Holt v. Prather

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-870
Filed 21 October 2026
Wake County, No. 19CVD006138-910
ALFRED BENEDICT HOLT, III, Plaintiff,
v.
LATOYA PRATHER, Defendant.
Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 20 May 2025 by Judge Rhonda Young
in Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 February 2026.
Alfred Benedict Holt, III, pro se, for plaintiff-appellant.
Law Offices of Raushanah F. Rodgers, PLLC, by Raushanah Rodgers, for
defendant-appellee.
STADING, Judge.
Alfred Benedict Holt, III (“Plaintiff”) appeals from the trial court’s order
modifying permanent child custody. On appeal, Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s
determination that a substantial change in circumstances justified child custody
modification. Plaintiff also presents several evidentiary and constitutional
arguments. After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s order.

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I. Background
Plaintiff and Latoya Prather (“Defendant”) are the biological parents of a
minor child. On 6 March 2020, the trial court entered a temporary custody order.
The order concluded it was in the minor child’s best interest that “temporary legal
and physical care, custody, and control be granted to the parties jointly.”
On 11 March 2022, the trial court entered a permanent joint custody order.
The trial court concluded that the parties “are fit and proper persons to share joint
legal custody of [their] minor child.” The trial court ordered the parties to have joint
legal custody and set out a detailed visitation schedule, which “corresponds to
Plaintiff’s . . . work schedule.” With respect to custody exchanges, the order provided:
All exchanges of the minor child shall take place at the
minor child’s daycare or school. When school is not in
session, the exchanges shall take place in the parking lot
of Barnes and Noble . . . . This location is currently
approximately halfway between the parties residences. If
either party moves to a different residence, the parties may
agree to exchange the minor child at a different location
which is approximately halfway between the residences.
On 2 July 2024, the trial court entered an order for civil contempt. The
contempt order found that Plaintiff had willfully violated the 11 March 2022
permanent joint custody order. As a purge condition,1 the trial court ordered Plaintiff
1 Generally, purge conditions are provisions that, if met, allow individuals to “purge” themselves of
contempt. See generally N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A‑22 (2025).

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to “ensure that he is on time for each exchange until November 19, 2024. Plaintiff
shall be at the exchange location by 8AM.” Additionally, the trial court ordered
Plaintiff to report to the Wake County courthouse on 19 November 2024 to provide
proof of compliance with the purge conditions.
On 19 March 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Defendant’s motions to
modify custody and show cause for contempt. On 20 March 2025, the trial court
entered an order for civil contempt. The trial court found that Plaintiff had willfully
violated a memorandum of judgment entered by the court on 2 July 2024, which
ordered Plaintiff to comply with Defendant’s 15 April 2024 request for production. As
a purge condition, Plaintiff was ordered to “produce all documents that have not been
produced as outlined above within 7 days of the entry of this order.” The trial court
also ordered Plaintiff to report to the Wake County courthouse on 9 May 2025, to
provide proof of compliance with the purge conditions.
On 20 March 2025, the trial court entered an order for civil contempt regarding
Plaintiff violating the custody exchange provisions of the 11 March 2022 permanent
custody order. The trial court found that Plaintiff violated the permanent custody
order by:
Failing to meet at the Barnes and Nobel [sic] in Cary, NC
on multiple occasions including the following dates,
February 19, 2024, March 9, 2024, March 11, 2024, March
25, 2024, March 29, 2024, May 27, 2024, June 21, 2024,
July 1, 2024. Defendant did not consent to change the
exchange location.

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As a purge condition, Plaintiff was ordered to pay a $400.00 fine to Defendant within
thirty days. The trial court also ordered Plaintiff to report to the Wake County
courthouse on 9 May 2025 to provide proof of compliance with the purge conditions.
On 20 May 2025, the trial court entered an order modifying permanent child
custody. The trial court found that “there is a substantial change in circumstance
affecting the health and general welfare of the minor child.” The trial court ordered
continued shared joint legal custody of the minor child. The trial court modified the
parties’ physical custody schedule and gave Defendant primary physical custody and
Plaintiff secondary physical custody. The trial court also modified custodial
exchanges by providing it would occur at the minor child’s daycare or school.
Additionally, the trial court ordered the minor child to remain in gymnastics and Girl
Scouts. The trial court specified that “activities occurring during a parent’s custodial
time requires the parent to ensure the minor child is at her extracurricular activities.”
Plaintiff entered his written notice of appeal on 18 June 2025.
II. Analysis
On appeal, Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s determination that a
substantial change in circumstances justified child custody modification. Plaintiff
also presents several evidentiary and constitutional arguments. Before examining
the merits, however, we address a myriad of preliminary issues both parties raised.

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A. Preliminary Issues
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
On 7 October 2025, Defendant moved to dismiss this appeal. Defendant argues
this appeal should be dismissed given Plaintiff’s violation of Rules 7 and 11 of the
North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Defendant also contends Plaintiff
falsely represented that a certified transcript was served on 4 August 2025. For the
reasons below, we decline to dismiss this appeal.
This Court analyzes violations of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure primarily through three lenses: “(1) waiver occurring in the trial court; (2)
defects in appellate jurisdiction; and (3) violation of nonjurisdictional requirements.”
Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 194, 657
S.E.2d 361, 363 (2008). This Court considers a violation of Rule 7 as a
nonjurisdictional defect. N.C. State Bar v. Sossomon, 197 N.C. App. 261, 270, 676
S.E.2d 910, 917 (2009) (“Rule 7 is a nonjurisdictional defect.”); see also Lawrence v.
Sullivan, 192 N.C. App. 608, 617, 666 S.E.2d 175, 181 (2008). Likewise, this Court
considers a violation of Rule 11 as a nonjurisdictional defect. See Ramsey v. Ramsey,
264 N.C. App. 431, 435, 826 S.E.2d 459, 463 (2019); see also K2HN Constr. N.C., LLC
v. Five D Contractors, Inc., 267 N.C. App. 207, 212, 832 S.E.2d 559, 563 (2019).
Nonjurisdictional requirements are “designed primarily to keep the appellate
process ‘flowing in an orderly manner.’ ” Dogwood, 362 N.C. at 198, 657 S.E.2d at
365 (citation omitted). “A party’s failure to comply with nonjurisdictional rule

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requirements normally should not lead to dismissal of the appeal.” Id. (citation
modified). That said, dismissal of an appeal is appropriate for nonjurisdictional
defects when it falls within the categories of “substantial failure” or “gross violation.”
Id. at 199, 657 S.E.2d at 366.
This Court may consider the following factors in determining whether the
noncompliance rises to the level of “substantial failure” or “gross violation”: (1)
“whether and to what extent the noncompliance impairs the court’s task of review,”
and (2) “whether and to what extent review on the merits would frustrate the
adversarial process.” Id. at 200, 657 S.E.2d at 366–67. In addition, this Court may
also consider the number of rules violated. Id. at 200, 657 S.E.2d at 367.
a. Rule 7
Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed “to ensure the timely and proper filing of
the certified transcript after ordering it,” and that “no certification from a court
reporter or authorized transcriptionist has been filed or served.” Defendant also
argues that while Plaintiff filed a transcript contract, there is “no evidence in the
record that the Certified Transcript and/or Transcripts Documentation Form of the
trial court proceedings has been filed with the Clerk of Superior Court of Wake
County,” and Defendant has not been served with the transcript contract.
Rule 7 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, entitled
“Transcripts,” provides the following:
(a) Scope. This rule applies to the ordering, preparation,

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delivery, and filing of each transcript that is to be
designated as part of the record on appeal.
(b) Ordering by a Party. A party may order a transcript
of any proceeding that the party considers necessary for the
appeal.
(1) Transcript Contract. A party who orders a
transcript for the appeal after notice of appeal is
filed or given must use an Appellate Division
Transcript Contract form to order the transcript.
That form is available on the Supreme Court’s rules
webpage.
(2) Service of Transcript Contract. An appellant
must serve its transcript contract on each party and
on the transcriptionist no later than fourteen days
after filing or giving notice of appeal. An appellee
must serve its transcript contract on each party and
on the transcriptionist no later than twenty-eight
days after any appellant files or gives notice of
appeal.
(3) Transcript Documentation. A party who has
ordered a transcript for the appeal, whether ordered
before or after notice of appeal, must complete an
Appellate Division Transcript Documentation form.
That form is available on the Supreme Court’s rules
webpage.
(4) Service of Transcript Documentation. A
party must serve the transcript documentation on
all other parties within the time allowed under
subsection (b)(2) of this rule for that party to serve a
transcript contract.
. . . .
(d) Formatting. The transcriptionist must format the
transcript according to standards set by the Administrative
Office of the Courts.

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(e) Delivery.
(1) Deadlines. The transcriptionist must deliver the
transcript to the parties no later than ninety days
after having been served with the transcript
contract or the appellate entries, except:
a. In a capitally tried case, the deadline is one
hundred eighty days.
b. In an undisciplined or delinquent juvenile
case under Subchapter II of Chapter 7B of the
General Statutes, the deadline is sixty days.
c. In a special proceeding about the admission
or discharge of clients under Article 5 of
Chapter 122C of the General Statutes, the
deadline is sixty days.
(2) Certification. The transcriptionist must certify
to the parties and to the clerk of superior court that
the transcript has been delivered.
. . . .
(g) Neutral Transcriptionist. The transcriptionist must
not have a personal or financial interest in the proceeding
unless the parties otherwise agree by stipulation.
N.C. R. App. P. 7.
Under this rule, Plaintiff was required to use a transcript contract to order the
transcript and serve that transcript contract “on each party and on the
transcriptionist no later than fourteen days after filing or giving notice of appeal.”
N.C. R. App. P. 7(b)(2). Having ordered a transcript for appeal, Plaintiff was required
to complete an appellate division transcript documentation form, and “serve the
transcript documentation on all other parties within the time allowed under

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subsection (b)(2) of this rule for that party to serve a transcript contract.” N.C. R.
App. P. 7(b)(4). Finally, the transcriptionist “must deliver the transcript to the
parties no later than ninety days after having been served with the transcript
contract,” N.C. R. App. P. 7(e)(1), and “must certify to the parties and to the clerk of
superior court that the transcript has been delivered.” N.C. R. App. P. 7(e)(2); see
also Harvey v. Stokes, 137 N.C. App. 119, 123, 527 S.E.2d 336, 339 (2000).
As discussed, however, a Rule 7 violation is a nonjurisdictional defect. See
Sossomon, 197 N.C. App. at 270, 676 S.E.2d at 917. Here, Plaintiff’s noncompliance
does not rise to the level of a “substantial failure or gross violation.” Dogwood, 362
N.C. at 200, 657 S.E.2d at 366. This Court’s ability to review Plaintiff’s appeal on the
merits is not hindered, and the adversarial process is not frustrated. See, e.g.,
Bradley v. Cumberland Cnty., 262 N.C. App. 376, 382, 822 S.E.2d 416, 420 (2018).
We therefore decline to dismiss Plaintiff’s appeal.
b. Rule 11
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff violated Rule 11(a) of the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure since she “never properly served Defendant-Appellee
with the complete Proposed Record on Appeal and instead filed piecemeal
documents.”
Rule 11(a) provides the procedure for settling the record on appeal by
agreement. See N.C. R. App. P. 11(a). This rule is inapplicable, however, because the

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parties did not “by agreement entered in the printed record settle a proposed record
on appeal . . . .” Id.
Rule 11(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
(b) By Appellee’s Approval of Appellant’s Proposed
Record on Appeal. If the record on appeal is not settled
by agreement under Rule 11(a), the appellant shall, within
the same times provided, serve upon all other parties a
proposed record on appeal constituted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 9. Within thirty days (thirty-five
days in capitally tried cases) after service of the proposed
record on appeal upon an appellee, that appellee may serve
upon all other parties a notice of approval of the proposed
record on appeal, or objections, amendments, or a proposed
alternative record on appeal in accordance with Rule 11(c).
If all appellees within the times allowed them either serve
notices of approval or fail to serve either notices of approval
or objections, amendments, or proposed alternative records
on appeal, appellant’s proposed record on appeal thereupon
constitutes the record on appeal.
N.C. R. App. P. 11(b).
Here, the record shows that Plaintiff’s proposed record on appeal was served
upon Defendant on 4 August 2025. Since Defendant did not challenge the record
within thirty days under Rule 11(c), Plaintiff’s proposed record “constitutes the record
on appeal.” Id. Defendant fails to explain any further or cite to authority regarding
her argument, therefore Plaintiff’s alleged error is deemed abandoned. See N.C. R.
App. P. 28(a) (“Issues not presented and discussed in a party’s brief are deemed
abandoned.”); see also N.C. R. App. P. 28(c) (“If the appellee presents issues in
addition to those stated by the appellant, the appellee’s brief must contain a full, non-

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argumentative summary of all material facts necessary to understand the new issues
supported by references to pages in the record on appeal . . . .”).
Defendant further argues that Plaintiff violated Rule 11(c) of the North
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff
unilaterally filed “a ‘Settled Record’ without following the mandatory procedure for
judicial settlement or agreement of the parties.” Despite Defendant’s urging,
however, it was her obligation to raise any potential issues with the record. See N.C.
R. App. P. 11(b). As Defendant did not do so, this Court considers the record settled.
See id. Regardless, any error would amount to a nonjurisdictional defect, and, under
these facts, would not rise to the level of a “substantial failure or gross violation.”
Dogwood, 362 N.C. at 200, 657 S.E.2d at 366; see also Sullivan, 192 N.C. App. at 617,
666 S.E.2d at 181.
c. False Certification of Service
Defendant next argues this appeal should be dismissed because she never
received the certified transcript despite Plaintiff certifying service.
Entitled “Manner of Service,” Rule 26(c) of the North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure provides:
Service of any item may be made upon a party’s attorney of
record or upon a party in the manner provided for service
and return of process in Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Service of any item may alternatively be made
upon a party’s attorney of record or upon a party by
delivering a copy to either or by mailing a copy to the
recipient’s last known address, or if no address is known,

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by filing it in the office of the clerk with whom the original
item is filed. Delivery of a copy within this rule means
handing it to the attorney or to the party or leaving it at
the attorney’s office with a partner or employee. Service by
mail is complete upon deposit of the item enclosed in a
postpaid, properly addressed wrapper in a post office or
official depository under the exclusive care and custody of
the United States Postal Service, or, for those having
access to such services, upon deposit with the State Courier
Service or Inter-Office Mail.
If the item to be served is filed electronically in the
appellate courts using the appellate courts’ electronic-filing
site, then service may alternatively be made upon a party’s
attorney of record by e-mail to the attorney’s correct and
current e-mail address. If the item to be served is filed with
the clerk of superior court using Odyssey, the trial court’s
electronic-filing system, then service may alternatively be
made using the service feature in that system.
N.C. R. App. P. 26(c).
Here, aside from claiming she has not received the transcript, Defendant has
not provided evidence of a false certification. See N.C. R. App. P. 25(a) (“Motions to
dismiss shall be supported by affidavits or certified copies of docket entries which
show the failure to take timely action or otherwise perfect the appeal . . . .”). Even
assuming Defendant did not receive the certified transcript, such violation is
nonjurisdictional and not substantial enough to warrant dismissal of Plaintiff’s
appeal since Defendant had actual notice of the filings evidenced by her own brief.
Accordingly, we decline to dismiss the present appeal.

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2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions
On 12 November 2025, Plaintiff filed with this Court a motion for sanctions
pursuant to Rule 34 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Plaintiff
requests this Court to sanction Defendant for the cost of his appeal and provides an
itemized list of his applicable costs. Besides referencing Rule 34, however, Plaintiff
has failed to present any argument as to why Defendant should be sanctioned under
that rule. Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument is deemed abandoned. See N.C. R. App. P.
28(a) (“Issues not presented and discussed in a party’s brief are deemed abandoned.”).
3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay
On 24 January 2026, Plaintiff requested a temporary stay of the underlying
order. Plaintiff also attached a motion to stay to his notice of appeal entered on 18
June 2025. However, since we affirm the trial court’s order, Plaintiff’s motion is
denied. See Chavez v. McFadden, 374 N.C. 458, 467, 843 S.E.2d 139, 146 (2020) (“A
case is ‘moot’ when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered,
cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.” (citation omitted)).
B. Merits
Having addressed the preliminary issues, we now turn to Plaintiff’s numerous
arguments regarding the merits of the case. We take each argument in turn.
1. The Trial Court’s Order
Without challenging specific findings, Plaintiff maintains the trial court
ignored “[u]ncontroverted current documents.” We disagree.

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“[A]n order of a court of this State for custody of a minor child may be modified
or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed
circumstances by either party or anyone interested.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7(a)
(2025). “The trial court’s examination of whether to modify an existing child custody
order is twofold. The trial court must determine whether there was a change in
circumstances and then must examine whether such a change affected the minor
child.” Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 474, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253 (2003). If “the
trial court determines that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and
that the change affected the welfare of the child, the court must then examine
whether a change in custody is in the child’s best interests.” Id. “We review an order
for modification of custody to determine if the findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence and if the conclusions of law are supported by the findings; the
trial court determines the credibility and weight of the evidence.” Walsh v. Jones,
263 N.C. App. 582, 588, 824 S.E.2d 129, 134 (2019).
a. Findings
Upon review of an order modifying child custody, this Court “must examine
the trial court’s findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by
substantial evidence.” Shipman, 357 N.C. at 474, 586 S.E.2d at 253. “Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Thomas v. Thomas, 233 N.C. App. 736, 738, 757 S.E.2d 375,
378 (2014) (citation omitted).

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The trial court made the following pertinent findings:
9. That due to the minor child’s age she was not engaged in
extracurricular activities when the order was entered and
is now involved in gymnastics and girl scouts.
10. That the court does find there is a substantial change
in circumstances affecting the health and general welfare
of the minor child.
11. That the court finds that this is a high conflict case.
12. That the court finds that the parents are unable to
communicate regarding what is in the best interests of the
minor child.
13. That there is a consistent issue regarding pick up and
drop offs of the minor child.
14. That there are ongoing conflicts regarding extra-
curricular/ recreational activities for the minor child, which
the court finds are affecting the minor child’s health and
general welfare.
15. That the Court notes that there were at least three (3)
Motions and Orders to show cause before the Court
wherein the Plaintiff had the burden upon him to show why
he should not be held in contempt of this Court’s
permanent custody order.
16. That the court finds that the Plaintiff did not offer any
evidence regarding the show causes and as such, the court
takes that information in the show causes as true. There
was virtually no testimony to dispute the Defendant’s
account as alleged in her Motion for Order to Show Cause
and the court entered orders for the Plaintiff to appear and
testify as to why he should not be held in contempt.
17. That since the entry of this court’s permanent custody
order on March 11, 2022, the parties were on a joint
custodial schedule and that based on Plaintiff’s work
schedule, Plaintiff has worked a substantial amount of

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time and overtime since the Order was entered, and some
of the times he has worked, have been during his custodial
time.
18. That even though the Plaintiff testified that he no
longer works overtime, the Court does not find that
testimony to be credible based on the exhibit introduced as
Plaintiff’s exhibit 8, that shows he is still working
overtime.
19. That during Plaintiff’s custodial time wherein he works
overtime, the court is unsure exactly where the minor child
is or who cares for the minor child.
20. That Defendant (mom) raised an issue regarding
Plaintiff’s brother-in-law . . . to Plaintiff as early as 2022.
That the issues that she raised was that [Plaintiff’s
brother-in-law] was visiting the minor child at school
during her before and after school care program.
21. That in October 2022 before and after school care
providers contacted the Defendant (mom) regarding these
frequent visits and their concerns after their
communication with Plaintiff (dad) rendered no results.
22. That by Our Family Wizard message on 10/11/2022[,]
Defendant mom informed Plaintiff about her concerns
related to [Plaintiff’s brother-in-law’s] frequent visits to the
minor child’s school and Plaintiff did not respond.
Defendant also sent a text and email.
23. That on about May 15th, 2024, Defendant (mom)
informed Plaintiff (dad) that she learned that the brother-
in-law was charged with a sex offense crime in Franklin
County. That dad did not respond via Our Family Wizard
and the court finds credible that he did call, and his
response was “that if convicted, he will handle it then.”
24. That Defendant (mom)’s concerns regarding the minor
child are credible. However, Plaintiff disregarded
Defendant (mom)’s legitimate concerns regarding the
minor child’s welfare and her safety.

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25. That [Plaintiff’s brother-in-law] was removed from the
pickup list for the before and after school care program by
the school administrators.
26. That the paternal grandmother . . . would assist with
the care of the minor child as well as court-ordered
custodial exchanges.
27. That there are times where the Defendant’s son and her
fiancé assist[ ] with the court-ordered custodial exchanges.
28. That the parties have had and continue to have issues
with custodial exchanges.
29. The current order requires the exchanges to occur at
the former Barnes and Noble . . . . Plaintiff has purchased
a home and moved to Zebulon since the prior order was
entered.
30. That the exchange location is no longer convenient to
the parties, as the Court entered a civil contempt order in
this case before the Plaintiff moved to Zebulon due to the
Plaintiff consistently reporting substantially late for
custodial exchanges.
31. That Defendant enrolled the minor child in summer
camp, and this was reasonable, based on the tardiness and
location issues the parties were having with custodial
exchanges.
32. That Defendant enrolled the minor child in gymnastics
and girl scouts. Although she did not inform Plaintiff about
enrolling the minor child in gymnastics prior to such
enrollment, she did inform Plaintiff about her intention to
enroll the minor child in girl scouts prior to such
enrollment.
33. That Dad has not taken the minor child to either of the
child’s activities, which is girl scouts or gymnastics, during
his custodial time.
34. That even though mom offered to take the minor child

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during his custodial time to gymnastics/ girl scouts,
Plaintiff did not allow the minor child to participate.
35. That Plaintiff (dad)’s testimony that the activities were
intrusive or impacting his custodial time was not
significant, since under the current court order, Defendant
would only have had to take the minor child to these
activities during his custodial time approximately one or
two times per month.
That it was not unreasonable for Defendant to request
Plaintiff to have the minor child in attendance at her
activities and for Plaintiff to have taken the child to such
activities during his custodial time
36. Plaintiff (dad) refused to take the minor child to the
activities.
37. That Defendant (mom) pays for all the extracurricular
activities for the minor child and is the one who takes the
minor child to all her extracurricular activities.
38. That Defendant (mom) has been the one paying for
summer camp.
39. That Defendant (mom) has taken a parenting class (the
Triple P parenting class), as well as parenting skills class
with the North American Learning Institute for 12 hours.
40. That since the entry of this court’s order, Plaintiff has
been convicted of driving while impaired.
Without specifically stating, Plaintiff appears to challenge findings of fact nos.
17–19. In doing so, Plaintiff claims “Exhibit D-8 established the overtime-free
schedule” and “no present-tense contrary evidence exists.” Plaintiff asserts that
“[f]indings to the contrary rely on speculations and historical documents, not
substantial evidence.” We disagree.

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Plaintiff’s contention is contradicted by Defendant’s testimony, as well as
Plaintiff's own testimony and exhibit. At the hearing, testimony showed that
Plaintiff’s mother had confirmed Plaintiff worked overtime:
Q. Now, are you aware that your son’s been working a lot
of overtime during -- since the Courts enter of the custody
order in March of 2022?
A. I can say I know he’s worked overtime. I don’t know if
it’s been an abundance. And I’ll -- and I’ll stick to that.
. . . .
Q. . . . Are you aware of how much your son worked since
entry of the Court’s custody order?
A. I can’t say yes because I can’t confirm, but do I know he’s
worked overtime? Yes. How much overtime? I cannot
answer that because I do not know that.
. . . .
Q. Okay. During the period of time, he was working a lot of
overtime hours, is that the period of time that you were
helping him with childcare?
A. Yes.
Q. And you’re not currently providing childcare for her? Is
that -- did that end, approximately, October of 2024 that
you stopped needing to provide childcare to the same
extent?
A. (Inaudible.)
Q. And is it your understanding that was because you no
longer had to work the same overtime hours?
A. Yeah.
Defendant also testified Plaintiff had been working overtime:

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I don’t get any additional financial support from [Plaintiff].
But [Plaintiff] is working all of this overtime, all of these
long hours. He’s getting the money for it, there’s just no
support for it. Like, what is she doing? Like, she’s – she’s –
you’re working all these hours. So where is [the minor
child] at and what is [she] doing, she got gymnastics, why
can’t she go? She’s a kid that like -- that enjoys these
activities.
Q. When you say working overtime and getting money, did
the Court compel that [Plaintiff] provide bank statements
to you?
A. Yes.
Q. And were those bank statements provided?
A. Yes, they were.
Q. And in reviewing those bank statements, did you have
some concerns with what you saw on the bank statements?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What did you see on the bank statements?
A. [Plaintiff] has -- not only does [Plaintiff] gets his salary
from his job and his overtime, but [Plaintiff] also receives
V.A. benefits at almost 2 thousand dollars a month. And
[Plaintiff] ha[s] large amount – amounts of A.T.M.
deposits.
Plaintiff testified that he was previously required to work overtime, but he had
since obtained a new position with no overtime available:
Q. And how did that impact you?
A. It impacted me because I was not able to have my
schedule look correctly where I had to set up work and
spend majority of the time with my kids. They had a
mandate that had to be covered. And unfortunately, I had

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to cover them, which is mandatory overtime.
. . . .
Q. Is that a different position than the one you worked?
A. Correct. Before I was a senior officer specialist, and I
went to time and attendance clerk with the hours of 8 to 4.
Monday to Friday, holidays off, I don’t get overtime.
Here, Plaintiff’s testimony is inconsistent regarding overtime hours worked.
Although Plaintiff testified that his position changed on 8 January 2024, he testified
to working overtime on 16 July 2024. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s copy of his work
schedule filed with this Court shows he had worked overtime as recently as 20
February 2025. The trial court reviewed Plaintiff’s work schedule exhibit and stated:
THE COURT: -- military time don’t work well together.
Then, I see 2/19, where it says O.T. again. I’m not sure
what that means. Then, I’m looking at 2/11 overtime, 2/10
overtime, 1/31 overtime, 1/28 overtime.
And your question was, what is O.T.? He said it was
overtime, 1/27 overtime, 1/23 overtime, 1/22 overtime. 1/20
overdue 2025. 1/19, yeah, 01/19/2025 overtime. 01/14/2025
overtime, 01/13/2025.
I don’t know it’s -- it’s you -- you asked the question.
I’m going off of the exhibit that was introduced. The
question was, what does O.T. stand for? He said overtime.
He said I don’t do overtime anymore.
And clearly, in the exhibit that you introduced,
there’s overtime on here consistently, 01/05/2025 overtime.
I mean, it’s your exhibit and it’s your client’s testimony. His
testimony, he hasn’t done overtime since 2023.
Even assuming that he meant 2024, there’s still
overtime on here since 2020 -- in 2024. July 17, 2024,

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there’s overtime. July 6 – I’m sorry July 16, July 14. So the
-- the testimony that he hasn’t done overtime is not true.
It’s not accurate. I’ll put it that way.
I mean, and it’s consistent throughout this schedule
that you introduced this evidence as I continue to flip
through this schedule. I mean, month after month after
month, there is overtime except when he was not working
because of his -- so there was leave without pay.
The trial court found Plaintiff’s assertions regarding his overtime were not
credible, and this Court does not reweigh such evidence. See Walsh, 263 N.C. App.
at 588, 824 S.E.2d at 134 (“We review an order for modification of custody to
determine if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and if the
conclusions of law are supported by the findings; the trial court determines the
credibility and weight of the evidence.”). As the trial court is better positioned to
make such credibility determinations, it properly considered the testimony and
Plaintiff’s exhibit. See Shipman, 357 N.C. at 474–75, 586 S.E.2d at 253–54 (“Our
trial courts are vested with broad discretion in child custody matters. This discretion
is based upon the trial courts’ opportunity to see the parties; to hear the witnesses;
and to detect tenors, tones, and flavors that are lost in the bare printed record read
months later by appellate judges. Accordingly, should we conclude that there is
substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings of fact, such
findings are conclusive on appeal, even if record evidence might sustain findings to
the contrary.” (cleaned up)). Accordingly, testimony from all witnesses and the

HOLT V. PRATHER
Opinion of the Court
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exhibit introduced by Plaintiff himself amount to substantial evidence in the record
to support findings of fact nos. 17–19.
As Plaintiff does not challenge the remaining findings, the findings are binding
on appeal. See Klein v. Klein, 290 N.C. App. 570, 577, 892 S.E.2d 894, 903 (2023)
(“[U]nchallenged findings of fact are presumed to be supported by competent evidence
and are binding on appeal.” (citation omitted)).
b. Change in Circumstances
Plaintiff contends the trial court did not assess current conditions but instead
“conflated ordinary logistics with a welfare detriment.” Plaintiff argues custody was
modified for convenience and scheduling preferences. We disagree.
“A substantial change in circumstance can be supported by either allegations
that the current custody situation has an adverse effect on the child or by ‘showing a
change in circumstance . . . is, or is likely to be, beneficial to the child.’ ” Durbin v.
Durbin, 388 N.C. 55, 61, 918 S.E.2d 832, 837 (2025) (citation omitted). “Before a child
custody order may be modified, the evidence must demonstrate a connection between
the substantial change in circumstances and the welfare of the child, and flowing
from that prerequisite is the requirement that the trial court make findings of fact
regarding that connection.” Shipman, 357 N.C. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 255 (citation
modified). “Unless the effect of the change on the children is ‘self-evident,’ the trial
court must find sufficient evidence of a nexus between the change in circumstances
and the welfare of the children.” Stephens v. Stephens, 213 N.C. App. 495, 499, 715

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Opinion of the Court
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S.E.2d 168, 172 (2011) (quoting Shipman, 357 N.C. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 255–56).
“The trial court’s conclusions of law receive de novo review.” Id. at 498, 715 S.E.2d
at 171.
Here, the trial court found there is “a substantial change in circumstances
affecting the health and general welfare of the minor child.” The trial court found
this case to be high conflict in nature, as evidenced by the parties’ inability to
communicate and Plaintiff’s refusal to take the minor child to extracurricular and
recreational activities.
Plaintiff was previously found to be in civil contempt of court for violating the
11 March 2022 permanent custody order. Plaintiff’s violation dealt with the
exchanges of custody of the minor child as Plaintiff had “been late on multiple
occasions.” Here, the trial court found that “Plaintiff did not offer any evidence
regarding the show causes” to show why he should not be held in contempt of the
permanent custody order. As Plaintiff failed to “offer any evidence regarding the
show causes,” the trial court took “the information in the show causes as true.”
The trial court noted that the minor child was three years old at the time of
the permanent custody order but, at the time of the hearing, was eight years old and
participated in extracurricular activities, including gymnastics and Girl Scouts. The
trial court provided that the minor child’s circumstances changed from the time of
the permanent custody order, but there remained a “consistent issue regarding pick

HOLT V. PRATHER
Opinion of the Court
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up and drop offs.” Further, the trial court noted Plaintiff “refused to take the minor
child to the activities.”
Here, we hold substantial change in circumstances resulted from Plaintiff’s
noncompliance with the prior permanent custody order, the parties’ lack of
communication, and the high conflict nature of this case. See, e.g., Savani v. Savani,
102 N.C. App. 496, 505, 403 S.E.2d 900, 906 (1991) (holding repeated noncompliance
with a prior child custody order regarding visitation and communication
demonstrated substantially changed circumstances affecting the welfare of the child).
Plaintiff argues custody was changed for convenience and scheduling
preferences with no “child-centered change” or “child-welfare change” being found.
To be sure, the trial court must “make findings demonstrating a nexus ‘between the
substantial change in circumstances and the welfare of the child.’ ” Durbin, 388 N.C.
at 61, 918 S.E.2d at 837–38 (citation omitted). Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions,
however, the trial court found these issues surrounding the minor child’s ability to
participate in extracurriculars “are affecting the minor child’s health and general
welfare.” Moreover, in response to finding that Plaintiff continues to work overtime
during his custodial time, the trial court found that it “is unsure exactly where the
minor child is or who cares for the minor child.” Finally, the trial court found that
“legitimate concerns regarding the minor child’s welfare and her safety” were being
disregarded by Plaintiff in connection to finding Plaintiff’s lack of response to his
brother-in-law’s frequent visits with the minor child. Accordingly, the trial court’s

HOLT V. PRATHER
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findings demonstrate a “nexus ‘between the substantial change in circumstances and
the welfare of the child.’ ” Durbin, 388 N.C. at 61, 918 S.E.2d at 837–38 (citation
omitted). Plaintiff’s argument is therefore overruled for lack of merit.
c. Best Interest of the Child
This Court next considers whether a change in custody is in the best interest
of the child. We “review the trial court’s determination of the motion to modify
custody for abuse of discretion.” Walsh, 263 N.C. App. at 587, 824 S.E.2d at 133.
“As long as there is competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings, its
determination as to the child’s best interests cannot be upset absent a manifest abuse
of discretion.” West v. Marko, 141 N.C. App. 688, 691, 541 S.E.2d 226, 229 (2001).
“Under an abuse of discretion standard, we must ‘determine whether a decision is
manifestly unsupported by reason, or so arbitrary that it could not have been the
result of a reasoned decision.’ ” Stephens, 213 N.C. App. at 503, 715 S.E.2d at 174
(citation omitted).
In this case, the trial court concluded that its “order is appropriate under the
circumstances, and the best interests of the minor child shall be served by the
provisions set forth in this order.” The evidence and findings show that the trial court
considered the minor child’s “health and general welfare,” by noting its concerns of
Plaintiff’s refusal to allow the minor child to participate in extracurriculars and by
Plaintiff failing to address his brother-in-law’s frequent visits with the minor child.
In consideration of the minor child, the trial court ordered for physical custody to be

HOLT V. PRATHER
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modified, for custodial exchanges to take place at the minor child’s daycare or school,
and for the parties to ensure the transportation of the minor child to her
extracurriculars. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion since it was
not “manifestly unsupported by reason, or so arbitrary that it could not have been the
result of a reasoned decision.” Id. (citation modified).
2. Evidentiary Error
Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court “relied on an uncertified,
unauthenticated transcript as substantive proof.” We disagree.
“We review de novo rulings on authentication issues under Rule of Evidence
901.” State v. Davenport, 297 N.C. App. 605, 610, 910 S.E.2d 750, 754 (2025) (citation
omitted). “The mere admission by the trial court of incompetent evidence over proper
objection does not require reversal on appeal.” In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 301,
536 S.E.2d 838, 846 (2000). Even if incompetent evidence is admitted, “there yet
applies in non-jury cases a presumption that the judgment appealed from was based
solely upon other evidence which was competent and correctly admitted.” Harrell v.
W. B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 300 N.C. 353, 357, 266 S.E.2d 626, 629–30 (1980). “Only
where the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that the challenged ruling by the
trial court was based upon or influenced by erroneously admitted evidence will there
be a finding of reversible error.” Id. at 357, 266 S.E.2d at 630.
The record does not contain this alleged uncertified transcript. The record
tends to show that Defendant called Plaintiff’s mother to the stand. On direct

HOLT V. PRATHER
Opinion of the Court
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examination, Plaintiff’s mother reviewed “Exhibit 16,” two pages of a transcript from
Plaintiff’s mother’s prior testimony from a December 2024 hearing. Before Defendant
moved to introduce the exhibit into evidence, Plaintiff objected on the grounds that it
was not “a notarized certified copy of a transcript in this file.” After Defendant moved
the exhibit into evidence, Plaintiff renewed the objection, to which the trial court
responded: “Well, I’ll -- so here’s what I’ll do. The part that Ms. Hawkins has said that
she identifies as her testimony, I will allow that in.” Later during the mother’s
testimony, Defendant moved to introduce “Exhibit 16, pages 29 and 30.” Defendant’s
counsel explained: “Your Honor indicated that you’ll allow entry of what she
recognized as her testimony. And it’s behind tab 16, just 29 and 30.” The trial court
responded: “Those -- those pages alone will be admitted because she did acknowledge
page 29 was her testimony.” Indeed, the witness acknowledged the pages of the
transcript were her testimony.
During the hearing, Plaintiff objected to the exhibit’s lack of notarization. A
transcript without the proper certification would not allow it to be self-
authenticating. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 902(8) (2025) (“Extrinsic evidence
of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect
to the following: . . . Documents accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment
executed in the manner provided by law by a notary public or other officer authorized
by law to take acknowledgments.”). Although the trial court disagreed, and even

HOLT V. PRATHER
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assuming Plaintiff was correct, there would be no error since Plaintiff’s mother
confirmed on the stand that the statements in the transcript were hers.
Under the Rules of Evidence, “[t]he requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 901(a) (2025). Examples of authentication
includes “testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-
1, Rule 901(b)(1) (2025) (citation modified). Here, the witness acknowledged and
adopted the statements in the transcript. See Davenport, 297 N.C. App. at 611, 910
S.E.2d at 754 (“It is not error for the trial court to admit the evidence if it could
reasonably determine that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that ‘the
matter in question is what its proponent claims.’ ” (cleaned up)).
Even if the transcript was incompetent and its admissibility was error,
Plaintiff makes this assertion with no supporting argument as to what substantive
evidence the court relied on from the exhibit. See In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. at 301,
536 S.E.2d at 846 (“In the context of a bench trial, an appellant ‘must show that the
court relied on the incompetent evidence in making its findings.’ ” (citation omitted)).
Here, the trial court did not include findings from the challenged exhibit, and
Plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption that the trial court ignored such evidence.
See Woncik v. Woncik, 82 N.C. App. 244, 249, 346 S.E.2d 277, 280 (1986) (“A trial
judge sitting without a jury is presumed to have considered only the competent,

HOLT V. PRATHER
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admissible evidence and to have disregarded any inadmissible evidence that may
have been admitted.” (citation modified)); see also State v. Jones, 260 N.C. App. 104,
109, 816 S.E.2d 921, 925 (2018) (“But in a bench trial, we presume the trial court
ignored any inadmissible evidence unless the defendant can show otherwise.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s alleged evidentiary error is dismissed.
Plaintiff next asserts that “[e]motionally charged testimony about Appellee’s
childhood abuse [was] irrelevant to Appellant’s parental fitness [and] was admitted
and then used atmospherically to craft restrictive exchange conditions[.]”
During the hearing, Defendant was asked: “Did you hear the mother’s
testimony regarding her not having an issue with [the minor child] being in the
brother-in-law’s company?” Defendant responded, in part, as follows: “I’ve been
molested at 10. As a mother, it disgusts me that you don’t -- you don’t have a problem
with a man being around your grandchild or as a father. You don’t want to protect
your child, and you don’t want -- you want this child.” Defendant once more
mentioned her personal experience again: “I never -- when that happened to me at 10
years old, I didn’t tell nobody. I didn’t tell nobody because I was scared. So I’m being
proactive as a mother, and I don’t want nothing like that happening to my child.”
Plaintiff did not object to this testimony. Assuming arguendo this testimony
was incompetent, Plaintiff has failed to rebut the presumption that the trial court
ignored such evidence. See Woncik, 82 N.C. App. at 249, 346 S.E.2d at 280 (“A trial
judge sitting without a jury is presumed to have considered only the competent,

HOLT V. PRATHER
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admissible evidence and to have disregarded any inadmissible evidence that may
have been admitted.” (citation modified)). Plaintiff provides no argument connecting
Defendant’s passing remark of her prior experience to the trial court’s formation of
the modified custody exchange provision. See Kabasan v. Kabasan, 257 N.C. App.
436, 443, 810 S.E.2d 691, 697 (2018) (“It is not the role of the appellate courts . . . to
create an appeal for an appellant. It is likewise not the duty of the appellate courts
to supplement an appellant’s brief with legal authority or arguments not contained
therein.” (cleaned up)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument is dismissed.
3. Constitutional Violations
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by holding the contempt hearing
and the custody hearing without clear notice. Specifically, Plaintiff contends the trial
court “merged pending contempt into the custody hearing without clear notice,
blurring burdens and quasi-criminal safeguards. Trying contempt without adequate
notice violates due process.” Again, we disagree.
Defendant filed a motion to modify custody on 10 October 2023. On 19 March
2025, the trial court held a hearing for Defendant’s motions to modify custody and
show cause for civil contempt, not criminal contempt. The record is clear that
Plaintiff did not object and litigated all matters during the hearing. Cf. Jackson v.
Jackson, 192 N.C. App. 455, 463, 665 S.E.2d 545, 551 (2008) (“The record gives no
indication either party understood or reasonably should have understood the
evidence presented or the arguments made to be grounds for the modification of

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custody made by the trial court when it entered its Contempt Order.”). The record
demonstrates that both parties were prepared for all issues to be heard on 19 March
2025. Accordingly, any alleged lack of notice is considered waived. See Browne v.
Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 624, 400 S.E.2d 736, 740–41 (1991) (“However, when the
case was called for trial, both parties introduced evidence on these relevant issues
without objection and the trial court heard the evidence. Therefore, any failure by
this defendant to give proper notice of his request that a hearing be conducted was
waived.”). Further, because Plaintiff did not object to the trial court hearing the
matters of contempt and custody, he has waived such issue on appeal. See In re J.N.,
381 N.C. 131, 133, 871 S.E.2d 495 (2022) (holding that unpreserved constitutional
arguments are waived on appeal). Accordingly, we dismiss this argument.
Next, Plaintiff contends the trial court constitutionally erred by being biased.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that “[r]emarks signaling indifference to Appellant’s
parenting time, combined with selective crediting of Appellee’s narrative and
discounting of Appellant’s unrebutted evidence, undermine the appearance of
neutrality.”
We note that Plaintiff does not elaborate any further regarding this argument
or whether he preserved this argument. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1) (“In order to
preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court
a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the
party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the

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context.”); see also Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415, 416, 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002)
(“A constitutional issue not raised at trial will generally not be considered for the first
time on appeal.”). Indeed, issues regarding a trial court’s bias or prejudice must be
preserved by moving for the recusal of the trial judge. See Sood v. Sood, 222 N.C.
App. 807, 812, 732 S.E.2d 603, 608 (2012) (“When a party does not move for a judge’s
recusal at trial, the issue is not preserved for our review.”). Additionally, Plaintiff’s
argument merely illustrates the trial court performing its function during a bench
trial. See Cox v. Cox, 238 N.C. App. 22, 34, 768 S.E.2d 308, 316 (2014) (“This is not
the sort of ‘judicial bias’ that is prohibited by law; in fact, trial judges are required to
rule on evidentiary issues, to assess the credibility of witnesses, and to make rulings
which will, in most cases, be adverse to one party or the other. The type of judicial
bias which is considered to be improper is bias based upon the judge’s ‘personal bias
or prejudice concerning a party.’ ”).
As Plaintiff did not elaborate further and there is no evidence of preservation,
Plaintiff has failed to preserve his argument. See Sood, 222 N.C. App. at 812, 732
S.E.2d at 608 (“Where appellant failed to move that the trial judge recuse himself, he
cannot later raise on appeal the judge’s alleged bias based on an undesired outcome.”);
see also Cox, 238 N.C. App. at 35, 768 S.E.2d at 317 (holding that unpreserved
arguments of judicial bias are waived on appeal). Further, Plaintiff makes no
allegations of the trial judge having any personal bias or prejudice, rather, only that

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Opinion of the Court
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the trial judge conducted a bench trial. See Cox, 238 N.C. App. at 34, 768 S.E.2d at
316. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument is dismissed.
4. Remaining Contentions
All other contentions proffered by Plaintiff are dismissed as abandoned due to
a lack of argumentation and citation to authority. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6)
(“Issues not presented in a party’s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument
is stated, will be taken as abandoned.”).
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s order modifying child custody of the parties
involved.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge DILLON and Judge ARROWOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).