State of Maine v. Libby

STATE OF MAINE . UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET

CUMBERLAND, ss. DOCKET NO. CUMCD-CR-2021-04648
STATE OF MAINE )
)
)
Vv. )
) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
) MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS
BRANDON LIBBY, )
)
Defendant. )

Before the Court are Defendant Brandon Libby’s two pending Motions to
Suppress. In the first motion, Mr. Libby seeks to suppress evidence obtained during the
warrantless search of his home at 35 Dow Road, Standish, Maine. In the second motion,
Mr. Libby seeks to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officers in the
ambulance and at the hospital on June 16, 2021, before he received Miranda warnings.

At hearing on February 2, 2024, the Court heard the testimony of Sergeant Brian
Smith, Deputy Richard Bradway, and Lieutenant David A. Hall’ of the Cumberland
County Sheriff's Office, as well as Maine State Police Detective Lauren Edstrom and
Sergeant Ethel Ross. The Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law.

L Findings of Fact

On June 16, 2021, at 10:17 a.m., Lieutenant David A. Hall heard “radio traffic’
about an incident at 35 Dow Road, Standish. He responded to the address. On the way to
35 Dow Road, he received a call from Deputy John Cross, who told Lieutenant Hall that,
while responding to an address in Hollis, he had learned that a woman may have been

shot in the stomach at 35 Dow Road.

1 Lieutenant Hall retired in April 2022.

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When Lieutenant Hall arrived at 35 Dow Road, other officers were already on
scene. Deputy Bradway was the first officer to respond to 35 Dow Road, after receiving a
call about a possible dead body. He walked around the house and saw no signs of
struggle outside. He characterized the purpose of the search as locating a body or injured
victim, not to locate evidence.

Lieutenant Hall gave the order to breach the door to search for the potential victim.
Lieutenant Hall entered the home and remained in the kitchen while other officers
searched the home.

Body-worn camera footage shows officers at 35 Dow Road repeatedly announcing
“Sheriffs office” before breaching the door and while searching the first and second
floors, basement, and attic space. Officers searched the home with their weapons drawn.
A few minutes after officers breached the door, one of the officers can be heard yelling
“10-48,” indicating that a body had been located. Officers continued to search the
_ remaining areas of the home for other victims.

Sergeant Smith informed Lieutenant Hall that he had located a body. Lieutenant
Hall checked on the body and then called to report to his superior. Officers left the home
after searching remaining rooms for other victims.

Detective Edstrom testified that on June 16, 2021, she received a call to respond to
Waterboro regarding a man who may have been involved in a death in Standish. When
Detective Edstrom arrived at the Waterboro residence, Maine State Police were
surrounding the house, where Mr. Libby had barricaded himself inside.

When Mr. Libby came outside, he was bitten by the duty K-9 and placed in
handcuffs. Due to the bite wounds, he was loaded into an ambulance. Detective Edstrom

joined him in the ambulance.

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Detective Edstrom testified that she did not give Mr. Libby Miranda warnings in
the ambulance because she did not intend to question him. Detective Edstrom’s recorder
was, however, recording during the ambulance ride and at the hospital. At one point
while in the hospital, Mr. Libby asked Detective Edstrom if she had questions for him.
Detective Edstrom replied that she would like to talk with him about what happened, but
not until he had seen the doctor. She told him she wanted to read him Miranda warnings
before talking with him.

In the ambulance and at the hospital, Mr. Libby volunteered information about the
events of that day and the night before, as well as his relationship with the victim.
Detective Edstrom and Maine State Police Troopers Miles Carpenter and Patrick Hall
asked a few questions about Mr. Libby’s injuries and use of prescribed medications and
other substances, as well as conversational questions about Mr. Libby’s background.

When Detective Edstrom’s partner, Sergeant Ross, arrived at the hospital, she
started to give Mr. Libby Miranda warnings, but stopped when Detective Edstrom told
her that Mr. Libby had not yet been seen by the doctor. Sergeant Ross read Mr. Libby his
Miranda rights in full after he had been seen by the doctor. After hearing the warnings,
Mr. Libby confirmed that he wished to speak with the detectives. When he indicated that
he needed a break, Detective Edstrom arranged for a ride for Mr. Libby.

Il. Conclusions of Law

Under Maine’s Constitution and the United States Constitution, Mr. Libby
challenges the warrantless search of 35 Dow Road and his unwarned statements in the
ambulance and at the hospital.

A. Warrantless Search

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 5

of the Maine Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const.

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amend. IV; Me. Const. art. 1, § 5. In general, the reasonableness of a search is determined
by weighing the degree to which it intrudes on an individual’s privacy against the
legitimate government interests in the search. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S, 386, 395-96
(1989). The reasonableness of a search “is generally assured through an officer’s
procurement of a warrant issued upon the demonstration of probable cause, or through
the individual’s consent to the search.” State v. Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¥ 14, 928 A.2d 753.
“In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific
exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Akers, 2021 ME 43, {[ 26, 259 A.3d 127
(quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014)).

The State argues that the warrantless search of 35 Dow Road was permissible
under the emergency aid doctrine. The emergency aid doctrine provides that “law
enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance
to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). “Th[e] emergency aid exception does not depend on the
officers’ subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating when the
emergency arises. It requires only an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a
person within the house is in need of immediate aid.” Akers, 2021 ME 43, {[ 36, 259 A.3d
127 (quoting Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009)).

Officers responded to 35 Dow Road after a report that a woman had been shot in
the stomach at that address, and that the victim was possibly deceased. Defense counsel
argues that exigent circumstances do not exist to investigate a report of a dead body.
Indeed, if officers had received an unequivocal report of a dead body or a shooting that
had occurred long ago, there may not be a reasonable basis for believing that the victim
needed assistance. At the time they breached the house, however, officers were acting on

information that a woman had been shot relatively recently and may be deceased. It was

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reasonable to believe that she needed immediate aid. The State has met its burden of
proving the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement.

B. Pre-Miranda Statements

“A person who is in custody and subject to interrogation must be advised of the
rights referred to in Miranda v. Arizona in order for statements made during the
interrogation to be admissible against [him] as part of the State’s direct case at trial.” State
v. Bridges, 2003 ME 103, 7 23, 829 A.2d 247; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79
(1966). A person is “in custody” if he is subjected to a formal arrest or “a restraint on
freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Bryant, 2014
ME 94, ¥ 10, 97 A.3d 595 (quoting State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, 4 4, 724 A.2d 1222). A
defendant is restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest when “a reasonable
person in the defendant's position would have believed he was in police custody.”
Michaud, 1998 ME 251, {{ 4, 724 A.2d 1222.

There can be no dispute that Mr. Libby was in custody after he was subdued by
the K-9, handcuffed, and placed into an ambulance, accompanied by law enforcement
officers. The State argues that although Mr. Libby was in custody in the ambulance and
at the hospital, he was not subject to interrogation before receiving Miranda warnings.

A person is subject to interrogation if he is subject to “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after [having] been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.” Michaud, 1998 ME 251, 7 3, 724 A.2d 1222
(quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 107 (1995)). Interrogation encompasses
“express questioning or its functional equivalent. . . . [including] any words or actions on
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the

suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980); see State v. Fleming, 2020 ME

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120, { 26, 239 A.3d 648. “[B]rief, neutral questions that are not part of an effort to elicit a
confession or admission do not constitute interrogation.” Fleming, 2020 ME 120, 7 26, 239
A.3d 648 (quoting State v. Reese, 2010 ME 30, { 8, 991 A.2d 806).

The few questions law enforcement officers asked before administering Miranda
warnings were either conversational questions about Mr. Libby’s background or
questions regarding Mr. Libby's medical condition. These questions did not and could
not reasonably have been expected to elicit an incriminating response. The unwarned
statements Mr. Libby offered about the events of that day and the night before were
entirely volunteered, without prompting by law enforcement.

Mr. Libby argues that the delay in administering Miranda warnings was an
impermissible tactic intended to induce Mr. Libby to reveal incriminating information.
The Law Court, interpreting Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004), has held that
when law enforcement has elicited a pre-warning confession before administering
Miranda warnings and eliciting a post-warning confession, “the State bears the burden of
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the two-step procedure was not
deliberately employed to undermine the efficacy of the Miranda warnings.” State v.
Nightingale, 2012 ME 132, { 29, 58 A.3d 1057.

Here, the State demonstrated that Detective Edstrom delayed giving Miranda
warnings because she did not think it was appropriate to question him or obtain a
Miranda waiver before Mr. Libby had been treated for his injuries. There was no
deliberate attempt to elicit a pre-warning confession or undermine the efficacy of the
Miranda warnings eventually given by Detective Ross. See id. { 30. There are no grounds
for suppressing Mr. Libby's volunteered statements.

Wi. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the State has met its burden with regards to both of Mr.

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Libby’s motions.
The Court orders as follows:
1. Defendant Brandon Libby’s Motion to Suppress evidence is DENIED; and
2. Defendant Brandon Libby’s Motion to Suppress statements is DENIED.

The clerk is instructed to incorporate this Order by reference on the docket

pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 53(a).

4 C Abe
Mary Kennedy, Justic
Maine Superior Court“

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