Moore v. Brooks

Moore v. Brooks, 2026 NCBC 6.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
DURHAM COUNTY 25CV001214-310

KELLY F. MOORE, individually and
as Executor of the ESTATE OF
DRUE A. MOORE; MILES MOORE,
individually and on behalf of his
minor brother, COLE MOORE; KMC
MOORE LLC, as Trustee of the
REDWOOD TRUST, u/a/d April 10,
2017; and RICK GRAVES, as Trustee
of the REDWOOD LIFE
INSURANCE TRUST u/a/d
November 15, 2018,
ORDER AND OPINION ON
Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT BROOKS’S MOTION TO
DISMISS
v.

ROBERT SCOTT BROOKS and
WINTHROP INTELLIGENCE, LLC,

Defendants.
___________________________________

ROBERT SCOTT BROOKS and
WINTHROP INTELLIGENCE, LLC

Crossclaim
Plaintiffs,

v.

REDWOOD WI HOLDINGS, LLC

Crossclaim
Defendant.

1. This matter is before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed by defendant

Robert Scott Brooks pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina

Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 73). Brooks first seeks dismissal under Rule
12(b)(2), contending that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him.

Alternatively, he seeks dismissal of two causes of action against him pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for intentional infliction

of emotional distress or for conversion.

2. The Court held a hearing on the motion on 26 September 2025. (ECF No.

96). Counsel appeared for Plaintiffs and Brooks and argued the motion.

3. Having considered the motion, the complaint, the arguments of counsel, and

applicable law, the Court DENIES the motion for the reasons set forth below.

Ward and Smith, P.A., by E. Bradley Evans, Gavin B. Parsons, and
Jordan Spanner, for Plaintiffs Kelly F. Moore, individually and as
executor of the estate of Drue A. Moore; Miles Moore, individually and on
behalf of his minor brother, Cole Moore; KMC Moore LLC, as trustee of
the Redwood Trust, u/a/d April 10, 2017; Rick Graves, as trustee of the
Redwood Life Insurance Trust u/a/d November 15, 2018; and
Crossclaim Defendant Redwood WI Holdings, LLC.

Everett Gaskins Hancock Tuttle Hash LLP, by E.D. Gaskins and James
M. Hash, for Defendants Robert Scott Brooks and Winthrop Intelligence,
LLC.

Houston, Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

4. The Court does not make findings of fact on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss, nor is it necessary for the Court to do so on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss.

See N.C. R. Civ. P. 52. This is particularly the case for Rule 12(b)(2) motions in cases

in which, as here, the original complaint is unverified and the defendant does not
introduce competent evidence contradicting the relevant allegations of the complaint.

(See generally ECF No. 74). 1

5. Rather, the uncontroverted factual allegations of Plaintiffs’ complaint are

accepted as true for purposes of both motions under such circumstances. Sykes v.

Health Network Sols., Inc., 372 N.C. 326, 332 (2019) (well-pleaded factual allegations

are accepted as true for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes); Wyatt v. Walt Disney World Co., 151

N.C. App. 158, 163 (2002) (uncontroverted factual allegations are treated as true for

Rule 12(b)(2) purposes); Banc of Am. Sec. LLC v. Evergreen Int’l Aviation, Inc., 169

N.C. App. 690, 693 (2005) (explaining that, unless the defendant introduces an

opposition affidavit or declaration, the court “must decide whether the complaint

contains allegations that, if taken as true, set forth a sufficient basis for the court’s

exercise of personal jurisdiction”).

6. Thus, for background, the Court summarizes the complaint’s relevant

factual allegations and accepts them as true only for purposes of this Order and

Opinion.

1 Brooks attached to his brief a single unauthenticated exhibit: a copy of defendant Winthrop

Intelligence, LLC’s articles of domestication in the State of Wyoming, in support of his
argument that Winthrop is now a Wyoming LLC rather than a Delaware LLC. (ECF No. 74.1,
Ex. A). Brooks did not, however, authenticate the document or otherwise ask that the Court
take judicial notice of it, (ECF No. 74 at 4 n.1), and the Court need not do so, as it is not an
adjudicative fact, particularly where Plaintiffs otherwise affirmatively plead Winthrop’s
status as an out-of-state entity, regardless of whether its state of organization is Delaware
or Wyoming. (ECF No. 3, ¶ 13); see also N.C. R. Evid. 201(a) (limiting judicial notice to
adjudicative facts); State v. Baskin, 190 N.C. App. 102, 105 (2008) (citation omitted)
(confirming that irrelevant facts need not be noticed). Regardless of whether Brooks’s act of
attaching the document, without moving for its admission or a request for judicial notice,
otherwise constituted an attempt to introduce evidence for purposes of the Rule 12(b)(2)
motion, the document does not controvert 221 of Plaintiffs’ 222 allegations. Accordingly, the
Court properly considers those uncontroverted allegations. Inspirational Network, Inc. v.
Combs, 131 N.C. App. 231, 235 (1998).
7. Drue Moore was a citizen and resident of Durham County, North Carolina

until his death on 10 January 2025. Drue’s family members resided with him and

continue to reside in Durham County, North Carolina. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 7–10).

8. Drue and his cousin Ben Moore formed defendant Winthrop Intelligence,

LLC (“Winthrop”) in 2009. Winthrop was formed as an out-of-state entity, though it

is and was registered to do business in North Carolina with a principal office in

Durham County, North Carolina. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 13, 40, 50).

9. Winthrop’s business model involves maintaining and selling access to a

database with public records and other data concerning the salaries of college

athletics coaches and similar information. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 2, 50). Winthrop regularly

conducts business in North Carolina, remains registered with the North Carolina

Secretary of State to do business in the state, and continues to maintain a mailing

address in Durham County, North Carolina. (ECF No. 3, ¶ 40).

10. Defendant Scott Brooks is a resident of Arizona and, at the time the

complaint was filed, had been Chief Investment and Financial Officer (“CIFO”) of

Winthrop since around 2018. He was a long-time business partner of Drue Moore and

Ben Moore and was previously involved in various business ventures with them. He

also became Chief Financial Officer of their “family office” in 2019. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 3,

15, 81).

11. In his role as CIFO, Brooks has overseen Winthrop’s business operations in

North Carolina, including receiving its mail in Durham County, and dealt extensively

with Drue Moore as a resident of North Carolina. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 13, 38).
12. Over the course of approximately a decade, Scott Robinson, a Wyoming

attorney and Winthrop’s Chief Executive Officer, helped Drue create a series of

Wyoming entities to protect his assets from future creditors. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 26, 55–

57, 65, 68). These included a trust to be beneficiary of a life insurance policy on Drue’s

life, a trust to hold Drue’s 50% interest in Winthrop, and an entity to hold Drue’s

interest in Teton Global Ventures, LLC, another Wyoming entity. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 26–

28, 55–59, 60–61, 65–67).

13. Around 2020, Drue and Kelly deeded their ownership interests in their

Durham, North Carolina residence to several of these entities. Brooks now insists

that he has an ownership interest in those entities and asserts a claim to ownership

of the Durham residence. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 68–71, 115).

14. Drue and Brooks’s relationship deteriorated progressively until around

September 2024, when Brooks and Robinson “accused Drue of taking millions of

dollars in unauthorized distributions from Winthrop over several years.” (ECF No. 3,

¶ 80). Soon after, documents purportedly written by Drue were discovered that

admitted to the allegations of embezzlement. (ECF No. 3, ¶ 89). Plaintiffs contend

that the documents “bore similarities to Brooks’[s] writing and to Brooks’[s] previous

lawsuits” in which the defendants had also allegedly admitted wrongdoing via similar

written admissions. (ECF No. 3, ¶ 89).

15. Over the following months, Brooks initiated and engaged in a series of

ongoing communications and threats, including letters, emails, and text messages,

directed to Drue in North Carolina. (ECF No. 3, ¶ 122). These communications
concerned Drue’s assets, payments to Drue, and demands that Drue assign his assets

(including his North Carolina assets) to Winthrop, Brooks, or other alleged creditors

as reimbursement for his alleged misappropriations. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 122–27). Brooks

also purportedly sought to negotiate settlement agreements with Drue. (ECF No. 3,

¶ 132).

16. Among other things, around 3 January 2025, Brooks sent a letter to Drue (i)

purporting to terminate Drue’s role in Winthrop and other entities, (ii) demanding

disclosure of all of Drue’s assets (including those in North Carolina), and (iii)

threatening “criminal charges, possible arrest, and public proceedings” against Drue.

(ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 132–36).

