Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Rudman & Winchell, LLC

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
PENOBSCOT, ss. CIVIL DIVISION
DKT. NO. CV-16-99
ENGINEERING DYNAMICS, INC., )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) JUDGMENT
)
RUDMAN & WINCHELL, LLC and )
JOHN K. HAMER, )
Defendants. )

This is an attorney negligence action. Plaintiff Engineering Dynamics, Inc., holds the rights

to petition for and receive property tax abatements from the Town of Cushing for the April 1, 2005

tax year for two subdivisions (Meduncook Plantation and Gaunt Neck) that were being developed in

Cushing. 1 After failing to persuade the Town to grant the tax abatements in full, Plaintiff appealed

the denial to the State Board of Property Tax Review (the Board). The appeal concerned 6 lots in

Meduncook Plantation and 14 lots in Gaunt Neck. The Board received a substantial amount of

testimony over 9 days spread out over 20 months. In order to meet its burden before the Board,

Plaintiff offered the testimony of and appraisal by Norman Gosline, who was a real estate appraiser,

consultant, and broker.2 Mr. Gosline attempted to demonstrate (1) that Plaintiffs properties were

treated unequally in relation to other properties within Cushing, and (2) that the properties were

overvalued by the assessment. He offered both an assessment ratio study and an appraisal that relied

1 The entities that instituted the tax abatement proceedings in 2005 were Cushing Holdings, LLC (CH) and

Last Resort Holdings, LLC (LRH). James Tower was the sole owner of each entity. (R. Ex. 1, 2:5-15 (Apr. 14,
2008).) He also owned Engineering Dynamics. (R. Ex. 1, 24:20-21 (Apr. 14, 2008).) Before the State Board
of Property Tax Review issued its decision on CH and LRH's appeal of the denial of the abatements, CH and
LRH administratively dissolved. (Pl.'s Comp!. ,r 11.) CH andLRH-who had received the rights from Machias
Savings Bank (R. Ex. 12, Petitioner's Ex. 33 before the Board.)-assigned the rights to petition for and receive
property tax abatements regarding the 2005 tax abatement proceedings to Plaintiff. (Pl.'s Comp!. ,r 12.) The
Court will simply reference "Plaintiff' in this order for the sake of simplicity. Additionally, there was a third
subdivision being developed by Mr. Tower called Hornbarn Hill, but there were no lots in that subdivision
subject to the appeal. The record did, however, contain information about Hombam Hill because it was located
near and being developed at the same time as Meduncook Plantation and Gaunt Neck.

2 Mr. Gosline passed away while the present attorney negligence case was pending for trial.

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on the "subdivision development method." In the formal written decision that the Board issued on

May 4, 2010, it rejected Mr. Gosline's testimony and appraisal as not credible evidence of just value.

The Board therefore concluded that Plaintiff had not met its burden before the Board and denied

Plaintiff's appeal.

Plaintiff then retained Defendants to pursue an SOC appeal to the Superior Court. Defendants'

attempted appeal of the Board's decision was dismissed by the Superior Court for lack of jurisdiction

due to the petition being filed one day beyond the statutory deadline. See generally Mt1tty v. Dep 't ef Con:,

2017 ME 7, ,r 8, 153 A.3d 775 (citations and quotation marks omitted) ("The time limits set forth in

the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) are jurisdictional, meaning that unless the petition is timely

filed, the court lacks jurisdiction."). Plaintiff then filed the pending action in June 2016.

The parties appeared for a bench trial on July 26, 2019, where the issue of the causation prong

of the negligence claim was argued. Plaintiff was represented by Jed Davis, Esq., and Defendants

were represented by John Whitman, Esq. The Court has reviewed the Board's record and considered

the arguments presented by each side in their respective trial briefs. It now issues this decision.

LEGAL STANDARD

"To prove attorney malpractice, a plaintiff must show (1) a breach by the defendant of the

duty owed to the plaintiff to conform to a certain standard of conduct; and (2) that the breach of that

duty proximately caused an injury or loss to the plaintiff." Pawlendzjo v. Haddow, 2016 ME 144, if 10,

148 A.3d 713. A showing of proximate cause is necessary to succeed on a legal malpractice claim, and

that requires introducing "evidence and inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence

indicat[ing] that the negligence played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury

or damage and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably foreseeable

consequence of the negligence." Mmiam v. Wanget; 2000 ME 159, ,r 8, 757 A.2d 778.

Generally, "a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she would have achieved a more favorable

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result but for the defendant's alleged legal malpractice." Nieheff v. Shank111an & Assocs. Legal Ct,:, PA.,

2000 ME 214, ,r 9, 763 A.2d 121. "A 'mere possibility' of a more favorable result is insufficient .... "

Bmoks v. Le111iet1x, 2017 ME 55, ,r 10, 157 A.3d 798. When the alleged legal malpractice stems from a

failure to perfect an appeal, "whether an appeal not taken would have succeeded is within the exclusive

province of the court, not the jury .... " Steeves v. Bemstcin, Sht1r, Sawyer & Nelson, P.C., 1998 ME 210,

,r 15, 718 A.2d 186 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The issue here then becomes whether Plaintiff would have received a better outcome had the

Rule SOC appeal been filed on time. Malcing this determination requires a counterfactual analysis of

the "case within the case." In other words, what was the likelihood that Plaintiff would have received

a better outcome with respect to the requested abatements if the Rule SOC appeal had been filed on

time? Would the Superior Court have vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case back to

the Board to engage in an independent determination of fair market value? If the Superior Court did

vacate and remand, after conducting this hypothetical independent determination of fair market value,

would the Board have granted the requested abatements? This requires a dive into the law on tax

abatement requests and appeals of denials of such requests.

When a taxpayer appeals the denial of an abatement to the Board it has to overcome the

presumption that the assessor's valuation is valid. Yt1se111 v. Town ojRay111ond, 2001 ME 61, ,r 8, 769

A.2d 865. In order to overcome this presumption of validity, the taxpayer must meet an initial burden

by proving to the Board that the assessment is manifestly wrong by showing that "(1) the judgment

of the assessor was irrational or so unreasonable in light of the circumstances that the property was

substantially ove1valued and an injustice resulted; (2) there was unjust discrimination; or (3) the

assessment was fraudulent, dishonest, or illegal." Id ,r 9. Merely impeaching the assessor's

methodology is not sufficient to show that the assessment is manifestly wrong. Id ,r 13. Instead,

when the taxpayer attempts to meet its initial burden to show that the assessor substantially overvalued

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the property, the taxpayer must present the Board with credible evidence of its view of just value to

demonstrate the assessment is manifestly wrong. Id. ,r 8.

"If, but only if, the taxpayer meets that burden, the [Board] must engage in an independent

determination of fair market value ... based on a consideration of all relevant evidence of just value."

Id. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). Even if the taxpayer does not convince the Board of

the ultimate accuracy of its position on just value, "if that suggested value and the basis for the value

are credible evidence of the overvaluation of the subject property, tbe Board's responsibility to

undertake an independent determination of value is triggered." Northeast Empi'" Ltd. P 'ship # 2 v. Town

of Ashland, 2003 ME 28, ,r 8, 818 A.2d 1021. However, if the taxpayer does not present credible

evidence of just value to meet its initial burden, the Board is left unable to make any comparison of

the taxpayer's view of just value in relation to the assessed value, and the Board is not compelled to

grant an abatement. Wesson v. Town ofBmnen, 667 A.2d 596, 599 (Me. 1995).

When a taxpayer appeals the Board's denial of an abatement to the Superior Court on a Rule

SOC appeal, the Court reviews the Board's decision "for abuse of discretion, error of law, or findings

unsupported by substantial evidence in the record." Town of Southwest Harbor v. Hatwood, 2000 ME

213, ,r 6, 763 A.2d 115. The Court "will vacate the [Board's] conclusion that the taxpayer failed to

meet [its] burden [to show the assessment is manifestly wrong] only ifthe mord compels a contrary conclusion

to the exc/11sion of any other inft1"nce." Yusem, 2001 ME 61, ,r 9, 7 69 A.2d 865 (emphasis added) (quotation

marks omitted). If the record compels a contrary finding that the taxpayer provided the Board ,vith a

credible assessment of value and met its burden to prove the assessor's assessment was manifestly

wrong, the Court would remand the case to the Board to make an independent assessment of value.

No,theast Empi1", 2003 ME 28, ii 9, 818 A.2d 1021.

