Ap Atl., Inc. v. Crescent Univ. City Venture, LLC

AP Atl., Inc. v. Crescent Univ. City Venture, LLC, 2017 NCBC 91.

NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
MECKLENBURG COUNTY 15 CVS 14745 (Master File)
16 CVS 14844 (Related Case)
AP ATLANTIC, INC. d/b/a
ADOLFSON & PETERSON
CONSTRUCTION,

Plaintiff,

v.

CRESCENT UNIVERSITY CITY
VENTURE, LLC; THE GUARANTEE
COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA
USA; BB&M ARCHITECTURE,
PLLC; SCA ENGINEERS, INC.;
MADISON CONSTRUCTION
GROUP, INC.; TRUSSWAY
MANUFACTURING, INC.; and T. A.
KAISER HEATING & AIR, INC.,

Defendants. ORDER AND OPINION ON
DEFENDANT CRESCENT
v.
UNIVERSITY CITY VENTURE, LLC’S
SEARS CONTRACT, INC.; MACEDO OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF’S
CONTRACTING CO.; WHALEYS THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
DRYWALL, LLC; GRANADA
INTERIORS, INC.; STALLINGS
DRYWALL, LLC; MAYNOR PI, INC.;
MATUTE DRYWALL, INC.;
INTERIOR DISTRIBUTORS, A
DIVISION OF ALLIED BUILDING
PRODUCTS, CORP.; MANUEL
BUILDING CONTRACTORS, LLC;
EAGLES FRAMING COMPANY,
INC.; DIAZ CARPENTRY, INC.;
SOCORRO CASTILLE MONTLE;
AND GUERRERO CONSTRUCTION
PRO, INC.

Third-Party Defendants.

MADISON CONSTRUCTION
GROUP, INC.,

Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.
MANUEL BUILDING
CONTRACTORS, LLC,

Third-Party Defendant.

1. This Matter is before the Court upon Defendant Crescent University

City Venture, LLC’s (“Crescent”) Objection to Plaintiff’s Third-Party

Complaint (the “Objection”) in the above-captioned matter.

2. After considering the Objection, the arguments of counsel for the

parties at the September 25, 2017 expedited hearing on the Objection, and the

briefs by the parties in support of and in opposition to the Objection, the Court

hereby OVERRULES the Objection.

Swindell & Bond, PLLC, by John D. Bond, III, and Bradley Arant
Boult Cummings LLP, by Douglas L. Patin and Avery A.
Simmons, for Defendant Crescent University City Venture, LLC.

Bell, Davis & Pitt, P.A., by Edward B. Davis, Jason B. James, and
Demitra Sourlis, for Defendant BB&M Architecture, PLLC.

Johnston, Allison & Hord, P.A., by Greg C. Ahlum, Robert L.
Burchette, and Parker Evans Moore, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., by
Robert McCune and Alan R. Belcher, Ragsdale Liggett PLLC, by
William W. Pollock and Edward E. Coleman, III, and Robinson
Elliot & Smith, by William C. Robinson and Dorothy M. Gooding,
for Plaintiff AP Atlantic, Inc. d/b/a Adolfson & Peterson
Construction.

Bledsoe, Judge.

I.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

3. This case began over two years ago, in August 2015. It has proceeded

in this Court since its designation as a complex business case in April 2016.
(Designation Order, ECF No. 36.) On October 10, 2016, this case was

consolidated with a related action, Crescent University City Venture, LLC v.

Adolfson & Peterson, Inc., No. 16 CVS 14844 (Mecklenburg County), and

designated as the master case on the Court’s docket. For the purposes of

resolving the Objection before the Court, the alleged facts and complex

procedural history of this litigation can be distilled as follows.

4. The dispute at the center of this litigation concerns the construction

of student apartments in Charlotte, North Carolina (the “project” or

“construction”) by Plaintiff AP Atlantic, Inc. d/b/a Adolfson & Peterson

Construction (“AP Atlantic”) for Crescent. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.)

AP Atlantic sued Crescent for an alleged breach of contract for outstanding

balances, for a suit on bond and to enforce a claim of lien on the property, for

priority of AP Atlantic’s claim of lien, and for quantum meruit. (Compl. 3–6.)

AP Atlantic then expanded the suit by amending its Complaint in November

2015 to add claims against several subcontractors. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 6.)

5. On January 29, 2016, Crescent filed an Answer and asserted its own

counterclaims against AP Atlantic. (Answer & Countercl., ECF No. 19.) These

counterclaims were based on two theories. First, Crescent claimed AP Atlantic

had completed the construction late. (Answer & Countercl. 43–48.) Second,

Crescent claimed a defect in the project’s floor trusses. (Answer & Countercl.

49–57.) Allegedly, following a large gathering of students in one of the

apartments, the floor of that apartment, and the ceiling of the unit beneath,
began to sag and crack. (Answer & Countercl. 50.) This lead Crescent to

discover that alleged defects and damages to the apartments’ floor trusses were

“prevalent throughout the buildings.” (Answer & Countercl. 52.) Crescent

amended its counterclaims again in January 2017. (Answer & Am. Countercl.,

ECF No. 159.) That amendment added a party that was later dismissed from

the case.

6. In the interim, the litigation continued forward. On September 20,

2016, the Court entered a Case Management Order detailing the timeline on

which the case was to proceed. (Case Management Order, ECF No. 94.) Under

the Case Management Order, the parties had until April 20, 2017 to conduct

fact discovery. (Case Management Order 22.) On March 28, 2017, the Court

extended this deadline for ninety days. (Order Joint Mot. Modify Case

Management Order & Extend Disc. Deadlines 2, ECF No. 183.) In requesting

this modification, AP Atlantic and the subcontractor parties represented to the

court that the parties had been engaged in “extensive fact

discovery . . . including the exchange of written fact discovery, and [were]

pursuing discovery diligently.” (Joint Mot. Modify Case Management Order &

Extend Disc. Deadlines 3, ECF No. 177.) Under the extended deadline, the

parties continued with discovery.

7. As part of this continuing discovery, AP Atlantic received responsive

information identifying second-tier subcontractors who had worked on the

project. AP Atlantic received this information in April and May 2017,
approximately seven to eight months after the Court’s entry of the Case

Management Order. AP Atlantic took no action at that time to involve the

second-tier subcontractors in the case. The Court was not informed that these

newly discovered parties existed or that AP Atlantic intended to add them to

the litigation as third-party defendants.

8. On June 6, 2017, Crescent and AP Atlantic agreed to settle all claims

between the two parties dealing with late completion of the construction and

outstanding balances on the construction contract. (Pl.’s Mem. Reply Def.’s

Obj. Pl.’s Third-Party Compl. 5, ECF No. 252.) The agreement required

Crescent to “modify its counterclaim to remove any claim for liquidated

damages[,]” i.e., any claim besides those relating to the defective floor trusses.

(Def.’s Br. Supp. Obj. Pl.’s Third-Party Compl. 3, ECF No. 231.) In an effort to

comply with this provision, Crescent filed an Amended Answer and Second

Amended Counterclaim on June 29, 2017. This pleading did not add any new

theories of liability to the case or contain new allegations; it simply removed

allegations from Crescent’s Answer and Amended Counterclaim that Crescent

believed should be deleted due to the settlement agreement. (See generally

Am. Answer & Second Am. Countercl., ECF No. 212.)

9. Without previously consulting with Crescent or the Court, AP

Atlantic filed a Reply to Crescent’s Second Amended Counterclaim and a

Third-Party Complaint on July 20, 2017. (Pl.’s Mot. Strike, Mot. Dismiss,

Reply Def.’s Second Am. Countercl. & Third-Party Compl., hereinafter “Reply
& Third-Party Compl.,” ECF No. 219.) The Third-Party Complaint asserted

claims against thirteen second-tier subcontractors AP Atlantic contends it

discovered in April and May. (See generally Reply & Third-Party Compl.)

