State of Maine v. Hannan

STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL COURT
CUMBERLAND, ss. PORTLAND
Docket No. CR-17-7211

STATE OF MAINE )
)
)
V. ) ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
) MOTION TO SUPPRESS RE(~ 5f; (:tJM.8 t:L ERJ:-s DFC
) LTl~L .2 '19 .F'.~4:1t3
PARLEYE. HANNAN )
)
Defendant )

By motion dated January 31, 2018, Ms. Hannan seeks to suppress the results of a
blood test which she claims was improperly administered because, although she had
ostensibly "consented" to the blood draw, she did so because she believed she had no
choice.
The court held an evidentiary hearing on January 17, 2019. Assistant District
Attorney William Barry appeared on behalf of the State, and Attorney Peter Radway
appeared on behalf of Ms. Hannan. The court heard testimony from Ms. Hannan as well
as from South Portland Police Officer Kaitlyn Thurlow, and in ruling on Ms. Harman's
motion has considered the evidence adduced at hearing as well as the arguments
contained in the parties' respective memoranda of law. See Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion to Suppress Results of Blood Test, filed March 18, 2009, and State's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, filed May 29, 2019.
The facts are essentially undisputed. On July 14, 2017, Ms. Hannan lost control of
her vehicle and crashed into a guardrail. EMTs were attending to· her when Officer
Thurlow arrived at the scene. Officer Thurlow heard Ms. Hannan say that she had had
some wine before the crash, and the officer detected the odor of intoxicants. After Ms.
Hannan was taken to the hospital for further examination, Officer Thurlow approached
Ms. Hannan in the Emergency Department and told her that she believed Ms. Hannan
"was under the influence" and that "she would need to take [her] blood." Ms. Hannan
verbally consented and Officer Thurlow then had her sign a consent form. Although Ms.
Hannan consented to the blood draw and signed the written consent form, she did so
because she did not believe she had the option to refuse, having not been advised by
Officer Thurlow that she had the right to withhold consent.
Ms. Hannan contends that suppression of the results of the blood draw is
warranted because the State failed to meet its burden of showing that the consent was
voluntary and not simply "mere acquiescence and cooperation," citing State v. Boyd, 2017
ME36.
Boyd, however, is readily distinguishable because in that case the officer did not
attempt to obtain consent for the blood test. Rather, the officer had the driver's blood
drawn without obtaining any consent and without any warnings or discussion regarding
the blood test whatsoever.
Unlike in Boyd, the issue presented in this case is whether Ms. Harman's purported
consent was legally and constitutionally ineffective because she had not been told that
she had the right to refuse. The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly rejected such an
argument, ruling that "knowledge of a right to refuse is not a prerequisite of voluntary
consent. ... In short, neither this Court's prior cases, nor the traditional definition of
'voluntariness' requires proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of
effective consent to a search." Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
In State v. LeMeunier-Fitzgerald, 2018 ME 85, the Law Court applied Schneckloth in
considering: "[W]hether, given the need to prevent drivers from operating vehicles while
under the influence of intoxicants, it is reasonable to draw a driver's blood without
procuring a warrant when the driver has consented to a blood test after being read
Maine's statutory warnings about the consequences of refusing to submit to testing." Id.
'll 15. In that case, the officer, reading verbatim from a warning form, informed the driver:
"If you are convicted of operating while under the influence ... your failure to submit to
a chemical test will be considered an aggravating factor at sentencing which in addition
to other penalties, will subject you to a mandatory minimum period of incarceration." Id.
'll 4. After receiving that warning, the driver agreed to submit to a blood test, and a blood
sample was taken from her without a warrant. Significantly with respect to Ms. Hannan's
contention, the Law Court expressly rejected the argument that the recital of adverse
consequences stemming from a refusal to submit undermined the voluntariness of the
consent provided. See id. 'll 31 ("In sum, when probable cause exists, a warrantless blood
test is not unreasonable when a driver has consented to testing after being warned that
the lower limit of a court's sentencing range will increase if the driver refuses to submit
to testing and is ultimately convicted of OUI.").

2
(
( l

Applying LeMeunier-Fitzgerald, which in turn applies the U.S. Supreme Court's
ruling in Schneckloth, the court determines from the totality of the circumstances that Ms.
Harman's consent to the blood test was voluntary and was neither "coerced by explicit
or implicit means" nor "induced by deceit, trickery, or misrepresentation." 2018 ME 85,
'II 22. Accordingly, having found that the State has "proven by a preponderance of the
evidence, that an objective manifestation of consent was given" by Ms. Hannan, id. <JI 21,
it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress Results of Blood Test is
hereby DENIED.
The clerk shall schedule this matter for trial.

DATED: a JV~ 11

3
STATE OF,MAINE CRIMINAL DOCKET
vs'
r p,
CUMBERLAND, ss .
PARLEY E HANNAN
288 BLACK POINT ROAD APT A
i Docket No CUMCD-CR-2017-07211

SCARBOROUGH ME 04074 ~ \SC Zb-Y DOCKET RECORD
DOB: 08'/10/1996
Attorney: PETER RODWA Y State's Attorney: STEPHANIE ANDERSON
RODWA Y & HORODYSKI PA
POBOX444
l20 EXCHANGE STREET 4TH FLOOR
PORTLAND ME 04112-0444
RETAINED 10/23/2017
Filing Document: CRIMINAL COMPLAINT Major Case Type: MISDEMEANOR (CLASS D,E)
Filing Date: 12/14/2017
Charge(s)
1 OUI (ALCOHOL) 07/15/2017 SOUTH PORTLAND
Seq 12942 29-A 2411(1-A)(A) Class D

Docket Events:
12/19/2017 FILING DOCUMENT- CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FILED ON 12/14/2017

12/19/2017 Charge(s): 1
HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT SCHEDULE OTHER COURT ON 12/20/2017 at 08:30 a.m. in Room No. 1

PORSC
12/19/2017 Party(s): PARLEY E HANNAN
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 10/23/2017

Attorney: PETER RODWA Y
12/20/2017 Charge(s): 1
HEARING- ARRAIGNMENT WAIVED ON 12/20/2017

12/20/2017 Charge(s): 1
PLEA - NOT GUILTY ENTERED BY COUNSEL ON 12/20/2017

12/20/2017 HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 03/06/2018 at 10:00 a.m. in Room No. 7

12/20/2017 Charge(s): 1
TRIAL - JURY TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR 05/14/2018 at 08:30 a.m. in Room No. 11

NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
03/06/2018 HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE HELD ON 03/06/2018
JOYCE A WHEELER , JUSTICE
Attorney: PETER RODWAY
DA: WILLIAM BARRY
Defendant Not Present in Court
CONF HELD, OFFER MADE. AGREEMENT TO RESET CASE. ALL NEW DATES GIVEN .
03/06/2018 Charge(s): 1
TRIAL - JURY TRIAL CONTINUED ON 03/06/2018

03/06/2018 Charge(s): 1
HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 05/22/2018 at 02:00 p.m. in Room No. 7

03/06/2018 Charge(s): 1
TRIAL - JURY TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR 07/23/2018 at 08:30 a.m. in Room No . 11
CR-200 Page 1 of 4 Printed on: 07/03/2019