17. In addition, Brooks at various times “pressured Drue to direct Robinson to

assign the assets” of several of the Wyoming trusts, including assets based in North

Carolina or themselves holding assets based in North Carolina, as well as Wyoming-

based entities. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 26–38, 127). Of those, at least one used Drue and Kelly

Moore’s Durham, North Carolina residence as its mailing address and did business

in North Carolina, leasing vehicles and conducting other business using that address.

(ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 31, 42). Another of the trusts maintained a life insurance policy on

Drue’s life, with Drue based in North Carolina, and the affected beneficiaries of the

trusts—Kelly Moore, Miles More, and Cole Moore—were all North Carolina

residents. (ECF No. 3, ¶ 34).
18. Brooks also sought to have Drue and Kelly Moore’s personal residence in

Durham County, North Carolina transferred to “Winthrop, Brooks,” or other alleged

creditors. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 7–9, 20–21, 36, 68–69, 104, 114–15, 127).

19. Ultimately, through his communications and pressure campaign, Brooks

successfully compelled Drue to liquidate or assign many of his assets, including (i)

brokerage accounts of approximately $1 million, (ii) a substantial promissory note,

and (iii) a foreign investment property worth more than $165,000. Those assets were

transferred to Brooks or entities under his control, along with “multiple luxury

wristwatches” that Brooks demanded Drue ship to him. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 128–29).

20. The total value of the assets that Brooks successfully demanded that Drue

transfer to him “exceeds the amount of unauthorized distributions allegedly taken by

Drue or any debt owed by Drue.” (ECF No. 3, ¶ 130).

21. Nonetheless, with his January 2025 letter, Brooks threatened to involve law

enforcement, have criminal charges brought, and ensure Drue’s potential arrest—

presumably by local law enforcement—if Drue did not provide the requested

information by 10 January 2025. (ECF No. 3, ¶ 132). Despite these threats, Brooks’s

statements were false, and he did not intend to involve law enforcement. (ECF No. 3,

¶¶ 134–36, 154).

22. On 10 January 2025—the deadline to comply with Brooks’s demands—Drue

committed suicide. (ECF No. 3, ¶ 36).
23. Since that time, Brooks has sought to recover assets from Drue’s estate,

attempting to divert those assets from Kelly Moore, Cole Moore, and Miles Moore.

(ECF No. 3, ¶ 145).

24. Plaintiffs commenced this suit on 31 January 2025, (ECF No. 2), and filed

their amended complaint approximately a month later, asserting causes of action for

declaratory judgment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, unjust

enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, constructive trust, and

negligence. (ECF No. 3). This action was thereafter designated as a complex business

case and assigned to the undersigned shortly after. (ECF No. 1).

25. On 28 July 2025, Brooks moved to dismiss the claims asserted against him

for lack of personal jurisdiction, and, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim.

(ECF No. 74).

26. The parties have fully briefed the motion, and the Court held a hearing at

which Plaintiffs and Brooks were represented by their respective counsel of record.

(ECF No. 96).

27. Plaintiffs have since voluntarily dismissed their cause of action for

conversion. (ECF No. 80).

II. ANALYSIS

28. Brooks argues that dismissal of all claims against him is appropriate

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and, in the alternative, that Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction

of emotional distress and conversion causes of action fail to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6). The Court address each argument in turn.
A. Brooks’s Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss

i. Standard for Rule 12(b)(2) Motions

29. Two principal authorities limit North Carolina courts’ power to exercise

personal jurisdiction: our state’s long-arm statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4, and the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Shaeffer v. SingleCare Holdings, LLC, 384 N.C. 102, 106 (2023) (citations omitted).

However, the limits those authorities set are identical: the long-arm “statute makes

available to the North Carolina courts the full jurisdictional powers permissible

under federal due process.” Id. (citation and internal punctuation omitted). Therefore,

the Court need only analyze its authority under the Due Process Clause.

Inspirational Network, 131 N.C. App. at 235 (“Our jurisdiction statutes are to be

‘liberally construed in favor of finding that personal jurisdiction exists,’ subject to the

limitations of due process[.]”(internal citations omitted)).

30. Under the U.S. Constitution, “a tribunal’s authority [to exercise jurisdiction

under the Fourteenth Amendment] depends on the defendant’s having such ‘contacts’

with the forum State that ‘the maintenance of the suit’ is ‘reasonable, in the context

of our federal system of government,’ and ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.’” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,

592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17

(1945)).

31. Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific. General jurisdiction

requires that a defendant have “affiliations with the State . . . so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render [the defendant] essentially at home in the forum State.”

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citation

omitted).

32. Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, is proper only when a defendant’s

“conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably

anticipate being haled into court there” in connection with the particular claims at

issue in a case. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)

(citations omitted); see also Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359. While such contacts need

not be continuous and systematic, “random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts” will

not suffice. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014) (quoting Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claims must arise out of or relate to “some act by which

the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within

the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Beem USA

Ltd.-Liab. Ltd. P’ship v. Grax Consulting, LLC, 373 N.C. 297, 303 (2020) (citation

omitted).

33. “Naturally, the parties’ relationships with each other may be significant in

evaluating their ties to the forum.” Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980)

(addressing co-defendants’ relationship to forum state).

34. Generally, the relationship between the defendant and the forum state

“must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State.”

Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (citation omitted). Thus, while the “unilateral activity” of the
plaintiff cannot create personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant’s own

conduct in response to the plaintiff’s actions can nonetheless create sufficient contacts

for jurisdiction. Id. at 286 (citation and internal quotations omitted); Schaeffer, 384

N.C. at 103–15 (2023) (defendant’s acts under employment agreement with plaintiff,

including directing action in the forum state for the sake of the employer, were

sufficient for jurisdiction); Shively v. Aci Learning Holdings, LLC, 2025 NCBC LEXIS

112, at *26–28 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2025).

35. Thus, the party initiating contact between the plaintiff and defendant is a

“critical factor” in evaluating whether the defendant purposefully availed himself of

the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state. Banc of Am., 169 N.C. App.

at 698 (citation omitted); see Inspirational Network, 131 N.C. App. at 241–42

(determining that defendant purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting

business in North Carolina by initiating and voluntarily entering into an agreement

with a North Carolina based corporation).

36. For example, a defendant who “kn[ows] that [the] Plaintiff resides in North

Carolina” and afterwards attempts to direct the plaintiff’s actions therein may have

enough non-unilateral contacts and target the forum state sufficiently for the exercise

of jurisdiction. Shively, 2025 NCBC LEXIS 112, at *26–28 (concluding that

jurisdiction existed where defendants knew plaintiff resided in state when they

offered an agreement, defendants communicated with plaintiff asking that he

perform services under the agreement, and plaintiff provided services as requested).
37. A corporate officer or representative is not subject to jurisdiction merely

because his company is. Schaeffer, 384 N.C. at 116 (citation omitted). Where,

however, the individual personally participates in the conduct at issue, jurisdiction

may be appropriate even if the conduct is otherwise performed in the course of his

employment or corporate representation. Brown v. Refuel AM., Inc., 186 N.C. App.

631, 637–38 (2007); Shively, 2025 NCBC LEXIS 112, at *26–28.

38. In general, if a defendant challenges a court’s personal jurisdiction, “the

plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing prima facie that jurisdiction is proper.”

Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co., 138 N.C. App. 612, 615, (2000) (citations

omitted).

39. “Where unverified allegations in the complaint meet plaintiff’s ‘initial

burden of proving the existence of jurisdiction . . . and defendant[s] . . . d[o] not

contradict plaintiff’s allegations in their sworn affidavit,’ such allegations are

accepted as true and deemed controlling.” Inspirational Network, 131 N.C. App. at

235 (quoting Bush v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 64 N.C. App. 41, 45 (1983)) (other

citations omitted); Wyatt, 151 N.C. App. at 163 (uncontroverted factual allegations

are treated as true for Rule 12(b)(2) purposes); Banc of Am., 169 N.C. App. at 693

(explaining that, unless the defendant introduces an opposition affidavit or

declaration, the court “must decide whether the complaint contains allegations that,

if taken as true, set forth a sufficient basis for the court’s exercise of personal

jurisdiction” (citation omitted)). 2

2 While Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit and evidence in opposition to Brooks’s motion, the

limited scope and nature of Brooks’s challenge affects the scope of the Court’s review and the
ii. Personal Jurisdiction Over Brooks

40. In this case, Plaintiffs assert that the Court has specific personal

jurisdiction over Brooks arising from the subject matter of their complaint. They

argue that Brooks purposefully availed himself of jurisdiction in North Carolina by

sending messages to and negotiating with Drue Moore, a resident of North Carolina,

directing and demanding Drue Moore’s conduct in North Carolina, and controlling or

attempting to control real property and other property located in North Carolina. (See

generally ECF No. 3). Plaintiffs also contend that Brooks availed himself of the

privilege of conducting activities in North Carolina in his capacity as CIFO of

Winthrop, a company that does business in North Carolina, by taking various actions

on its behalf with respect to Drue Moore and assets in North Carolina. (See generally

ECF No. 81).

41. Brooks does not challenge the numerosity or significance of his contacts with

North Carolina, and his counsel conceded as much at the hearing before the Court.

Brooks merely contends that the contacts were created by Drue Moore, rather than

Brooks, and that his conduct was on behalf of Winthrop, such that Brooks did not

matters properly considered. As noted above, Brooks did not introduce competent evidence
contradicting the relevant allegations of the complaint, and the scope of his challenge is
therefore to the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations of the complaint—not as to the
merits of the underlying facts. Thus, Plaintiffs are not entitled to supplement the allegations
of their complaint by an affidavit accompanying their responsive brief. Banc of Am., 169 N.C.
App. at 693 (explaining that, where “the defendant makes a motion to dismiss without
submitting any opposing evidence . . . ‘[t]he allegations of the complaint must disclose
jurisdiction although the particulars of jurisdiction need not be alleged.’ The trial judge must
decide whether the complaint contains allegations that, if taken as true, set forth a sufficient
basis for the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.” (internal citations omitted)); Williams
v. Inst. for Computational Stud. at Colo. State Univ., 85 N.C. App. 421, 428 (1987) (citation
omitted). Even if the Court were to consider Plaintiffs’ submissions, however, the Court’s
resolution of the motion would be the same.
purposefully avail himself of jurisdiction in North Carolina. (ECF No. 74 at 8–13; Hr’g

Tr. 7:10–14 (Sept. 26, 2025) (“There are North Carolina ties here, Your Honor, that

they’re in the record and they’re undeniable, but we think that, as reflected in the

artifacts that plaintiffs put in the record, Your Honor, these North Carolina ties were

all created by Mr. Moore, not by Mr. Brooks.”)).

42. The Court concludes that the totality of Brooks’s alleged conduct is sufficient

to subject him to jurisdiction before this Court.

43. Brooks admits in his briefing that “Plaintiffs’ allegations can be read as

suggesting that Mr. Brooks, personally, is claiming an interest in assets in North

Carolina and that should subject him to jurisdiction here.” (ECF No. 74 at 12). But

Brooks asserts that he “does not claim personal ownership in such assets.” (ECF No.

74 at 12–13). Where he has failed to tender an affidavit or other competent evidence

in opposition to the relevant allegations of Plaintiffs’ complaint despite ample

opportunity to do so, however, Brooks may not use his brief to contradict the

allegations of the complaint. Inspirational Network, 131 N.C. App. at 235; Wyatt, 151

N.C. App. at 163; Banc of Am., 169 N.C. App. at 693.

44. Similarly, Brooks contends in his briefing that he “was not dealing with

Drue because Drue was in North Carolina [but] was dealing with Drue in North

Carolina because [Drue] was affiliated with Winthrop and happened to be in North

Carolina.” (ECF No. 74 at 12). Again, without putting on contradictory evidence,

Brooks attempts to have the Court reach inferences that contradict the plain factual

allegations of the complaint.
45. Taking the complaint as true, Brooks voluntarily associated himself with

Winthrop and acted in many respects on behalf of Winthrop in addition to acting on

behalf of himself individually. (See, e.g., ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 3, 116–36). As CIFO, Brooks

oversaw Winthrop’s business operations in North Carolina, including receiving its

mail in Durham County, and dealt extensively with Drue Moore as a resident of

North Carolina. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 13, 38).

46. As Plaintiffs allege, in making demands of Drue, Brooks attempted to

effectuate the transfer of ownership of Drue and Kelly Moore’s personal residence in

Durham County to Brooks personally or to Winthrop (a North Carolina entity),

among others. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 7–9, 20–22, 36, 68–69, 104, 114–15, 127). Brooks also

compelled Drue to (i) ship items to Brooks from North Carolina, and (ii) liquidate his

brokerage accounts and similar assets for the benefit of Brooks or Winthrop. (ECF

No. 3, ¶¶ 128–29).

