In re Children of Nicole M. — 2018 ME 75

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 	Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 	2018 ME 75
Docket: 	Lin-17-286
Submitted
On Briefs: 	January 11, 2018
Decided: 	June 12, 2018
Panel: 	SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILDREN OF NICOLE M.
HJELM, J.
[¶1] The parents of three children appeal from a judgment of the District
Court (Wiscasset, Raimondi, J.) terminating their parental rights to the children.
Although the parents do not challenge the court’s conclusion that they are unfit
within the meaning of 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b) (2017), they contend that
the court erred by determining that termination is in the children’s best
interests, see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) (2017), because the court also
ordered a permanency plan that includes either adoption or a permanency
guardianship. Given the court’s findings regarding the circumstances and best
interests of the children, the court did not err by terminating the parents’ rights
to them while also approving a permanency guardianship 	as a possible
permanency plan. We therefore affirm the judgment.

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I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts, which are supported by the evidence, are drawn
from the court’s judgment and the procedural record. 	See In re Dominyk T.,
2017 ME 222, ¶ 5, 173 A.3d 1065.
[¶3] 	The Department of Health and Human Services became involved
with this family in January of 2016 when one of the children was rushed to the
hospital after suffering seizures. 	Ultimately, that child and one of the other
children were diagnosed with “failure to thrive” as a result of the parents’
life-threatening failure to feed them adequately. 	Several weeks after the first
child was hospitalized, the Department filed a child protection petition as to all
three children, and in late February, the three children were placed with their
paternal grandmother pursuant to a safety plan. 	In April of 2016, with the
agreement of the parents, the court entered a jeopardy order placing the
children in the Department’s custody and ordering that the children continue
to live with the grandmother.
[¶4] 	Both parents have learning disabilities, and the mother also has
cognitive impairments 	and suffers from depression. 	Neither parent 	has
meaningful insight into the reasons why the children are in foster care, nor has
either parent adequately participated in court-ordered diagnostic and therapy

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services or in their children’s doctor appointments. 	The parents initially
missed so many visits that the visits were suspended for a time. 	When visits
eventually resumed, the quality of the parents’ interactions with the children
was concerning until the last few weeks before the termination hearing, when
the visits went better. The parents love their children and want to reunite with
them, 	but 	their personal difficulties have contributed to their failure to
“understand, 	let 	alone 	provide[,] 	the 	steps 	necessary 	to 	foster 	a 	home
environment 	that 	eliminates 	the 	threat 	of 	jeopardy 	and 	support[s] 	the
nurturing and well-being of their children.”
[¶5] Since coming to live with the grandmother, the condition of the two
children who had failed to thrive improved “spectacularly,” and all three
children are doing very well in her care. 	The grandmother supports the
parents’ continued involvement with the children and is willing to either serve
as the children’s permanency guardian or adopt them.
[¶6] A year after the children came into its custody, the Department filed
a petition to terminate the parents’ rights to the children, and in May of 2017,
the court held a three-day consolidated hearing on the termination petition and
on a permanency plan for the children. 	The next month, the court issued a
judgment terminating both parents’ parental rights. The court found by clear

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and convincing evidence that both parents are unfit because they are unable or
unwilling to protect the children from jeopardy and would not do otherwise
within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs; they are
unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children within a time
reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs; and they did not make a
good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the children. 	See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b).
[¶7] 	The court also concluded that termination is in the children’s best
interests because of the stability and care provided to them by the grandmother
as well as her “tireless” advocacy for their interests. 	In making these best
interest determinations, the court considered the children’s greatly improved
condition 	while 	in 	the 	grandmother’s 	“excellent 	care”; 	the 	successful
integration of the children into the grandmother’s family, which includes four
other children; and the grandmother’s effectiveness in assisting the parents to
“maintain their attachment to the children” and her continued willingness to do
so. The court also credited the strong support from the children’s guardian ad
litem for continued placement with the grandmother.
[¶8] In its judgment, the court also established the permanency plan for
the children. See 22 M.R.S. § 4038-B (2017). After recognizing the policy found

