Benner v. N.C. Hunt, LLC

ST ATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION
.J;/OCKET NO. CV-19-302

/
TRAVIS BENNER,

Plaintiff

V. ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
N .C. HUNT, INC.,

Defendant

The matter before the court is Defendant N.C. Hunt, Inc.'s, ("N.C. Hunt") Motion for

Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the motion is denied.

Background

N.C. Hunt is a business operating in Damariscotta, Maine, that sells lumber, hardware,

hardscape and other things to the general public. (Supp.'g S.M.F. ! 1.) The business has a large

property located on U.S. Route 1, containing a building for retail, a warehouse and spaces for

outside storage of materials. Id.! 2. The property is located just northeast of the intersection of

U.S. Route 1 and Business Route 1. Id.! 3. The intersection between U.S. Route 1 and Business

Route 1 has a stop sign to regulate traffic, where travelers coming from Business Route 1 must

wait for an opportunity to turn right. Id.!! 6-7.

There are two entrances to the property, one on the southern side of the property and one

on the northern side. Id.! 4. The southern entrance can be accessed via a public right of way that

branches off from Business Route 1 before the stop sign. Id.! 5. The northern entrance is located

on the northbound side of U.S. Route 1, after the stop sign. Id.! 4. If a motorist traveling north

on Business Route 1 wished to bypass the stop sign, they could enter N.C. Hunt's property via

the southern entrance and exit onto U.S. Route 1 via the northern entrance. Id.! 8.

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The incident that gave rise to this lawsuit occmTed on Friday, August 6, 2018,

somewhere between 5:30 and 6:00 PM. ld. l) 17. Plaintiff Travis Benner was traveling north on

Business Route 1 on a motorcycle with two of his co-workers, John Tonry and Camille Lazzari,

who were each in separate vehicles. Id. l) 21. When Benner reached the intersection, he turned

onto the public right of way leading to the entrance to N.C. Hunt's property. ld. l) 28. Benner

could not see the property when he turned off of Business Route 1. Id. l) 29.

N.C. Hunt is open from 6:30 AM to 5:00 PM on weekdays. After 5:00 PM, an employee

hangs a rust colored chain between two large pine trees near the southern entrance to the

property, effectively blocking vehicle traffic. (Opp. S.M.F. l) 10; Supp.'g S.M.F. l) 10.) As

Benner proceeded down the right of way towards N.C. Hunt's property, he attempted to turn into

the southern entrance. He did not notice the chain until too late and collided with it, resulting in

injuries to his neck, arm and top. (Supp.'g S.M.F. l) 35.) There was no signage indicating that

N.C. Hunt was closed for the night. (Opp. S.M.F. l) 7.)1

Standard

Summary judgment is granted to a moving party where "there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact" and the moving party "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." M.R. Civ. P.

56(c). "A material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case, and there is a genuine issue

when there is sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the

fact." Lougee Conservancy v. City Mortgage, Inc., 2012 ME 103, lJ 11, 48 A.3d 774 (quotation

omitted). "Facts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported

1 The court only considers this paragraph of the Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts for the proposition
that there was no closed sign on the day of the incident. The rest of the paragraph deals with subsequent
remedial measures and is therefore not properly considered on a motion for summary judgment. See
HSBC Mortg. Servs. v. Murphy, 2011 ME 59, lf 9, 19 A.3d 815 ("Assertion of material facts must be
supported by record references to evidence that is of a quality that would be admissible at trial.").

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by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly

controverted." M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4). In order to controvert an opposing party's factual

statement, a party must "support each denial or qualification by a record citation." M.R. Civ. P.

56(h)(2).

Discussion

Negligence has four elements:

(1) a duty owed to the plaintiff;
(2) a breach of that duty;
(3) an injury; and
(4) causation, that is, a finding that the breach of the duty of care was the cause of the
injury.

Estate of Smith v. Cumberland County, 2013 ME 13, ! 16, 60 A.3d 759. When the alleged harm

has to do with the conditions on a landowner's property, the status of the plaintiff determines the

duty owed by the landowner.

A person on the landowner's property may be an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser. An

invitee, someone "present on the land through an owner's express or implied invitation, either for

a purpose connected with the owner's business or for a social visit," is owed "the positive duty of

exercising reasonable care in providing reasonably safe premises for their use. Poulin v. Colby

College, 402 A.2d 846,848 (Me. 1979). Licensees, "persons who are neither passengers,

servants, nor trespassers, and do not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the

premises, and are permitted to come upon the premises for their own interest, convenience or

gratification," are owed the same duty. Id. at 848, 850-51. A trespasser, defined as "a person who

enters or remains upon land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so created by

the possessor's consent or otherwise," is only owed a duty to refrain from "wanton, willful or

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reckless acts of negligence." Collomy v. School Admin. Dist. No. 55, 1998 ME 79, 11116, 15,710

A.2d 893.

The substance of N.C. Hunt's motion is that Benner was a trespasser when his injury

occurred, and no reasonable jury could find that it breached its duty to refrain from wanton,

willful or reckless negligence. The determination of Benner's legal status is an issue of fact.

Poulin, 402 A.2d 846, 849 (Me. 1979). Thus, the question is whether, interpreting the facts in the

light most favorable to Benner, a jury could reasonably conclude that he was at least a licensee.

Based on a review of the record and the relevant law, the court believes that it could.

N.C. Hunt cites two cases in support of its argument that Benner was a trespasser. In

Collomy v. School Admin. Dist. No. 55, a child was found to be a trespasser after he left a school

playground held open to the public, where he was an invitee, and entered a shed that the school

used to store equipment and materials.1998 ME 79, 11117-8, 710 A.2d 893. In the other case,

Lemieux v. Central Furniture & Appliances, Inc., the Superior Court held that the plaintiff was a

trespasser when he drove his car to the delivery area adjacent to the defendant's warehouse,

where he failed to introduce any evidence that the defendant had consented to his presence there.

No. CV-02-032, 2003 Me.Super. LEXIS 29 at *3 (Feb. 24, 2003).

Neither of these cases apply to the case at bar. Crncially, both cases that N .C. Hunt relies

on involve situations where the plaintiff entered a part of the property that was not ordinarily

held out as open to the public. This is very different from this case, where Benner was injured

attempting to enter the parking lot used by customers when N .C. Hunt is open. The court knows

of no authority that would require a finding that Benner was a trespasser when he attempted to

enter the customer parking lot of a business, absent some clear indication that his presence was

not desired. The entrance Benner was attempting to use was an entrance to the location where

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customers typically park. There are numerous factors a jury could consider to determine whether

Benner was an invitee or licensee versus a trespasser, including the time of day, the degree of

daylight, the appearance of the business and other similarly situated businesses and whether they

appeared open, and the appearance of the parking lot. The jury may also want to consider what

steps N.C. Hunt had taken to indicate the business was closed and that people were not welcome

on the property. In addition, Benner has testified he was entering the premises to procure paint

palettes. (Opp. S.M.F. ,r 9). Whether or not that is true, as well as assessing the factors listed

above, are questions of fact for the jury to decide. In other words, because Benner was

attempting to enter a portion of the property normally held open to the public, the court has no

basis to remove this question of fact from the jury, especially where there was no signage to

indicate that N.C. Hunt was closed. The adequacy of the chain to communicate this message is a

fairly contested matter of fact and will be left to the jury.

The entry is

Defendant N.C. Hunt's Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED.

The Clerk is directed to enter this order into the oEk.;t
reference pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 79(a). (

Harold Stewart, II
Justice, Superior Court

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