guilty as either an accomplice or a principal, and the

State argued to the jury that even if some of the drugs were Jalbert’s, Quirion

was at least guilty as his accomplice. Taken as a whole, the evidence of guilt

was substantial and overwhelming. See Judkins, 2024 ME 45, ¶¶ 23, 25,

319 A.3d 443 (explaining that a relevant consideration is whether the evidence
20

supporting the conviction was overwhelming); State v. Coleman, 2018 ME 41,

¶ 26, 181 A.3d 689; State v. Goodall, 407 A.2d 268, 276 (Me. 1979).

[¶26] Based on the combination of all of these factors, we conclude that

the court’s erroneous ruling could not have affected the verdict in this case.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law LLC, York, for appellant Angelena
L. Quirion

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Jason Horn, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Orally), Office
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2021-3804
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY