Futures Grp., Inc. v. Brosnan

Futures Grp., Inc. v. Brosnan, 2023 NCBC 4.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
WAKE COUNTY 21 CVS 7106

THE FUTURES GROUP, INC. and
GEOFF G. CRAMER,

Plaintiffs,
ORDER AND OPINION ON
v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
DENIS BROSNAN,

Defendant.

1. Denis Brosnan (“Brosnan”) served as Chair of the Board of Directors of The

Futures Group, Inc. (“Futures”) before disputes with his former son-in-law and

Futures’ Chief Executive Officer, Geoff Cramer (“Cramer”), led to Brosnan’s abrupt

removal from the Board on 23 March 2021. This lawsuit followed on 6 October 2021.

2. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Brosnan is not entitled to recover the

monies and ownership interest in Futures that Brosnan has demanded. In addition,

Plaintiffs sue Brosnan for breach of the fiduciary duties he owed Futures as one of its

directors, alleging, among other things, that he destroyed and falsified corporate

records. (See generally First Am. Compl., ECF No. 13.)

3. Brosnan responds with a series of counterclaims, including one for

advancement of litigation expenses. (Answer First Am. Compl. and Counterclms.

[“Counterclms.”], ECF No. 30.) The matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion

for Partial Summary Judgement (“Motion”), (ECF No. 68), with respect to that claim.
4. Having considered the Motion, the related briefs, the arguments of counsel

at a hearing on the Motion, and other relevant matters of record, the Court GRANTS

the Motion.

Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, LLP, by Walter L.
Tippett, Jr., Jimmy C. Chang, and Lindsey S. Barber, for Plaintiff
Futures Group, Inc.

Sigmon Law, PLLC, by Mark R. Sigmon, for Plaintiff Geoff G. Cramer.

Miller Monroe & Plyer, PLLC, by Jason A. Miller, Paul Flick, and John
W. Holton, for Defendant Denis Brosnan.

Earp, Judge.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

5. The facts underlying this case are detailed in an earlier Order and Opinion.

See generally Futures Grp., Inc. v. Brosnan, 2022 NCBC LEXIS 150 (N.C. Super. Ct.

Dec. 7, 2022). In short, Futures is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of

business in Wake County, North Carolina. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) Article VIII of

Futures’ Bylaws addresses both advancement and indemnification for its directors

and officers. (Aff. Denis Brosnan Ex. A, 15–16 [herein “Bylaws”], ECF No. 71.)1

6. Cramer is the founder and CEO of Futures. He married Brosnan’s

daughter Aimee Brosnan (“Aimee”) in 2008. (Counterclms. ¶¶ 7–11.) They separated

in 2020. (Aff. Cramer Supp. Pl. Futures’ Opp. Def. Brosnan’s Mot. Part. S.J. ¶ 2

[“Cramer’s Aff.”], ECF No. 74; Counterclms. ¶ 52.)

1 Before changing its name in 2007, Futures was formerly named “The Talent Group, Inc.”

(Counterclms. ¶ 10.) Its Bylaws still reflect that name.
7. Over the years, Brosnan has loaned a considerable amount of money to

Futures. (See Counterclms. ¶ 60.) In addition, Brosnan served as Chair of Futures’

Board of Directors until his removal. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 8.)

8. The parties’ disagreements continued after Brosnan was removed from the

Board. Futures and Cramer brought suit in May 2021. (See Compl., ECF No. 3.)

9. On 17 November 2021, Brosnan, through counsel, sent Futures a letter

demanding advancement of his legal expenses with respect to this action. The letter

included an undertaking promising to reimburse Futures if the Court determined

that Brosnan was not entitled to indemnification. (See Aff. Denis Brosnan Ex. B,

ECF No. 71.) Brosnan alleges that Futures did not respond, and the record reveals

no response. (Counterclms. ¶ 170.)

10. Brosnan subsequently filed his Answer to First Amended Complaint and

Counterclaims, asserting twelve causes of action (six in the alternative), (ECF No.

