Drew on behalf of Reed v. Reed

W endy J o dreW, on behalf of M adison J oy reed et al .,
Minor children , appellee and cross - appellant , v .
patrick W illiaM reed , appellant
and cross - appellee .
755 N.W.2d 420
Filed August 12, 2008. 	No. A-07-251.
1. Actions: Paternity: Child Support: Equity. While a paternity action is one at law,
the award of child support in such an action is equitable in nature.
2. Paternity: Child Support: Appeal and Error. A trial court’s award of child sup-
port in a paternity case will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse
of discretion by the trial court.
3. Paternity: Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. In a paternity action, attorney fees
are reviewed de novo on the record to determine whether there has been an abuse
of discretion by the trial judge.
4. Paternity: Expert Witnesses: Fees: Appeal and Error. In a dissolution action,
an appellate court reviews an award of expert witness fees de novo on the record
to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. The
same standard applies to an award of expert witness fees in a paternity action.
5. Child Support: Rules of the Supreme Court. Neb. Ct. R. § 4-212 states that
when a specific provision for joint physical custody is ordered, support may be
calculated using worksheet 3.
6. Child Custody. Joint physical custody means the child lives day in and day out
with both parents on a rotating basis.
7. ____. Numerous parenting times with a child do not constitute joint physical
custody.
8. Child Custody: Child Support. Liberal parenting time does not justify a joint
custody child support calculation.
9. Waiver: Appeal and Error. Errors not assigned in an appellant’s initial brief are
waived and may not be asserted for the first time in a reply brief.
10. Child Support: Rules of the Supreme Court. The child support guidelines per-
mit a deviation when the total net income exceeds the monthly income amount
provided for in the guidelines.
11. ____: ____. Child support for amounts in excess of the monthly income amount
provided for in the child support guidelines may be more but shall not be less than
the amount which would be computed using the monthly income amount provided
for, unless other permissible deviations exist.
12. ____: ____. There is no single methodology or approach to setting child support
when the total net income exceeds the amount provided for in the child support
guidelines; rather, the question of proper support in such a case is determined by
the evidence which encompasses not only methodology but a variety of other mat-
ters relating to the circumstances of the parties and the children.
13. Stipulations: Parties: Courts. Stipulations voluntarily entered into will be
respected and enforced by the courts.
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Cite as 16 Neb. App. 905
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:16 AM CST

14. Attorney Fees. The award of attorney fees depends on multiple factors that
include the nature of the case, the services performed and results obtained, the
earning capacity of the parties, the length of time required for preparation and
presentation of the case, customary charges of the bar, and the general equities of
the case.
Appeal from the district Court for Seward County: alan G.
G less, Judge. Affirmed in part, affirmed in part as modified, and
in part vacated and set aside.
Mark J. Krieger, of bowman & Krieger, for appellant.
Charles 	W. 	Campbell, 	of Angle, 	Murphy, 	Valentino 	&
Campbell, P.C., for appellee.
inbody, Chief Judge, and sievers and carlson, Judges.
sievers, Judge.
Patrick William Reed (Patrick) appeals and Wendy Jo drew
(Wendy) cross-appeals from the decision of the district court
for Seward County that awarded sole custody of the parties’
minor children to Wendy but ordered Patrick to pay child sup-
port based on a joint custody calculation, ordered Patrick to
pay $21,658 in retroactive child support, ordered Patrick to pay
$13,916.31 toward Wendy’s attorney fees, and ordered Patrick
to pay $27,592 in expert witness fees.
FACTUAL ANd PRoCEdURAL bACKGRoUNd
Though never married, Patrick and Wendy engaged in a long-
term relationship that produced three children: Madison Joy
Reed, born February 8, 1998; Jack William Patrick Reed, born
April 3, 2000; and Claire Estelle Reed, born February 12, 2003.
Patrick and Wendy ended their relationship in February 2004.
on August 9, 2004, Wendy filed a petition on behalf of
Madison, Jack, and Claire to establish paternity and child sup-
port. on August 27, the parties filed a stipulation and agree-
ment for a temporary order establishing that Wendy would have
custody of the children, subject to Patrick’s reasonable rights of
visitation, and that Patrick would pay $2,700 per month in child
support beginning September 1. The district court approved the
parties’ stipulation and entered the temporary order.
906 	16 NEbRASKA APPELLATE REPoRTS

Trial was held on August 10 and 11, 2006. The court’s opin-
ion and judgment was filed on december 8. The district court
adjudged that Patrick is the father of the three minor children.
The district court incorporated the parties’ agreement on par-
enting time into its judgment, thereby establishing that Wendy
would “have sole legal and physical custody” of the parties’
three minor children. The judgment provided that Patrick would
have parenting time (1) on alternating weekends; (2) every
Wednesday from 5:30 p.m. until 8 a.m. Thursday; (3) during
the weeks immediately preceding each weekend that he does
not have parenting time, for a period commencing at 8 a.m. on
Thursday and concluding at 8 a.m. on Friday; (4) every school
spring break, without interfering with Wendy’s Easter parenting
time; (5) two 2-week periods in the summer; and (6) alternat-
ing holidays.
The district court stated that even though Wendy was awarded
sole legal and physical custody, based on the parties’ parenting
time agreement, Patrick will have the children 43 percent of
every year, which “comes close enough to a factual joint cus-
tody” for purposes of setting child support. Thus, the district
court used a joint child support calculation and ordered Patrick
to pay child support in the amount of $3,337 per month for the
three children beginning January 1, 2007. Wendy filed a motion
to alter or amend judgment regarding the child support calcu-
lation, which was denied by the district court. however, in an
addendum to its december 8, 2006, judgment, the district court
ordered Patrick to pay $21,658 in retroactive child support.
Additionally, taking into account both the december 8 judgment
by the district court and the court’s later addendum, Patrick
was ordered to pay $13,916.31 toward Wendy’s attorney fees
and $27,592 in expert witness fees. Patrick appeals and Wendy
cross-appeals the district court’s judgment.
ASSIGNMENTS oF ERRoR
Patrick alleges that the district court erred when it ordered
him to pay an additional $13,916.31 in attorney fees, $27,592 in
expert witness fees, and $21,658 in retroactive child support.
on cross-appeal, Wendy alleges that the district court erred
in (1) applying a joint custody calculation for child support,
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(2) calculating child support using worksheet 3 of the child
support guidelines, (3) failing to award child support as deter-
mined by worksheet 1, and (4) failing to award retroactive child
support based on the calculation of child support pursuant to
worksheet 1.
STANdARd oF REVIEW
[1,2] While a paternity action is one at law, the award of
child support in such an action is equitable in nature. State on
behalf of Kayla T. v. Risinger, 273 Neb. 694, 731 N.W.2d 892
(2007). A trial court’s award of child support in a paternity case
will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of
discretion by the trial court. Id.
[3] In a paternity action, attorney fees are reviewed de novo
on the record to determine whether there has been an abuse of
discretion by the trial judge. Henke v. Guerrero, 13 Neb. App.
337, 692 N.W.2d 762 (2005). Absent such an abuse, the award
will be affirmed. Id.
[4] In a dissolution action, an appellate court reviews an
award of expert witness fees de novo on the record to deter-
mine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial
judge. See Davidson v. Davidson, 254 Neb. 656, 578 N.W.2d
848 (1998). We find that the same standard applies to an award
of expert witness fees in a paternity action.
ANALYSIS
Child Support Calculation.
Wendy argues that the district court erred in applying a joint
custody calculation to determine child support. She argues that
the district court should have used worksheet 1 to determine the
child support award.
[5] The version of the child support guidelines in effect at the
time of the trial and judgment in this case stated:
C. Rebuttable Presumption. The child support guide-
lines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption. All
orders for child support obligations shall be established in
accordance with the provisions of the guidelines unless the
court finds that one or both parties have produced suffi-
cient evidence to rebut the presumption that the guidelines
908 	16 NEbRASKA APPELLATE REPoRTS

should be applied. . . . In the event of a deviation, the
reason for the deviation shall be contained in the find-
ings portion of the decree or order, or worksheet 5 should
be completed by the court and filed in the court file.
deviations from the guidelines are permissible under the
following circumstances:
. . . .
3. if total net income exceeds $10,000 monthly, child
support for amounts in excess of $10,000 monthly may be
more but shall not be less than the amount which would be
computed using the $10,000 monthly income unless other
permissible deviations exist[.]
The version of the child support guidelines in effect at the time
of the trial and judgment in this case further stated: “L. Joint
Physical Custody. When a specific provision for joint physical
custody is ordered, support may be calculated using worksheet
3.” In its order, the district court specifically stated: “The par-
ties agreed, and I accepted their agreement, that sole legal and
physical custody would be placed with Wendy.” however, the
district court also stated that based on the parties’ parenting-
time agreement, Patrick will have the children 43 percent of
every year, which “comes close enough to a factual joint cus-
tody” for purposes of child support.
Using its finding of “factual joint custody,” the district court
did a joint custody child support calculation citing Elsome v.
Elsome, 257 Neb. 889, 601 N.W.2d 537 (1999). Elsome holds
that if the evidence establishes a joint physical custody arrange-
ment, courts will so construe it, regardless of how prior decrees
or court orders have characterized the arrangement. According
to the trial court in this case, the threshold time division is 40
percent, although the Elsome opinion did not explicitly adopt
such as a determinative percentage.
[6,7] In our view, Elsome is distinguishable from the present
case. In Elsome, the decree provided that the parties would have
“joint legal custody” of their children, but neither party was des-
ignated primary physical custodian of the children. The parties
had a detailed shared physical custody arrangement based upon
14-day cycles, which generally provided that the children spend
4 days every week with the mother and the following 3 days
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every week with the father. Thus, in Elsome, the parties had a
true joint physical custody arrangement, regardless of whether
it was labeled as such. The Elsome opinion favorably cites
Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485 (1995), where
the New Jersey court said that although there is no established
norm for joint physical custody, experts cite schedules within a
joint physical custody framework as spending 3 entire days with
one parent and 4 entire days with another parent or alternat-
ing weeks or even years with each parent. Thus, joint physical
custody means the child lives day in and day out with both par-
ents on a rotating basis. Pascale, supra. Numerous “‘parenting
times’” with a child do not constitute joint physical custody.
Pascale, 140 N.J. at 597, 660 A.2d at 492. See, also, Heesacker
v. Heesacker, 262 Neb. 179, 629 N.W.2d 558 (2001) (recogniz-
ing Pascale, supra).
Alternately living with divorced parents is to be distin-
guished from cases in which the noncustodial parent has liberal
parenting time. In Pool v. Pool, 9 Neb. App. 453, 613 N.W.2d
819 (2000), the father had custody of his children every other
weekend, plus an additional weekend day per month; weekday
visitation two times a week from 4 to 8 p.m.; visitation on
alternating holidays; and extended summer visitation continu-
ously from June 1 to July 31 each year. The arrangements for
parenting time for the father in Pool are nearly identical to those
involved in the present case. The district court in Pool found
that the father had physical custody for 33 percent of the time
and determined his support obligation based on the joint physi-
cal custody worksheet. on appeal, the mother argued that the
court should have used the sole custody worksheet, rather than
the joint custody worksheet. This court reversed the decision
of the trial court, concluding that the mother was the primary
caregiver, that she had sole physical custody of the children, and
that the father had been granted “‘typical’ weekend, holiday,
and summer visitation rights.” Id. at 458, 613 N.W.2d at 824.
Thus, we found that the trial court abused its discretion in bas-
ing the child support calculation on the joint custody worksheet,
rather than the sole custody worksheet.
Another “liberal parenting time” case is Heesacker, supra,
which cited with approval our decision in Pool, supra. In
910 	16 NEbRASKA APPELLATE REPoRTS

Heesacker, through mediation, the parents agreed to joint cus-
tody. The father was to have custody of the parties’ child on
alternating weekends from Friday after school until Monday
morning and from Wednesday after school until Thursday
morning. In addition, the father was to have custody an addi-
tional Friday night each month and 1 other day each month to
be agreed upon by the parties. The visitation plan also called for
each parent to have custody of the child for one-half of her sum-
mer and winter breaks from school, with holidays and birthdays
split on an alternating yearly schedule. The trial court found
that the time division was split 65 percent with the mother and
35 percent with the father, and the court used the sole custody
worksheet to determine the father’s child support obligation.
on appeal, in Heesacker, supra, the father argued that the trial
court erred in using a sole custody worksheet, rather than a joint
custody worksheet. The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded
that the visitation plan adopted by the trial court was “a grant of
physical custody to [the mother], with a liberal visitation sched-
ule for [the father].” Heesacker v. Heesacker, 262 Neb. 179, 185,
629 N.W.2d 558, 562 (2001). Accordingly, the Supreme Court
determined that the trial court was correct in calculating the
father’s child support based on the sole custody worksheet.
[8] The present case is more in line with Heesacker, supra,
and Pool v. Pool, 9 Neb. App. 453, 613 N.W.2d 819 (2000),
where there was clearly liberal parenting time, but such did
not justify a joint custody child support calculation. Patrick’s
children do not live with him day in and day out on a rotat-
ing or alternating basis. And while he has extensive and varied
parenting times, it is best described as liberal visitation as in
Heesacker, supra, and Pool, supra. Thus, the trial court abused
its discretion in basing the child support calculation on the
joint custody worksheet, rather than the sole custody worksheet
which we shall use in making the necessary adjustments to
Patrick’s child support obligation.
Calculation of Child Support When
Income Is Above Guidelines.
[9] Patrick’s financial situation is complex. he wholly owns
several corporations and is part owner in other corporations that
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are involved in the cellular telephone industry. Two different
accountants did indepth analyses of Patrick’s finances and testi-
fied regarding his income. We digress to point out that his reply
brief attempts to challenge the district court’s findings regard-
ing his income. however, errors not assigned in an appellant’s
initial brief are waived and may not be asserted for the first time
in a reply brief. Genetti v. Caterpillar, Inc., 261 Neb. 98, 621
N.W.2d 529 (2001). because Patrick did not contest the trial
court’s conclusions regarding his income in his original brief,
we need not further detail his finances.
In contrast to the complexities of Patrick’s finances, Wendy’s
financial situation is quite simple. She has been a stay-at-home
mother. however, she agreed that she has an earning capacity
of $11 per hour, and the district court accepted such. Wendy
does not dispute the trial court’s conclusion regarding her
income capacity.
[10] Thus, we use the district court’s findings that Wendy
has a gross monthly earning capacity of $1,907 and Patrick has
a gross monthly income of $49,195. The district court deter-
mined that based on their gross monthly incomes, Wendy’s net
monthly income is $1,754.03 and Patrick’s net monthly income
is $29,436.68. Again, neither party challenges this finding.
Thus, the parties’ combined net monthly income is $31,190.71,
making this an “above guidelines” case. The version of the child
support guidelines in effect at the time of trial and judgment in
this case permitted a deviation from the child support guidelines
when the total net income exceeded $10,000 monthly, and given
that Patrick’s net income was three times that provided for in
the guidelines, deviation was clearly justified.
The obvious difficulty in an above guidelines case is deter-
mining what deviation from the guidelines is appropriate, and it
must be recognized that trial courts have considerable discretion
in this regard. In this case, the guidelines in effect at the time of
this trial only account for approximately one-third of Patrick’s
net income. In short, the guidelines do not tell us how to handle
child support from the remaining two-thirds of Patrick’s net
income. Thus, of necessity, the determination of support over
the guidelines amount is largely a matter of the trial court’s dis-
cretion, guided by the evidence before the trial court.
912 	16 NEbRASKA APPELLATE REPoRTS

[11] The version of the child support guidelines in effect at
the time of trial and judgment in this case simply told us that
“child support for amounts in excess of $10,000 may be more
but shall not be less than the amount which would be computed
using the $10,000 monthly income unless other permissible
deviations exist.” The district court heard testimony from two
accountants and an economics professor on how child support
for monthly incomes above $10,000 can be extrapolated from
the child support chart for monthly incomes below $10,000.