DISCUSSION

The result of the underlying proceeding before the Board appears to the Court to be closely

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analogous to that in Nottheast Empire Ltd. P'ship # 2 v. Town ofA.rhland. In No1theast E111pi1", the Town's

assessor valued Northeast Empire Limited Partnership's ("NELP") property at $39,218,400 for the

tax year of 1997. Id. ,r 4. The assessor valued it 36% lower for the tax year of 1998, which was related

to the fact that NELP would receive lower revenues due to a contract it had starting with Maine Public

Sencice as compared to the prior contract it had with Central Maine Power. Id. ,r,r 3-4. NELP

requested abatements for both years, but the assessor denied both the applications for the 1997 and

1998 abatements, and NELP appealed to the State Board of Property Tax Review. Id.

In front of the Board, NELP offered an appraiser who presented an appraisal report and gave

testimony. Id. The Board noted some deficiencies with the Town's appraisals, but it did not decide

whether or not the Town had properly appraised the property because it determined that NELP did

not meet its initial burden to present credible evidence to show that the Town's assessment was

manifestly wrong. Id. ,r,r 6-7. NELP filed a Rule SOC appeal with the Superior Court, but the Superior

Court affirmed the Board's decision. Id. ,r 6.

In upholding the denial of the abatements the Law Court explained that "a Board may not

escape [the responsibility to undertake an independent determination of value] by simply declaring the

taxpayer's value 'not credible."' Id. ir s. However, the Law Court found that the Board had not simply
stated NELP's asserted value was not credible, but instead engaged in a thorough review of the

evidence before it in determining NELP had not carried its burden to present credible evidence to

show the property was substantially ovetvalued. Id. The Law Court noted the numerous flaws the

Board found with NELP's assessment. Id. ,r,r 11-13. After its review of the Board's decision, the Law

Court explained that "[i]t is obvious that the Board concluded that the numerous flaws in [the

appraiser's] analysis, which the Board outlined in detail, defeated the entire appraisal. As the fact-

finder, the Board was entitled to make that conclusion. A fact-finder who hears inconsistencies,

unexplained assertions, and incorrect assumptions in the testimony of a witness is entitled to reject

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that witness's testimony entirely." Id. ,r 15.

Further, the Law Court refused to accept NELP's argument that the Board should have been

required to conduct an independent analysis of valuation even though it found NELP's proffered

value not to be credible. It explained its rationale: "[i]f the Board in this case had rejected NELP's

appraisal with the two words, 'not credible,' we would agree [that the Board should have conducted

an independent analysis]. But that is not the case. The Board articulated in detail its numerous reasons

for finding the appraisal not credible." Id. ,r 17. Accordingly, the Law Court affirmed the Board's

decision and did not require it to conduct an independent analysis of valuation in the absence of the

taxpayer being able to meet its burden.

The above description of the Northeast Empi1" almost exactly mirrors what happened before

the Board in this case. Here, Plaintiff attempted to get tax abatements on assessments for the tax year

of 2005 on certain lots in two subdivisions that were in the process of being developed (though lots

were being marketed and sold at the same time the subdivisions were being developed). The board

of assessors almost entirely denied the requested abatements, and Plaintiff appealed to the Board. The

Board engaged in thorough review and consideration of Mr. Gosline's testimony and appraisal.

Nonetheless, it concluded that he did not offer credible evidence of just value. Because Mr. Gosline

did not offer credible evidence of just value, Plaintiff did not demonstrate to the Board that the

assessment was manifestly wrong. Because Plaintiff did not demonstrate to the Board that the

assessment was manifestly wrong, the assessor's assessment-which the law requires to be presumed

valid-stood. It is worth noting just a sampling of the issues with his testimony and appraisal that

caused the Board to conclude he did not offer credible evidence of just value.3 The examples provided

3 Plaintiff contends that Defendant's reliance on the Board's concerns articulated in the record, but not

expressly listed in the actual decision, are irrelevant because they expand upon the bases for which the Board
rejected Mr. Gosline's testimony. Despite this, the Court disagrees. Other issues with Mr. Gosline's testimony
and appraisal extant throughout the record are directly relevant to the proximate cause prong. Plaintiff must
demonstrate that the record would have compelled a contrary result on the SOC appeal. \Vhen the record

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here are not intended to be an exhaustive list of every issue with Mr. Gosline's testimony and appraisal.