30). He then filed this Motion on 17 May 2022, (ECF No. 68). The Motion seeks

partial summary judgment as to Brosnan’s Tenth Claim for Relief (Breach of

Bylaws—Advancement). The Motion has been fully briefed, and a hearing on the

matter was held on 30 August 2022. (See ECF No. 78.) The Motion is now ripe for

disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

11. “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [the movant] is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Da Silva v. WakeMed, 375 N.C. 1, 10 (2020)

(quoting N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, R. 56(c)).

12. For affirmative summary judgment on a party’s own claim, the burden is

heightened. The moving party “must show that there are no genuine issues of fact,

that there are no gaps in his proof, that no inferences inconsistent with his recovery

arise from the evidence, and that there is no standard that must be applied to the

facts by the jury.” Parks Chevrolet, Inc. v. Watkins, 74 N.C. App. 719, 721 (1985);

accord Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 370 (1976). Consequently, “rarely is it proper to

enter summary judgment in favor of the party having the burden of proof.” Blackwell

v. Massey, 69 N.C. App. 240, 243 (1984).

13. Here, the facts with respect to Brosnan’s Motion are not in dispute. Instead,

the parties wrestle over the meaning of the relevant provisions of Futures’ Bylaws.

Brosnan asks this Court to order Futures to specifically perform the contractual

commitment in its Bylaws to advance Brosnan’s expenses for this litigation. In

response, Futures contends that the Bylaws do not entitle Brosnan to advancement.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Choice-of-Law

14. As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine which state’s law

applies with respect to interpreting the Bylaws of this Delaware corporation. North

Carolina subscribes to the internal affairs doctrine. See Russell M. Robinson, II,

Robinson on North Carolina Corporation Law § 32.05, at 32-7 (7th ed. 2021) (“the

choice-of-law question will be decided with reference to the ‘internal affairs doctrine’
”); Velleros, Inc. v. Patterson, 2015 NCBC LEXIS 16, at **21 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 23,

2015) (“North Carolina has adopted the ‘internal affairs doctrine’ ”). “The internal

affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State

should have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs . . . because

otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands.” Bluebird Corp. v.

Aubin, 188 N.C. App. 671, 680 (2008).

15. Accordingly, North Carolina courts apply the substantive law of the

incorporating state when deciding matters of internal governance. See id. Internal

governance includes “matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the

corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.” Islet Scis., Inc. v.

Brighthaven Ventures, LLC, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 4, at *11 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 12,

2017). Because advancement is an internal governance matter and Futures is a

Delaware corporation, this Court will apply the substantive law of Delaware to the

issue of advancement. Cf. RoundPoint Mortg. Co. v. Florez, 2016 NCBC LEXIS 18,

at **66 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2016) (using the internal affairs doctrine to apply

Florida law when deciding if a Florida corporation’s bylaws require indemnification);

Spira Footwear v. Lebow, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129918, at *29–35 (W.D. Tex. Aug.

29, 2008) (using the internal affairs doctrine to order a Texas corporation to advance

legal fees).
B. Futures’ Bylaws

16. Article VIII of Futures’ Bylaws speaks to a director’s rights to

indemnification and advancement.2 The indemnification section, in relevant part

reads:

1. Indemnification for Expenses and Liabilities. Any person who at any
time serves or has served (i) as a director, officer, employee or agent
of the Corporation, . . ., shall have a right to be indemnified by the
Corporation to the fullest extent from time to time permitted by law
against Liability and Expenses in any Proceeding (including without
limitation a Proceeding brought by or on behalf of the Corporation itself)
arising out of his or her status as such or activities in any of the
foregoing capacities.

(Bylaws, Article VIII, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).)

17. The advancement section uses mandatory language. It provides:

2. Advance Payment of Expenses. The Corporation shall (upon receipt
of an undertaking by or on behalf of the director, officer, employee or
agent involved to repay the Expenses described herein unless it shall
ultimately be determined that he or she is entitled to be indemnified by
the Corporation against such Expenses) pay Expenses incurred by such
director, officer, employee or agent in defending a Proceeding or
appearing as a witness at a time when he or she has not been named as
a defendant or a respondent with respect thereto in advance of the final
disposition of such Proceeding.

2 Indemnification and advancement are tools that companies use to address litigation risk for

would-be directors and officers. Without these tools, talented individuals might forgo the
opportunity to serve because of the heightened risk of litigation associated with being a
company official. Indemnification ensures that directors and officers do not personally bear
the litigation risk for actions they take in good faith on behalf of the business. In addition,
while litigation is pending, and before decisions regarding indemnification can be made, a
company may agree to advance the cost of attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses upon
receipt of the official’s promise to repay the funds should it be determined that
indemnification is not appropriate. Accordingly, advancement and indemnification are used
to attract talented leaders to become company officials by at least initially shouldering the
risk of liability and the cost of litigation. See generally Russell M. Robinson, II, Robinson on
North Carolina Corporation Law § 18.01 (7th ed. 2021).
(Bylaws, Article VIII, ¶ 2.)

18. The Bylaws define “Expenses” broadly, encompassing “expenses of every

kind, including counsel fees.” Likewise, “Proceeding” is defined broadly to mean “any

threatened, pending or completed action, suit, or proceeding and any appeal therein

. . . whether civil, criminal, administrative, investigative or arbitrative and whether

formal or informal.” (Bylaws, Article VIII, ¶ 4.)

19. Brosnan contends that he “is entitled to an Order requiring Futures to

specifically perform under the Bylaws and advance payment of his litigation expenses

associated with defending the claims brought by Futures, including expenses already

incurred and expenses to be incurred through the duration of the litigation.”

(Counterclms. ¶ 171.) In support of his request, Brosnan asserts that (1) the Bylaws

constitute a binding and enforceable contract requiring advancement for current and

former directors, (2) Futures sued Brosnan for actions he took as a director of Futures,

and (3) Brosnan has provided the required undertaking. (Counterclms. ¶¶ 165–71.)

20. Futures responds by arguing that (1) this Court does not have jurisdiction

to decide the issue of advancement; (2) the Bylaws do not require advancement to

Brosnan, as a former director; and (3) the Court should not provide relief because

Brosnan has committed wrongs against the company. (Futures’ Opp. Br. 19 fn.10,

20, 23–24, ECF No. 73.)
1. Jurisdiction

21. Starting with the jurisdictional issue, Futures argues that this Court does

not have subject matter jurisdiction because, by Delaware statute, “[t]he Court of

Chancery is . . . vested with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all actions

for advancement of expenses or indemnification brought under this section or under

any bylaw[.]” 8 Del. C. § 145(k). Futures argues, therefore, that the Delaware

Chancery Court has exclusive jurisdiction over Brosnan’s claim. (Futures’ Opp. Br.

19 fn.10.)

22. But Futures misconstrues the statute. The Chancery Court has itself

observed that the statute merely “allocat[es] jurisdiction among the Delaware courts.

The state is not making a claim against the world that no court outside of Delaware

can exercise jurisdiction over that type of case. Nor, as a matter of power within our

federal republic, could the State of Delaware arrogate that authority to itself.”

In re Kloiber, 98 A.3d 924, 939 (Del. Ch. 2014) (emphasis in original) (reversed on

other grounds). See also Merinoff v. Empire Merchs., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 23, at *7

(Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2017) (“the [Delaware General Corporation Law] does not require a

proceeding for advancement to be brought in this court”). Indeed, actions for

advancement and indemnification have been brought and adjudicated in courts other

than the Delaware Chancery Court. See, e.g., Island Two LLC v. Island One, Inc.,

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28507, at *16–22 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2015); Abakan, Inc. v.

Uptick Capital, LLC, 943 F. Supp. 2d 410, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Souder v. Rite Aid

Corp., 911 A.2d 506, at **512–13 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2006).
23. Therefore, while the Court of Chancery would be the proper court in which

to pursue this claim if the case were pending in Delaware, it is pending in North

Carolina, and the Court determines that in this State, it has jurisdiction over

Brosnan’s claim for advancement.3

2. Language of Futures’ Bylaws

24. Futures next argues that the Bylaws provide “that only current directors

are entitled to the privilege of advancement; not former directors, such as [Brosnan].”

(Futures’ Opp. Br. 1 (emphasis omitted).) To make this argument, Futures contrasts

the language in the indemnification section of the Bylaws, affording indemnification

rights to a director “who at any time serves or has served[,]” with the language in the

advancement section, which does not expressly state that the rights extend to a

former director who has “served.” (See Bylaws, Article VIII, ¶¶ 1–2.)

25. Relying on general principles of contract interpretation, Futures argues

that the drafters’ intentional use of the past tense “served” in the indemnification

section and their omission of a similar past tense verb in the advancement section

3 Futures cites to Wheeler v. Wheeler, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 156 (N.C. Super Ct. Nov. 15, 2018)

in support of its argument that only the Delaware Chancery Court can decide disputes
regarding advancement when Delaware corporations are involved. However, Wheeler
involved a North Carolina corporation, and the court applied North Carolina law to hold that
the defendant did not make the requisite showing of immediate, pressing, and irreparable
harm that is required for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. In reaching
its decision, the Court observed that the law of advancements in North Carolina was not yet
well-developed and that in Delaware, unlike North Carolina, a statute gives the Court of
Chancery exclusive jurisdiction to hear and summarily decide actions for advancement. Id.
at **43. The Wheeler Court did not hold that only the Delaware Chancery Court can decide
disputes involving advancement in the North Carolina courts, even when the dispute involves
a Delaware corporation.
can only mean that advancement rights are limited to current directors and not

former ones. (Futures’ Opp. Br. 20–24.)

26. Furthermore, Futures relies on Charney v. Am. Apparel, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch.

LEXIS 238 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 2015) to support its conclusion that Brosnan, as a

former director, has no right to advancement. In Charney, the Chancery Court held

that the defendant, a former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of American

Apparel, was not entitled to advancement for violation of a Nomination, Standstill

and Support Agreement (“Standstill Agreement”) because his actions were not

“related to the fact” that Charney is or was a director or officer of the company. See

Charney, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 238, at *47–58.

27. Additionally, the Charney court held that the company’s charter mandated

advancement only for current directors and officers, and Charney was neither when

he violated the Standstill Agreement. The court observed that generally “[w]hen the

words ‘officers’ and ‘directors’ are not qualified by the adjective ‘former’ (or a similar

adjective), Delaware courts have interpreted those words to refer to current officers

and current directors.” Id. at *19. Futures argues that “[l]ike in Charney, the absence

of any language extending the right to advancement to former directors precludes

[Brosnan] from obtaining an advancement for his legal fees and expenses.” (Futures’

Opp. Br. 22.)

28. However, the holding in Charney is not controlling in the present case.

Rather, 8 Delaware Code § 145(j) controls. Section 145(j) reads:

The indemnification and advancement of expenses provided by, or
granted pursuant to, this section shall, unless otherwise provided
when authorized or ratified, continue as to a person who has ceased to
be a director, officer, employee or agent and shall inure to the benefit of
the heirs, executors and administrators of such a person.

Del. C. § 145(j) (emphasis added).

29. By its plain language, Section 145(j) creates a default “continuation rule”

establishing, absent express language to the contrary in the Bylaws, that a director’s

right to advancement for legal expenses to defend a Proceeding “arising out of his or

her status as [a director,]” Bylaws, Article VIII, ¶ 1, continues even after his or her

status as a director ends. See Marino v. Patriot Rail Co., LLC, 131 A.3d 325, 342

(Del. Ch. 2016) (“those rights presumptively continue to provide coverage for actions

the individuals took during their period of service even after the individuals have

ceased to serve”).

30. Put differently, “if a person serves as a director and makes a decision, and

if that person would be entitled to receive advancements in litigation over that

decision while serving as a director, then that person’s rights to advancements ‘shall

. . . continue’ after that person ‘has ceased to be a director.’ ” Marino, 131 A.3d at

338; see also 1 David A. Drexler et al., Delaware Corporation Law and Practice §

16.04, at 16–23 (Supp. 2012) (“under the current default rule, the right to

advancement vests at the time of the act or omission giving rise to such right”).

31. In addition, parties cannot opt-out of this default rule by implication or

omission; it must be done expressly. See Marino, 131 A.3d at 343 fn.19 (the “right to

indemnification or advancement under a corporate bylaw vests at the occurrence of
the act or omission that is the subject of the . . . action, suit or proceeding unless the

bylaw expressly provides otherwise”).

32. Here, Futures relies on an inference drawn from the difference between the

wording of the Bylaws’ advancement provision and its indemnification provision to

argue that Brosnan’s advancement rights did not continue after his service on the

Board ended. But faced with Section 145(j), an inference is not enough. Without

express language in the Bylaws deviating from the default rule, Delaware’s

presumption that advancement rights continue after a director’s service ends applies

to Brosnan’s claim. See id.

33. Accordingly, because no express provision rebutting the default rule exists

in Futures’ Bylaws, Brosnan’s right to advancement vested at the time of his actions

as a director and was not lost when his service on the Board ended.

3. Brosnan’s Alleged Wrongdoing

34. Lastly, Futures argues that Brosnan is not entitled to specific performance

of the advancement provision because he is guilty of wrongs against the company.

(Futures’ Opp. Br. 23–24.)

35. This time Futures puts the proverbial cart before the horse. Brosnan has

not admitted to wrongdoing, and at this stage, no fact-finder has determined that he

is responsible for it.4 The Delaware Chancery Court has observed that it has often

been required to uphold the advancement rights of corporate officials accused of

4 Futures’ reluctance to honor its bylaws is not unusual.
As this Court has observed, “[f]ew
companies, having sued an official for bad behavior, are willing to fund both sides of the
lawsuit, even when they’ve contracted to do so.” Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC v. Moody, 2020
NCBC LEXIS 92, *7 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2020).
serious misconduct, because to do otherwise would undermine the public policy

served by Section 145. See, e.g., Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS

69, at *15–16 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2002) (“[I]t is highly problematic to make the

advancement right of such officials dependent on the motivation ascribed to their

conduct by the suing parties. To do so would be to largely vitiate the protections

afforded by [Section] 145 and contractual advancement rights.”); Imbert v. LCM

Interest Holding LLC, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 126, at *15–19 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2013)

(enforcing mandatory advancement provision where complaint alleged that officer

breach his fiduciary duties to withdraw millions of dollars from the company); Zaman

v. Amedeo Holdings, Inc., 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 60, at *134 (Del. Ch. May 23, 2008)

(upholding advancement rights where former directors were alleged to have, among

other things, siphoned funds, used credit cards improperly, and entered sweetheart

contracts to benefit themselves).

36. There is no wiggle room here. Futures’ Bylaws mandate advancement:

“The Corporation shall (upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf
of the director . . . involved to repay the Expenses described herein
unless it shall ultimately be determined that he or she is entitled to be
indemnified by the Corporation against such Expenses) pay Expenses
incurred by such director . . . in defending a Proceeding . . . in advance
of the final disposition of such Proceeding.”

(Bylaws, Article VIII, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).) “When advancement is mandatory, the

company carries the ultimate burden of proving that advancement is not required.

This Court construes advancement provisions broadly to effectuate Delaware’s policy

of providing temporary relief from substantial expenses.” Kerbs v. Bioness, Inc., 2022
Del. Ch. LEXIS 193, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2022) (cleaned up); accord Krauss v. 180

Life Scis. Corp., 2022 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2022).

37. In the present case, Futures has not carried that ultimate burden. The

Court finds that Brosnan, having provided the required undertaking, is entitled to

advancement.

IV. CONCLUSION

38. For these reasons, Brosnan’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is

GRANTED. Futures is ORDERED to advance Brosnan’s Expenses in this matter

in accordance with Article VIII, ¶ 2 of its Bylaws.

39. No later than 3 February 2023 counsel shall meet and confer in good faith

to determine the amount of advanceable expenses incurred by Brosnan to date and

to establish a procedure for ongoing advancement. Counsel is directed to avoid

granular disputes, which may be addressed as necessary at the indemnification stage.

See Thompson v. ORIX USA Corp., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 84, at *14 (Del. Ch. June 3,

2016).

40. On or before 8 February 2023, the parties shall report to the Court, via

email to the Court’s clerk, regarding their status.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this the 19th day of January, 2023.

/s/ Julianna Theall Earp
Julianna Theall Earp
Special Superior Court Judge
for Complex Business Cases