Gebhardt v. Gebhardt

[4] In light of the history of the 1996 and 2001 amendments
to UIFSA (adopted by the Legislature in 1997 and 2003, respec-
tively), the purpose of the statute is clear. Section 42-746(d)
declares that the law of the state which issued the initial con-
trolling order governs the duration of the obligation of support.
the district court recognized that the law of New Mexico pro-
vides for support to terminate at age 18. As New Mexico issued
the initial controlling order, its law governs the duration of
russell’s support obligation. the district court erred in extend-
ing russell’s child support by the additional year.
CONCLUSION
Under the 1996 and 2001 amendments to UIFSA, the law
of New Mexico, as the state which issued the initial control-
ling order, governs the duration of russell’s support obligation.
to the extent that the district court’s order of modification
purported to change the duration of support, it is modified to
conform to the provision of the original New Mexico decree
continuing child support until such time as the children “are
married, reaches [sic] majority or [are] otherwise emancipated.”
Under the governing law of New Mexico, a child reaches
majority when he or she attains the age of 18 years. As so
modified, we affirm the final order of the district court.
affirmed as modified .
rhonda l. geBhardt , appellant , v .
J ohn o. geBhardt , appellee .
746 N.W.2d 707
Filed March 11, 2008. 	No. A-07-102.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues presented for
review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction
over the matter before it.
2. ____: ____. Notwithstanding whether the parties raise the issue of jurisdiction,
an appellate court has a duty to raise and determine the issue of jurisdiction
sua sponte.
3. Pleadings: Judgments: Time. Neb. rev. Stat. § 25-1329 (Cum. Supp. 2006)
requires the filing of a motion to alter or amend no later than 10 days after the
entry of the judgment.
gEBHArDt v. gEBHArDt 	565
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 565
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:16 AM CST

4. Pleadings: Judgments: Time: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 25-1912(3) (Cum. Supp. 2006), a motion to alter or amend timely filed termi-
nates the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal as to all parties.
5. Pleadings: Judgments: Time. In order to be a tolling motion, a motion to alter
or amend must seek substantive alteration of the judgment.
6. Judgments: Final Orders: Words and Phrases. According to Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 25-1301(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006), a judgment is the final determination of the
rights of the parties in an action; to be final, an order must dispose of the whole
merits of the case and leave nothing for further consideration of the court, and
thus the order is final when no further action of the court is required to dispose of
the pending cause.
7. Pleadings: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Successive motions to alter or amend
do not toll the time to appeal; however, motions to alter or amend are not “suc-
cessive” when they were timely filed after the court substantially altered the judg-
ment, giving the parties a statutory right to seek alteration or amendment of the
“new judgment” in the trial court before appealing to an appellate court.
8. Divorce: Property Division: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews
a dissolution case de novo on the record to determine whether there has been
an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Such standard also applies to the trial
court’s determinations regarding the division of property.
9. Evidence: Appeal and Error. In a de novo review, an appellate court reappraises
the evidence in the record and reaches its own independent conclusions.
10. ____: ____. Where the evidence is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the
appellate court considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial judge
heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather
than another.
11. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists when the
reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving
a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters submitted
for disposition.
12. Appeal and Error. An issue not properly presented to and passed upon by the
trial court may not be raised on appeal.
13. Divorce: Property Division. In dissolution matters, property divisions are not
subject to a rigid mathematical formula and the division must, most of all,
be reasonable.
Appeal from the District Court for greeley County: ronald
d. olBerding and mark d. kozisek, Judges. Affirmed.
gregory g. Jensen, p.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
Barry D. geweke, of Stowell, kruml, geweke & Cullers,
p.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
irwin , sievers, and moore, Judges.
566 	16 NEBrASkA AppELLAtE rEpOrtS

sievers, Judge.
rhonda L. gebhardt and John O. gebhardt were divorced by
a decree of dissolution of marriage entered on May 1, 2006, by
then District Judge ronald D. Olberding in the district court for
greeley County, Nebraska. Judge Olberding retired effective
April 30. Following the entry of decree, there was a motion for
a new trial on May 3 and a ruling thereupon on August 10 by
District Judge Mark D. kozisek. thereafter, there were a series
of motions to alter or amend judgment, rulings thereupon, and
finally rhonda’s notice of appeal, which was filed January
23, 2007. these procedural occurrences, which we discuss in
further detail below, raise jurisdictional issues which we have
previously directed the parties to address in their briefs. We
have determined that the matter should be submitted for deci-
sion without oral argument pursuant to our authority under Neb.
Ct. r. of prac. 11B(1) (rev. 2006).
prOCEDUrAL BACkgrOUND
the district court’s decree of dissolution of May 1, 2006,
was followed by rhonda’s motion for a new trial of May 3. the
motion raised issues with respect to the trial court’s property
division, award of alimony, and failure to award her attorney
fees. Judge kozisek’s order on rhonda’s motion for new trial
and order modifying decree was entered August 10. Citing
Heald v. Heald, 259 Neb. 604, 611 N.W.2d 598 (2000), Judge
kozisek recited in his order the well-known three-step process
for property division: (1) to classify the parties’ property as
marital or nonmarital, (2) to value the marital assets and liabili-
ties, and (3) to calculate and divide the net marital estate.
the trial court found a number of problems with the previ-
ous property division, which we will not fully detail other than
to set forth the order portion of the ruling, which provided that
the motion to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial was
overruled, but that the judgment of May 1, 2006, was modified
to provide:
“[rhonda] is awarded all property and ordered to pay
all debt listed under the column heading ‘rhonda’ on the
property Division Worksheet. [John] is awarded all property
gEBHArDt v. gEBHArDt 	567
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 565

and ordered to pay all debt listed under the column heading
‘John’ on the property Division Worksheet.
“[John] shall pay to the court clerk for disbursement
to [rhonda] as property settlement the total sum of
$62,000.00 within 60 days of entry of this order. there
shall be no interest if paid on or before the due date, but
any delinquent payment shall bear interest at the judgment
rate of 7.297% per annum from due date until paid.”
Otherwise, the trial court left the original decree of dissolution
unchanged. this ruling of August 10 changed the May 1 judg-
ment by awarding rhonda a $62,000 judgment against John
which had not previously been part of the decree.
Within 10 days of the August 10, 2006, decision, John filed
a motion to alter or amend the order modifying decree so as
to eliminate the $62,000 judgment against him and in favor of
rhonda. Additionally, John’s motion asserted that the original
decree of dissolution of May 1 failed to give him credit for a
$384,288.67 cash inheritance and that with said credit, no prop-
erty settlement judgment against him was warranted.
rhonda filed a “Cross Motion to Alter or Amend Order
Modifying Decree” on October 10, 2006.
By an “Order on Motion to Alter or Amend Order Modifying
Decree” entered on November 14, 2006, Judge kozisek first
found that rhonda’s pending cross-motion to alter or amend
filed October 10 was filed more than 10 days after the entry
of the order modifying decree of August 10, and therefore the
court granted John’s motion to strike rhonda’s cross-motion to
alter or amend as untimely. the trial court then took up John’s
motion to alter or amend, and after citing authority making
inheritances and gifts which are traceable nonmarital property,
see Quinn v. Quinn, 13 Neb. App. 155, 689 N.W.2d 605 (2004),
the court found that “it incorrectly failed to give John credit for
the inheritance and life insurance when it rendered its Order
Modifying Decree.” the trial court had allowed a credit to
rhonda for her inherited property in the amount of $43,000.
However, Judge kozisek found that there was no evidence
adduced which traced such inherited property and that no credit
would be allowed for rhonda’s inherited property. thus, the
court ordered that John’s motion to alter or amend was granted
568 	16 NEBrASkA AppELLAtE rEpOrtS

to the extent of allowing him credit for inherited property and
life insurance proceeds in the amount of $384,288.67. the
court further ordered:
the judgment previously entered on May 1, 2006 . . . and
the Order Modifying Decree entered August 10, 2006 are
modified to provide:
“[rhonda] is awarded all property and ordered to pay
all debt listed under the column heading ‘rhonda’ on
the property Division Worksheet-2. [John] is awarded all
property and ordered to pay all debt listed under the col-
umn heading ‘John’ on the property Division Worksheet-2.
Neither party shall pay the other money for any prop-
erty division.”
rhonda was unsatisfied with the above outcome and therefore
filed another motion to alter or amend the order modifying decree
on November 22, 2006, which was within 10 days of November
14. Such motion was denied by a signed and filed journal entry
of December 28, after which rhonda filed an appeal to this court
on January 23, 2007.
JUrISDICtIONAL ANALySIS
[1,2] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review,
it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it
has jurisdiction over the matter before it. Saunders County
v. City of Lincoln, 263 Neb. 170, 638 N.W.2d 824 (2002).
Notwithstanding whether the parties raise the issue of jurisdic-
tion, an appellate court has a duty to raise and determine the
issue of jurisdiction sua sponte. Keef v. State, 262 Neb. 622,
634 N.W.2d 751 (2001).
this appeal raises issues dealing with the tolling effect of a
motion to alter or amend, the effect of successive motions to
alter or amend, and ultimately, if we have jurisdiction, which
actions of the trial court are subject to our appellate review.
rhonda asserts that because she was satisfied with the order
on her motion for new trial of August 10, 2006, she takes “the
unusual position of arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction,”
provided we determine that the August 10 order is the final
order in this case, from which order an appeal needed to be
filed within 30 days. Brief for appellant at 1. As we understand
gEBHArDt v. gEBHArDt 	569
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 565

rhonda’s jurisdictional argument, it is that only her motion for
new trial of May 3 was effective to terminate the running of the
30 days in which to appeal to this court. We note that rhonda
does not assign error to the trial court’s ruling of November 14,
or its ruling of December 28. However, perhaps we are to infer
from rhonda’s argument that she would have us declare the
trial court’s rulings of November 14 and December 28 nullities.
John concludes his briefing by asking us to affirm either the
decree of dissolution of May 1 or the order modifying decree
of November 14.
[3-5] Both parties reference Mason v. Cannon, 246 Neb. 14,
516 N.W.2d 250 (1994), for two fundamental propositions: (1)
An untimely motion for new trial is ineffectual and does not
toll the time for perfection of an appeal, nor does it extend
or suspend the time limit for filing such appeal, and (2) the
filing of a motion for new trial and its subsequent overruling
do not convert an otherwise unappealable order into an appeal-
able order. However, Mason was decided before the operative
date (April 16, 2004) of the statute providing for the filing of
a motion to alter or amend, Neb. rev. Stat. § 25-1329 (Cum.
Supp. 2006). Section 25-1329 requires the filing of such a
motion no later than “ten days after the entry of the judgment.”
And, under Neb. rev. Stat. § 25-1912(3) (Cum. Supp. 2006),
such a motion timely filed terminates the running of the time
for filing a notice of appeal “as to all parties.” In order to be a
tolling motion, a motion to alter or amend must seek substan-
tive alteration of the judgment. See Weeder v. Central Comm.
College, 269 Neb. 114, 691 N.W.2d 508 (2005).
returning to Mason v. Cannon, supra, the trial court entered
an order on June 3, 1992, dismissing the case for want of
prosecution. the plaintiff, Sandra Mason, did not appeal, but,
rather, filed a motion to vacate the order of dismissal and
set the matter for trial. the Nebraska Supreme Court, citing
Abboud v. Cutler, 238 Neb. 177, 469 N.W.2d 763 (1991), held
that a motion to vacate filed within 10 days of an order of
dismissal is the equivalent of the filing of a motion for new
trial. Mason’s motion to vacate was overruled on June 22. the
Mason court said that the overruling of the motion to vacate
was a final order requiring the filing of a notice of appeal
570 	16 NEBrASkA AppELLAtE rEpOrtS

within 30 days of June 22, but that because Mason filed another
motion for new trial, dated June 26, 1992, and because suc-
cessive motions for new trial cannot extend the appeal time,
Mason’s notice of appeal filed on September 21, after the trial
court overruled her second motion for new trial on August 21,
was an ineffective notice of appeal and thus the Supreme Court
lacked jurisdiction.
Mason is instructive but not determinative of the result in this
case, because it did not involve a motion to alter or amend and,
most important, the trial court in Mason took no action which
altered or changed the judgment between the two motions for
new trial filed by Mason. Our situation is substantially differ-
ent. perhaps that difference is underscored by recalling exactly
what constitutes a judgment, remembering that the motion to
alter or amend judgment tolls the appeal time when the motion
seeks a substantial alteration of a judgment.
[6] the statutory definition of “judgment” is found in Neb.
rev. Stat. § 25-1301(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006): “A judgment is the
final determination of the rights of the parties in an action.” to
be final, an order must dispose of the whole merits of the case
and leave nothing for further consideration of the court, and
thus the order is final when no further action of the court is
required to dispose of the pending cause. However, if the cause
is retained for further action, the order is interlocutory. See
Hake v. Hake, 8 Neb. App. 376, 594 N.W.2d 648 (1999), citing
Moulton v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 251 Neb. 95, 555 N.W.2d
39 (1996).
therefore, when reviewing the procedural events of this case
sequentially, we begin with the entry of the decree of dissolu-
tion of May 1, 2006, by Judge Olberding. that order retained
nothing for further action and was clearly a final order within
the foregoing definitional parameters. rhonda’s motion for new
trial of May 3 is unquestionably a motion which tolls the time
in which to appeal the district court’s decree. On August 10,
the district court ruled on rhonda’s motion for new trial and
substantially altered the judgment by adding a $62,000 judg-
ment to the decree in her favor and against John. this decision
is unquestionably a judgment, and under the plain language of
§ 25-1329, a party may seek to alter or amend this judgment,
gEBHArDt v. gEBHArDt 	571
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 565

a tactic that John would understandably consider doing before
filing an appeal. If such a motion is filed within 10 days of
August 10, the time to appeal to this court is tolled until 30
days after the motion to alter or amend is disposed of. John’s
motion to alter or amend sought to eliminate the $62,000 judg-
ment that had been imposed upon him 8 days earlier in the order
of August 10, and he sought to gain credit for his $384,288.67
cash inheritance as a basis to eliminate the obligation to pay
rhonda $62,000, which would be a substantial alteration.
As a result of this “new judgment,” John’s motion to alter or
amend was a tolling motion and had to be disposed of before
the 30 days in which to appeal to this court began to run.
We digress to note that on October 10, 2006, rhonda filed a
cross-motion to alter or amend the August 10 judgment. this
motion to alter or amend was obviously out of time and a
nullity, as the trial court found. the trial court then ruled on
John’s motion to alter or amend in its order of November 14,
by removing rhonda’s $43,000 credit for inherited property,
which credit was in the original May 1 decree, and by eliminat-
ing the $62,000 judgment given to rhonda by the order modi-
fying decree entered August 10. thus, the trial court entered a
new judgment which again substantially altered the decree, to
rhonda’s disadvantage.
On November 22, 2006, within 10 days of the November
14 judgment, rhonda moved again to alter or amend the judg-
ment, seeking to restore to her the $62,000 property settlement
judgment against John. this motion by rhonda clearly sought
substantial alteration of what by now was the third judgment
in this case, and thus rhonda’s motion was a tolling motion.
Accordingly, when rhonda’s last motion to alter or amend
was denied on December 28 with no change in the third judg-
ment, the third judgment became a final, appealable order. As a
result, rhonda’s notice of appeal filed on January 23, 2007, was
within 30 days of December 28, 2006, and was therefore effec-
tive. therefore, we have jurisdiction of this appeal to conduct
appellate review of the final judgment entered in this divorce
case, which judgment did not occur until the third attempt at a
final order entered on November 14. that order became final
with the overruling of rhonda’s motion to alter or amend such
572 	16 NEBrASkA AppELLAtE rEpOrtS

judgment on December 28, at which time the 30-day clock in
which to appeal began to run.
[7] If rhonda, instead of filing a notice of appeal within
30 days of December 28, 2006, would have filed another
motion to alter or amend attacking the trial court’s decision of
November 14, the principles of Mason v. Cannon, 246 Neb. 14,
516 N.W.2d 250 (1994), would apply. Because, at that point,
she would have filed successive motions to alter or amend the
same judgment. However, in this case, her various motions to
alter or amend were not “successive” in the sense condemned
in Mason. In other words, while successive motions to alter or
amend would not toll the time to appeal under the reasoning
of Mason, the motions to alter or amend in this case were not
“successive,” because they were timely filed after the court
substantially altered the judgment, giving the parties a statutory
right to seek alteration or amendment of the “new judgment”
in the trial court before appealing to this court. therefore, we
have jurisdiction over rhonda’s appeal and now proceed to take
up her assignments of error.
ASSIgNMENtS OF ErrOr
While rhonda assigns four errors, the foregoing discussion
of the jurisdictional issue disposes of rhonda’s fourth assign-
ment of error relating to the district court’s ruling that rhonda’s
October 10, 2006, cross-motion to alter or amend the August
10 judgment was out of time. We have affirmed the finding that
such motion is a nullity. Accordingly, the remaining assign-
ments of error for decision are that (1) the district court erred in
using July 22, 2005, as the valuation date for the parties’ prop-
erty; (2) the district court erred in assigning values to marital
assets and marital debt; and (3) the district court erred in failing
to consider improvements made to inherited property.
StANDArD OF rEVIEW
[8] An appellate court reviews a dissolution case de novo
on the record to determine whether there has been an abuse of
discretion by the trial judge. Such standard also applies to the
trial court’s determinations regarding the division of property.
See Longo v. Longo, 266 Neb. 171, 663 N.W.2d 604 (2003).
gEBHArDt v. gEBHArDt 	573
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 565

[9,10] In its de novo review, an appellate court reappraises
the evidence in the record and reaches its own independent
conclusions. See McGuire v. McGuire, 11 Neb. App. 433, 652
N.W.2d 293 (2002). However, where the evidence is in con-
flict on a material issue of fact, the appellate court considers
and may give weight to the fact that the trial judge heard and
observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts
rather than another. See id.
[11] A judicial abuse of discretion exists when the reasons or
rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving
a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in mat-
ters submitted for disposition. Tyma v. Tyma, 263 Neb. 873, 644
N.W.2d 139 (2002).
ANALySIS
As a predicate to the discussion of rhonda’s first two
assignments of error, we note that the parties were married in
September 1988, four children were born to the marriage, and
rhonda filed for dissolution on July 22, 2005. Both parties
are in their forties, John is a farmer-rancher, and since 2000,
rhonda has been a full-time public school teacher.
Valuation Date.
In the early 1990’s, the gebhardts moved to greeley County
to farm. the president of the State Bank of Scotia testified with
respect to the gebhardt family finances. Apparently, in order to
secure operating loans, the gebhardts submitted financial state-
ments around the first of March each year. the bank’s president
testified from the bank’s documentation that a February 12,
2003, financial statement revealed that the gebhardts had a net
worth of $26,580. their assets were valued at $534,977, against
which there was debt of $508,397. Following the death of John’s
mother, the financial picture materially changed. A financial
statement dated August 31, 2004, in the bank’s records revealed
that at that time, the gebhardts’ net worth was $1,201,000, with
total assets of $1,322,000 and total debt of $121,000. the trial
court found that this substantial increase in net worth was due
to John’s inheritance, not from the efforts of the parties, and no
claim is made that such finding is erroneous.
574 	16 NEBrASkA AppELLAtE rEpOrtS

rhonda argues that the trial court improperly used July 22,
2005, the date rhonda filed for dissolution, as the date to value
assets and debts, because such date bore no rational relation-
ship to the assets to be divided, particularly with regard to the
crops and the livestock. given rhonda’s testimony on cross-
examination as quoted below, this assignment of error is with-
out merit. the record reveals the following cross-examination
of rhonda:
Q. you do not object to using July 22, 2005 as the date
to value assets?
A. I believe, if John is honest, I believe those are
okay, yes.
Q. you are okay with using July 22, 2005.
[Objection 	as 	calling 	for 	a 	legal 	conclusion 	was
overruled.]
A. Say it one more time.
Q. Do you agree with using July 22, 2005 as the date
to . . . value assets and debt?
A. When I filed?
Q. yes.
A. yes.
[12] this testimony brings into play the well-established
rule that an issue not properly presented to and passed upon
by the trial court may not be raised on appeal. See Beaver
Lake Assn. v. Sorensen, 231 Neb. 75, 434 N.W.2d 703 (1989).
Additionally, we note that in none of the postdecree motions
filed by rhonda did she raise the issue to the trial court that the
July 22, 2005, valuation date was improper. this assignment of
error is without merit.
Value of 2005 Corn Crop.
the trial court valued the irrigated corn crop for 2005 at
$102,235 and the dryland corn crop at $4,000. With respect to
both values, the court found: “While [rhonda] asks the court
to speculate that the value was more, she presented no cred-
ible evidence to justify the increase.” John’s evidence valued
the corn crop at $102,235, using a formula of 508 acres at
175 bushels per acre estimated at $2.30 per bushel (including
“LDp” money) reduced by “50% of season.” rhonda argues
gEBHArDt v. gEBHArDt 	575
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 565