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in statutes and case law that favors permanence for children, the court stated
that it had “no difficulty in finding that the plan of either permanency
guardianship or adoption is clearly in the best interest of [the children] so that
they may have permanency with their paternal grandmother in the stable and
nurturing environment where they have been placed during the pendency of
this action.” The court recognized that the grandmother had applied with the
Department to be licensed as a foster parent but that the application was denied
because of the Department’s concerns with the grandmother’s domestic
partner. The court stated that it was not bound by that administrative decision,
however, 	and 	found 	explicitly 	“that 	continued 	placement 	with 	[the
grandmother] is in the best interest of these children.”
[¶9] 	Both parents appealed from the termination order. 	See M.R.
App. P. 2(b)(3); 2(b)(5) (Tower 2016).1
II. DISCUSSION
[¶10] 	On 	this 	appeal, 	the 	parents 	do 	not 	contest 	the 	court’s
determination that they are unfit as the children’s parents. 	Rather, they
challenge only the court’s determination that termination is in the children’s
1 This appeal was filed before September 1, 2017; therefore, the restyled Maine Rules of Appellate
Procedure do not apply. See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled Rules).

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best interests, given the court’s finding that their best interests would also be
served if they continued to live with the grandmother as a permanency
guardian.
[¶11] Because the predicate of the parents’ challenge to the termination
order is the permanency plan that would provide for either a permanency
guardianship or an adoption, the scope of this appeal must be established with
clarity. 	Although an appeal can be taken from a 	termination order, 	a
permanency plan order is treated by operation of statute as an interlocutory
order and is therefore not 	itself 	appealable. 	22 M.R.S. 	§ 	4006 	(2017).
Consequently, the parents’ appeal cannot be used as a vehicle to directly
challenge the permanency plan ordered by the court. 	Rather, the cognizable
question presented here is whether one of the necessary predicates to a
termination order, namely, that termination is in the best interest of the child,
see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), is compatible with a determination that a
permanency guardianship also is in the child’s best interests.
[¶12] 	“We review the court’s factual findings related to the child’s best
interest for clear error,” In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 16, 889 A.2d 297, and
its “ultimate conclusion [regarding the child’s best interest] for an abuse of
discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, through the trial

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court’s lens,” In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 11, 154 A.3d 1199 (quotation
marks omitted). 	“Upon review for an abuse of discretion, we ask three
questions: (1) whether factual findings, if any, are supported by the record
pursuant to the clear error standard; (2) whether the court understood the law
applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given the facts and applying the
law, whether the court weighed the applicable facts and made choices within
the bounds of reasonableness.” 	Hutt v. Hanson, 2016 ME 128, ¶ 15, 147 A.3d
352 (quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted).
[¶13] Pursuant to Maine’s Child and Family Services and Child Protection
Act, a court is required to periodically order a permanency plan during the
lifetime of a child protection proceeding, subject to certain exceptions that are
not presently applicable.2 	22 M.R.S. § 4038-B(1). 	When a court creates a
permanency plan for a child, the court “must determine whether and when, if
applicable,” one of five plans will be implemented. 	Id. § 4038-B(4). 	The
following permanency plans are authorized by statute:
• 	returning the child to a parent;
• 	placing the child for adoption;
2 Pursuant to section 4038-B(1), permanency planning hearings are not required when judicial
review hearings are not required, which includes, for example, when custody of the child is not with
the Department or with a parent. See 22 M.R.S. § 4038(1) (2017).

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• 	placing the child in the care of a permanency guardian pursuant to
22 M.R.S. § 4038-C (2017) or a guardian appointed by a probate court;
• 	placing the child with “a fit and willing relative”; or
• 	in narrowly drawn circumstances, 	placing 	the child in “another
planned permanent living arrangement.”
Id. § 4038-B(4)(A)(1)-(5).
[¶14] 	Here, the permanency plan for the children called for either
adoption or appointment of a permanency guardian. 	The court explicitly
framed that plan in terms of “permanency with . . . [the] grandmother in the
stable and nurturing environment where [the children] have been placed
during the pendency of this action.” 	(Emphasis added.) 	This specific and
essential aspect of the court’s best interest analysis requires us to consider how
it interrelates with the court’s concurrent determination that termination is in
the children’s best interests.
[¶15] 	As a general matter, a “central tenet” of the child protection
statutes 	“is the importance of 	permanency 	for children subject to child
protection proceedings.” 	In re David W., 2010 ME 119, ¶ 6, 8 A.3d 673
(quotation marks omitted). Permanency planning is integrally connected to the
best interest determination that a court is called upon to make in a termination
proceeding. 	As we have held, “[p]ermanency planning and the best interest

