TPL Financial Services, LLC v. A.L. Doggett, Inc.

ST ATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
ANDROSCOGGIN, ss DOCKET NO. CV-20-71

TPL Financial Services, LLC, )
) E c
Plaintiff, )
)
V. )
)
A.L. Doggett, Inc., ) Rchl!fe!yi;)Ji Motions to Dismiss
Christopher R. Breau, ) Counts VII · IX
Bald Eagle, Inc., )
Just Taxes, LLC, )
Virginia Fowler-Rawls, )
W.R. Green & Sons, Inc., )
Apex Electric, LLC, )
Trombley Redi-Mix, Inc., )
Simard Constructions, Inc., )
Michael J. White, and )
JBBC,Inc. )
)
Defendants. )

In June 2019, A.L. Doggett, Inc. contracted with Bald Eagle, Inc. to undertake tank

installation and related work at Bald Eagle's service station in Eagle Lake, Maine. Because A.L.

Doggett required financing in order to do the Bald Eagle project, it entered into a financing

agreement with Plaintiff in July 2019. Plaintiff thereafter advanced money for the project which

has not been paid back to it.

A.L. Doggett commenced work and eventually billed Bald Eagle for $136,073.08 which

remains unpaid. W.H. Green & Sons, Inc.; Apex Electric, LLC; Trombley Redi-Mix, Inc.;

Simard Construction, Inc.; Michael J. White; and JBBC, Inc. are all subcontractors of A.L.

Doggett. In May 2020, Bald Eagle obtained financing from FAME. When they closed, Bald

Eagle paid $31,221.19 to the various subcontractors and did not pay anything to Plaintiff,

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allegedly contrary to the terms of the Customer Notification and Consent it had signed. This suit

followed.

Counts VII through IX of the Complaint seek damages pursuant to the Maine Uniform

Fraudulent Transfer Act against Bald Eagle and the six subcontractor defendants. Defendants

Bald Eagle, Inc., Simard Constructions, Inc., JBBC, Inc., Trombley Redi-Mix, Inc., and W.H.

Green & Sons, Inc. have moved to dismiss Counts VII through IX The motions are brought

pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and failure to allege the claims with

sufficient particularity pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 9(b).

Specifically, Counts VII incorporates all prior allegations and alleges the transfers are

avoidable pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 3575(l)(A), as follows:

101. On or about May 20, 2020, Bald Eagle, with actual intent to
hinder, delay or defraud TPL, which was a creditor of TPL at the time of the
Transfers ... , made transfers of funds to Subcontractor Defendant [totally
$31,221.19].
102. As a result of the Transfers, TPL, as creditor of Bald Eagle, has
suffered damages.
103. Subcontractor Defendants were the initial transferees of the
Transfers or the entities for whose benefit the Transfers were made or an
immediate or mediate transferee of the initial transferee.
104. The transfers are avoidable pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 3575(1)(A),
TPL may recover from Bald Eagle and/or Subcontractor Defendants the Transfers
or the value of the Transfers.

Count VIII additionally alleges the transfers are avoidable pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 3575(l)(B) as

follows:

106. Before and after the Transfers, Bald Eagle was engaged or was
about to engage in a business or a transaction for which its remaining assets were
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction.
107. Bald Eagle did not receive a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the Transfers.
108. Before and after the Transfers, Bald Eagle intended to incur, or
believed or reasonably should have believed that it would incur, debts beyond its
ability to pay as the debts became due.'

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Finally, Count IX alleges the transfers are avoidable pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 3576( 1) as follows:

114. Bald Eagle made the Transfers to Subcontractor Defendants
without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the Transfers and
Bald Eagle was insolvent at the time of the Transfers and/or Bald Eagle became
insolvent as a result of the Transfers.

115. As of May 20, 2020, unsecured creditors of Bald Eagle, including
TPL, had claims against it in an amount of no less than $148,000.

These Counts incorporate the language of the Maine Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and state

the elements of claims under the referenced subsections.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the complaint on a motion to dismiss under M.R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the material allegations of the complaint are taken as true and court examines

the complaint "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether [the complaint I

sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief

pursuant to some legal theory." Anctil v. Cassese, 2020 ME 59, lJ 10,232 A.3d 245,250, quoting

Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co., 2012 ME 113, lJ 6, 54 A.3d 710. The claim will not be dismissed

unless it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any facts it might prove. Id.