Crescent filed its Objection in response to this maneuver.

10. Defendant BB&M Architecture, PLLC (“BB&M”) joined in Crescent’s

Objection. BB&M adopts Crescent’s Objection, statements, and arguments as

its own. (BB&M Architecture Notice Joining Def.’s Obj. Pl.’s Third-Party

Compl. 1–2, ECF No. 266.) The Court will therefore address the arguments of

both parties by reference to Crescent’s arguments.

11. Crescent argues that AP Atlantic’s Third-Party Complaint is

improper because AP Atlantic was required to seek leave from the Court before

filing, citing Rules 14, 15, and 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure

(“Rule(s)”). (Def.’s Br. Supp. Obj. Pl.’s Third-Party Compl. 4.) AP Atlantic

counters by asserting that Rule 14 clearly allows for AP Atlantic’s conduct.

(Pl.’s Mem. Reply Def.’s Obj. Pl.’s Third-Party Compl. 6.)

II.

ANALYSIS

12. The issue before the Court is clearly one centered on Rule 14. While

Crescent’s argument that principles expressed in Rules 15 and 21 are

analogous to considerations of fairness and prejudice that should apply in this

case is well taken, the question presented by the Objection is about the

timeliness of third-party practice. Rule 15 deals with the amendment of
pleadings. N.C. R. Civ. P. 15. Here, the action to which Crescent objects is not

the filing of an amended pleading but the filing of a third-party complaint. In

the same vein, Rule 21 does not address the specific issue of timeliness in the

context of third-party practice. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 21. Thus, the question

before the Court is whether Rule 14 required AP Atlantic to seek leave of the

Court before adding third-party defendants to the case on the heels of

Crescent’s nonsubstantive amendment to its Counterclaim.

13. Rule 14(b) provides that a plaintiff may “cause a third party to be

brought [into an action] under circumstances which under [Rule 14] would

entitle a defendant to do so.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 14(b). Whether a plaintiff can

properly engage in third-party practice thus depends on whether a defendant

in his position could do so. On that point, Rule 14 states

At any time after commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-
party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon
a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all
or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. Leave to make the service
need not be obtained if the third-party complaint is filed not later than
45 days after the answer to the complaint is served. Otherwise leave
must be obtained on motion upon notice to all parties to the action.

N.C. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Thus, putting the provisions together, a plaintiff does

not need to obtain leave to serve a third-party defendant if the plaintiff files a

third-party complaint not later than forty-five days after the plaintiff’s reply

to a counterclaim is served.

14. AP Atlantic argues that this language expressly allows what it has

done in this case. Twenty-one days after Crescent filed its Second Amended
Counterclaim, AP Atlantic filed its Reply. Contemporaneously, AP Atlantic

also filed its Third-Party Complaint. As such, AP Atlantic asserts, its Third-

Party Complaint was served within the forty-five-day limit of Rule 14, and no

leave was required.

15. Crescent disputes this interpretation and application of Rule 14. It

argues that its Second Amended Counterclaim was nothing more than a

housekeeping filing meant to prune the issues proceeding to trial down to those

that remained following the settlement agreement. Because the amendment

did not change the theory or scope of the case and did not add claims or

allegations to Crescent’s previous Amended Counterclaim, Crescent asserts AP

Atlantic was not required to file a subsequent responsive pleading. Crescent

objects to AP Atlantic using a duplicative reply as a means to add new third

parties into the case without leave.

16. Where a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, “courts must

construe the statute using its plain meaning.” Burgess v. Your House of

Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990). A term not defined

by the statute is interpreted according to its ordinary meaning. Morris

Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Bessemer, 365 N.C. 152, 157, 712 S.E.2d 868, 872

(2011). “A term is ambiguous if it has more than one meaning, and a layman

would be unable to determine which meaning is intended.” Morris v. Thomas,

161 N.C. App. 680, 685, 589 S.E.2d 419, 422 (2003).
17. In contrast, when “a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction must

be used to ascertain the legislative will.” Burgess, 326 N.C. at 209, 388 S.E.2d

at 136–37. The primary objective of the courts in such a case is “to ascertain

and adhere to the intent of the legislature.” Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 149 N.C.

App. 672, 685, 562 S.E.2d 82, 92 (2002). In attempting to discern this intent,

the courts “presume that the legislature acted with full knowledge of prior and

existing law and its construction by the courts.” Id. (citing Raeford Lumber

Co. v. Rockfish Trading Co., 163 N.C. 314, 317, 79 S.E. 627, 628–29 (1913)).

18. The plain text of Rule 14 sheds no light on which answer or complaint

it refers to, much less on whether an amended complaint or amended

counterclaim must change the theory or scope of a case in order to allow a party

to serve third-party defendants without leave. The statute provides only that

the forty-five-day period in which leave is not required begins with the “answer

to the complaint.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 14(a). This provides no guidance on how

amended pleadings are to be treated under Rule 14. Particularly, it fails to

address how to proceed in cases like the present one, where an amended

pleading is filed only as a housekeeping matter to weed settled claims out of a

case. The North Carolina courts have not spoken to this issue. Rule 7, which

identifies the pleadings used in North Carolina courts, does not provide any

useful information either. The Court believes this lack of guidance renders the

meaning of “answer to the complaint” in Rule 14 ambiguous—it is not clear,

when considering the many stages of amendments that pleadings may go
through, what complaint (or counterclaim) Rule 14 refers to, and as such, what

answer (or reply) the time limit in Rule 14 begins to run from.

19. A similar conundrum appears to have troubled federal courts in other

jurisdictions. Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a third-

party plaintiff to “obtain the court’s leave if it files [a] third-party complaint

more than 14 days after serving its original answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1)

(emphasis added). When confronted with questions regarding the meaning of

“original answer,” federal courts have reached three different conclusions:

Three interpretations of “original answer” are possible . . . . Under a
“plain language” interpretation, the “original” answer is the one that
responds to the “original” complaint. If the complaint is amended,
subsequent answers would be designated as the “Answer to the [First,
Second, etc.] Amended Complaint” and would not be considered
“original.”

Under a more nuanced, functional reading, the “original answer” can
be an answer to an amended complaint, so long as the basis for
impleader is that which is new, i.e. “original,” in the answer to the
amended complaint.

Finally, one court has reasoned that because an amended complaint
which stands alone supplants any prior complaints, such an amended
complaint becomes the original complaint and therefore the answer to
such amended complaint becomes the “original answer” within the
meaning of Rule 14(a).

FTC v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 186 F.R.D. 245, 247 (D.D.C. 1999) (citations

omitted). The majority of federal courts confronting the issue appear to have

adopted the second, “nuanced” view. McDougald v. O.A.R.S. Cos., 2006 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 22505, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2006). Though this majority

approach is an attractive solution to the problem before the Court, the Court
believes legislative history and the canons of statutory construction preclude

its adoption.

20. Prior to the 1967 enactment of Rule 14 in North Carolina, no statutes

provided an exact procedure for third-party practice. See North Carolina

Comments, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 14 (noting the lack of concrete

authority pre-Rule 14 governing the basis on which third-party defendants

could be brought into an action and the procedure by which third-party practice

was accomplished). In adopting Rule 14, the General Assembly was inspired

by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14. Id. (referencing Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 14 repeatedly and explaining the ways it provides satisfactory

guidance for third-party practice).1

21. Critical to this analysis, however, and unlike with many other rules

of civil procedure, the Generally Assembly did not adopt the language of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 in its entirety. Since 1963, the federal rule

has included the phrase “original answer.”2 North Carolina’s rule does not

include this language, instead measuring its leave-free period from the service

1 The final sentence of the original comment to Rule 14 is particularly revealing on

this point: “It should be noted that federal Rule 14 is of course entirely procedural—it
does not, indeed cannot—affect any substantive rights. Thus, it does not allow
impleader unless the substantive right exists under State law. Accordingly, then,
adoption of this rule does not affect any of the North Carolina substantive law of
contribution or indemnification.” North Carolina Comments, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1,
Rule 14.

2 Benjamin Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963

(II), 77 Harv. L. Rev. 801, 801 (1964) (noting the addition of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 14’s second sentence, which, for the first time, gave parties the ability to
bring in third-party defendants without leave).
of the “answer to the complaint.” Because North Carolina’s rule was first

enacted in 1967, and because the Court must presume the legislature acted

with full knowledge of prior and existing law, the Court must presume that the

legislature knew of the language in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 and

made—and continues to make—a deliberate decision not to use it in North

Carolina’s rule.3

22. The Court must then determine what legislative intent is showcased

by the decision to use the phrase “answer to the complaint” in North Carolina’s

Rule 14 in place of the federal rule’s “original answer.” Because both rules’

time periods run from the service of an “answer,” the logical place to begin this

inquiry is determining why the legislature omitted the word “original” from

North Carolina’s Rule 14.

23. When analyzing the meaning of disputed terms in a statute, courts of

North Carolina may turn to the “standard, nonlegal dictionaries” as a guide.

3 This difference appears to be somewhat unique. Several other states, such as
Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West
Virginia, have third-party practice rules similar to the federal rule, with time limits
measured from the “original answer” or “original pleading.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.180; Ga.
Code Ann. § 9-11-14; N.J. Ct. R. 4:8-1; S.C. R. Civ. P. 14; Tenn. R. Civ. P. 14.01; Va.
Sup. Ct. R. 3:13; W. Va. R. Civ. P. 14. Kansas’s third-party practice rule used to
include language similar to North Carolina’s, Russell v. Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n, 428 P.2d
783, 785 (Kan. 1967) (“Leave to make the service need not be obtained if the third-
party complaint is filed not later than five (5) days after the answer to the complaint
is served.” (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-214 (1963)), but that language appears to
have been amended by the Kansas Supreme Court in 1969. The next time the law
was amended by legislative action in 1997, “answer to the complaint” was already
replaced by “original answer.” H.B. No. 2007, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997). All
of this supports the notion that our state legislature intentionally chose to use the
language “answer to the complaint” instead of “original answer” in North Carolina’s
Rule 14.
C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Indus. Crankshaft & Eng’g Co., 326 N.C. 133, 152,

388 S.E.2d 557, 568 (1990). The word “original” is an adjective meaning

“having to do with an origin; first; earliest” or “never having been before; new;

novel[.]” Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language 526

(1966). Under this definition, the “original answer” would be the first or

earliest answer filed in a lawsuit, as no answer would have been filed before it.

While the majority of federal courts have not ascribed this meaning to the

phrase “original answer,” our own legislature’s decision to omit “original”

compels the conclusion that North Carolina’s Rule 14 does not distinguish

between the very first answer in a suit and subsequent amended answers. This

means the rule also draws no distinction between original complaints and

amended complaints. As such, “answer” and “complaint,” as used in Rule 14,

must include amended pleadings.

24. Crescent urges the Court to read Rule 14 in a manner nearly identical

to the “nuanced” federal interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14

and thereby prevent the late addition of third-party defendants in this case.

While a compelling alternative, the Court is not at liberty to adopt this

approach. The plain text of North Carolina’s Rule 14 provides no sign that the

legislature intended “answer to the complaint” to mean “an answer which

responds to a complaint asserting new theories of liability or claims.” Absent

any limiting factor imposed by the legislature, the Court must conclude Rule

14(a) permits a defendant to file a third-party complaint within forty-five days
of service of its answer to a plaintiff’s amended complaint, and in such cases

the third-party defendant may be served without leave of court. Neither the

language of Rule 14 nor case law interpreting it requires the amended

complaint to change the need for impleader or allege a new theory of liability.

By virtue of Rule 14(b) then, a plaintiff need not obtain leave to serve a third-

party defendant when he has served a reply to any amended counterclaim and

has filed a third-party complaint within the required time period.

25. Crescent argues that this interpretation of Rule 14 goes against the

overall purpose and spirit of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and

will cause Crescent great prejudice due to the delay resulting from the addition

of the new parties. While the Court’s reading of Rule 14 may have an

undesirable effect in some cases—including in this one—and it is true that

constructions that defeat the purpose of a statute must be avoided, In re

Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 151, 250 S.E.2d 890, 914 (1978), the Court cannot

conclude the result it is compelled to reach now defeats the purpose of Rule 14.

26. The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated “the purpose of Rule

14 is to promote judicial efficiency and the convenience of parties by

eliminating circuity of action . . . by combining [all] suits into one action.”

Heath v. Board of Comm’rs, 292 N.C. 369, 376, 233 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1977)

(quoting Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1442

(1971)). The rule is meant to avoid “a potentially damaging time lag between

a judgment against [a defending party] in one action and a judgment in his
favor against the party ultimately liable in a subsequent action[.]” Id. (quoting

Wright et al., supra). Allowing a defending party great liberty to bring in third-

party defendants who are or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff furthers

these goals of Rule 14. Indeed, AP Atlantic might suffer from a potentially

damaging time lag in this case if it were found liable to Crescent and was forced

to seek relief against the third-party defendants in a separate action.

27. Having concluded the above, the Court must permit AP Atlantic’s

joinder of the third-party defendants in this case to stand under Rule 14.

Although Crescent’s Second Amended Counterclaim merely withdrew

previously brought claims, it was indeed a counterclaim and one to which AP

Atlantic properly filed a reply. Because AP Atlantic filed its Third-Party

Complaint within forty-five days of filing its Reply to the Second Amended

Counterclaim,4 no leave was required to file the Third-Party Complaint or

serve the new third-party defendants. As such, the addition of the third parties

was properly made.

28. The Court reaches this conclusion reluctantly. The Court is

particularly troubled by the fact AP Atlantic represented to the Court that it

had been involved in “extensive fact discovery” as of March 2017 when asking

for an extension of discovery deadlines, (Joint Mot. Modify Case Management

Order & Extend Disc. Deadlines 3), but now argues that it did not delay in

4
“After an action has been designated as a mandatory complex business case or
otherwise assigned to the [Business] Court,” electronic filing and the resulting Notice
of Filing constitute “adequate service under the Rules of Civil Procedure[.]” BCR
3.9(a).
joining these third-party defendants because “[f]act discovery had barely

begun, as of . . . February 2017[,]” (Pl.’s Mem. Reply Def.’s Obj. Pl.’s Third-

Party Compl. 3). Had AP Atlantic pursued discovery in a more diligent and

proactive fashion, it likely could have added these third parties into the case

much earlier and with less disruption to Crescent, the existing parties, and the

case calendar. Instead, AP Atlantic opportunistically, but lawfully, seized

upon Crescent’s perfunctory amendment to expand (and likely, now, delay) the

progress of the case in circumstances avoiding the need for judicial leave.

29. At the same time, the Court is mindful of the fact that Crescent could

have withdrawn its settled counterclaims by voluntarily dismissing them

pursuant to Rule 41—a procedural step that would not have given AP Atlantic

the opportunity to file its Third-Party Complaint under Rule 14. Assuming,

arguendo, that an amendment was required by the language of the settlement

agreement—“[Crescent] will modify its counterclaim to remove any claim for

liquidated damages”—that requirement was agreed to by Crescent. (See Def.’s

Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Certain Claims & Enforce Settlement Agreement Ex.

B, Settlement Agreement 4, ECF No. 229.) In the end, to the extent Crescent

contends that AP Atlantic has taken unfair advantage of the other parties to

this action through its (and the Court’s) interpretation of Rule 14, it is an

advantage Crescent allowed through its choices in negotiating and

implementing the settlement agreement.
III.

CONCLUSION

30. For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby OVERRULES the

Objection.

SO ORDERED, this the 5th day of October, 2017.

/s/ Louis A. Bledsoe, III
Louis A. Bledsoe, III
Special Superior Court Judge
for Complex Business Cases