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determination made in a termination proceeding cannot be divorced from one
another because a best interest decision necessarily requires the court to
consider the long-term living arrangement that will best serve a child’s needs.
The court’s permanency plan for the child is an inextricable part of that
decision.” In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 28, 889 A.2d 297. As was true here,
a termination hearing is often consolidated with a permanency planning
hearing because the resulting record is the “single body of evidence” on which
the court rests its best interest analysis that bears on both the issue of
termination and the formulation of a permanency plan. See id. ¶ 29.
[¶16] Here, the first of the two alternative permanency plans set out by
the court is adoption. An adoption will provide “certainty and stability” to the
adopted child, see In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 13, 154 A.3d 1199; In re
David W., 2010 ME 119, ¶ 10, 8 A.3d 673, and often results in permanence for
the child, see In re Marcus S., 2007 ME 24, ¶ 10, 916 A.2d 225.
[¶17] The question of who is the best person to adopt the child, however,
is beyond the scope of a termination proceeding because that question must be
addressed in a separate adoption action governed by 18-A M.R.S. §§ 9-301 to
9-315 (2017). See 4 M.R.S. § 152(5-A) (2017); Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME
220, ¶ 9 n.2, 175 A.3d 639; In re Tacoma M., 2017 ME 85, ¶ 9 n.2, 160 A.3d 537.

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Therefore, 	in 	a 	consolidated 	proceeding 	where 	the 	court 	addresses 	a
termination petition and establishes a permanency plan, while the court may
determine that as a general matter adoption is in the child’s best interest and
will be the permanency plan, the court would overreach if it were to designate
the adoptive party. See In re Kenneth S., 2017 ME 45, ¶ 6, 157 A.3d 244. In this
way, the permanency plan of adoption leaves open the important question of
who the adoptive parent might be.3
[¶18] 	The other type of permanency plan endorsed here by the court,
namely, a permanency guardianship, provides a child with “safe, long-term
care” in the custody of the permanency guardian. See In re Cameron B., 2017 ME
18, ¶ 12, 154 A.3d 1199. Unlike with a permanency plan of adoption, where the
court may not properly address the question of who is an appropriate adoptive
party, establishing a permanency guardianship requires the court to identify a
3 We note that, pursuant to the Home Court Act, the District Court will have exclusive jurisdiction
over an adoption petition if there is a pending District Court child protection proceeding involving
the same child, see 4 M.R.S. § 152(5-A) (2017), even though adoption petitions ordinarily must be
filed in a probate court, see 18-A M.R.S. § 9-103(a)(1) (2017). In this way, the same court that is
familiar with the child’s circumstances germane to the child protection action will have the authority
to adjudicate the adoption petition.

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person who will serve as the permanency guardian based on the particular
attributes of the prospective guardian.4 See 22 M.R.S. § 4038-C.
[¶19] 	Another difference between an adoption and a permanency
guardianship is that the latter, “[w]hen it is appropriate, . . . allows parents
whose children cannot be returned to them to have a meaningful opportunity
to maintain a legal relationship with their children and to have the court
determine their rights to have contact with their children.” 	In re Cameron B.,
2017 ME 18, ¶ 12, 154 A.3d 1199. 	This opportunity is recognized in the law,
however, only where a parent’s rights to the child have not been terminated
because a parent whose rights have been terminated has no legal relationship
with the child except that the child’s right to inherit from the parent remains
intact. 22 MRS § 4056(1) (2017).
4 In making that determination, the court must consider factors that are highly specific to a
prospective permanency guardian by determining whether that person
A. 	[h]as the ability to provide a safe home for the child;
B. 	[h]as a close emotional bond with the child and whether the child has a close emotional
bond with the prospective permanency guardian;
C. 	[i]s willing and able to make an informed, long-term commitment to the child;
D. 	[h]as the skills to care for the child; and
E. 	[h]as submitted to having fingerprints taken for the purposes of a national
criminal history record check.
22 M.R.S. § 4038-C(1) (2017); see also In re C.P., 2016 ME 18, ¶ 34, 132 A.3d 174 (affirming a judgment
denying the parents’ request for a permanency guardianship where the court found that the
proffered guardian did not satisfy the statutory criteria).

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[¶20] 	This does not mean that the court may order a permanency
guardianship 	only 	when parental rights have 	not 	been terminated. 	The
statutory authorization for a permanency guardianship contains no 	such
limitation, and none is implied. 	See 22 M.R.S. § 4038-C. 	Although there are
certain circumstances where the court is no longer required to hold periodic
permanency planning hearings, the issuance of a termination order by itself
does not have that effect. See id. § 4038-B(2), (3). This means that permanency
planning will be an ongoing post-termination requirement unless the court is
specifically relieved of that responsibility pursuant to statute, and that, with the
exception of reunifying the child with the parent,5 all of the permanency plans
identified 	in 	section 	4038-B(4)(A), 	including 	creation 	of 	a 	permanency
guardianship, remain available to the court. This is as it should be, so that the
court 	will be authorized to consider 	as many 	options 	as possible 	when
5 	Pursuant to section 4038-B(4)(A)(1), a court may return a child to a parent as part of a
permanency plan only when the parent has fulfilled the responsibilities required by a reunification
plan created pursuant to section 4041(1-A)(B). For at least two reasons, it is self-evident that this
will not be possible for a person whose parental rights have been terminated. First, reunification
may be pursued only by a “parent,” 22 M.R.S. § 4041(1-A)(B) (2017), and a person whose rights to a
child have been terminated is no longer a “parent” for purposes of the child protection laws, see id.
§ 4002(7) (2017). Second, post-termination reunification would be contrary to the very nature of a
termination order, which requires determinations that the person is unfit as a parent and that
termination is in the child’s best interest. See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2017). In contrast, none of these
considerations impedes a court’s consideration of the other four permanency plan options in a
post-termination setting.

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determining what arrangement best meets the needs and promotes the best
interest of the child.
[¶21] To the extent that the plain language of section 4038-B(4)(A) does
not make clear that the court may order a post-termination permanency
guardianship, the legislative history resolves the issue. See Manirakiza v. Dep’t
of Health and Human Servs., 2018 ME 10, ¶ 8, 177 A.3d 1264 (“Only if the plain
language of the statute is ambiguous will we look beyond that language to
examine 	other 	indicia 	of 	legislative 	intent, 	such 	as 	legislative 	history.”
(quotation marks omitted)). When the Legislature was considering the bill that
was 	ultimately 	enacted 	as 	the 	permanency 	guardianship 	statute, 	the
Department’s Director of Policy and Practice for the Bureau of Child and Family
Services testified to explain the central purposes underlying the proposed
legislation. See An Act to Establish Permanent Subsidized Guardianship: Hearing
on L.D. 1382 Before the Comm. on Health and Human Servs., 122nd Legis. (2005)
(testimony of Dan Despard, Director of Policy and Practice for the Bureau of
Child and Family Services within the 	Department of Health and Human
Services). 	Several of those stated purposes make clear that a permanency
guardianship plan could be created even after a termination order. 	Id. 	For
example, the Director stated that a permanency guardianship would be an

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“effective alternative that will honor the needs of older children currently in
foster care who express a desire not to be adopted . . . .” 	Id. 	By casting a
permanency guardianship as an alternative to adoption, it is evident that the
permanency guardianship was intended to be available to the court even after
a termination order had been issued.
[¶22] 	Additionally, as the Director testified, adding a permanency
guardianship to the roster of permanency plans would avoid the situation
where a guardianship would have to be imposed in a proceeding that is
separate from the child protection action—i.e., in a Title 18-A guardianship
proceeding in a probate court—where a different judge who may well be less
familiar with the child’s circumstances would be called upon to adjudicate the
question of whether a guardianship should be imposed and who the guardian
should be. Id. With the availability of a permanency guardianship plan within
the child protection case itself, a District Court judge—who should be the same
judge who is already presiding over the child protection proceeding—would
make that determination.6 The rationale for creating this pathway for the judge
6 With the 2016 enactment of the Home Court Act, see 4 M.R.S. § 152(5-A); P.L. 2015, ch. 460, § 1
(effective July 29, 2016), a Title 18-A guardianship action that would have been filed in a probate
court now will be both commenced and adjudicated in the District Court if a child protection
proceeding involving the same child is already pending there. This was not the case in 2005 when
section 4038-B(4)(A)(3) was enacted, see P.L. 2005, ch. 372, § 6 (effective Sept. 17, 2005), which
explains why the Legislature created such a process for child protection cases.

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in the child protection case to also adjudicate the guardianship issue is not
diminished after a termination order has been issued; 	even if the 	child
protection case is in a post-termination posture, the benefit of allowing the
same judge to preside over the child protection case and the guardianship issue
is no less important than it would be before any termination order is issued.
[¶23] 	We 	also 	note 	that, 	unlike in 	a Title 18-A 	guardianship, 	a
permanency guardian appointed in a child protection case pursuant to section
4038-B(4)(A)(3) is eligible for a guardianship subsidy in some circumstances.
See 22 MRS § 4038-D (2017). A parent’s obligation to pay child support often
ends when that parent’s parental rights are terminated. 	See id. § 4056(1);
Guardianship of Anthony J., 2009 ME 97, ¶ 6, 980 A.2d 1250 (explaining that the
“only exception” to the rule that a terminated parent “has no duty to provide
ongoing support for the child” is that a court may, pursuant to 22 M.R.S.
§ 4056(5) (2017), “order a parent who was convicted of a crime against the
child prior to the termination of parental rights to pay a lump sum as child
support”). The provision for a guardianship subsidy is therefore an important
Pursuant to the Home Court Act, an adoption petition relating to a child who is the subject of a
child protection petition also must be filed in the District Court rather than in a probate court. See
4 M.R.S. § 152(5-A). Clearly, the best practice is for the petition to be heard and adjudicated by the
same District Court judge who has been presiding over the child protection case.

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possible feature 	of 	a permanency guardianship that 	can be 	even 	more
important after termination than before termination, when the parents are
required to pay for the children’s material needs. See id. § 4036(1)(G) (2017).
[¶24] For these reasons, we conclude that a permanency guardianship is
not necessarily incompatible with a court’s determination that a termination of
parental rights is in the child’s best interest. To be sure, because a permanency
guardianship may result in less permanency than adoption and therefore, to
that extent, may be less effective in achieving the “central tenet” of permanency
for children, see In re David W., 2010 ME 119, ¶ 6, 8 A.3d 673 (quotation marks
omitted), there will be only limited countervailing circumstances where a court
will 	terminate 	the 	parental 	rights 	of 	both 	parents 	and 	also 	approve 	a
permanency guardianship. 	The legislative history described above proposes
one situation where those determinations could overlap—where an older child
does not want to be adopted but whose best interest will be served by the
measure of stability and security that a permanency guardianship can provide.
See supra ¶ 21.
[¶25] Given the court’s factual findings, this case provides another such
example. 	By all accounts, the grandmother has provided the three children
with exemplary care, support, and advocacy, and the court found, with

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considerable support in the record, that the children unquestionably should
continue to live with her. 	That result would be subject to some uncertainty if
the court established a permanency plan limited to adoption, because, as
discussed above, see supra ¶ 17, the court would act beyond its authority in the
child protection proceeding if it were to designate the grandmother as the
adoptive parent. That level of uncertainty is enhanced to some degree because
the Department had denied the grandmother’s application to be licensed as a
foster parent.7 	The court therefore designated alternative post-termination
permanency plans that would ensure that, in the end, the children remained
with the grandmother.8 In that way, the court legitimately viewed that outcome
as being at least as important as the process used to achieve that result and the
nature of the grandmother’s ultimate legal relationship with the children.
[¶26] 	The 	parents 	argue 	that 	the 	availability 	of 	a 	permanency
guardianship with the grandmother establishes that termination was not
7 	The grandmother filed an appeal within the Department from that denial, and the matter
remained pending when the termination hearing concluded. 	As was discussed during the
termination hearing, the denial created the prospect that the Department would object to an
adoption petition filed by the grandmother. 	As the Department itself pointed out to the court,
however, the court is authorized to overrule such an objection and grant the petition. See 18-A M.R.S.
§ 9-302(a)(3) (2017).
8 In addition to testifying at the termination hearing that she would be willing to serve as a
permanency guardian, the grandmother and her partner filed a petition for private guardianship for
the children in the District Court on the second day of the termination hearing.