Defendants first argue that M.R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires that the circumstances constituting

fraud in each of these Counts must be stated with particularity, and they are not. The court

disagrees. First, these are statutory claims and not common-law claims of fraud. It should be

sufficient to allege the statutory elements. 1 Second, Plaintiff has alleged with great deal of

1 Defendants cite Bean v. Cummings, 2008 ME 18 for the proposition that a statut01y pe1jury claim is like
a claim of fraud and requires a higher pleading standard with circumstances pied with particularity. That
case was not interpreting Rule 9(b) but rather the civil pe1jury statute itself, which explicitly requires that
the claim identify the specific testimony alleged to be false at the initial filing of the claim. Moreover, the
statute states its pleading and proof requirements must be stdctly construed. 14 M.R.S. § 870. There are
no such requirements in the Maine Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.

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specificity all the events in the case. It remains to be seen whether there was in fact any

fraudulent transfer, but the allegations are there.

Defendants also argue Count VII fails to state a claim because it is not sufficient to allege

"actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud"; rather, Plaintiff must allege the specific facts to

support that allegation. The court disagrees that any more specificity is required.

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to show that Bald

Eagle paid the Subcontractors "without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange,"

and indeed that Plaintiff specifically alleged elsewhere in the Complaint that A.L. Doggett in fact

did not pay the Subcontractors in full. While the court certainly questions whether Plaintiff can

prove that Bald Eagle did not receive a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the

payments, Plaintiff is permitted to plead in the alternative and inconsistently, and it has done so

here.

For these reasons, the motions to dismiss Counts VII, VIII and IX are denied. This Order

may be incorporated on the docket of the case by reference pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 79(a).

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Dated: _ _ _f_,1/_ -1-/~-io_io
__
Valerie Stanfill
Justice, Maine Superior Court

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ST ATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
D & Fl DOCKET NO. CV-20-71
ANDROSCOGGIN, ss

TPL Financial Services, LLC,

Plaintiff,
)
V. ) Attachment Order
)
A.L. Doggett, Inc., )
Christopher R. Breau, )
Bald Eagle, Inc., )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )

This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment attachment

against Defendants A.L. Doggett, Inc., Christopher R. Breau and Bald Eagle, Inc. Attachment is

sought under Counts 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the Complaint. Attachment is not sought against the

remaining defendants or pursuant to the remaining counts 1 . The court has considered Plaintiff's

motion and all supporting documentation as well as Defendant Bald Eagle's opposition 2 and

Plaintiff's reply thereto. No opposition has been filed by any other party.

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 4A,

No property may be attached unless such attachment for a specified amount is approved
by order of the court. ... upon a finding by the court that it is more likely than not that
the plaintiff will recover judgment, including interest and costs, in an amount equal to or
greater than the aggregate sum of the attachment and any liability insurance, bond, or
other security, and any property or credits attached by other writ of attachment or by
trustee process shown by the defendant to be available to satisfy the judgment.

1 A separate order deals with the pending motions to dismiss Counts VII-IX of the Complaint.

2 The court notes that even if Bald Eagle waived objection by not filing a timely objection to the motion
for attachment, the court must still determine whether Plaintiff has in fact met the standards for
attachment by examining the affidavits and documents submitted in support of the request. M.R. Civ. P.
4A(c). Because much of what the court discusses in this motion is based on Plaintiff's own filings, the
same result would occur.

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The standard for attachment on trustee process is the same. M.R. Civ. P. 4B(c). Of particular

note in this case,

[WJhether a party will receive an attachment depends on the party's proof, by a
preponderance of the evidence, of both the likelihood of success in the underlying
suit and the likelihood of recovering in that amount or greater. Boisvert v.
Boisvert, 672 A.2d 96, 98 n.3 (Me. 1996).

Estate of Summers v. Nisbet, 2016 ME 88, ~6. Thus, it is not enough for Plaintiff to establish

that it is likely to succeed against some defendant; Plaintiff must establish a claim against each

defendant against whom it seeks to recover, and must establish a basis for the amount sought

from that party. See also Bowman v. Dussault,425 A.2d 1325, 1329 (Me. 1981). In this case,

both A.L. Doggett and Breau failed to answer and defaults were entered. Those defaults

establish that Plaintiff is likely to succeed against them. The defaults do not establish, however,

the amount to which Plaintiff may be entitled. Thus, the court considers the claims against each

defendant separately.

Factual Background

The undisputed facts show that in June 2019, A.L. Doggett entered into an agreement

with Bald Eagle to undertake tank installation and related work at Bald Eagle's service station in

Eagle Lake, Maine. Because A .L. Doggett required financing in order to do the Bald Eagle

project, it entered into a financing agreement with Plaintiff in July 2019. Breau is a principal in

A.L. Doggett, and executed a personal guarantee of A.L. Doggett's obligations under the

financing agreement with Plaintiff. Plaintiff thereafter advanced a total of $107,000 to A.L.

Doggett in October 2019 under the agreement which has not been paid back to it.

In October 2019, Bald Eagle executed a "Customer Notification and Consent" with A.L.

Doggett, under which it agreed as follows:

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Pursuant to our [A.L. Doggett's] agreement with TPL all right, title, and interest in our
rights to payment under the Contract have been assigned to TPL. Your payment to TPL
in full is the only valid discharge of your payment obligations under said Contract.

This Customer Notification and Consent ("Consent") addresses only the assignment of
payment rights to TPL. All petformance obligations under the CONTRACT remain our
obligation exclusively.

The referenced "Contract" was the Bald Eagle project. At that point, Bald Eagle had already

paid $59,951.92 for the project which had an original contract price of $179,855.76, with

approximately $10,000 additional in change orders.

Thereafter A.L. Doggett billed Bald Eagle for $136,073.08 which remains unpaid. A.L.

Doggett did not complete the project and apparently did not pay a number of the subcontractors,

who are also named as defendants in this action3 • In May 2020, Bald Eagle obtained financing

from FAME. When they closed, Bald Eagle paid $31,221.19 to the various subcontractors and

did not pay anything to either A.L. Doggett or to Plaintiff. This suit followed.

A.L. Doggett

Plaintiff asserts that it is owed $148,755.84 from A.L. Doggett as of May 20, 2020 under

the Financing Agreement (Count I). This amount of $148,755.84 is asserted to be due in the

complaint, in the attachment motion and in the affidavit of Timothy Roach, but nowhere does

Plaintiff explain where that figure comes from. The Financing Agreement requires A.L. Doggett

to pay Plaintiff the amount of all payments received from Bald Eagle, but it does not appear that

Bald Eagle made any payments to A.L. Doggett after the initial payment of $59,951.92 so that

does not explain the demand for $148,755.84. Plaintiff asserts that pursuant to the Consent, Bald

Eagle should have paid to it the $31,221.19 paid directly to subcontractors, but that does not

3Subcontractors named as defendants are: W.H. Green & Sons, Inc.; Apex Electric, LLC; Trombley
Redi-Mix, Inc.; Simard Construction, Inc.; Michael J. White; and JBBC, Inc. These defendants are
named only in Counts 7 - 9 and no attachment is sought against any of them.

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explain the demand for $148,755.84. It is undisputed Plaintiff advanced $107,000 to A.L.

Doggett under the Financing Agreement, but that does not explain the demand for $148,755.84.

Plaintiff states that it seeks judgment and attachment in the "principal amount" of $148,755.84,

"plus any and all additional interest, expenses, costs of collection, and attorney's fees", so

presumably that amount does not include such additions. The court has examined all of the

exhibits, has tried adding and subtracting the various sums referenced, and finds no calculation

that fits. In short, the court is baffled as to explanation for the $148,755.84 sought.

As noted above, Plaintiff must establish "both the likelihood of success in the underlying

suit and the likelihood of recovering in that amount or greater." Estate of Summers, 2016 ME 88,

~6. Plaintiff has indeed established it is likely to recover $107,000 from A.L. Doggett, but has

not established how much more than that it may be entitled to4 . Therefore, the court orders that

Plaintiff may have prejudgment attachment, including attachment on trustee process, in the

amount of $107,000.00 against A.L. Doggett, Inc. on Counts 1 and 3 of the Complaint.

Christopher R. Breau

As stated above, Breau executed a personal guarantee to Plaintiff for the debts of A.L.

Doggett. Therefore, for the same reasons stated above, the court orders that Plaintiff may have

prejudgment attachment, including attachment on trustee process, in the amount of $107,000.00

against Christopher R. Breau on Count VI of the Complaint..

Bald Eagle, Inc.

Bald Eagle entered into a "Customer Notification and Consent" with A.L. Doggett.

Despite Plaintiff's argument and assertions to the contrary, Plaintiff has not established that Bald

4Certainly Plaintiff is entitled to contract interest and other additions, but Plaintiff has not established
how much that is.

4
Eagle has a contractual relationship with Plaintiff. The Consent assigned all of A .L. Doggett's

right to payments from Bald Eagle to Plaintiff, such that Bald Eagle is obligated to make all

payments for the project directly to Plaintiff and not to A .L. Doggett. Bald Eagle is not

responsible for other obligations of A.L. Doggett to Plaintiff under the Consent. The Consent

does not put Bald Eagle in A .L. Doggett's stead in relationship to Plaintiff. Rather, Bald Eagle is

only responsible to pay any sums it owes A.L. Doggett directly to Plaintiff.

A.L. Doggett billed Bald Eagle for $136,073.08 for the project; under the Consent, Bald

Eagle is required to pay Plaintiff directly rather than A.L. Doggett. Bald Eagle has not paid A.L.

Doggett. Thus, Plaintiff is presumably claiming that Bald Eagle owes it $136,073.08 because

that is the amount it owes A.L. Doggett. Bald Eagle, however, disputes that it owes that much to

A.L. Doggett because A.L. Doggett did not complete its obligations included in that billing.

Plaintiff does not address whether A.L. Doggett is entitled to the full $136,073.08 or whether the

work was completed; it simply bases its claim on the fact that this is the amount billed. This is

not sufficient for the court to find that it is more likely than not that Bald Eagle is liable to A.L.

Doggett - and hence to Plaintiff - for that amount. No party attempts to parse out how much

might be owed if not the total claimed. Thus, while the court is persuaded that Bald Eagle likely

owes money to A.L. Doggett for the project and thus to Plaintiff, it is unclear to the court how

much more is owed.

Plaintiff also claims that the $31,221.19 Bald Eagle paid to the subcontractors was really

owed to A.L. Doggett and therefore should have been paid to Plaintiff under the Consent. While

Bald Eagle argues a number of reasons why it felt it appropriate to pay the subcontractors

directly, it agrees that these payments were A.L. Doggett's responsibility, and that had the

contract proceeded as it was supposed to, these were monies it would have paid to A.L. Doggett.

5
Under these circumstances, the court agrees that it is more likely than not that the Consent

required Bald Eagle to pay the money to Plaintiff, and thus that Plaintiff is entitled to an

attachment against Bald Eagle in the amount of $31,221.19 on Count II of the Complaint.

Count III of the Complaint asserts a claim for unjust enrichment against Bald Eagle (as

well as A.L. Doggett) in the amount of $107,000. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that "TPL

conferred benefits upon A.L. Doggett and Bald Eagle when it provided financing to and for the

benefit of A.L. Doggett and Bald Eagle". Complaint, Paragraph 76. Plaintiff advanced

$107,000 only to A.L. Doggett, however, and not to Bald Eagle. In its motion for attachment

and supporting documents Plaintiff does not otherwise attempt to quantify any benefit it directly

conferred upon Bald Eagle. Thus, even if Bald Eagle benefitted unjustly from the financing

Plaintiff provided to A.L. Doggett, there is nothing from which the court could find the value of

that benefit. 5

Conclusion and Attachment Order

For all of the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's motion for attachment is granted in patt and

denied in part. The court orders as follows:

1. On Counts I and III of the Complaint, attachment, including attachment on
trustee process, may be made against Defendant A.L. Doggett, Inc. and its
property, both real and personal, tangible and intangible, and not otherwise
exempt from attachment and attachment on trustee process in the amount of
$107,000 plus prejudgment interest accruing from the date of filing of the
Complaint.

2. On Count VI of the Complaint, attachment, including attachment on trustee
process, may be made against Christopher R. Breau and his property, both real
and personal, tangible and intangible, and not otherwise exempt from
attachment and attachment on trustee process in the amount of $107,000 plus
prejudgment interest accruing from the date of filing of the Complaint.

5 Bald Eagle tries to argue that Plaintiff has "unclean hands" and is thus barred in its claims. The court

does not reach this issue, because the "clean hands" doctrine does not apply to the contractual claim in
Count II, and the court has found that Plaintiff has not sufficiently quantified any benefit conferred upon
Bald Eagle in Count Ill.

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3. On Count II of the Complaint, attachment, including attachment on trustee
process, may be made against Defendant A.L. Doggett, Inc. and its property,
both real and personal, tangible and intangible, and not otherwise exempt
from attachment and attachment on trustee process in the amount of
$31,221.19 plus prejudgment interest accruing from the date of filing of the
Complaint.

This order may be incorporated on the docket of the case by reference pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P.

79(a).

Dated:_ _ _----'-/1:_-,(L';,="r+/---"'l,,'--'O=-=-v<>~
Valerie Stanfill
Justice, Maine Superior Court

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