47. Knowing that Drue resided in North Carolina, Brooks (i) attempted to

negotiate a settlement agreement with Drue, (ii) demanded that Drue transfer North-

Carolina-based assets, (iii) fired (or purported to fire) Drue from his role with

Winthrop (a business operating, and with its principal place of business, in North

Carolina) and other entities, and (iv) directed demands and threats to Drue in North

Carolina, with the intent and expectation that Drue would act on those demands in

North Carolina. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 122–36).

48. Importantly, in making his demands of and threats against Drue, Brooks

threated to involve law enforcement—it is reasonable to infer North Carolina law
enforcement—and to have law enforcement charge and arrest Drue. (ECF No. 3,

¶¶ 132–36). With Brooks’s knowledge that Drue lived in North Carolina and with his

communications focused on North Carolina, Brooks implicitly and intentionally

invoked the authority of law enforcement 3 to increase the realism and impact of his

threats, even if he ultimately did not intend to carry through on those threats. (ECF

No. 3, ¶¶ 132–36).

49. Then, “as a result of Brooks’[s] persistent and threatening actions” (i.e., the

foregoing communications, threats, demands, and other conduct directed to Drue in

North Carolina), Drue committed suicide, (ECF No. 3, ¶ 136), and Drue’s death and

the other conduct of Brooks directly led to the litigation in this case.

50. Inasmuch as Brooks argues that the contacts underlying Plaintiffs’ cause of

action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are insufficient to support

personal jurisdiction, (Hr’g Tr. 6:11–7:9), applicable case law indicates otherwise.

51. Intentional tortious conduct originating outside the forum can amount to

purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum when the

tortfeasor directs conduct—including communications—into the forum. See Calder v.

Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–90 (1984) (determining that jurisdiction was proper in

California where defendants’ “intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were

expressly aimed at California”; defendants allegedly defamed plaintiff in an article

3 Given that law enforcement would need jurisdiction over Drue and that applicable North

Carolina law would presumably govern under the circumstances of this case, as noted above,
it is reasonable to infer for pleading purposes that Brooks therefore invoked the threat of
action by local North Carolina law enforcement (and, thus, the application of North Carolina
law). (See ECF No. 3, ¶ 132).
“drawn from California sources” that “concerned the California activities of a

California resident,” and defendants knew that harm would result to plaintiff in

California, largely due to circulation of their magazine in California); Brown v. Ellis,

363 N.C. 360, 363–64 (2009) (per curiam) (concluding personal jurisdiction existed in

alienation of affections and criminal conversation action where defendant initiated

telephone and email conversations with plaintiff’s wife, who resided in North

Carolina, “on an almost daily basis”); see also Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta

Int’l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062, 1068–69 (4th Cir. 1982) (concluding that allegedly tortious

telephone calls and letters directed at plaintiff in North Carolina sufficed to establish

personal jurisdiction).

52. Under the circumstances, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have

sufficiently carried their burden to demonstrate that Brooks could have, and should

have, “reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court” in North Carolina in

connection with claims asserting that his conduct was wrongful and that he has

sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.

at 297 (citation omitted); see Shively, 2025 NCBC LEXIS 112, at *26; Schaeffer, 384

N.C. at 108–13; see also Calder, 465 U.S. at 791.

53. Because Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of demonstrating specific

jurisdiction over Brooks, the Court DENIES Brooks’s motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(2).
B. Brooks’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

54. With the Rule 12(b)(6) portion of his motion, Brooks moves to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ causes of action for (i) intentional infliction of emotional distress and (ii)

conversion.

55. In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must

determine “whether the allegations of the complaint, if treated as true, are sufficient

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under some legal theory.” Corwin v.

Brit. Am. Tobacco PLC, 371 N.C. 605, 615 (2018) (citation omitted).

56. Dismissal is appropriate if “(1) the complaint on its face reveals that no law

supports the plaintiff’s claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts

sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the complaint discloses some fact that

necessarily defeats the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. (citation omitted).

57. The Court must treat the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view

them “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” E.g., Sykes v. Health

Network Sols., Inc., 372 N.C. 326, 332 (2019) (citation omitted).

i. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

58. To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff

must allege “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to cause and

does cause (3) severe emotional distress to another.” Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C.

437, 452 (1981) (citations omitted)).