Instead, they are intended to show why the record on the untimely SOC appeal would not have

compelled a contra1y conclusion to the Board's finding that Mr. Gosline did not provide credible

evidence of just value. Cf Yusem, 2001 ME 61, 'if 9, 769 A.2d 865 (emphasis added) (quotation marks

omitted) (explaining that the Superior Court "will vacate the [Board's] conclusion that the taxpayer

failed to meet [its] burden [to show the assessment is manifestly wrong] only ifthe m-ord compels a contrary

conclusion to the excl11sion ofany other inje1"nce").

First, Mr. Gosline tried to demonstrate that the assessment ratio applied to Plaintiffs

properties resulted in unequal treatment in relation to other properties in Cushing. See generally 36

M.R.S. § 848-A. The Board was concerned with Mr. Gosline's testimony on this issue for a number

of reasons. One such issue was that his assessment-ratio study had a number of "N / A" entries, which

compromised the accuracy of what he purported the assessment ratio to be in the Town compared to

what Plaintiffs lots were assessed at. (R. Ex. 14, "Decision," p. 7; R. Ex. 12, "Appraisal of Lots at

'Meduncook Bay Colony' Cushing, Maine," pp. 52-53 of Petitioner's (Revised) Ex. 23 before the

Board.) While Mr. Gosline seemed to believe he used all that the Town had available, the Town's

assessor explained that Mr. Gosline could have easily accessed the assessment values for what he had

as "N/ A" entries. (R. Ex. 7, 143:17-145:8 (June 2, 2008).) Furthermore, the assessor's testimony

revealed a number of instances where Mr. Gosline's assessment-ratio study failed to properly account

for multi-lot transactions. For instance, the first line of page 52 of his report shows Map 4, Lot 15-A

selling for $475,000, but being assessed at only $55,000; the Town's assessor clarified that it was part

of a larger sale (with Lot 15-B, which Mr. Gosline did not include on page 52). The Town's assessment

was actually much higher. (R. Ex. 7, 140:23-147:25 (June 2, 2008); Ex. 13, Respondent's Ex. 54 before

instead points to the opposite conclusion, namely that the record compels the result that the Board reached, it is
entirely relevant to focus on issues and errors not necessarily commented on by the Board in its decision to
demonstrate why Plaintiff is unable to establish proximate causation.

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the Board; see also R. Ex. 7, 155:3-159:5, 166:20-171:15, 180:6-182:19 Gune 2, 2008).) The Board had

every reason to be skeptical of Mr. Goslin e's assessment-ratio study when it was based on faulty inputs.

Cf Tetjloth v. Town ofScarbotvttgh, 2014 ME 57, i/ 17, 90 A.3d 1131 (explaining that "evidence presented

in an abatement hearing is within the Board's authority to believe or disbelieve"); No1theast Empi1,,

2003 ME 28, i/ 15, 818 A.2d 1021 ("A fact-finder who hears inconsistencies, unexplained assertions,

and incorrect assumptions in the testimony of a witness is entitled to reject that witness's testimony

entirely."). The Board also found unreliable Mr. Gosline's use of the Multi-Listing Service to gather

sale prices because, unlike the transfer ta," forms that buyers and sellers sign under oath, values in the

Multi-Listing Service are not reported under oath. 4 (R. Ex. 14, "Decision," p. 7.) The Board was well

,vithin its province to not accept Mr. Gosline's assessment-ratio study for this and myriad other

reasons, and the record would not have compelled othet\vise.

Second, Mr. Gosline attempted to demonstrate, mainly by way of the "subdivision

development method," that the property was substantially overvalued. As he explained it, the

"subdivision development method" was used to determine what the property was worth if Mr. Tower

tried to sell the entire 390-acre property (i.e., Meduncook Plantation, Gaunt Neck, and Hombarn

Hill). 5 (R. Ex. 2, 5:1-6:18 (Apr. 15, 2008).) Mr. Gosline conceded that he "had the benefit of

hindsight" for his appraisal, (R. Ex. 2, 6:11-18 (Apr. 15, 2008).), which the Board roundly criticized

4 The unreliability of the Multi-Listing Service reporting was evidenced by the one Gaunt Neck lot that was
under contract before April 1, 2005. lvfr. Tower testified~and the documentation supported~that the lot was
under contract in September 2004; the deed was executed March 31, 2005; the transfer took place on April 4,
2005; and that the sale price was $725,000. (R. Ex. 5, 25:18-29:9 (Apr. 29, 2008); R. Ex. 12, Petitioner's Ex. 22
before the Board.) Nonetheless, the Multi-Listing Service report stated that the lot was under contract in
November 2004; it was sold April 13, 2005; and the sale price was $720,000. (R.. Ex. 13, Respondent's Ex. 20
before the Board.) The Board's disregard oflvfr. Gosline's reliance on the Multi-Listing Service seems to have
been wholly appropriate.

s Mr. Gosline agreed one "thousand percent" that the "subdivision development method" was highly
controversial in the appraisal community. (R.. Ex. 4, 9:21-10:6 (Apr. 29, 2008).)

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when it stated that he "took unfair advantage of hindsight by taking into consideration information

that was not reasonably available to the market as of April 1, 2005." (R. Ex. 14, "Decision," p. 9.) A

review of the record demonstrates numerous problems with Mr. Gosline's report and testimony that

support the Board's rejection. For instance, he could not explain certain assumptions, he was missing

data, and he had a number of arithmetic errors. (See, e.g., R. Ex. 2, 79:7-82:2, 172:12-180:18 (Apr. 15,

2008).) He also did not use the correct tax map in his report. (R. Ex. 2, 69:24-70:2 (Apr. 15, 2008);

R. Ex. 12, "Appraisal of Lots at 'Meduncook Bay Colony' Cushing, Maine," pp. 14 of Petitioner's

(Revised) Ex. 23 before the Board; R. Ex. 13, Respondent's Ex. 50 before the Board.) Even given the

chance to amend his report before his second day of testimony, which he did, Mr. Gosline still had

errors that made it difficult for him to explain his approach and made it hard for the Board to follow. 6

(See, e.g., R. Ex 3, 2:5-4:18, 7:5-22, 22:19-23:4, 66:23-69:13, 83:3-86:6, 114:14-120:22, 121:21-122:18

(Apr. 28, 2008).)

Most glaring to the Court-and it certainly weighed heavily into the Board's decision (R. Ex.

14, "Decision," p. 9.)-is the fact that Mr. Gosline originally had a 7-year sellout (or abso1ption) period

when he appraised the property late in 2006 for work related to the creation of a conservation

easement. When he came back to appraise it again in 2008 for the purpose of the abatement requests

he then changed it to a 10-year absotption period. (R. Ex. 4, 10:19-14:8 (Apr. 29, 2008).) Changing

the absotption period fundamentally changed how his model placed a value on the lots as of April 1,

2005, and he was able to game the numbers in a sense because he had the benefit of knowing that the

6 It is clear that the parties were speaking past each other when it came to the "entrepreneurial profit"

percentage in Mr. Gosline's appraisal. The Court did some basic arithmetic and was able to uncover what Mr.
Gosline was attempting to do, which the Town's attorney and the Board were unable to do. Mr. Gosline was
nonetheless unable to explain it in any comprehensible manner to the Town's attorney and the Board in real
time. (See, e.g., R. Ex. 3, 97:19-100:20, 124:18-142:7 (Apr. 28, 2008).) Moreover, the Court simply could not
understand what he intended to convey with the "entrepreneurial profit" because it seemed as though he was
including it on the costs-to-complete side of the ledger. If so, it was a highly misleading name for a category in
his appraisal.

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real estate market crashed catastrophically in 2007 and 2008. The Town's assessor standing there in

2005 would have had to be a financial market savant to know that the market would crash. Instead,

when the assessor was standing there in 2005, he was working with an appreciating market not just in

Plaintiffs subdivisions, but in the Town in general. (R. Ex. 6, 50:8-24 (Apr. 29, 2008).) While there is

plenty within the record that shows why the Board found Mr. Gosline's testimony and appraisal to be

not credible, and does not show that it compels a contrary result, suffice it to say that the Board's

decision would have been affirmed on a timely SOC appeal. The record does not compel that Mr.

Gosline's testimony and appraisal were credible evidence of just value.