that instead of using the 50-percent valuation factor that is
tied to the time of year that valuation occurred (and also tied
to the midpoint in the growing season, we assume), the crop
should have been valued at $204,470. We have closely exam-
ined rhonda’s testimony on this point. She testified that there
was a “variance” with respect to the value of the dryland and
irrigated corn because John “only valued half the value rather
than the entire value of the corn crop.” that said, rhonda was
willing to use John’s values of $2.30 per bushel and yield of
175 bushels per acre—just not the percentage reduction that
John incorporated into his valuation that was adopted by the
court. the foregoing is the extent of rhonda’s direct evidence
with respect to the corn crop.
In John’s testimony, he conceded that the seed had been
planted and that all chemicals, fertilizer, and herbicide had been
applied prior to July 22, 2005. However, when asked on cross-
examination whether his only expenses after July 22 would
have been for “running the irrigation motors and hauling the
crop to town,” he disagreed, pointing out there was second-half
cash rent on one farm, crop insurance premiums around $8,000,
and an estimate of $10,000 for fuel, which we assume meant
fuel for harvest. He also testified that the “Aurora Co-op” was
paid in August for chemicals by a check for $48,000.
[13] In summary, rhonda would have us include in the
marital estate the gross value of the 2005 corn crop and ignore
all of the costs associated with planting it, fertilizing it, water-
ing it, and harvesting it. In Blaser v. Blaser, 225 Neb. 104,
107, 402 N.W.2d 875, 877 (1987), the court emphasized that
in dissolution matters, property divisions are not subject to a
rigid mathematical formula and the “division must, most of all,
be reasonable.” rhonda’s position about valuation of the 2005
corn crop simply is not reasonable. this assignment of error is
without merit. the evidence is undisputed that after July 22,
2005, rhonda provided no help with irrigating, working with
the cattle, or operating the farm equipment. Accordingly, after
the trial court’s valuation date, John was solely responsible for
turning the 2005 growing crop into cash. And, the trial court
did not err in rejecting rhonda’s claim that the 2005 corn crop
be valued without regard to the cost of raising it.
576 	16 NEBrASkA AppELLAtE rEpOrtS

Improvements to Inherited Property.
rhonda asserts that the trial court “erred in failing to con-
sider improvements made to inherited property as a marital
asset.” rhonda did not testify on this subject. John testified in
response to a cross-examination question about improvements
to the inherited real estate that in the fall of 2004, all trees were
cleared off “the building site” at a cost of around $10,000, a new
pivot was built in the spring of 2005 (although on what farm is
not specified), and a storage bin was acquired. As we understand
John’s testimony, approximately $67,000 was spent for this
work, which he said he paid for in 2005. the record does not
specify whether the payment was before or after July 22, but it
was financed via a note at the State Bank of Scotia.
the 	foregoing 	evidence 	is 	obviously 	sketchy 	at 	best.
Nonetheless, the inescapable conclusion from the entire record
is that if the note was paid before the divorce was filed, it
was likely paid from John’s inheritance, given that the parties
did not appear to have substantial assets or cash until John’s
inheritance. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to
establish that the improvements John made to his inherited,
and therefore separate, property increased such property’s value
over and above the cost of the improvements. Accordingly, on
the sketchy record we have on this issue, we cannot say that
the trial court abused its discretion in any way concerning this
aspect of the property division.
CONCLUSION
Because successive and material changes were made to the
decree of dissolution, the motions to alter or amend that were
filed within 10 days of the “change orders” tolled the time to
appeal to this court. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over
rhonda’s appeal. However, none of her assignments of error
have merit.
affirmed .
gEBHArDt v. gEBHArDt 	577
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 565