In Re Child of Danielle H.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2026 ME 19
Docket: Yor-24-355
Argued: November 13, 2025
Decided: February 26, 2026

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

IN RE CHILD OF DANIELLE H.

STANFILL, C.J.

[¶1] Danielle H. appeals from a judgment of the District Court

(Springvale, Moskowitz, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child. During

the pendency of the case, the mother was in and out of jail and several

treatment facilities for opioid use disorder. She asserts that the court

misapprehended the nature of addiction and recovery when it found that she

was unable to protect the child from jeopardy, unable to take responsibility for

the child in a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, and failed to

make a good faith effort to rehabilitate. See 22 M.R.S.

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i),(ii),(iv) (2025). She also argues that the court abused its

discretion in concluding that termination was in the child’s best interest

because the guardian ad litem (GAL) failed to file required reports, attend all of

the family team meetings, or meet the mother face-to-face. Finally, she asserts

that the court abused its discretion when it found termination to be in the
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child’s best interest without explicitly considering a permanency guardianship.

Although we are concerned by the GAL’s performance in this case, it did not

prevent the court from independently determining that termination was in the

child’s best interest. Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to

support a finding of parental unfitness on at least one basis and that the court

did not abuse its discretion in its best interest finding, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The child was born drug-affected in February 2023. The

Department of Health and Human Services immediately petitioned for a child

protection order and preliminary protection order, and the child has been in

the Department’s custody ever since. The mother agreed to an order finding

jeopardy based on her chronic substance use disorder, including substance use

during her pregnancy.

[¶3] The Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental

rights on February 28, 2024, and a hearing was held on June 26 and 27, 2024.

The GAL testified at the termination hearing, and the mother cross-examined

her about her performance throughout the case. The GAL testified that she had

never met the mother in person or observed a visit between the mother and the

child. She also testified that she had missed four out of nine family team
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meetings and wrote only one report for the case. On July 13, 2024, the court

entered a judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights. The mother

timely appealed. M.R. App. P. 2B(c).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Parental Unfitness

[¶4] We review the trial court’s findings of unfitness and best interest for

clear error, and we uphold those findings if they are supported by any

competent record evidence. In re Child of Rebecca J., 2019 ME 119, ¶ 5, 213 A.3d

108. “Proof of any one of the four statutory definitions of parental unfitness

. . . is independently adequate to justify termination, if supported by clear and

convincing evidence.” In re Charles G., 2001 ME 3, ¶ 6, 763 A.2d 1163.

[¶5] During most of the sixteen months between the child’s birth and the

termination hearing, the mother was participating in the Adult Treatment and

Recovery Court.1 The recovery court program required that she participate in

1 The Adult Treatment and Recovery Courts, formerly known as Adult Drug Treatment Courts,

are for “individuals whose involvement with the criminal justice system has been fueled by a serious
substance use disorder.” Adult Treatment and Recovery Courts, State of Maine Judicial Branch,
https://www.courts.maine.gov/courts/treatment/adult.html [https://perma.cc/NP3Y-CJQU] (last
visited Jan. 15, 2026). Maine also offers Family Recovery Courts, which are “specialty civil dockets
that work with families whose children are at risk of abuse or neglect due to parental substance use
disorders and/or co-occurring disorders.” Family Recovery Court, State of Maine Judicial Branch,
https://www.courts.maine.gov/courts/treatment/family.html [https://perma.cc/6QP3-FS4G] (last
visited Jan. 15, 2026). The mother in this case was involved in the Adult Treatment and Recovery
Court through the criminal system and not in the Family Recovery Court.
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treatment, and stints in jail could be imposed as sanctions for her failure to

abide by the rules of the program. During the pendency of the protective

custody case, the mother spent a total of six months in jail and spent most of

the rest of the time in residential programs for substance use treatment. She

left one treatment facility after only two days and, before finishing another

program, was discharged from it, arrested, and returned to jail. At the time of

the termination hearing, the mother was participating in a third residential

treatment program but had months remaining to complete it, had no long-term

plan for her life after that, and was not sure when she would be able to care for

the child.

[¶6] The mother argues that the trial court failed to account for the

chronic nature of substance use disorder and showed “a tragic

misapprehension about the nature of addiction and recovery, which may result

in a relapse or a series of relapses, which are . . . an important part of the

recovery process itself.” She argues that this misunderstanding undermines

not only the finding that she failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate

herself but also the finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.

[¶7] We acknowledge a possible inconsistency between Maine’s

statutory child protection framework and the current understanding of the
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time needed for recovery from opioid use disorder. Section 4055(1-A)(C) of

Title 22 provides that the court may presume parental unfitness for a child in

departmental custody when “the parent has a chronic substance use disorder,

and the parent’s prognosis indicates that the child will not be able to return to

the custody of the parent within a reasonable period of time.” Significantly, the

statute provides that there is chronic substance use when “a parent has been

unable to provide safe care of a child for a period of 9 months due to substance

use.” 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1-A)(C); see also 22 M.R.S. § 4052(2-A)(A) (2025)

(generally requiring the Department to file a termination petition when a child

has been in foster care for fifteen months).

[¶8] In contrast, the minimum time required to complete the Adult

Treatment and Recovery Court is thirteen months—and it is frequently much

longer. See State of Maine Judicial Branch, Maine Treatment and Recovery Court

Participant Handbook 15-19 (2022), available at

https://www.courts.maine.gov/courts/treatment/trc-participant-

handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U7X-9BGU]. This length of time is necessary

partly because relapses, also known as symptom recurrences, are an expected

part of recovery for many individuals. See All Rise, Adult Treatment Court Best

Practice Standards 7-8 (2025), available at https://allrise.org/wp-
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content/uploads/2025/11/Adult-Treatment-Court-Best-Practice-

Standards_11.7.2025.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8MR-KQDC]. “[P]ersons with

serious mental health, substance use, and trauma disorders often remain

vulnerable to severe symptom recurrence over many years or decades

. . . Addressing these recovery management needs is critical to avoid future

symptom recurrence . . . .” Id. at 7. The program’s length also ensures that

individuals do not fall through the cracks and are given the time to build the

skills and support necessary to maintain sobriety once they “graduate” from the

treatment court. Id. at 7-8, 67-74.

