Dewolfe v. Agro

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CUMBERLAND, ss. Civil Action

Docket No. RE-22-79

)
FRANK G. DEWOLFE, JR. AND )
SERINA M. DEWOLFE, )
)

Plaintiffs, ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO

) STRIKE AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY

Vv. ) JUDGMENT

)
TYRONE AGRO, )
)
Defendant. }

Before the court is Plaintiffs Frank and Serina DeWolfe’s Motion to Strike and Motion
for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs move to strike Defendant’s affirmative defense of adverse
possession on the grounds that it does not conform with Maine Rules of Civil Procedure 7 and 9,
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is premised on an assumption that the defense of
adverse possession will be striken.

Plaintiffs argue that the defense of adverse possession is “so poorly structured as to be

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meaningless.” Defendant’s answer alleges that he believes the disputed area is his land and that
he has parked his vehicle alongside the road for forty-three years and his answer lists adverse
possession as a defense. ““Maine is a notice pleading state.”” Howe v. MMG Ins. Co., 2014 ME
78, (9, 95 A.3d 79 (quoting Johnston v. Me. Energy Recovery Co., Ltd. P’ship, 2010 ME 52, ¢
16, 997 A.2d 741). The notice pleading standard is forgiving. /d. (quoting Burns v.
Architectural Doors & Windows, 2011 ME 61, 421, 18 A.3d 823). A party stating a defense
need only do so in “short and plain terms;” “[njo technical forms of pleading .. . are required.”

MLR. Civ. P. 8(b), (e)(1). Defendant’s answer meets this forgiving standard, as evidenced by

Plaintiffs’ ability to recognize his defense of adverse possession.

Plaintiffs’ argument that adverse possession needs to be pleaded with particularity under
Rule 9(c) is unavailing. Rule 9(c) sets forth the pleading standards for pleading the performance
or occurrence of conditions precedent, which is only relevant when there is a contract involved.
See MLR. Civ. P. 9(c). There is no contract between the parties to this case. Therefore, there is
no basis to require particularity in pleading under Rule 9(c).

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is premised in large part on an assumption that
their Motion to Strike will be granted and adverse possession will no longer be in issue. Beyond
that assumption, Plaintiffs argue that the undisputed facts are insufficient to establish adverse
possession. As the non-movant, Defendant’s task on summary judgment is to show that a
genuine dispute of material facts exists in order to defeat judgment as a matter of law for the
Plaintiffs. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). Defendant need not establish his defense as a matter of law to
defeat summary judgment. Here, Defendant has shown that a genuine dispute of material fact
remains, therefore Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike and Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED.

The Clerk is requested to enter this Order on the docket for this case by incorporating it by
reference. M.R. Civ. P. 79fa).

DATED: / Wp) U3 Ae 7

Thomas R. McKeon
Justice, Maine Superior Court