State of Maine v. William True — 2017 ME 2

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 	Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 	2017 ME 2
Docket: 	And-15-593
Argued: 	September 13, 2016
Decided: 	January 5, 2017
Panel: 	SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
WILLIAM TRUE
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] 	Twenty-year-old Romeo Parent was killed in April 2013. 	He had
been stabbed in the back of the neck, beaten, and choked. 	William True was
charged with, and found guilty by a jury of, the intentional or knowing, or
depraved indifference murder of Parent.1 True appeals from the judgment of
conviction entered by the court (MG Kennedy, J.). See 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A),
(B) (2015). 	He argues that the judgment should be vacated because he was
deprived of a fair trial due to allegedly perjured testimony from certain of the
State’s witnesses. We affirm the judgment.
1 	True was also convicted of hindering apprehension or prosecution (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 753(1-B)(C)(1) (2015), but he does not appeal from his conviction of this offense.

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I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] 	Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the
jury could rationally have found the following facts beyond a reasonable
doubt. 	See State v. Westgate, 2016 ME 145, ¶ 5, --- A.3d ---. 	During the
weekend of April 6 and 7, 2013, True was in jail after Parent informed the
police that the two of them had committed a robbery. 	On Tuesday, April 9,
2013, at about 7:40 p.m., Nathan Morton2 and Michael McNaughton,3 who
were known to both Parent and True, picked Parent up in a pharmacy parking
lot in Auburn in Morton’s vehicle. McNaughton had planned to kill Parent for
being a “snitch.” 	Morton, the driver, then drove to the home of True’s friend
Eric Leighton on James Street in Auburn and picked up True, who had been
released from jail.4
2 Nathan Morton was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and hindering apprehension or
prosecution based on a plea agreement that he reached with the State. 	State v. Morton,
No. AUBSC-CR-2013-524 (Me. Super. Ct., And. Cty., June 26, 2014). A month after True’s trial ended,
the court (MG Kennedy, J.), pursuant to the agreement, sentenced Morton to twenty years, all but ten
suspended, for conspiracy to commit murder, and a concurrent ten-year sentence for hindering
apprehension or prosecution. Id. (Jan. 23, 2015).
3 Michael McNaughton was convicted of murder and hindering apprehension or prosecution,
and the court (MG Kennedy, J.) sentenced him to life in prison for the conviction of murder and ten
years in prison for the conviction of hindering apprehension or prosecution, to be served
concurrently with the life sentence. State v. McNaughton, No. AUBSC-CR-2013-458 Unified Criminal
Docket (Androscoggin Cty., Sept. 15, 2016). 	His appeal is now pending with us. 	State v.
McNaughton, No. And-16-447 (Me. Sept. 26, 2016). 	The Sentence Review Panel denied his
application for leave to appeal from his sentence. State v. McNaughton, No. SRP-16-446 (Me. Sent.
Rev. Panel Oct. 26, 2016).
4 The conditions of True’s release from jail are not detailed in the record.

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[¶3] 	Morton drove to a secluded location on South Mountain Road in
Greene. True and McNaughton exited the car with Parent, and the three went
into the woods while Morton, who is disabled, waited in the car. 	Once in the
woods, 	McNaughton 	stabbed 	Parent 	in 	the 	back 	of 	the 	neck 	with 	a
screwdriver and used a brake cable to choke him repeatedly while True
punched and kicked Parent. 	Although Parent bled only a little from the
stabbing, a small amount of his blood got on the leg of True’s jeans. 	True
injured his foot, and it bled. 	Parent died due to the constriction of blood
vessels in his neck.
[¶4] Morton drove away with True and McNaughton at about 9:20 p.m.
He dropped True off near his friend Theodore Gagnon’s house. 	During the
next morning, April 10, True returned to Leighton’s residence in Auburn
looking for a duffel bag. He obtained large garbage bags from Leighton. True
left Leighton’s apartment and got in the car with Morton and McNaughton,
after which Morton drove to pick up bedsheets from another friend. The three
went to Morton’s residence, where they waited until dark and then went to
Greene to move Parent’s body.
[¶5] 	When they arrived in Greene, True and McNaughton cut the shirt
and pants off Parent’s body, bound Parent’s hands and feet with strips of sheet

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fabric, wrapped Parent’s body in garbage bags, and placed his body on a sheet
in Morton’s trunk. Morton drove to Jug Stream in Monmouth, where True and
McNaughton threw Parent’s body into the water from above a dam. 	They
later threw the sheet out the window of the car.
[¶6] 	Morton dropped True off near Leighton’s home. 	Leighton called
the police when True attempted to get into his house. 	True was arrested by
police at 12:24 a.m. because he was violating a curfew imposed as a condition
of bail. 	Police investigators found Parent’s body in Jug Stream on Friday,
April 12, 2013.
[¶7] 	In July 2014, True was charged by indictment with intentional or
knowing, or depraved indifference murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), (B);
conspiracy to commit intentional murder (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 151(1)(A)
(2015); and hindering apprehension or prosecution (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 753(1-B)(C)(1) (2015).
[¶8] 	An eleven-day jury trial was held from December 3 through 17,
2014. 	The State presented testimony from multiple members of state and
local law enforcement; an employee of a youth outreach center frequented by
Parent and True; the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy of Parent’s
body; the Maine State Crime Lab 	personnel 	who examined the physical

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evidence; Morton; Leighton; Gagnon; and many friends of True, McNaughton,
and Parent who socialized and used drugs with the three of them around the
time of the murder. Many of the friend witnesses, including Morton, Leighton,
and 	Gagnon, 	whose 	testimony 	True 	now 	challenges 	as 	perjured, 	were
subjected to intense cross-examination by defense counsel, highlighting their
drug use at the time and the inconsistencies in their statements to police and
others.
[¶9] Morton conceded, during extensive cross-examination, that he told
police conflicting stories on various occasions and did not mention True being
involved in the murder at all until reaching an agreement with the State to
resolve his own pending charges of murder, conspiracy to commit murder,
and hindering apprehension or prosecution. 	As a result of that agreement,
Morton received a sentence of twenty years in prison, all but ten years
suspended, for conspiracy to commit murder, and a concurrent ten-year
sentence 	for 	hindering 	apprehension 	or 	prosecution. 	Leighton 	also
acknowledged inconsistent statements and lies that he told the police, and
Gagnon admitted that he had not—even when previously testifying under
oath—told anybody about True’s statement that Parent had been “taken care
of.”

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[¶10] 	True did not testify. 	Nor did he present additional witnesses or
other evidence.
[¶11] 	The 	jury 	found 	True 	guilty 	of 	murder 	and 	hindering
apprehension 	or 	prosecution, 	and 	not 	guilty 	of 	conspiracy 	to 	commit
intentional murder. 	True moved to dismiss or for a new trial on multiple
grounds. 	As one ground for the motion, he asserted that the State had
presented testimony from Morton, Leighton, and Gagnon that it knew or
should have known was perjured. 	The State moved to dismiss True’s motion
for a new trial as untimely, and the parties supplied memoranda concerning
the motions. 	In his memorandum, True argued that Morton had told fellow
inmates, before True’s trial, that he was lying about True to get a good deal
from the State and that he had bragged after the trial that he had been
responsible for True’s conviction and sentence. True offered an affidavit from
an inmate in support of his motion. 	Subpoenas and writs of habeas corpus
were issued, and Morton was appointed counsel, in anticipation of multiple
witnesses testifying regarding True’s motion.
[¶12] 	On November 3, 2015, True withdrew his motion to dismiss and
for 	a 	new 	trial 	in 	exchange 	for 	(1) 	the 	State’s 	agreement 	to 	seek 	the
twenty-five year minimum mandatory sentence for a murder conviction, see

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17-A M.R.S. § 1251 (2015), with a concurrent ten-year sentence on the charge
for hindering apprehension or prosecution, and (2) the State’s dismissal of all
other known criminal charges—specifically, a burglary and theft indictment
and a bail violation charge. 	At the plea and sentencing hearing, True
represented that he did not intend to appeal from his conviction but did not
waive his right to do so. 	The State indicated at the sentencing that, despite
True’s right to appeal, any issues arising from the withdrawn motion would
not be “preserved” for appeal. 	The State did not say, and the court did not
inform True, that his withdrawal of the motion would operate as a full waiver
of his right to press the issue of possible perjury. 	The court informed True
that he retained the rights to appeal from the judgment of conviction, to
petition for review of the sentence, and to petition for post-conviction review.
The 	court 	accepted 	the 	sentencing 	agreement 	and 	sentenced 	True 	to
twenty-five years in prison for murder and ten years in prison for hindering
apprehension or prosecution, to be served concurrently with the murder
sentence. 	The court also ordered True to pay fifty dollars to the Victims’
Compensation Fund.
[¶13] 	True brought the present appeal. 	See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2015);
M.R. App. P. 2.

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II. DISCUSSION
[¶14] We first address the State’s argument that True waived the issues
he now raises on appeal because he withdrew his motion to dismiss or for a
new trial, which raised the same issues of witness perjury, in exchange for the
dismissal of other charges and a sentence at the mandatory minimum of
twenty-five years. 	Waiver occurs when a defendant voluntarily, knowingly,
and intentionally relinquishes or abandons a known right. See State v. Tuplin,
2006 ME 83, ¶ 14, 901 A.2d 792. It appears on the record presented that True
voluntarily, knowingly, and intentionally opted not to follow through with his
motion to dismiss or for a new trial as part of a negotiated plea agreement.
We would ordinarily determine, therefore, that he waived the opportunity to
challenge the issues that he had raised in his post-trial motion by intentionally
withdrawing that motion and thereby precluding any evidentiary hearing that
would determine which of the witnesses’ varying stories—delivered under
oath—might be untruthful. See State v. Foster, 2016 ME 154, ¶ 10, --- A.3d ---;
cf. United States v. Gates, 698 F. Supp. 2d 212, 218-19 (D. Me. 2010) (denying a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the defendant strategically decided to
plead guilty during trial as part of an agreement with the government, rather
than test a witness’s testimony through trial).

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[¶15] 	However, when fundamental constitutional rights are at stake,
“every reasonable presumption is made against a finding of waiver.” 	Tuplin,
2006 ME 83, ¶ 16, 901 A.2d 792. 	Despite True’s withdrawal of the motion to
dismiss or for a new trial and the apparent waiver of the claims he raised in
that motion, we will address the issue he raises as an unpreserved claim of
error because True may have based his decision-making on the State’s
position, expressed during the plea and sentencing hearing, that all issues
raised in his motions would be treated as not “preserved,” with no reference
made to any waiver of the claims. 	We do review unpreserved claims of error
in criminal cases, although only for obvious error, meaning that there is
“‘(1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.’” State v.
McBreairty, 2016 ME 61, ¶ 20, 137 A.3d 1012 (quoting State v. Pabon, 2011
ME 100, ¶ 29, 28 A.3d 1147); see M.R. Crim. P. 52(b) (Tower 2014).5 “‘If these
conditions are met, we will exercise our discretion to notice an unpreserved
error only if we also conclude that (4) the error seriously affects the fairness
and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” 	State v. Daluz,
5 	The Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure were not yet in effect at the time of trial,
though they contain the same provision regarding obvious error. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(b).

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2016 ME 102, ¶ 51, 143 A.3d 800 (quoting Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 29, 28 A.3d
1147).6
[¶16] True argues that allegedly false testimony from Morton, Leighton,
and Gagnon deprived him of a fair trial. 	He contends that Morton told many
lies throughout the investigation and proceedings such that his testimony
cannot be relied on, that Leighton perjured himself at trial about being
assaulted by a friend of McNaughton’s at a time when that friend was not in
Maine, 	and 	that 	Gagnon 	committed 	perjury 	when 	testifying 	to 	True’s
statement that Parent had been “taken care of”—a statement that he had not
previously conveyed to anyone, even when testifying under oath during a
previous court proceeding.
[¶17] 	Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, a state may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 	“[A] conviction
obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives
6 We acknowledge that, in other contexts, primarily in civil appeals, we have treated issues that
are “unpreserved” as non-reviewable on appeal. 	See, e.g., Bickford v. Onslow Mem'l Hosp. Found.,
Inc., 2004 ME 111, ¶ 8, 855 A.2d 1150; Landmark Realty v. Leasure, 2004 ME 85, ¶ 10, 853 A.2d 749.
In the context of criminal appeals, in order to assure that special care is taken with constitutionally
established liberty interests, we do undertake appellate review of unpreserved claims of error
when they are properly raised on appeal. 	See M.R. Crim. P. 52(b) (Tower 2014); M.R.U.
Crim. P. 52(b); see, e.g., State v. Westgate, 2016 ME 145, ¶ 15, --- A.3d ---; State v. Pratt, 2015 ME
167, ¶ 28, 130 A.3d 381. Our interchangeable use of the terms may have led to the State’s use of the
phrase “not properly preserved” at the sentencing agreement hearing when “waiver” may have
been the concept it intended to express.

