Dinges v. Dinges

Omaha Cable argues that the award of attorney fees was
improper, because “Heppler did not obtain an increase in the
amount of such award, but rather was entitled to continue to
receive the identical benefits originally awarded.” Brief for
appellant at 11-12. Although we agree that the effect of the
review panel’s order was to continue the obligations under the
initial award, Omaha Cable’s argument ignores the trial court’s
order from which Heppler filed the application for review.
On July 11, 2006, the trial court overruled Heppler’s motion
to compel payment of temporary total disability benefits and
attorney fees and his motion for penalties and attorney fees.
The court’s order effectively limited Heppler’s entitlement to
temporary total disability benefits to 300 weeks. Heppler filed
an application for review from that order, and the review panel
determined that there was no such limitation on the number
of weeks that payments are to be made and that Omaha Cable
continued to be under the initial award’s obligation to pay
Heppler temporary total disability benefits. Because Heppler
obtained an increase on review, he was entitled to attorney fees.
This assignment of error lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that under § 48-121(1), a worker’s entitlement
to temporary total disability benefits is not capped at 300 weeks.
We affirm the decision of the review panel in all respects.
A ffirmed .
JAmes e. dinges , Appellee , v .
C indy e. dinges , AppellAnt .
743 N.W.2d 662
Filed January 2, 2008. 	No. A-06-239.
1. Due Process: Appeal and Error. Determination of whether procedures afforded
an individual comport with constitutional requirements for procedural due process
presents a question of law, regarding which an appellate court is obligated to reach
its own conclusions independent of those reached by the trial court.
2. Judges: Recusal: Appeal and Error. A motion to recuse for bias or partiality is
initially entrusted to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s ruling will
be affirmed absent an abuse of that discretion.
DINgeS v. DINgeS 	275
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 275
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:17 AM CST

3. Property Division: Appeal and Error. The division of property is entrusted to
the discretion of the trial judge and will be reviewed de novo on the record and
affirmed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
4. Courts. generally, Nebraska state courts are not bound by the federal rules govern-
ing civil procedure in federal courts.
5. Appeal and Error. To be considered by an appellate court, alleged error must be
both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party assign-
ing the error.
6. Rules of the Supreme Court: Records: Evidence. Neb. Ct. R. of Prac. 5A(1)
(rev. 2006) requires the official court reporter to include in the verbatim record
of any trial or other evidentiary hearing the evidence offered at such trial
or hearing.
7. Judges: Recusal. A trial judge should recuse himself or herself when a litigant
demonstrates that a reasonable person who knew the circumstances of the case
would question the judge’s impartiality under an objective standard of reasonable-
ness, even though no actual bias or prejudice is shown.
8. Divorce: Property Division. Under the analytical approach, compensation for
an injury that a spouse has or will receive for pain, suffering, disfigurement, dis-
ability, or loss of postdivorce earning capacity should not equitably be included in
the marital estate, but compensation for past wages, medical expenses, and other
items that compensate for the diminution of the marital estate should equitably
be included in the marital estate because they properly replace losses of property
created by the marital partnership.
9. Federal Acts: Social Security: Assignments. The anti-assignment section of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000), states that the right of any
person to any future payment under that subchapter shall not be transferable or
assignable, at law or in equity, and that none of the moneys paid or payable or
rights existing under that subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attach-
ment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy
or insolvency law.
10. Constitutional Law: Federal Acts: Social Security: Divorce: Property Division.
The anti-assignment clause of the Social Security Act and the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution prohibit a direct offset to adjust for disproportionate
Social Security benefits in the property division of a dissolution decree.
11. ____: ____: ____: ____: ____. While an offset of a Social Security award is
prohibited by the anti-assignment clause of the Social Security Act and the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a court may properly consider a
spouse’s Social Security award in equitably dividing the marital property.
12. Divorce: Appeal and Error. Appeals in domestic relations matters are heard de
novo on the record, and thus, an appellate court is empowered to enter the order
which should have been made as reflected by the record.
13. Property Division. Although the division of property is not subject to a precise
mathematical formula, the general rule is to award a spouse one-third to one-half
of the marital estate, the polestar being fairness and reasonableness as determined
by the facts of each case.
276 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

Appeal from the District Court for Dakota County: K urt
rAger, County Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Cindy e. Dinges, pro se.
Dennis R. Ringgenberg and Daniel L. Hartnett, of Crary,
Huff, Inkster, Sheehan, Ringgenberg, Hartnett & Storm, P.C.,
for appellee.
inbody, Chief Judge, and CArlson and CAssel, Judges.
CAssel, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Cindy e. Dinges appeals from the decree dissolving her
marriage to James e. Dinges. We find no merit in Cindy’s
assignments that the trial court erred in denying her due proc-
ess, in making findings not supported by the evidence, and in
not recusing itself. However, we conclude that the trial court
erred in treating traceable proceeds of Cindy’s lump-sum Social
Security disability award as a marital asset, contrary to the
anti-assignment clause of the Social Security Act. We therefore
modify the trial court’s division of property.
BACkgROUND
Cindy and James married on October 23, 1998. No children
were born to the marriage. On July 20, 2004, James filed a
petition for dissolution. On July 27, Cindy moved from the
marital home.
At the time of the marriage, Cindy worked as a union pipe-
fitter. She finished working for her employer on April 30, 2000,
and took an honorable withdrawal from the union on August 1.
James testified that Cindy worked full time until toward the end
of 2000, when she had an appendicitis attack, underwent some
surgeries, and was laid off. Cindy applied for Social Security
disability benefits. A “Notice of Decision - Fully Favorable”
dated August 16, 2004, informed Cindy that the Social Security
Administration had decided her case. A notice of award stated
that Cindy’s first payment was for $27,170 for the money she
was due through September 2004 and that she would then
receive $632 per month. The notice of award stated that the
DINgeS v. DINgeS 	277
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 275

administration found Cindy became disabled on December 3,
2000, that she had to be disabled for 5 full calendar months in
a row before she was entitled to benefits, and that Cindy’s first
month of entitlement to benefits was June 2001.
In February 2005, Cindy purchased a modular home with a
cash value of $54,000. She made a downpayment of $27,000,
using the “Social Security back pay.”
The trial court determined that Cindy’s lump-sum Social
Security 	disability 	award 	represented 	benefits 	which 	were
accrued during the marriage and that the award should be con-
sidered in equitably dividing the marital estate. Because Cindy
used the proceeds from the award to purchase the modular
home, the court stated that the modular home was part of the
marital estate. The court proceeded to equitably distribute the
marital assets and debts.
Cindy timely appeals.
ASSIgNMeNTS OF eRROR
Cindy alleges, restated, that the court erred in (1) denying her
due process by forcing her to go to trial without a final pretrial
conference, (2) making factual findings unsupported by the evi-
dence, (3) finding no basis for recusal, and (4) classifying her
lump-sum Social Security disability award as marital property
and awarding one-half of its value to James.
STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1] Determination of whether procedures afforded an individ-
ual comport with constitutional requirements for procedural due
process presents a question of law, regarding which an appellate
court is obligated to reach its own conclusions independent of
those reached by the trial court. Conn v. Conn, 13 Neb. App.
472, 695 N.W.2d 674 (2005).
[2] A motion to recuse for bias or partiality is initially
entrusted to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s
ruling will be affirmed absent an abuse of that discretion.
Gibilisco v. Gibilisco, 263 Neb. 27, 637 N.W.2d 898 (2002).
[3] The division of property is entrusted to the discretion of
the trial judge and will be reviewed de novo on the record and
278 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

affirmed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Liming v.
Liming, 272 Neb. 534, 723 N.W.2d 89 (2006).
ANALYSIS
Due Process.
[4] Cindy argues that she was denied due process by the
trial court’s denying her a pretrial conference, in violation of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f). generally, Nebraska state courts are not
bound by the federal rules governing civil procedure in federal
courts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (federal rules govern procedure in
U.S. district courts). Nebraska has not adopted a rule similar to
the federal rule 26(f), and Neb. Ct. R. of Dist. Ct. Pretrial Proc.
(rev. 2000) states only that “the court may in its discretion direct
the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference
to consider” certain issues. Further, the court held a pretrial
conference on November 5, 2004, which Cindy’s then counsel
attended. The court’s decision not to hold another pretrial con-
ference or a settlement conference after Cindy began handling
her own representation does not amount to a denial of due proc-
ess or an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. This assignment
of error is without merit.
Factual Findings.
Another of Cindy’s assignments of error broadly questions
whether the trial court erred in making its findings contained
in the decree “[w]hen [i]ts [f]indings [w]ere [n]ot [b]ased [o]n
[e]vidence [a]dduced [a]t [t]rial.” Brief for appellant at 2.
[5] She argues that the court erred in dividing the marital
assets and debts and contends that the court based its find-
ings on exhibits that were “allowed into evidence against [her]
timely objections and against the Nebraska Rules of evidence.”
Id. at 22. To the extent Cindy argues the court erred in receiving
evidence over her objections or in dividing the marital estate,
such arguments are not encompassed by her assignment of error
and we do not consider them. See Bellino v. McGrath North,
274 Neb. 130, 738 N.W.2d 434 (2007) (to be considered by
appellate court, alleged error must be both specifically assigned
and specifically argued in brief of party assigning error).
DINgeS v. DINgeS 	279
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 275

[6] Cindy argues that the values used by the trial court
were based on an exhibit offered by James showing values of
property, which exhibit was not received into evidence “[b]ut
curiously . . . was made part of the bill of exceptions after
trial.” Brief for appellant at 23 (emphasis omitted). Of course,
Neb. Ct. R. of Prac. 5A(1) (rev. 2006) requires the official
court reporter to include in the verbatim record of any “trial
or other evidentiary hearing” the “evidence offered” at such
trial or hearing. Thus, there is nothing “curious” about the
presence of the exhibit within the bill of exceptions. The rule
requires that an exhibit offered at trial but not received by the
trial court be included in the record in order to allow an appel-
late court—where an alleged error in refusing to receive the
exhibit is properly raised in an appeal—to effectively review the
court’s decision. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-103(1)(b) (Reissue
1995). The pertinent question, however, is whether, in deciding
the issues, the trial court expressly relied on the exhibit which
the court had refused to receive. We have reviewed the court’s
decree, including extensive findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and find no indication that the values used by the court
were derived from the refused exhibit. We conclude that the
values used by the trial court are supported by other evidence
which was received at trial.
Recusal.
On November 7, 2005, Cindy filed a “Motion to Recuse or,
in the Alternative[,] Motion for Disqualification.” She alleged
that she had “sufficient reason to believe” that the trial judge
was biased against Cindy because of the judge’s actions in
a telephonic hearing on October 28 where the judge “ridi-
culed” Cindy and “belittled her actions[,] all the while praising
[James’] [a]ttorney for his alleged ‘correctness.’” Cindy further
alleged that the judge showed “an obvious bias” toward James
and his position during the telephonic hearing. Cindy stated
that she filed a complaint against the judge with the “Nebraska
Judicial review Committee.” On November 18, the court entered
an order stating that it “finds that there is no basis in fact for
this judge to recuse or disqualify himself from hearing the
within matter.”
280 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

[7] A trial judge should recuse himself or herself when a
litigant demonstrates that a reasonable person who knew the
circumstances of the case would question the judge’s impartial-
ity under an objective standard of reasonableness, even though
no actual bias or prejudice is shown. Gibilisco v. Gibilisco,
263 Neb. 27, 637 N.W.2d 898 (2002). We have reviewed the
transcription of the October 28, 2005, hearing, and find nothing
in the court’s statements showing bias. While a more complete
explanation of the court’s rulings might have been helpful to
this litigant, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the
motion. This assignment of error lacks merit.
Social Security Disability Award.
Cindy argues that the court erred in classifying her lump-
sum Social Security award as marital property. The trial court,
using an “analytical approach,” determined that Cindy’s Social
Security award represented benefits accrued during the mar-
riage and should be included in the marital estate. The court
then stated that because Cindy used the proceeds from the
Social Security disability award to purchase the modular home,
the modular home was part of the marital estate.
[8] In Parde v. Parde, 258 Neb. 101, 602 N.W.2d 657 (1999),
the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the analytical approach
in determining whether proceeds from a Federal employers’
Liability Act personal injury settlement should be included
in the marital estate. The Parde court explained that “[i]n the
analytical approach, courts analyze the nature and underly-
ing reasons for the compensation.” 258 Neb. at 108-09, 602
N.W.2d at 662. The Parde court held that compensation for
an injury that a spouse has or will receive for pain, suffering,
disfigurement, disability, or loss of postdivorce earning capac-
ity should not equitably be included in the marital estate, but
compensation for past wages, medical expenses, and other
items that compensate for the diminution of the marital estate
should equitably be included in the marital estate because
they properly replace losses of property created by the marital
partnership. We have little difficulty agreeing with the trial
court that under the analytical approach, Cindy’s lump-sum
award would be included in the marital estate because it was
DINgeS v. DINgeS 	281
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 275

compensation for the diminution of the marital estate. The
problem presented by this case, which problem the trial court
did not address, is that Cindy’s lump-sum award was composed
of Social Security benefits.
[9] The anti-assignment section of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000), states:
The right of any person to any future payment under
this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable,
at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or pay-
able or rights existing under this subchapter shall be sub-
ject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other
legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or
insolvency law.
In Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413, 417,
93 S. Ct. 590, 34 L. ed. 2d 608 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court
described § 407(a) as “impos[ing] a broad bar against the use of
any legal process to reach all social security benefits.” However,
in 1975, Congress declared that Social Security benefits were
subject to legal process “to enforce the legal obligation of the
individual to provide child support or alimony.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 659(a) (2000). “Alimony” does not include “any payment or
transfer of property or its value by an individual to the spouse
or a former spouse of the individual in compliance with any
community property settlement, equitable distribution of prop-
erty, or other division of property between spouses or former
spouses.” § 659(i)(3)(B)(ii).
In Webster v. Webster, 271 Neb. 788, 716 N.W.2d 47 (2006),
the Nebraska Supreme Court considered whether the husband,
who participated in a public employee retirement fund in lieu of
Social Security participation, was entitled to an offset or other
compensation for the wife’s Social Security benefits when divid-
ing marital property in a dissolution decree. The Webster court
stated, “Courts generally agree that § 407(a) preempts state law
that would authorize distribution of Social Security benefits,
and that Social Security benefits themselves are not subject to
direct division in a dissolution proceeding.” 271 Neb. at 796,
716 N.W.2d at 54. The Webster court cited to a number of cases
where state courts considered the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 99 S. Ct. 802,
282 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

59 L. ed. 2d 1 (1979), as instructing them that Social Security
is not subject to an indirect adjustment through offset.
In Hisquierdo, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in
dissolution proceedings, a wife did not have a community
property interest in her husband’s expectation of receiv-
ing railroad retirement benefits. The Court, in so holding,
expressly pointed to the similarities between the railroad
retirement benefits and benefits under the Social Security
Act, including the fact that the laws providing for both
forms of benefits specifically prohibited the assignment
of the benefits through garnishment, attachment, or other
legal process. . . .
The Court concluded that Congress had decided upon
a delicate statutory balance in which it fixed an amount
it thought appropriate to support an employee’s old age
and to encourage the employee to retire. In deciding how
finite funds were to be allocated, Congress chose not to
allow diminution of that fixed amount by the spouse for
whom the fund was not designed. The Social Security Act
provides a specific limited avenue for divorced persons
to obtain a share of the former spouse’s benefits. See 42
U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(A) through (D), and (c)(1)(A) through
(D) (2000).
The Court in Hisquierdo specifically rejected the wife’s
argument that even if a direct allocation of her former
husband’s railroad retirement benefit would be contrary to
the statutory benefit scheme, she should still be entitled
to an offsetting award of presently available community
property to compensate her for her interest in the expected
benefits. The court explained: “An offsetting award, how-
ever, would upset the statutory balance and impair peti-
tioner’s economic security just as surely as would a
regular deduction from his benefit check.” Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 588, 99 S. Ct. 802, 59 L. ed.
2d 1 (1979).
Webster v. Webster, 271 Neb. at 797-98, 716 N.W.2d at 54-55.
[10] The Webster court stated that the weight of authority
concluded an offset of Social Security benefits was prohibited,
but that most of those courts, especially those in equitable
DINgeS v. DINgeS 	283
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 275

division states as compared to community property states,
“have not found a more generalized consideration of Social
Security benefits to be an impermissible factor in the overall
scheme when making a property division.” 271 Neb. at 798,
716 N.W.2d at 55. The Webster court ultimately concluded that
“the anti-assignment clause of the Social Security Act and the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibit a direct off-
set to adjust for disproportionate Social Security benefits in the
property division of a dissolution decree.” Webster v. Webster,
271 Neb. 788, 800, 716 N.W.2d 47, 56 (2006).
The Webster court’s discussion of Marriage of Zahm, 138
Wash. 2d 213, 978 P.2d 498 (1999), and Neville v. Neville, 99
Ohio St. 3d 275, 791 N.e.2d 434 (2003), provides some guid-
ance on how to dispose of the issue before us.
The court in Marriage of Zahm . . . concluded that
where the trial court neither computed a formal calcula-
tion of the value of the husband’s Social Security benefits
nor offset a formal numerical valuation into the court’s
property division via a specific counterbalancing prop-
erty award to the wife, the reasoning in Hisquierdo did
not apply. The court explained that the antireassignment
clause of the Social Security Act did not preclude the trial
court from considering a spouse’s Social Security income
“within the more elastic parameters of the court’s power
to formulate a just and equitable division of the parties’
marital property.” 138 Wash. 2d at 222, 978 P.2d at 502.
As described by the court in Neville, “[a]lthough a party’s
Social Security benefits cannot be divided as a marital
asset, those benefits may be considered by the trial court
under the catchall category as a relevant and equitable fac-
tor in making an equitable distribution.” Neville v. Neville,
99 Ohio St. 3d at 278, 791 N.e.2d at 437. This is espe-
cially true when “‘a spouse’s social security contributions
and ultimate benefits have been increased by the work of
the other spouse, and . . . a nonemployed spouse loses
spending power after a divorce through the inability to
use the other spouse’s social security benefits.’ [Quoting]
2A Social Security Law and Practice (Flaherty & Sigillo,
284 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

eds., 1994), Section 34:67.” 99 Ohio St. 3d at 278, 791
N.e.2d at 437.
Webster v. Webster, 271 Neb. at 799, 716 N.W.2d at 55-56.
In In re Marriage of Knipp, 15 kan. App. 2d 494, 809 P.2d
562 (1991), a kansas appellate court reached a similar conclu-
sion. In that case, the husband received a lump-sum Social
Security disability benefit of approximately $12,800 during
the marriage for a disability suffered prior to the marriage,
and he invested the payment in an interest-bearing account. At
the time of the divorce, $9,200 remained in the account, and
the trial court ordered $3,000 from the account set over to the
wife as part of the property division. Citing to Philpott v. Essex
County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413, 93 S. Ct. 590, 34 L. ed.
2d 608 (1973), the kansas Court of Appeals stated that the U.S.
Supreme Court had determined that 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) applied
to benefits received and deposited in a savings account, stating,
“Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Douglas reasoned that
retroactive benefits placed in an account retained the quality of
‘moneys’ within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 407.” In re Marriage
of Knipp, 15 kan. App. 2d at 495, 809 P.2d at 563. The kansas
court concluded that the trial court erred in setting aside a por-
tion of the husband’s lump-sum Social Security benefits but
stated that “the anti-assignment statute does not prohibit a court
from considering the value of a lump sum social security dis-
ability award in dividing the remaining marital property.” Id. at
495-96, 809 P.2d at 564. The kansas court then reversed, and
remanded for reconsideration of the property division, stating
that “no single asset may be viewed independently in adjudicat-
ing a property settlement.” Id. at 496, 809 P.2d at 564.
In Olsen v. Olsen, 169 P.3d 765, 768 (Utah App. 2007), the
Court of Appeals of Utah held that
Congress has preempted state trial courts from including
social security benefits as a marital asset; however, trial
courts may consider social security benefits in relation to
all joint and separate marital assets in seeking to ensure
that “property be fairly divided between the parties, given
their contributions during the marriage and their circum-
stances at the time of the divorce.”
DINgeS v. DINgeS 	285
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 275

The Olsen court concluded that the division of property needed
to be reconsidered on remand.
[11] We conclude that the trial court erred in stating that it
“should consider the lump sum award received by C[indy] as
a marital asset subject to division in this dissolution proceed-
ing” and then including the modular home, purchased post
separation with the Social Security funds, in the marital estate.
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s holding in Webster v. Webster,
271 Neb. 788, 716 N.W.2d 47 (2006), precludes such treat-
ment. However, we must also decide the issue discussed but
not reached by the Webster court. We hold that while an offset
of a Social Security award is prohibited by the anti-assignment
clause of the Social Security Act and the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, a court may properly consider a spouse’s
Social Security award in equitably dividing the marital property.
We rely upon the “weight of authority” noted by the Webster
court. See id. at 798, 716 N.W.2d at 55. Of course, such award
is only one of many factors which we consider in our de novo
review of the division of marital property.
[12,13] Appeals in domestic relations matters are heard de
novo on the record, and thus, an appellate court is empowered
to enter the order which should have been made as reflected
by the record. Foster v. Foster, 266 Neb. 32, 662 N.W.2d 191
(2003). We therefore modify the decree to exclude the Social
Security award, traceable to the modular home, as part of the
marital estate. The trial court’s decree showed the net mari-
tal estate to be $41,933, and it awarded Cindy a net value of
$21,060.52 of the marital estate and James a net value of
$20,872.48. eliminating from the marital estate the $27,000
traceable to the modular home leaves a net marital estate of
$14,933. Although the division of property is not subject to a
precise mathematical formula, the general rule is to award a
spouse one-third to one-half of the marital estate, the polestar
being fairness and reasonableness as determined by the facts of
each case. Millatmal v. Millatmal, 272 Neb. 452, 723 N.W.2d 79
(2006). A division of one-third to one-half of this marital estate
would be to award a spouse between approximately $4,978 and
$7,467. We accept the trial court’s distribution of the assets and
liabilities, but, to equitably divide the marital estate, we order
286 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

James to pay $11,000 to be distributed to Cindy. With such pay-
ment, Cindy will have received $5,060.52 of the marital estate,
and James’ share will be reduced to $9,872.48.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Cindy a further pretrial conference or a settlement
conference, in the factual findings it made in the decree, or in
declining to recuse itself. However, we conclude that the court
erred in finding Cindy’s lump-sum Social Security disability
award to be a marital asset subject to division. We therefore
modify the court’s decree to equitably divide the marital estate
after eliminating from the marital estate the $27,000 in Social
Security disability benefits traceable to the modular home.
A ffirmed As modified .
stAte of nebrAsKA, Appellee , v .
W illiAm p. sutton , AppellAnt .
741 N.W.2d 713
Filed January 2, 2008. 	No. A-06-1297.
supplementAl opinion
Appeal from the District Court for Sheridan County: pAul d.
empson, Judge. Supplemental opinion: Former opinion modi-
fied. Motion for rehearing overruled.
Paul Wess for appellant.
Jon 	Bruning, 	Attorney 	general, 	and 	george 	R. 	Love
for appellee.
sievers , CArlson, and CAssel, Judges.
per C uriAm .
This matter is before the court upon the motion for rehear-
ing of the State regarding our opinion in State v. Sutton, ante
p. 185, 741 N.W.2d 713 (2007). While we overrule the motion
for rehearing, we modify our opinion as follows:
STATe v. SUTTON 	287
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 287