Each witness used a different mathematical approach to, in
effect, expand the child support chart beyond a monthly income
of $10,000 using extrapolation.
Accountant david Ellingson determined that to avoid a
“cap” on child support, for every $50 increase in income above
$10,000, the child support payment should be increased by
$8—Ellingson said that he used $8 for consistency purposes.
Thus, Ellingson determined that the child support obligation
for three children in this case would be $6,677 (this calculation
attributed a net monthly income of $35,233 to Patrick and no
monthly income to Wendy). The other two approaches resulted
in the child support amount being “capped” with no more
increases in child support, although both approaches capped
at different monthly incomes. Accountant Leonard Sommer
determined that child support “capped” at a monthly income
of $43,000, although he did not specify whether this was
net or gross income, thereby limiting the utility of his testi-
mony. however, we will assume that he was using net income
throughout his calculation. Sommer calculated that in this case,
child support for three children would be $4,006.
The approach used by an economics professor, dr. david
Rosenbaum, resulted in a child support figure between that
of the two accountants. Rosenbaum determined that for every
$500 increase in net monthly income from $5,000 to $10,000,
the increase in child support decreased by approximately $2
from the previous increase. We reproduce Rosenbaum’s chart
for child support for three children when the net income is
above $10,000, although we leave out the “middle” of the chart
in the interest of saving space, plus that portion is not terribly
pertinent. Rosenbaum developed his chart for child support for
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Cite as 16 Neb. App. 905

net income above $10,000 by extrapolation from the data for
child support amounts for three children when the net income is
between $5,000 and $10,000—but his exhibit only goes to net
income of $24,500.
Estimated Child Support Payments
Net Income 	Increase 	Child Support Payment
$10,000 	$2,645
$10,500 	$78 	$2,723
$11,000 	$76 	$2,799
$11,500 	$74 	$2,873
$12,000 	$72 	$2,945
$12,500 	$70 	$3,015
. . . .
$21,000 	$36 	$3,899
$21,500 	$34 	$3,933
$22,000 	$32 	$3,965
$22,500 	$30 	$3,995
$23,000 	$28 	$4,023
$23,500 	$26 	$4,049
$24,000 	$24 	$4,073
$24,500 	$22 	$4,095
because Rosenbaum’s chart only went up to $24,500 net
income, the court inquired of him what would be the amount of
support for three children under his method for net income of
$30,000, and his response was $4,205. Rosenbaum further testi-
fied that under the extrapolation method he used, child support
“caps” at $4,205—in other words, that it would not increase
any further from net earnings above $30,000 per month, even
if a parent netted $100,000 per month. The district court said it
“adopt[s] the Rosenbaum approach.” Neither parent claims that
the trial court’s adoption of the Rosenbaum method was error.
In addition to the trial court’s error in using a joint custody
calculation, we also find error in the trial court’s application of
the Rosenbaum methodology.
The trial court used $31,190 for net joint income, a fig-
ure that is unchallenged. The court then sought to extend the
Rosenbaum calculation to this figure. It did this by taking the
child support for income of $10,000 ($2,645) and adding to that
figure the amount for child support for net income of $21,190
914 	16 NEbRASKA APPELLATE REPoRTS

($3,899) to produce a worksheet 1 figure of $6,544. A num-
ber of things are wrong with what the district court did. First,
it fundamentally ignores Rosenbaum’s methodology, as well
as his testimony that under his methodology, adopted by the
trial court, child support does not increase when net income is
above $30,000. This should not be taken as our endorsement of
Rosenbaum’s finding or concept that support “caps” at $30,000
under his mathematical extrapolation from the guidelines, but
merely an observation that, whether intentional or not, the trial
court did not really “adopt” Rosenbaum’s method—which was
simply a mathematical extrapolation. The trial court’s method,
when considered in conjunction with Rosenbaum’s testimony
that child support is $4,205 for $30,000 of net income, attributes
$2,339 in child support to the “last” $1,190 of earnings—a
clearly illogical proposition. Finally, we bear in mind that we
do not, for example, determine the amount of child support for
net joint earnings of $9,000 by adding together the amounts
on the chart for earnings of $4,000 and $5,000—rather, we
just look at what the chart says the amount is for $9,000. And
while the chart does not go as high as net income of $31,190,
Rosenbaum calculated the amount for that level of income while
on the witness stand in direct response to the judge’s request
that he do so—and the answer was $4,205, not $6,544. In short,
the trial judge’s method is contrary to his express adoption of
Rosenbaum’s calculation—which was simply an expansion of
the child support chart by extrapolation from the known data for
child support at $500 increments between $5,000 and $10,000.
Therefore, the addition of two child support amounts for two
income levels within Rosenbaum’s chart is clearly not supported
by the evidence provided by Rosenbaum, nor is it a proper use
of his methodology.
[12] If Rosenbaum’s method is used, child support associ-
ated with the parties’ combined monthly net income of $31,190
would be $4,205. This is not to say that it could not be higher (or
lower) under the trial court’s considerable discretion in an above
guidelines case, or that Rosenbaum’s method of extrapolation
is the only acceptable methodology. Rather, although the trial
court misapplied Rosenbaum’s method, neither party quarrels
with the adoption of it as a methodology, and given its logical
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Cite as 16 Neb. App. 905

basis in mathematics, we certainly cannot conclude that it was
plain error to use Rosenbaum’s method. That said, we empha-
size that we have no intent to establish a single methodology or
approach to setting child support in an above guidelines situa-
tion. Rather, the question of proper support in an above guide-
lines case is determined by the evidence which encompasses not
only methodology but a variety of other matters relating to the
circumstances of the parties and the children. In this regard, we
note that Rosenbaum freely conceded the illogic of “capping”
child support when net income reached $30,000, a result which
his method produced purely by mathematics.
The district court found that Patrick is responsible for 94 per-
cent of the support amount. Therefore, Patrick’s child support
obligation, based on a sole custody calculation, is $3,952.70
per month, and we modify the district court’s order to provide
for monthly child support for three children in such amount,
retroactive to January 1, 2007, the date when the trial court’s
child support award was to begin. Rosenbaum’s extrapolation
does not encompass child support for one or two children, and
there will be support for the three children for a good number
of years. Therefore, when the number of children requiring sup-
port changes, the parties, and the trial court if need be, can deal
with that matter.
Retroactive Temporary Child Support.
both parties appeal from the district court’s award of retro-
active child support. Patrick argues that the district court erred
in ordering him to pay $21,658 in retroactive child support
when Wendy stipulated to the amount of temporary child sup-
port. The record is clear that on August 27, 2004, Wendy, who
was represented by counsel, stipulated to temporary child sup-
port of $2,700 per month. This stipulation was approved and
adopted by the district court on September 2. Wendy argues
that the district court erred in failing to award retroactive child
support based on the calculation of child support pursuant to
worksheet 1. We have handled this contention above, so we turn
to Patrick’s complaint.
At trial, Wendy testified that at the time the temporary
child support agreement was reached, she did not have any
916 	16 NEbRASKA APPELLATE REPoRTS

information about Patrick’s earnings, and that Patrick had never
told her anything about his earnings. She also explained that
she did not have any money to hire an accountant at that time
to review his financial records for the purpose of recommending
an appropriate child support amount. Wendy testified that she
was not in a position to decline Patrick’s offer of $2,700 per
month as temporary child support.
[13] We are not persuaded by Wendy’s argument for a num-
ber of reasons. on cross-examination, Wendy discussed an ear-
lier separation in 2002 which involved mediation to determine
the child support for the two children they had at the time, and
she acknowledged that she was then advised that Patrick’s net
income was above $10,000 per month. Moreover, living with
Patrick and the children would obviously acquaint Wendy with
the sort of lifestyle he was able to afford. Thus, she can hardly be
seen as completely in the dark about his finances. Additionally,
there were a number of options open to Wendy via discovery
to rather quickly gain financial information—tax returns for
example—before agreeing to a child support amount. And she
could have entrusted the decision to the court, negotiated a dif-
ferent stipulation, or made it contingent upon the acquisition of
more information. In the final analysis, Wendy voluntarily, with
the assistance of counsel, stipulated to $2,700 per month in tem-
porary support, and stipulations voluntarily entered into will be
respected and enforced by the courts. See Walters v. Walters, 12
Neb. App. 340, 673 N.W.2d 585 (2004). No showing has been
made that the stipulation was not voluntary—Wendy’s argument
being essentially premised on hindsight. And there is no show-
ing that the children lacked for anything during the pendency of
this case. In fact, the record clearly shows that anytime Wendy
needed additional money during the pendency of this case for
the children (or herself), Patrick provided such. having stipu-
lated to temporary child support, and given the considerations
set forth above, we cannot find a basis to void that stipulation
by an award of retroactive temporary support. The district court
abused its discretion in ordering Patrick to pay $21,658 in retro-
active child support. We vacate and set aside that portion of the
district court’s order.
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Attorney Fees.
[14] Patrick argues that the district court erred in ordering
him to pay an additional $13,916.31 toward Wendy’s attor-
ney fees.
The award of attorney fees depends on multiple factors
that include the nature of the case, the services performed
and results obtained, the earning capacity of the parties,
the length of time required for preparation and presenta-
tion of the case, customary charges of the bar, and the
general equities of the case.
Gress v. Gress, 271 Neb. 122, 132, 710 N.W.2d 318, 328 (2006).
Prior to trial, Patrick had already paid Wendy $2,500 for tem-
porary attorney fees. Wendy submitted a detailed accounting of
her attorney fees showing an outstanding balance of $15,184.79,
and Patrick was ordered to pay $13,416.31 of such amount.
Patrick was later ordered to pay an additional $500 to Wendy’s
attorney for services rendered in connection with the motion to
alter or amend judgment. After a thorough review of the record,
and considering the significant difference in the parties’ earn-
ing capacities, we find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering Patrick to pay the additional $13,916.31
toward Wendy’s attorney fees, and we affirm this aspect of the
district court’s order.
Expert Witness Fees.
Patrick argues that the district court erred in ordering him to
pay $27,592 in expert witness fees. We note that the appoint-
ment of the expert is not challenged. The district court appointed
Ellingson to (1) analyze Patrick’s personal and corporate tax
returns for the years 2000 through 2004; (2) analyze income
earned by and cashflow provided for Patrick from all disclosed
sources for the years 2001 through 2004; (3) compute child sup-
port based upon the child support guidelines; and (4) prepare a
comprehensive report summarizing the analysis and computa-
tion and recommending child support, based on the procedures
performed. Patrick’s financial circumstances are complex, and
there is no evidence that such fees were not reasonable and nec-
essary. The district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
Patrick to pay such fees, given the great disparity in the parties’
918 	16 NEbRASKA APPELLATE REPoRTS

income and the necessity to have expertise to assess Patrick’s
complex financial situation. We affirm this aspect of the district
court’s order.
CoNCLUSIoN
We find that although Patrick has numerous and varied
parenting times, it is liberal visitation and not joint custody.
As a result, the trial court erred in basing the child support
calculation on the joint custody worksheet, rather than the sole
custody worksheet. Patrick’s child support obligation, based
on a sole custody calculation, shall be $3,952.70 per month
for three children, and we modify the district court’s order in
this regard. This monthly child support amount shall be paid
retroactive to January 1, 2007, the date provided for in the trial
court’s order.
We find that the district court abused its discretion in order-
ing Patrick to pay $21,658 in retroactive temporary child sup-
port. We vacate and set aside that portion of the district
court’s order.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in order-
ing Patrick to pay the additional $13,916.31 toward Wendy’s
attorney fees, and we affirm this aspect of the district court’s
order. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in ordering
Patrick to pay attorney fees for Wendy, given the great disparity
in the parties’ income, and we affirm this aspect of the district
court’s order.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
Patrick to pay $27,592 in expert witness fees, given the great
disparity in the parties’ income and the necessity to have exper-
tise to assess his complex financial situation. We affirm this
aspect of the district court’s order.
affirMed in part , affirMed in part as Modified ,
and in part vacated and set aside .
dREW oN bEhALF oF REEd v. REEd 	919
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 905