Notwithstanding the fact that the law requires assessments to be presumed valid and that it is

a petitioner's burden to present credible evidence to overcome this presumption, Plaintiff contends

that the Board erred by accepting the assessments because the lots were not individually saleable at

the point at which they were being assessed in 2005. Plaintiff further contends that, nonvithstanding

the Board's finding that Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of presenting credible evidence of just value

in order to overcome the presumption of validity, the Board should have rejected the Town's

assessments and applied Mr. Gosline's proposed "subdivision development method." It bears

pointing out that the contention that the lots were not individually saleable does not hold water. 7

Jarues Tower conceded during his testimony that he entered into a purchase-and-sale agreement before

the April 1, 2005 assessment. One lot in Gaunt Neck was under contract in September 2004, at which

time Mr. Tower received "a substantial down payment." (R. Ex. 5, 25:18-29:9 (Apr. 29, 2008).) The

7 It also bears pointing out that the Town's assessor indeed testified that he factored in the unfinished nature
of the lots in his assessments, and that it was his intent to come in a bit lower with the assessments to factor in
the unfinished nature of the lots. (R. Ex. 7, 72:2-15, 201:3-202:2 Oune 2, 2008).) With the benefit of
hindsight-which Mr. Gosline notably took advantage of when he changed his originally projected absorption
rate of the lots from 7 years to 10 years (See, e.g., R. Ex. 2, 170:10-17 (April 15, 2008).)-it is readily apparent
that the Town's assessor was successful at his goal of coming in slightly below fair market value for his April
1, 2005 assessments on the subject lots. (R. 7, 199:17-203:13 Oune 2, 2008); Ex. 13, Respondent's Ex. 48 before
the Board.)

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actual transfer did not take place until April 4, 2005, but tbe fact tbat lots in one of the subdivisions

at issue on the appeal to the Board were being marketed and sold severely undermines tbe contention

that tbey were not saleable at tbe time of tbe Town's assessment.

Furthermore, Mr. Gosline's own data listed sales occurring for Meduncook Plantation and

Gaunt Neck lots contemporaneously to tbe development of tbe subdivisions. (R. Ex. 12, "Appraisal

of Lots at 'Meduncook Bay Colony' Cushing, Maine," pp. 45-46 of Petitioner's (Revised) Ex. 23 before

tbe Board.) While sales occurred after April 1, 2005, some occurred before the purported September

15, 2005 "commitment date" for the April 1, 2005 tax year.' (R. Ex. 14, "Decision," pp. 5-6.) While

tbe lots (and subdivisions) may not have been finished around this time, they were being marketed

and sold.

As detailed throughout, it is clear tbat Plaintiff would not have been able to establish on an

SOC appeal tbat the record compelled a contrary result otber tban the Board's finding tbat Plaintiffs

evidence of just value was not credible. Because Plaintiff would not have been able to establish tbat

tbe record compelled a contrary result, Plaintiff has not met its burden in this attorney negligence case

to demonstrate that it would have received a more favorable result had tbe SOC appeal been filed on

time. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to judgment on Plaintiffs complaint.

B The Court did not receive a clear explanation of how this purported "commitment date,, factors in relative to
sales that occurred in 2005 after April 1 but before the "commitment date." The Town's assessor agreed with
a description of it being "the date of the final tally of the valuations that were to be assigned to the properties
[being] committed for the tax roles [sic]." (R. Ex. 7, 16:13-16 (June 2, 2008.). It appears the Town's assessor
referenced the sales after April 1, 2005, to "double check'' bis work regarding assessments as of April 1, 2005.
(R. Ex. 6, 49:22-50:7 (Apr. 29, 2008).) Regardless, it cannot be disputed that there was at least one lot contracted
for sale for slightly under the listed price before tl1e April 1, 2005 date, and other lots in the subdivisions were
actively being listed for sale before April 1, 2005 (as early as 2004). (R. Ex. 3, 27:23-38:25 (Apr. 28, 2008); R.
Ex. 4, 44:22-51:19 (Apr. 29, 2008); R. Ex. 5, 35:23-39:5 (Apr. 29, 2008); R. Ex. 13, Respondent's Ex. 20 before
the Board.) This is despite the fact that all of the requisite approvals were not in place. (R. Ex. 7, 82:19-91:10
(June 2, 2008).)

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The entry is:

1. Because Plaintiff cannot establish the proximate cause prong of its attorney negligence
claim, judgment is granted in favor of Defendants.
2. The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to
M.R. Civ. P. 79(a). /l
' -;1//i
I \ /1 ;1///
Dated:
1
l1\ 1(( \ d-0
' .
c~/Ji~r-jfv~1~·. ___
Hon. William R. Anden;on
Justice, Maine Superior C.:;urt-·-

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