[¶9] On the other hand, we have also said that “permanency is the central

tenet of the Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act,” and the court

views the timeframes from the perspective of the child and not the parent in

determining whether to terminate parental rights. In re Child of Angela S., 2020

ME 60, ¶ 10, 232 A.3d 215 (quotation marks omitted). Here, the trial court

found, with support in the record, that the mother had a longstanding substance

use disorder, she had an inconsistent history with multiple treatment

programs, her future sobriety was uncertain, and her future plans were unclear.

The court concluded that the mother was unwilling or unable to protect the

child from jeopardy and those circumstances were unlikely to change within a
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time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs. See 22 M.R.S.

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i). It also found that she was unwilling or unable to take

responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the

child’s needs. See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii). We conclude that the court did not

clearly err because there is competent evidence in the record to support the

court’s finding that the mother is parentally unfit.

B. Child’s Best Interest

[¶10] We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s conclusion

concerning the best interest of the child. In re Child of Christian D., 2025 ME 16,

¶ 4, 331 A.3d 409. We view “the facts, and the weight to be given to them,

through the trial court’s lens.” Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted).

[¶11] The mother argues that that the court was unable to make the best

interest determination in the absence of a meaningful and reliable investigation

and report from the GAL. GALs are required to submit written reports, with

recommendations, to the court reasonably in advance of each court hearing

(except a summary preliminary hearing) and in any event at least every six

months. 22 M.R.S. § 4005(1)(B), (D) (2025). A GAL is required to “[c]omplete

assignments and written reports in a timely manner, and communicate

effectively with the court in motions, reports, recommendations, and
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testimony.” M.R.G.A.L. 1(b)(9). The GAL must have face-to-face contact with

the child at least once every three months. 22 M.R.S. § 4005(1)(B). A GAL’s

investigation must include interviews of the parents and other persons

involved in caring for the child. M.R.G.A.L. 4(c)(2)(E). A GAL is subject to the

oversight of the court. See In re Adoption of T.D., 2014 ME 36, ¶ 17, 87 A.3d 726.

Indeed, if a GAL fails to perform the duties that are required, the court may

remove the GAL from the case. M.R.G.A.L. 6(a), (d).

[¶12] GAL reports, if reliable, can be critical to a court’s determination of

the child’s best interest. The GAL is a “disinterested party and an agent of the

court” and “possesses competence and experience to make reasoned

judgments about the reliability of information” because of the GAL’s unique

ability to review all relevant records and interview the child and involved

persons. In re Chelsea C., 2005 ME 105, ¶ 14, 884 A.2d 97. Given the GAL’s

central role in child protection proceedings, it is the responsibility of everyone

involved, including the court, to address any deficiencies in the GAL’s

performance.

[¶13] Here, the GAL did not interview the mother before the termination

hearing, did not observe any of the visits, did not visit the child as required, and

failed to attend four out of nine family team meetings. The GAL filed only one
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report, a year after the case began and well before the termination hearing. The

mother argues that the GAL “failed in her statutory and court-ordered

obligations to conduct a thorough investigation of the facts and circumstances

of this case in ‘pursuit of the child’s best interest.’”

[¶14] As we have explained, the GAL’s compliance with her statutory

duties “does not constitute a discrete element requiring proof in a parental

rights termination hearing.” In re Aurora M., 2018 ME 4, ¶ 10, 177 A.3d 617.

The mother cross-examined the GAL and highlighted the deficiencies in the

GAL’s performance through that cross-examination. See Adoption of T.D., 2014

ME 36, ¶ 18, 87 A.3d 726 (“[O]ften the most effective challenge to the quality,

completeness, or competence of a guardian ad litem’s work will be

accomplished through cross-examination of the GAL at trial.”). It is up to the

court to determine how much weight, if any, to give to the GAL’s testimony and

recommendations. See id.

[¶15] In this case, the court did not indicate that it relied on the GAL’s

recommendations or report in concluding that termination of the mother’s

parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Instead, the court considered

the relevant factors based on the other evidence it heard, including the child’s

age, need for permanency, and the mother’s inability to parent, in reaching its
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conclusion. The GAL’s lack of involvement, while unacceptable, did not prevent

the court from making its own independent determination, based on competent

evidence, that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best

interest.

[¶16] Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion by failing to explicitly

consider a permanency guardianship when deciding whether termination was

in the child’s best interest. The court considered the child’s need for

permanency and specifically found that, because of that need, it was “unwilling

to provide [the mother] with any additional time to attempt reunification.” See

In re Child of Christian D., 2025 ME 16, ¶¶ 8-11, 331 A.3d 409 (holding that there

was no abuse of discretion in ordering termination of parental rights instead of

permanency guardianship when the trial court made specific, independent

findings that termination was in the child’s best interest). Although the court

did not explain why it rejected a permanency guardianship, in the absence of a

motion for further findings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), we assume the court

made the findings necessary to support the judgment. In re Children of

Quincy A., 2023 ME 49, ¶ 26, 300 A.3d 832. We conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion when it terminated the mother’s parental rights.
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The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Sara A. Murphy, Esq. (orally), Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, for appellant
Mother

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen.
(orally), Office of the Attorney General, Bangor, for appellee Department of
Health and Human Services

Springvale District Court docket number PC-2023-10
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLU