In re Interest of Michael S.

recoverable, assuming proper proof, and there is no assertion
made that Preston did not prove such sum. The trial court’s
award of such damages is not clearly wrong. For these reasons,
we find the assignment of error to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
Finding 	no 	merit 	to 	any 	of 	the 	assignments 	of 	error
advanced by Cold Storage, we affirm the trial court’s judgment
against Cold Storage and in favor of Preston in the amount
of $1,072,260.88.
A ffirmed .
in re interest of michAel s., A child under 18 yeArs of Age .
stAte of nebrAskA, Appellee , v . michAel s., Appellee ,
And nebrAskA depArtment of heAlth
And humAn services , AppellAnt .
742 N.W.2d 791
Filed December 11, 2007. 	No. A-07-467.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law,
on which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion
irrespective of the decision made by the court below.
2. Juvenile Courts: Words and Phrases. An adjudication means that a child is a
juvenile within the meaning of the Nebraska Juvenile Code, whereas a disposition
addresses promotion and protection of a juvenile’s best interests.
3. ____: ____. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-403(2) (Reissue 2004) defines “committed” as
an order by a court committing a juvenile to the care and custody of the Office of
Juvenile Services for treatment.
4. ____: ____. “Placed for evaluation” means a placement with the Office of Juvenile
Services for purposes of an evaluation of the juvenile.
Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Sarpy County:
robert 	o’neAl, 	Judge. 	Reversed 	and 	remanded 	with
directions.
John M. Baker, and, on brief, Charles E. Dorwart, Special
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Dennis P. Marks for appellee Michael S.
240 	16 NEBRASkA APPELLATE REPORTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:15 AM CST

Sandra k. Markley and Gary E. Brollier, Deputy Sarpy
County Attorneys, for appellee State of Nebraska.
inbody, Chief Judge, and cArlson and cAssel, Judges.
cAssel, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) 	appeals 	from 	an 	order 	which 	placed 	custody 	of
Michael S. with the Office of Juvenile Services (OJS) for pur-
poses only of an evaluation, remanded the child’s custody to the
Sarpy County sheriff’s office for placement in secure detention
pending further proceedings, and ordered that OJS continue to be
responsible for all costs associated with the order not covered by
insurance. We conclude that the juvenile court properly placed
the child with OJS for an evaluation but exceeded its statutory
authority in ordering OJS to pay for all costs not covered by
insurance. We therefore reverse, and remand with directions.
BACkGROUND
In an order filed on December 2, 2005, the juvenile court
adjudicated the child under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(b)
(Reissue 2004) because he had been habitually truant from
school. On March 2, 2006, following a disposition review
hearing, the court placed the child on probation and stated
that if the child violated rules and regulations, the child could
be placed in secure or staff-secure detention. On February 8,
2007, a capias was issued because the child’s whereabouts
were unknown. Following a hearing, the court vacated the
capias, placed the child in the custody of the Sarpy County
sheriff’s office for placement in staff-secure detention pending
further proceedings, and also ordered that the child be placed
in the temporary joint custody of DHHS for placement pending
further proceedings.
On March 12, 2007, Sarpy County filed an amended supple-
mental juvenile petition alleging that the child engaged in
criminal mischief, causing pecuniary loss of less than $200.
In an order filed March 20, the court indicated that it held
an arraignment on March 12, adjudicated the child under
§ 43-247(1), and proceeded to immediate disposition. In a
IN RE INTEREST OF MICHAEL S. 	241
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 240

separate March 20 order, the court stated that it held a dis-
position review on March 12 and that it found the child was
adjudged to be within § 43-247(3)(a) on January 29. (Nothing
in the record shows an adjudication under § 43-247(3)(a) or a
proceeding on January 29.) The court ordered that the matter be
continued to May 14 for a disposition review hearing and that
the child remain in the custody of OJS. The order further set
forth conditions for the child to follow.
On March 26, 2007, the county attorney filed a motion
for capias because the child (1) assaulted his grandfather,
(2) was truant from school, (3) canceled therapy appointments,
(4) unplugged his OJS electronic monitor, and (5) arranged an
unsupervised and unauthorized visit with his mother. Also on
March 26, Sarpy County filed a motion for review of disposition
based on the above events.
On March 27, 2007, the court held a capias review hearing.
During the hearing, an employee of DHHS recommended an
OJS evaluation for the child and continued placement at the
sheriff’s office, the Juvenile Justice Center, or the Douglas
County Youth Center. In an order filed on March 28, the court
stated that further detention of the child was a matter of imme-
diate and urgent necessity and that the matter was continued
to May 14 for a disposition review hearing. The court ordered
that it was in the best interests of the child to have an evalua-
tion through OJS, and the court ordered that the child be placed
in the custody of OJS for purposes only of the evaluation. The
court ordered that the child “be remanded to the custody of
the Sarpy County Sheriff for placement at the Juvenile Justice
Center or secure detention for detention pending further pro-
ceedings.” The court further ordered that OJS continue to be
responsible for all costs associated with the order not covered
by insurance. Finally, the court ordered that the capias previ-
ously issued be vacated.
DHHS timely appeals from the March 28, 2007, order.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
DHHS alleges that the court erred as a matter of law in (1)
placing the child’s temporary custody with OJS prior to adjudi-
cation on the motion for review of disposition and (2) directing
242 	16 NEBRASkA APPELLATE REPORTS

OJS to pay for all of the costs of the child’s care and detention
prior to adjudication and disposition on the motion for review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, on
which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an inde-
pendent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
court below. In re Interest of Teneko P., 15 Neb. App. 463, 730
N.W.2d 128 (2007).
ANALYSIS
DHHS argues in its brief that OJS should not be respon-
sible for costs associated with the care and custody of the
child prior to disposition. DHHS cites to statutes such as Neb.
Rev. Stat. §§ 43-254 and 43-413 (Reissue 2004) in support of
its position.
[2] At oral argument, however, DHHS abandoned its earlier
characterization of the order at issue as being entered prior to
adjudication. As DHHS now concedes, on December 2, 2005,
the juvenile court adjudicated the child under § 43-247(3)(b),
and on March 20, 2007, the court adjudicated the child under
§ 43-247(1). Adjudication means that a child is a juvenile
within the meaning of the Nebraska Juvenile Code, whereas a
disposition addresses promotion and protection of a juvenile’s
best interests. In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 256 Neb. 596,
591 N.W.2d 557 (1999). A ruling on a motion to review dis-
position is not an “adjudication” as that term is used in the
juvenile code. Because the child had been adjudicated, we find
§ 43-254—which is found in the juvenile code under “preadjudi-
cation procedures”—to be inapplicable.
[3,4] As DHHS recognizes in its brief, the Office of Juvenile
Services Act distinguishes between placement with OJS and
commitment to OJS’ custody for purposes of that act. Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 43-403(2) (Reissue 2004) defines “committed”
as “an order by a court committing a juvenile to the care and
custody of [OJS] for treatment.” On the other hand, “placed for
evaluation” means “a placement with [OJS] for purposes of an
evaluation of the juvenile.” § 43-403(6). The order at issue stated
that “the child herein is hereby placed in the custody of [OJS]
IN RE INTEREST OF MICHAEL S. 	243
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 240

for purposes of the evaluation only.” And under § 43-413(1), a
court may, following an adjudication but prior to final disposi-
tion, place a juvenile with OJS for an evaluation. DHHS con-
cedes that the juvenile court properly placed the child with OJS
for purposes of an evaluation.
The primary issue is whether the court erred in ordering that
OJS “shall continue to be responsible for all costs associated
with the [o]rder herein not covered by insurance.” We note that
the court’s order did not “commit” the child to OJS’ custody,
and we therefore do not discuss statutes such as § 43-413(3) and
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-408 (Cum. Supp. 2006), which concern a
juvenile who has been committed to OJS’ custody.
In In re Interest of Marie E., 260 Neb. 984, 621 N.W.2d 65
(2000), the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the pur-
pose of § 43-413(4) was to make the State—meaning DHHS—
responsible for the costs incurred in evaluating a juvenile under
§ 43-413(1). The In re Interest of Marie E. court stated that in
the absence of the immediate physical delivery of the juvenile
upon adjudication into an evaluation program, detention was an
unavoidable precursor of evaluation and was part of the evalua-
tion process under § 43-413, the cost of which was the responsi-
bility of DHHS. At the time of the decision in In re Interest of
Marie E., § 43-413(4) (Reissue 1998) stated, “All costs incurred
during the period in which the juvenile is being evaluated at a
state facility or a program funded by [OJS] are the responsibil-
ity of the state unless otherwise ordered by the court pursuant
to section 43-290.” In 2001, the Legislature made substantial
changes to the statute, see 2001 Neb. Laws, L.B. 640, and
§ 43-413(4) (Reissue 2004) now provides:
During 	any 	period 	of 	detention 	or 	evaluation 	prior
to disposition:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (4)(b) of this sec-
tion, the county in which the case is pending is responsible
for all detention costs incurred before and after an evalu-
ation period prior to disposition, the cost of delivering the
juvenile to the facility or institution for an evaluation,
and the cost of returning the juvenile to the court for
disposition; and
244 	16 NEBRASkA APPELLATE REPORTS

(b) The state is responsible for (i) the costs incurred
during an evaluation unless otherwise ordered by the
court pursuant to section 43-290 and (ii) the preevaluation
detention costs for any days over the first ten days from
the date the evaluation is ordered by the court.
Pursuant to § 43-413(5), OJS is “not responsible for pre-
disposition costs except as provided in subdivision (4)(b) of
this section.”
We conclude that the juvenile court erred in making OJS
responsible for all costs not covered by insurance. Under the
plain language of § 43-413(4)(b), Sarpy County is respon-
sible for the cost of the first 10 days of detention after the
court ordered the OJS evaluation. Under § 43-413(4)(a), Sarpy
County is also responsible for all detention costs incurred after
an evaluation period prior to disposition, the cost of delivering
the child to the facility or institution for an evaluation, and the
cost of returning the child to the court for disposition.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the juvenile court properly placed the child
in the custody of OJS for purposes of an evaluation after the
child had been adjudicated under § 43-247. We conclude that the
court erred in making OJS responsible for all costs associated
with the order which were not covered by insurance. We there-
fore reverse the juvenile court’s order and remand the matter
with directions to allocate between OJS and Sarpy County the
costs associated with the child’s evaluation in accordance with
§ 43-413(4) and (5).
reversed And remAnded with directions .
IN RE INTEREST OF MICHAEL S. 	245
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 240