59. “Extreme and outrageous conduct is defined as conduct that is ‘so

outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community.’” Norton v. Scotland Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 250 N.C. App. 392, 397 (2016)

(quoting Smith–Price v. Charter Behav. Health Sys., 164 N.C. App. 349, 354 (2004)).

60. “A defendant is liable for this tort when he desires to inflict severe emotional

distress or knows that such distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from

his conduct or where he acts recklessly in deliberate disregard of a high degree of

probability that the [emotional] distress will follow and the mental distress does in

fact result.” Id. at 398 (quoting Dickens, 302 N.C. at 449 (emphasis in original)).

61. However, “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions,

or other trivialities” do not rise to that level. Briggs v. Rosenthal, 73 N.C. App. 672,

677 (1985) (citation omitted); Turner v. Thomas, 369 N.C. 419, 427 (2016) (clarifying

that North Carolina “has set a ‘high threshold’” for extreme and outrageous conduct

(citation omitted)).

62. Here, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts

demonstrating either extreme and outrageous conduct or causation. (ECF No. 74 at

14–18). The Court concludes, however, that plaintiff Kelly F. Moore, as executor of

the Estate of Drue A. Moore, has adequately stated a claim upon which relief can be

granted. 4

4 Though it does not expressly state as much, the first amended complaint implies that this

cause of action is asserted only on behalf of Kelly Moore, as executor of Drue’s estate, in that
it contends only that (i) the emotional distress was to Drue and (ii) it seeks and asserts that
damages are appropriate only as to “Kelly, as executor of Drue’s estate.” (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 157–
60). Plaintiffs confirm in their briefing that they assert this as “Kelly’s IIED claim,” which
the Court construes to reference Kelly in her official capacity as executor. (ECF No. 81 at 24).
No other party has stated such a cause of action, and the Court accordingly construes it as
asserted only on behalf of Kelly Moore in her official capacity as executor.
63. Inasmuch as Plaintiffs allege in their briefing that “Brooks falsely accused

Drue of taking millions of dollars from Winthrop” or falsified documents suggesting

that Brooks did so, the complaint lacks factual allegations that match these

arguments, and the paragraphs cited by Plaintiffs do not support the contentions.

(ECF No. 84 at 25 (citing ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 80–83, 88–89) (emphasis added)). Rather, in

their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they “have not located documents

substantiating the amount of these unauthorized distributions, or that they even

occurred” and that “no documents substantiating the existence or amount of the

alleged unauthorized distributions have been provided to Plaintiffs.” (ECF No. 3,

¶¶ 88–89). 5

64. Plaintiffs’ allegations that they have not located documents and that

Defendants have not provided documents supporting Brooks’s contentions that the

distributions were unauthorized (i) are not factual allegations that Brooks’s demands

were actually false and (ii) fail to create a reasonable inference that Brooks fabricated

the basis for his demands.

5 The Court observes that, in their briefing, Plaintiffs take liberty with certain of their
characterizations of the complaint’s allegations. For example, in addition to the foregoing,
Plaintiffs assert in their briefing that “Brooks drafted documents, intended to appear as if by
Drue, in which Drue purportedly admitted to the accusation.” (ECF No. 84 at 6 (emphasis
added) (citing ECF No. 3, ¶ 89)). The paragraph of the complaint to which they point,
however, merely asserts that “in late 2024, documents began to surface, purportedly written
by Drue, admitting to all of Brooks’[s] and Robinson’s allegations. The language used in the
documents bore similarities to Brooks’[s] writing and to Brooks’[s] previous lawsuits in which
defendants admitted to all allegations against them.” (ECF No. 3, ¶ 89). Nowhere in that
sentence is there an allegation that Brooks actually drafted the documents, nor is there a
reasonable inference for briefing purposes that “Brooks drafted [the] documents” based on
Plaintiffs’ conclusory assertions. Merely because counsel want the complaint to assert a fact
does not grant them leeway to create unreasonable and unsupported inferences out of whole
cloth, and Plaintiffs and their counsel are cautioned accordingly. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 11.
65. Plaintiffs also allege, however, that Brooks “threatened Drue with criminal

charges, possible arrest, and public proceedings” and that he did so (i) without having

already contacted law enforcement and (ii) with no intention of contacting law

enforcement or having Drue arrested. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 132–36).

66. As Plaintiffs plead it, Brooks falsely threatened to have Drue charged and

arrested—despite no intention to do so and despite the fact that Brooks was

demanding that Drue transfer assets to Brooks, Winthrop, or other creditors well in

excess of the amount owed to them. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 128–30).

67. In turn, “as a result of Brooks’[s] persistent and threatening actions,

through which Brooks promised financial ruin and public humiliation, Drue took his

own life.” (ECF No. 3, ¶ 136).

68. In essence, accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Brooks demanded that

Drue transfer at least certain assets to which Brooks had no legal claim and

threatened to have him charged and arrested if he did not do so. These are factual

allegations that, if proven true, could amount to blackmail or extortion, among other

things. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-118 (setting forth elements of blackmail as (i)

knowingly sending or delivering a written demand “with menaces and without any

reasonable or probable cause” for delivery of chattels, money, or valuable security, or

(ii) knowingly sending or delivering a written accusation (or threat to accuse) another

of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment, with the intent to extort or gain

chattels, money, or valuable security); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-118.4 (“Any person who

threatens or communicates a threat or threats to another with the intention thereby
wrongfully to obtain anything of value or any acquittance, advantage, or immunity is

guilty of extortion and such person shall be punished as a Class F felon.”).

69. A party’s threat of “criminal prosecution” does not necessarily rise to the

level of extreme and outrageous conduct, but it is a fact-dependent determination.

Burton v. NCNB Nat. Bank of N.C., 85 N.C. App. 702, 707 (1987) (“Plaintiff contends

the statement by Brown that NCNB was considering criminal prosecution for the

filing of an inaccurate financial statement was extreme and outrageous conduct,

intending to cause and causing severe emotional distress. We find the statement does

not, under the facts of this case, exceed “all bounds usually tolerated by decent

society.” (emphasis added)). In Burton, for example, the court determined that telling

the plaintiff’s attorney that the defendant was considering the possibility of criminal

prosecution was not, under those circumstances, intentional infliction of emotional

distress. Here, on the other hand, Brooks allegedly threated Drue directly with

prosecution.

70. The malicious use of otherwise public information may constitute

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Burgess v. Busby, 142 N.C. App. 393, 400

(2001) (“Plaintiffs’ allegations that defendant’s action in writing a letter specifying

names and addresses of Rowan County residents who performed their civic duty as

jurors and in distributing the letter to every medical practitioner with hospital

admitting privileges in Rowan County sufficiently alleges extreme and outrageous

conduct.”).
71. If the Court determines as a matter of law that the conduct “may reasonably

be” regarded as extreme and outrageous, “then it is for the jury to decide whether,

under the facts of a particular case, defendants’ conduct . . . was in fact extreme and

outrageous.” Norton, 250 N.C. App. at 398 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

72. Here, while many of Plaintiffs’ allegations standing alone might not state a

claim, the Court determines that, construing the factual allegations in the light most

favorable to the non-moving Plaintiffs, the circumstances pleaded adequately allege

a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Brooks’s alleged conduct, in

totality, was extreme and outrageous, and Brooks allegedly intended to cause severe

emotional distress or otherwise acted recklessly in disregard of the probability of such

distress. Norton, 250 N.C. App. at 398 (quoting Dickens, 302 N.C. at 449 (emphasis

in original)). And, of course, Drue committed suicide based on those actions on

10 January 2025—the very day on which Brooks had demanded that Drue provide

more information or face severe consequences. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 122, 136); Soderlund

v. Kuch, 143 N.C. App. 361, 368 (2001) (recognizing that “shame, confusion, alcohol

abuse, inability to form healthy relationships, inability to lead a normal life, several

mental breakdowns, and contemplat[ion of] suicide” were forms of severe emotional

distress sufficient to trigger a claim (citations and internal punctuation omitted)).

73. The Court therefore DENIES the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as to Kelly

Moore’s cause of action, in her official capacity as executor of Drue Moore’s estate, for

intentional infliction of emotional distress.
ii. Conversion

74. Since Brooks’s motion was filed, Plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed

without prejudice the cause of action for conversion. (ECF No. 80). The Court

therefore DENIES AS MOOT Brooks’s motion to dismiss the conversion cause of

action.

III. ORDER

75. Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Brooks’s motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) as set forth above.

SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of January 2026.

/s/ Matthew T. Houston
Matthew T. Houston
Special Superior Court Judge
for Complex Business Cases