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necessary to promote the children’s best interests because the children could
continue in the grandmother’s care without terminating the parents’ parental
rights. 	This contention, however, does not account for the prospects of
impermanence 	in 	a 	permanency 	guardianship—despite 	the 	contrary
implication of that statutory term—particularly when a parent’s parental rights
have not been terminated, because the parent is statutorily authorized to
petition the court not only to determine rights of contact but even to terminate
the permanency guardianship itself.9 	See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4038-C(3), (6); In re
Haylie W., 2017 ME 157, ¶ 4, 167 A.3d 576.
[¶27] For the reasons we explained at the outset of our discussion, this
appeal is not from the permanency plan 	of adoption or a permanency
guardianship. See supra ¶ 11. Rather, given the restricted scope of this appeal,
the parents’ argument is limited to an assertion that the court’s approval of a
permanency guardianship as a way to protect the children’s best interests
9 In cases where the evidence raised the prospect of disruptive disputes between a parent and a
guardian, we affirmed decisions of the trial court that a permanency plan of adoption—and not a
permanency guardianship—is in the child’s best interest. See In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, 154 A.3d
1199; In re C.P., 2016 ME 18, 132 A.3d 174; In re David W., 2010 ME 119, 8 A.3d 673. Although the
court here did not find that type of difficulty in the relationship between the parents and the
grandmother, a best interest determination sufficient to support termination does not require the
existence of such a problem. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(2) (2017) (“In deciding to terminate parental
rights, the court shall consider the best interest of the child, the needs of the child, including the
child’s age, the child’s attachments to relevant persons, periods of attachments and separation, the
child’s ability to integrate into a substitute placement or back into the parent’s home and the child’s
physical and emotional needs.”).

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necessarily undermines the conclusion that termination is in the children’s best
interests. 	The 	court 	explained, 	however, 	that 	either 	a 	permanency
guardianship or an adoption would allow the children to “have permanency
with their paternal grandmother in the stable and nurturing environment
where they have been placed during the pendency of this action.” The court’s
goals therefore were to ensure that the children would have the permanence
that comes with a termination of parental bonds and also that the children
would be placed with the grandmother. This is a sufficient basis for the court’s
decision to terminate parental rights while leaving available the option of
placing the children in a permanency guardianship, because the termination
order and either permanency plan will allow the children to move forward.
[¶28] 	We therefore conclude that, in the circumstances of this case,
termination 	of 	parental 	rights 	is 	not 	inconsistent 	with 	a 	permanency
guardianship.10
10 Although, given the circumstances of this case, the designation of two possible permanency
plans does not call the termination determination into question, the fact remains that the court has
not yet ordered a particular permanency plan for the children. This creates more uncertainty for the
children than is intended by the permanency planning statute. See 22 M.R.S. § 4038-B(4)(A) (2017)
(referring to “[t]he permanency plan” (emphasis added)); see also In re David W., 2010 ME 119, ¶ 6,
8 A.3d 673 (emphasizing the importance of permanency for children). Any error by the court in
failing to specify a single permanency plan does not affect the termination order and is not appealable
in any event, see 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2017), and therefore does not constitute a basis for relief.
Nonetheless, as the case proceeds in the trial court, the court will now have the opportunity to specify
the permanency plan that will actually be implemented.

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The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Rory A. McNamara, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant mother
Nathaniel Seth Levy, Esq., Brunswick, for appellant father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Wiscasset District Court docket number PC-2016-01
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY