Clegg v. American Airlines, Inc.

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION
Docket No. CV-2022-224

CAMPBELL A. CLEGG and JENNIE
CLEGG,

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC,

Nemeth ret ieee age Se Sah Sa Sear! are Seamer”

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant American Airlines, Inc.’s (“AA”)
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Accept Entry of Motion for Summary
Judgment Under M.R. Civ. P. 56, Modify the Scheduling Order, And/Or Enlarge the
Dispositive Motion Deadline, Nunc Pro Tune. Plaintiffs Campbell and Jennie Clegg (“the
Cleggs”) oppose both motions. For the following reasons, the Court grants AA’s motions.
I. AA’s Motion to Accept Entry of Motion for Summary Judgment

AA moves for acceptance of its late-filed Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Court’s Order dated July 10, 2023, set a dispositive motion deadline of October 2, 2023.
Although AA initially attempted to file its Motion for Summary Judgment before that
deadline, they neglected to include the filing fee with their motion, so it was rejected by
the clerk. AA represents that the Cleggs’ counsel timely received the first attempted
filing. A second filing was received by the Court by mail on October 16, 2023, but not
docketed until October 22, 2023. AA neglected to copy the Cleggs’ counsel on the second
filing. Upon realizing their failure to copy counsel, AA then filed the pending motion.
AA asserts that the motion should be granted because it will not delay trial and because

good cause exists.

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The Court “has discretion to allow a late-filed motion for summary judgment, even
absent a showing of excusable neglect, if the request is made ‘within such time as not to
delay the trial’” Levis v. Konitzky, 2016 ME 167, 7 17, 151 A.3d 20 (quoting M_R. Civ. P.
56(b)). When deciding whether to allow a late-filed motion for summary judgment, the
Court should consider “whether the motion is interposed for the purpose of delay, and
whether granting leave to file the motion will promote effective case management or
result in undue costs to the parties or prejudice to the nonmoving party.” Id.

The Court finds that AA’s motion was not filed for the purpose of delay, that it
will not delay trial, and that it presents an important legal issue that would be most
efficiently decided through a motion for summary judgment. The Cleggs have already
filed their opposition to the motion. No prejudice will result to them. Accordingly, the
Court grants AA’s Motion to Accept Entry of Motion for Summary Judgment and accepts
the late-filed Motion for Summary Judgment.

Il. AA’s Motion for Summary Judgment

AA moves for summary judgment on the grounds that there is no genuine issue
of material fact and that the Cleggs’ claims are preempted by the federal Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (the “ADA”).

A. Facts

The following facts are drawn from the summary judgment record.’ Denials and
qualifications are noted when relevant.

The Cleggs purchased five first-class tickets from AA on or around February 1,

2022, for a flight departing on the morning of May 14, 2022, from Albany, New York, to

1 The summary judgment record consists only of the parties’ properly supported statements of material
fact and the portions of the record referenced therein. See Dorsey v. N. Light Health, 2022 ME 62, { 10, 288
A.3d 386. To controvert a party’s statement of fact, an opposing party must “support each denial or
qualification by a record citation.” MR. Civ. P. 56(h)(2).

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San Francisco, California, and returning on May 21, 2022. (AA’s Supp’g S.MLF. {] 1.) When
purchasing the tickets, the Cleggs agreed to the applicable Conditions of Carriage
(“COC”), (AA’s Supp’g S.MLF. { 2.)

The COC provide, in part:

When you buy a ticket or travel on a flight provided by American Airlines, you
agree:

e To the extent not preempted by federal law, Texas law applies to this
contract ....

© This contract cannot be modified or waived unless authorized in writing by
an American Airlines corporate officer.

e This contract is the entire agreement that governs your rights and
responsibilities as a passenger. . . .

¢ Limit of liability: You agree we are not liable for special, consequential,
indirect or incidental damages that arise from this agreement, even if we
knew, should’ve known or were advised damages were possible, including
from lost, damaged or delayed bags (including lost revenue or business
interruption).
(AA’s Supp’g S.M.F, J 14; AA’s Ex. A.)

With regard to check-in, the COC provides:

When it comes to checking in and arriving at the airport, earlier is better. Give

yourself extra time if you’re checking bags or traveling internationally.

Check-in times

In most cities, you must be checked in:
e Atleast 45 minutes before scheduled departure, for flights within the U.S.
(AAs Supp’g $.M.F. 7 15; AA’s Ex. A.) A “Check-in and arrival” information page linked
in the COC advises:

Our recommended arrival times are meant to allow plenty of time to check in (with
or without bags) and clear security before scheduled departure.

¢ Within the U.S. — at least 2 hours

2 The Cleggs did not cite to the record in support of their qualification of this statement of material fact.
Accordingly, it is deemed admitted without qualification.

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(AA‘s Supp’g S.MLF. { 16; AA’s Ex. B.)

On May 13, 2022, the Cleggs attempted to check into their flight online three times,
but the online check-in system did not permit them to do so. (AA’s Supp’g 3.M.LF. { 3;
Cleggs’ Resp. AA’s Supp’g S.MLF. { 3; Cleggs’ Add’l S.MLF. q A.) AA’s online system
instructed the Cleggs to “Check in at Airport.” (AA’s Supp’g 5.M.F, { 4; Cleggs’ Add’1
S.M.F. TB.)

The Cleggs arrived at the airport at 4:47 a.m. on May 14, and reached the ticket
counter sometime before 5:00 a.m. (AA’s Supp’g S.MLF. {| 6.) The flight was scheduled to
depart at 6:04 am. on May 14, 2022. (AA’s Supp’g S.M.F. 5.) The cut-off time for
checking in under the COC is forty-five minutes before the scheduled departure of the
flight. (AA’s Supp’g S.M.F. 1 8-9.) This includes the time necessary for checking bags.
(AA’s Supp’g S.M.F. { 10.)

When the Cleggs arrived at the ticket counter on May 14, an agent advised them
that while she could see the reservation and see that seats had been assigned to the
Cleges, AA’s computer system would not let her complete the check-in process. (Cleggs’
Add‘ S.M.F. B; AA’s Supp’g S.MLF. ¥ 7.) The issues preventing the ticket agent from
checking the Cleggs into their flight were not resolved before the cut-off time and they
missed the cut-off to check in. (AA‘s Supp’g S.M.F. {{ 8-9.) Boarding passes could not be
issued. (AA’s Supp’g S.M.F. {[ 11.)

The agent advised the Cleggs that there was an AA flight leaving from Boston that

afternoon that had availability. (Cleggs’ Add’! S.M.F. { F.) The agent advised that if she

3 The language quoted in paragraph 17 of AA’s Statement of Material Facts does not appear in the portion
of the record cited. Accordingly, paragraph 17 is omitted from the Court’s recitation of the facts in the
record.

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booked the flight from Boston, they would lose their return tickets, but if they booked the
new flight themselves, the return tickets would be preserved. (Cleggs’ Add’15.M.P. 4 G.}

The Cleggs attempted to book the new AA flight themselves, but due to difficulties
with the mobile application and price increases, they ultimately elected to book a flight
with a different airline. (Cleggs’ Add’l S.M.F. 7 H.) The agent assured them that if they
booked a flight on a different airline their return flight would not be affected if the agent
did not rebook the flight. (Cleggs’ Add’15.M.F. 4 L)

The holders of the other three tickets that the Cleggs purchased on February 1,
2022, were able to check in online successfully on May 13, 2022, and arrived at the gate
for their outbound flight at approximately 5:20 a.m. (Cleggs’ Add’‘1S.MF. 17 ©, D.) The
Cleggs’ assigned seats on their original outbound flight were empty. (Cleggs’ Add’l
SME. {J.)

The night before the Cleggs’ return flight, they received an email from AA
prompting them to check in for their return flight. (Cleggs’ Add’1S.M.F. {| K.) When they
attempted to check in online as prompted, they received an error message and were
unable to check in. (Cleggs’ Add’15.MLF. ¥j L.)

The Cleggs then called AA to determine how to check in, at which point AA
advised that their return tickets had been cancelled because they did not board the
outbound flight. (Cleggs’ Add’1 S.M.F. 7 M.) The Cleggs were not notified prior to this
conversation that their return tickets had been canceled. (Cleggs’ Add’I S.M.F. {| N.) The

Cleggs never received a refund for the outbound or return flights. (Cleggs’ Add’1S.MLF.
1 O.)

4 Material cited by AA in response to paragraphs G and I of the Cleggs’ Additional Statement of Material
Facts does not directly support their denial of those paragraphs. Accordingly, paragraphs G and I are
deemed admitted.

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B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the summary judgment record, taken in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue
of material fact in dispute and the moving party would be entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law at trial.” Chartier v. Farm Fam. Life Ins. Co., 2015 ME 29, | 6, 113 A.3d 234;
see MLR. Civ. P. 56(c). “A material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case, and
there is a ‘genuine issue’ when there is sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to choose
between competing versions of the fact.” Toto v. Knowles, 2021 ME 51, 8, 261 A.3d 233
(quoting Stewart-Dore v. Webber Hosp. Ass'n, 2011 ME 26, { 8, 13 A.3d 773). To survive a
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must present a prima facie case
for each challenged element of his claim. See Botvin v. Somatex, Inc., 2022 ME 44, ¥ 10, 279
A.3d 393.

C. Discussion

The Cleggs’ Complaint consists of three counts: Count I for breach of contract,
Count Ul for fraud, and Count III for violation of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act.
AA contends that it is not liable under state law because all of the Cleggs’ claims fall
under the ADA, which contains an express preemption provision as follows:

Except as provided in this subsection, a State, political subdivision of a

State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or enforce a

law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related

to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air

transportation under this subpart.
49 US.C. § 41713(b)(1). The United States Supreme Court has interpreted section
41713(b)(1) as expressing a “broad pre-emptive purpose.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 504 U.S, 374, 383 (1992).

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has interpreted section

41713(b\(1) as requiring resolution of two questions to determine whether a claim is

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preempted. Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 720 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2013). First, “whether
the arguably preempted claim is based on a state ‘law, regulation, or other provision
having the force and effect of law’” (the question of “mechanism” ), and second, “whether
the claim is sufficiently ‘related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier” (the question
of “linkage”). Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)).

The Cleggs concede that the “mechanism” prong is met as to their claims. (Cleggs’
Opp’n to AA’s Mot. Summ. J. 6.) As to linkage, the three counts of the Cleggs’ Complaint
arise from AA’s failure to issue boarding passes, cancellation of their return tickets, and
the ticket agent’s representations about their return tickets. These claims are all clearly
“related to a... service of an air carrier” within the plain meaning of the statute; that is,
ticketing. The Cleggs’ argument that their claims are not related to a service, but rather
to a failure to render a service, is unpersuasive.

In the alternative, the Cleggs argue that an exception to preemption applies for
breach of a “self-imposed undertaking” under American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S.
219, 228 (1995). The Wolens Court held that the ADA “allows room for court enforcement
of contract terms set by the parties themselves,” with “no enlargement or enhancement
based on state laws or policies external to the agreement.” Id. at 222, 233.

The Cleggs argue that their breach of contract claim is not preempted because AA
imposed obligations on itself through the COC and breached those obligations. Although
they assert three ways in which AA breached the COC, the Cleggs only provide
substantive argument and citation to specific provisions of the COC regarding AA‘s

failure to refund.’

5 Specifically, they assert that AA breached the COC when AA failed to issue a boarding pass, assist the
Cleggs in rebooking their flights, and refund the ticket price.

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To determine whether the COC obligated AA to issue a refund or whether there
exists a dispute of fact on that issue, the Court must interpret the language of the COC.
The Supreme Court of Texas* has held:

We afford contract language its plain, grammatical, and ordinary meaning

unless doing so “would clearly defeat the parties’ intentions” or the

instrument shows the parties used the terms in a different or technical
sense.

Whether a contract is ambiguous or not is a question of law. Ifa
contract has a certain and definite meaning, the contract is unambiguous,

and we will construe it as a matter of law and enforce it as written. A

contract subject to more than one reasonable interpretation is ambiguous,

giving rise to a fact issue regarding the parties’ intent.
Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. BlueSione Nat. Res., 639 S.W.3d 682, 690 (Tex. 2022).

The Cleggs claim they should have been issued a refund under two provisions of
the COC.’ First, they cite to a provision under the heading “Our responsibilities when
there are schedule/ operation changes” that reads: “If we or our airline partner fails to
operate or delays your arrival more than 4 hours, our sole obligation is to refund the
remaining ticket value and any optional fees according to our involuntary refunds policy,
subject to our policy for rebooking your delayed /cancelled flight.” (AA's Ex. A.)

This provision is plainly inapplicable. There is no dispute that the flight departed
with the other members of the Cleggs’ party on board. There was clearly no failure to
operate or delay. The Cleggs’ proposed interpretation of “fail[] to operate’—which they
argue could mean fail to issue a boarding pass—is unreasonable and therefore does not

generate an ambiguity.

Second, they point to a provision that reads:

® Because the COC provides that Texas law governs the parties’ contractual relationship, the Court will
apply Maine law to procedural matters and Texas law to substantive matters. See McDonald v. Seitec, Inc.,
2013 ME 59, { 4n.3, 79 A.3d 374,

7 The Court would note that the Cleggs cite provisions of the COC which are not specifically cited or
referenced in either party’s statement of material facts.

Page 8 of 10

Involuntary refunds
If you are due a refund because we failed to operate on schedule (a delay to

your departure time of over 4 hours) or we refused to let you fly for reasons
other than your violation of this contract, we will refund you:

e The full amount of the ticket and any extras if travel hasn’‘t started

(AA‘s Ex. A.}

This provision, read in the context of the COC as a whole, simply explains how
much will be refunded if you are due a refund, (AA’s Ex. A (emphasis added).) It does
not, standing alone, obligate AA to issue a refund in any particular circumstance. The
preceding provisions, such as the first provision cited by the Cleggs, provide when AA
will issue a refund.

The COC provide that passengers must be checked in within forty-five minutes of
scheduled departure in most cities. (AAs Supp’g 5.MLF. { 15; AA’s Ex. A.) The Cleggs
were denied boarding because they failed to arrive at the ticket counter early enough to
complete the check-in process and check their bags as required by the COC, The COC
does not obligate AA to refund when issues encountered during check-in take longer to
resolve than the time between the customer's arrival and the cut-off time.* Accordingly,
none of the Cleggs’ claims falls within the Wolens exception to preemption.

Because there is no dispute of material fact and the Cleggs’ claims are preempted

by the ADA, AA is entitled to summary judgment on the Cleggs’ Complaint.

8 With regards to AA’s failure to issue a boarding pass, the Cleggs do not cite any provision of the COC
that obligates AA to issue a boarding pass after the check-in cutoff time has passed. The Cleggs do not
argue that the COC obligate AA to refund a return ticket that is cancelled pursuant to their policies for
missed flights, and no such provision is present in the record. And to be clear, any verbal representation
by the ticket agent regarding the preservation of their return tickets would not impose an obligation on AA
under the COC becatise the COC provide that its terms “cannot be modified or waived unless authorized
in writing by an American Airlines corporate officer.” (AA's Supp’g S.M.F. 7 14; AA’s Ex. A.)

Page 9 of 10

Ill. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant both of AA’s pending motions.

The entry is:

1. Defendant American Airlines, Inc.’s (“AA”) Motion to Accept Entry of Motion
for Summary Judgment Under MLR. Civ. P. 56, Modify the Scheduling Order,
And/Or Enlarge the Dispositive Motion Deadline, Nunc Pro Tunc is GRANTED,
and the Motion for Summary Judgment is accepted as filed; and

9. AA's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Judgment is entered for AA
on Plaintiffs Jennie and Campbell Clegg’s Complaint.

The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference

pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79{a).

Dated: Sait Vt DD A C2 Y Jt 2X
ye

MarGdy Kennedy, Justice
M¢diné Superior Court

Entered on the Docket: O| 3] foc LY

inti Is, ESG.-
ntiffs-Lee Ba ,
vefendant-William sma

rt, ESQ.

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