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of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 	Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); see also State v. Brunette, 501 A.2d 419, 423 (Me.
1985).
[¶18] Although True argued in support of his motion to dismiss or for a
new trial that the State knew or should have known that it was presenting
false testimony, True has not argued on appeal that the State knew that the
evidence it offered was false—and, in fact, at oral argument, True expressly
stated that he was not asserting that the State had engaged in unethical
conduct at trial. Nor does the record contain evidence of any such knowledge.
When 	the 	State 	is 	not 	alleged 	to 	have 	knowingly 	presented 	perjured
testimony, “a new trial is warranted only if the testimony was material and
the court [is left] with a firm belief that but for the perjured testimony, the
defendant would most likely not have been convicted.” 	United States v.
Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (quotation
marks omitted).
[¶19] 	As a threshold matter, a defendant must satisfy the basic and
fundamental burden of demonstrating that the information delivered at trial
was 	perjured—not merely inconsistent with other evidence or previous
testimony. 	See United States v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967, 971 (4th Cir. 1987). 	A

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showing that trial testimony is inconsistent with other testimony or evidence
does 	not, 	standing 	alone, 	demonstrate 	that 	evidence 	presented 	to 	the
fact-finder 	contained 	intentional 	inaccuracies 	or 	that 	there 	had 	been 	a
knowing use of false testimony. 	See United States v. Verser, 916 F.2d 1268,
1271 (7th Cir. 1990); State v. Pratt, 565 A.2d 90, 91-92 (Me. 1989). 	Such
inconsistencies present issues of credibility and call for the weighing of
conflicting or inconsistent evidence—a task 	that 	falls 	solidly within the
province of the jury as the fact-finder. See State v. Weaver, 2016 ME 12, ¶ 14,
130 A.3d 972. “The jury is permitted to draw all reasonable inferences from
the evidence and is free to selectively accept or reject testimony presented
based on the credibility of the witness or the internal cogency of the content.”
State v. Perkins, 2014 ME 159, ¶ 13, 107 A.3d 636 (quotation marks omitted).
The jury may “believe some parts of witness testimony to the exclusion of
others,” and may “combine . . . testimony in any way.” State v. Crossman, 2002
ME 28, ¶ 10, 790 A.2d 603 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶20] 	On the record before us, True is correct that the trial record
contains evidence that the three witnesses upon whom he has focused told
inconsistent stories at different times and in different court proceedings. True
has not, however, demonstrated that any particular testimony about the

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events was perjured, much less that any perjured testimony contributed to
the jury’s verdict. 	See Wallach, 935 F.2d at 456. 	The jury could take into
account that the trial was held more than a year after the murder and that
many witnesses were admittedly under the influence of drugs—or suffering
withdrawal symptoms—when the events took place.
[¶21] 	Furthermore, the State presented other evidence at trial that
corroborated those three witnesses’ testimony sufficiently for a jury rationally
to find that True had either “[i]ntentionally or knowingly cause[d] the death
of” 	Parent 	or 	“[e]ngage[d] 	in 	conduct 	that 	manifest[ed] 	a 	depraved
indifference to the value of human life and that in fact cause[d] the death of”
Parent. 	17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), (B). In addition to the testimony of Morton,
Leighton, and Gagnon, the State offered evidence that (1) after learning that
Parent had left the pharmacy with Morton and McNaughton, True told a friend
that he was supposed to have gone with them, grabbed a couple of things, and
left quickly; (2) at the time of the murder, True was not at Gagnon’s residence
as Morton had told True’s girlfriend he would be; (3) Morton told another
friend, about a week after the murder, that True had more involvement in
Parent’s murder than she knew; (4) McNaughton said that True had been with
him during the murder and had kicked Parent just after he died; (5) an

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investigating detective testified that True’s foot was injured and had bled;
(6) Parent had contusions on his head that were likely inflicted with fists or
boots while Parent was on the ground; (7) the wound at the back of Parent’s
head bled, though not a lot because the screwdriver did not hit a major artery;
and (8) a small amount of Parent’s blood, as well as True’s own, was found on
True’s jeans.
[¶22] On the available record, True has presented no basis to vacate the
judgment of conviction because it is impossible to conclude as a matter of law
that perjured testimony was admitted and contributed to the jury’s verdict.
See Wallach, 935 F.2d at 456. 	Nor has True demonstrated that the evidence
presented by any of the challenged witnesses was so incredible as not to meet
a minimum standard of relevance. 	See 	M.R. Evid. 401 	(Tower 2014).7
Although 	there 	were 	inconsistencies 	in 	the 	evidence, 	each 	witness 	was
subjected to vigorous cross-examination during a trial held more than a year
after the events at issue, and the jury had a full opportunity to weigh the effect
of the passage of time and other factors, including drug use, on the weight and
credibility of the witnesses’ testimony and other evidence. 	True has failed to
demonstrate that he was deprived of a fair trial. There is no error, much less
7 	The Maine Rules of Evidence were restyled, effective after True’s trial, but no substantive
changes to Rule 401 were made.

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obvious error, on this record. 	See McBreairty, 2016 ME 61, ¶ 20, 137 A.3d
1012.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
James P. Howaniec, Esq. (orally), Lewiston, for appellant William True
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen., and
John Alsop, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta,
for appellee State of Maine
Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number CR-2014-699
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY