Maranville v. Dworak

computer, (5) failing to confront and cross-examine the State’s
witnesses by waiving a jury trial and agreeing to a stipulated
bench trial, (6) failing to file a motion in limine to exclude
irrelevant and prejudicial hearsay evidence, and (7) failing to
raise the defense of intoxication.
[6,7] A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel need not
be dismissed merely because it is made on direct appeal. The
determining factor is whether the record is sufficient to ade-
quately review the question. State v. McCulloch, 274 Neb. 636,
742 N.W.2d 727 (2007); State v. Walker, 272 Neb. 725, 724
N.W.2d 552 (2006). If a matter has not been raised or ruled on
at the trial level and requires an evidentiary hearing, an appel-
late court will not address the matter on direct appeal. State v.
McCulloch, supra; State v. Walker, supra.
We find that since all of Heslep’s allegations concern his
trial counsel’s failure to act, the record on direct appeal is not
sufficient for review of this assignment of error at this time.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, having rejected Heslep’s claim that the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction and finding that the
record on direct appeal is not sufficient for adequate review of
Heslep’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the deci-
sion of the district court is affirmed.
A ffirmed.
C hrystAl elAine mArAnville , formerly known
As C hrystAl elAine dworAk , Appellee And
Cross -AppellAnt, v. Justin tyler dworAk ,
AppellAnt And Cross -Appellee .
758 N.W.2d 70
Filed November 25, 2008. 	No. A-08-103.
1. Appeal and Error. Errors that are assigned but not argued will not be addressed
by an appellate court.
2. Child Custody. Ordinarily, custody of a minor child will not be modified unless
there has been a material change in circumstances showing that the custodial par-
ent is unfit or that the best interests of the child require such action.
mArANVILLE v. dWOrAk 	245
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 245
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:15 AM CST

3. Child Custody: Proof. The party seeking modification of child custody bears the
burden of showing a material change in circumstances.
4. Child Custody.r emoval of a child from the state, without more, does not
amount to a change of circumstances warranting a change of custody.
5. Child Custody: Modification of Decree.r emoval of a child from the state,
when considered in conjunction with other evidence, may result in a change of
circumstances that would warrant a modification of a divorce decree.
6. Child Custody: Proof. In order to prevail on a motion to remove a minor child
to another jurisdiction, a custodial parent has the burden to prove that he or she
has a legitimate reason for leaving the state and that it is in the best interests of
the child to continue living with him or her.
7. Child Custody. The standard for approval of a motion to remove a child to
another jurisdiction applies both when a custodial parent seeks to move a child
from Nebraska to a different state and in considering a subsequent move to yet
another state.
8. Child Custody: Marriage. A career enhancement for a custodial parent’s spouse
is a legitimate reason for removal of a child to another jurisdiction when the
career change occurs after remarriage.
9. Child Custody. In considering a motion to remove a minor child to another juris-
diction, the paramount consideration is whether the proposed move is in the best
interests of the child.
10. Child Custody: Visitation. In determining whether removal to another jurisdic-
tion is in the child’s best interests, the trial court considers (1) each parent’s
motives for seeking or opposing the move; (2) the potential that the move holds
for enhancing the quality of life for the child and the custodial parent; and (3) the
impact such a move will have on contact between the child and the noncustodial
parent, when viewed in the light of reasonable visitation.
11. Child Custody. The ultimate question in evaluating the parties’ motives in seek-
ing removal of a child to another jurisdiction is whether either party has elected
or resisted a removal in an effort to frustrate or manipulate the other party.
12. ____. In determining the potential that the removal to another jurisdiction holds
for enhancing the quality of life of the parent seeking removal and of the chil-
dren, a court should consider the following factors: (1) the emotional, physical,
and developmental needs of the children; (2) the children’s opinion or preference
as to where to live; (3) the extent to which the relocating parent’s income or
employment will be enhanced; (4) the degree to which housing or living condi-
tions would be improved; (5) the existence of educational advantages; (6) the
quality of the relationship between the children and each parent; (7) the strength
of the children’s ties to the present community and extended family there; and
(8) the likelihood that allowing or denying the move would antagonize hostilities
between the two parties.
13. ____. The list of factors to consider regarding removal of a child to another
jurisdiction does not set forth a hierarchy of factors; instead, depending on the
circumstances of a particular case, any one factor or combination of factors may
be variously weighted.
246 	17NE brASkAA ppELLATE rEpOrTS

14. ____. The factors to consider regarding removal of a child to another jurisdiction
were intended to help courts assess the potential the move has to enhance the
quality of life of the custodial parent and of the children.
15. ____. In order for the eight factors a court considers regarding removal of a
child to another jurisdiction to weigh in a custodial parent’s favor, he or she must
show that the relocation has the potential to enhance or improve the quality of
life for the children and custodial parent when all eight factors are considered as
a whole.
16. ____. While custody is not to be interpreted as a sentence to immobility, it is
important, in contemplating removal of children to another jurisdiction, to give
due consideration to whether such move indeed will improve the children’s lives,
or merely maintain the status quo, only in a new location.
17. ____. A custodial parent’s income can be enhanced because of a new spouse’s
career opportunities, for purposes of determining the potential that removal of
children to another jurisdiction holds for enhancing the quality of life of the par-
ent seeking removal and of the children.
18. ____. In considering removal of a child to another jurisdiction, the existence of
educational advantages receives little or no weight when the custodial parent fails
to prove that the new schools are superior.
19. Child Custody: Visitation. Consideration of the impact of removal of children
to another jurisdiction on the contact between the children and the noncustodial
parent, when viewed in light of reasonable visitation arrangements, focuses on
the ability of the court to fashion a reasonable visitation schedule that will allow
the noncustodial parent to maintain a meaningful parent-child relationship.
20. ____: ____. Generally, a reasonable visitation schedule is one that provides a
satisfactory basis for preserving and fostering a child’s relationship with the non-
custodial parent.
21. Visitation. The frequency and the total number of days of visitation and the
distance traveled and expense incurred go into the calculus of determining the
reasonableness of a visitation schedule.
22. Child Custody: Visitation. Indications of the custodial parent’s willingness to
comply with a modified visitation schedule have a place in analyzing the reason-
ableness of a visitation schedule.
23. Visitation. The trial court has discretion to set a reasonable visitation schedule.
24. Parent and Child: Visitation. Generally, a reasonable visitation schedule is one
that provides a satisfactory basis for preserving and fostering a child’s relation-
ship with the noncustodial parent.
25. Visitation. The determination of reasonableness of a visitation schedule is to be
made on a case-by-case basis.
26. Visitation: Appeal and Error. The matter of travel expenses associated with
visitation is within the trial court’s discretion, and although reviewed de novo
on the record, its determination will normally be affirmed absent abuse of
that discretion.
27. Visitation. There is no immutable standard for the allocation of travel expenses
associated with visitation; instead, the determination of reasonableness is made
on a case-by-case basis.
mArANVILLE v. dWOrAk 	247
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 245

Appeal from thed istrict Court for Lancaster County: John
A. C olborn, Judge. Affirmed.
Terrance A.p oppe and Nicholasm . Froeschl, ofm orrow,
poppe, Watermeier & Lonowski,p .C., for appellant.
Amie C.m artinez, of Anderson, Creager & Wittstruck,p .C.,
for appellee.
inbody, Chief Judge, and moore and CAssel, Judges.
moore, Judge.
I. INTrOdUCTION
Chrystal Elainem aranville, formerly known as Chrystal
Elained worak, sought to modify a decree and subsequent
order to allow her to move the parties’ four minor children
from Illinois to Ohio and to modify parenting time. Justin
Tylerd worak cross-claimed, requesting that custody of the
four children be awarded to him, his child support obliga-
tions abate, and Chrystal be ordered to pay child support. The
Lancaster Countyd istrict Court granted Chrystal permission
to move to Ohio with the three youngest children, awarded
custody of the oldest child to Justin, and modified the parties’
parenting time. Justin appeals from that order, and Chrystal
cross-appeals.
II.b ACkGrOUNd
Justin and Chrystal were divorced onm arch 18, 2003. Four
children were born of the marriage: Cole in 1994, Lauren in
1995, Summer in 1997, and Joseph in 2000. The Lancaster
Countyd istrict Court ordered joint legal custody of the chil-
dren and awarded primary physical custody to Chrystal, sub-
ject to Justin’s specific parenting time. Following the divorce,
Justin had parenting time with the children approximately
6 out of every 14 days and did not miss any of that parent-
ing time.
Following the divorce, Chrystal married Jeffreym aranville
(Jeff), and together they have a daughter born in 2005. They
were expecting a second child in June 2008. Chrystal does not
work outside of the home and continues to be a very involved
248 	17NE brASkAA ppELLATE rEpOrTS

caretaker for thed worak children. Jeff worked for Goodyear
in Lincoln, Nebraska, from 1998 untild ecember 2004. In the
summer of 2004, Jeff was offered a position as am idwest
regional sales manager in the Chicago, Illinois, area. Chrystal
moved the court for an order granting her permission to move
the children to Illinois.
On November 5, 2004, the district court granted Chrystal
permission to move the fourd worak children from Lincoln
to Geneva, Illinois, which decision this court affirmed by
memorandum opinion. Dworak v. Dworak, 13 Neb. App. xix
(No. A-04-1337, July 12, 2005). The district court’s order pro-
vided for Justin’s parenting from 6 p.m. Friday through 6 p.m.
Sunday every other weekend in the Geneva area as well as spe-
cific holiday and summer parenting time. Justin exercised all
of that parenting time, which was approximately 150 days per
year. Justin also made special trips to Illinois to attend extra-
curricular activities and visit the children on occasions such as
the first day of school.
Ind ecember 2005, Jeff learned that the sales management
group at Goodyear was going to be reorganized and that his
position would be relocated to Akron, Ohio. Jeff and Chrystal
declined to move, and Jeff was demoted to a sales representa-
tive for Goodyear in the Chicago area.
In 2007, Veyance Technologies (Veyance) purchased the
Goodyear division within which Jeff worked. In the fall of
2007, Veyance offered Jeff a position as a “distributor chan-
nel specialist.” Jeff’s accepting this position would require Jeff
and Chrystal to move their family to the Akron area, where the
company’s headquarters are based. The position may require
Jeff to travel within the U.S. and Canada approximately 25
percent of the time; however, Jeff understands the position to
require minimal travel.
The position in Akron would pay Jeff less than his current
pay. In 2005, Jeff’s earnings were $147,808; in 2006, they were
$163,355; and in 2007, Jeff earned approximately $140,000.
Jeff’s base pay as a sales representative is $103,000, and the
additional compensation is earned through commission. The
new position in Ohio would pay approximately $124,000 and
would not allow for commission opportunities.
mArANVILLE v. dWOrAk 	249
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 245

Jeff has been with Goodyear for 14 years, and the move
to Akron would be his fifth move within that time. Akron is
approximately 950 miles from Lincoln. Geneva is approxi-
mately 500 miles from Lincoln. The education and housing
opportunities in Akron are similar to those in Geneva; however,
the cost of living in Ohio is less.
Following his divorce from Chrystal, Justin remarried. Justin
and his current wife have no children together; however, she is
the custodial parent of her two sons. Justin is a dentist practic-
ing in Lincoln, earning approximately $295,000 per year.
The custody modification hearing in the present case was
held ond ecember 17, 2007.d r. George Williams, a clinical
psychologist; James Hill, the director of marketing for North
America at Veyance; Chrystal; and Jeff testified on Chrystal’s
behalf. Justin, his current wife, andd r. Thomas Gilligan, a
clinical psychologist, testified on behalf of Justin. Additional
evidence adduced from these sources will be set forth as
needed in the analysis section below.
The court granted Chrystal permission to move the three
youngestd worak children, Lauren, Summer, and Joseph, to
Ohio; awarded custody of the oldest child, Cole, to Justin (pur-
suant to the agreement of the parties); modified parenting time;
and allocated visitation expenses. Justin appeals, and Chrystal
cross-appeals.
III. ASSIGNmENTS OF ErrOr
Justin alleges that the court erred and abused its discretion
by (1) failing to award custody of the three youngestd worak
children to him and (2) granting Chrystal permission to remove
those minor children from Illinois to Ohio.
Chrystal alleges, restated, that the court erred in (1) grant-
ing her insufficient regular and summer visitation with the
dworak children, (2) its determination of visitation transporta-
tion, (3) ordering her to pay the transportation expenses for
all four of thed worak children, and (4) its determination of
child support.
IV. STANdArd OFr EVIEW
Child custody determinations, and visitation determinations,
are matters initially entrusted to the discretion of the trial court,
250 	17NE brASkAA ppELLATE rEpOrTS

and although reviewed de novo on the record, the trial court’s
determination will normally be affirmed absent an abuse of dis-
cretion. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 264 Neb. 232, 647 N.W.2d
577 (2002). A judicial abuse of discretion exists when a judge,
within the effective limits of authorized judicial power, elects
to act or refrains from acting, and the selected option results in
a decision which is untenable and unfairly deprives a litigant
of a substantial right or a just result in matters submitted for
disposition through a judicial system. Id.
As with other visitation determinations, the matter of travel
expenses associated with visitation is initially entrusted to the
discretion of the trial court, and although reviewed de novo
on the record, the trial court’s determination will normally be
affirmed absent an abuse of discretion. Vogel v. Vogel, 262 Neb.
1030, 637 N.W.2d 611 (2002).
modification of child support payments is entrusted to the
trial court’s discretion, and although, on appeal, the issue is
reviewed de novo on the record, the decision of the trial court
will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion. Gallner v.
Hoffman, 264 Neb. 995, 653 N.W.2d 838 (2002).
V. ANALYSIS
1. deniAl of Justin’s request for C ustody
of A ll four dworAk C hildren
[1] Justin asserts that the district court erred in refusing to
award him custody of all four of the minor children. However,
Justin does not separately argue this assigned error in his brief.
Errors that are assigned but not argued will not be addressed
by an appellate court. Kumke v. Kumke, 11 Neb. App. 304, 648
N.W.2d 797 (2002).
[2-5] To the extent that Justin’s argument for custody is part
and parcel of his argument against removal to Ohio, we are
governed by the principle that ordinarily, custody of a minor
child will not be modified unless there has been a material
change in circumstances showing that the custodial parent is
unfit or that the best interests of the child require such action.
Vogel v. Vogel, supra. The party seeking modification of child
custody bears the burden of showing such a change in circum-
stances. Id.r emoval of a child from the state, without more,
mArANVILLE v. dWOrAk 	251
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 245

does not amount to a change of circumstances warranting a
change of custody. Id. Nevertheless, such a move, when con-
sidered in conjunction with other evidence, may result in a
change of circumstances that would warrant a modification of
the decree. Id.
In Vogel v. Vogel, the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed
a similar issue and determined that resolution of both the
mother’s motion to remove the children and the father’s motion
for a change of custody depended upon consideration of
whether the best interests of the children were served by allow-
ing them to remain in the mother’s custody and move with her
or by transferring their custody to the father and allowing them
to stay in Nebraska. The father asserted that modification was
required not because the mother was unfit, but, rather, because
the mother indicated her intention to move. Id. Essentially,
the court found, the father contended that it would be in the
best interests of the children to remain in Nebraska rather than
move. Id.
The present case differs somewhat because Chrystal has
already been granted permission to remove the children from
Nebraska to Illinois and now seeks to move them again, from
Illinois to Ohio. Justin argues in his brief that Chrystal’s pro-
posed move with the children to Ohio would create even more
of a burden on his visitation with the children. However, Justin
argues only against the move to Ohio and does not provide any
evidence that it would be in the children’s best interests to live
with him in Nebraska.
Justin cites our decision in Carraher v. Carraher, 9 Neb.
App. 23, 607 N.W.2d 547 (2000), in which we determined
that a mother who had moved a child from Nebraska with-
out permission from the father or the court must return to
Nebraska or risk losing custody of the child. We find that
Carraher is distinguishable from the present case, as Chrystal
did not attempt to move the children without the court’s per-
mission and Justin points to nothing in the record to support
his claim that Chrystal has failed to follow the court’s previ-
ous orders.
We find that Justin failed to meet his burden of proof that
the best interests of thed worak children (except for Cole)
252 	17NE brASkAA ppELLATE rEpOrTS

required a change in custody. The record supports the district
court’s findings that Chrystal is meeting the needs of those
children. For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in failing to award Justin custody of Lauren, Summer,
and Joseph.
2. G rAnt of permission to move to ohio
[6,7] In order to prevail on a motion to remove a minor
child to another jurisdiction, a custodial parent has the burden
to prove that he or she has a legitimate reason for leaving the
state and that it is in the best interests of the child to continue
living with him or her. See McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 264
Neb. 232, 647 N.W.2d 577 (2002). Although this appears to be
an issue of first impression in Nebraska, we think this standard
applies both when a custodial parent seeks to move a child
from Nebraska to a different state and in considering a subse-
quent move to yet another state.
(a) Legitimater eason to Leave State
[8] Justin asserts that Chrystal did not prove a legitimate
reason for leaving the state because Jeff will essentially receive
less pay by accepting the position in Ohio than were he to
remain in his current position in Illinois. The Nebraska Supreme
Court has previously determined that a career enhancement for
a custodial parent’s spouse is a legitimate reason for removal
when the career change occurs after remarriage. See id. Jeff
and Hill testified that while the position in Ohio would initially
yield a decrease in pay, the potential for promotion within
Veyance was more likely than if Jeff were to remain in Illinois
as a sales representative, where there was no opportunity to
be promoted. Also, due to Veyance’s restructuring of sales
representative compensation, Jeff’s potential to retain his cur-
rent income, which is based significantly on commissions, was
uncertain. Finally, Jeff testified that due to the lower cost of
living in Ohio, his annual income in Ohio would effectively
equal his $140,000 annual earnings in the Chicago community.
For these reasons, we find the court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that Chrystal had proved a legitimate reason for the
move to Ohio.
mArANVILLE v. dWOrAk 	253
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 245

(b)b est Interestsd etermination
[9,10] In considering a motion to remove a minor child to
another jurisdiction, the paramount consideration is whether
the proposed move is in the best interests of the child. Vogel v.
Vogel, 262 Neb. 1030, 637 N.W.2d 611 (2002). In determining
whether removal to another jurisdiction is in the child’s best
interests, the trial court considers (1) each parent’s motives for
seeking or opposing the move; (2) the potential that the move
holds for enhancing the quality of life for the child and the
custodial parent; and (3) the impact such a move will have on
contact between the child and the noncustodial parent, when
viewed in the light of reasonable visitation. McLaughlin v.
McLaughlin, supra.
(i) Each Parent’s Motives
[11] The ultimate question in evaluating the parties’ motives
is whether either party has elected or resisted a removal in an
effort to frustrate or manipulate the other party. Id. The trial
court found that neither party’s motives were improper in
this case.
Chrystal’s motive in seeking to relocate with the children
to another state was to allow Jeff to accept a new position
in Ohio which would provide Jeff with better job stability
and increased promotional opportunities. Hill testified that the
maranvilles were required to move to the Akron area in order
for Jeff to begin and remain working for Veyance in the posi-
tion he was offered.
Justin’s motive in opposing the move was to be able to
maintain more frequent and regular contact with the parties’
children without the additional time and expense which would
be necessary if the three youngestd worak children moved an
additional 450 miles away.
We find that Chrystal’s and Jeff’s motives are not efforts to
frustrate or manipulate each other. This factor weighs neither in
favor of nor against the move.
(ii) Enhancing Quality of Life
[12,13] In determining the potential that the removal to
another jurisdiction holds for enhancing the quality of life of
the parent seeking removal and of the children, a court should
254 	17NE brASkAA ppELLATE rEpOrTS

consider the following factors: (1) the emotional, physical, and
developmental needs of the children; (2) the children’s opinion
or preference as to where to live; (3) the extent to which the
relocating parent’s income or employment will be enhanced;
(4) the degree to which housing or living conditions would
be improved; (5) the existence of educational advantages; (6)
the quality of the relationship between the children and each
parent; (7) the strength of the children’s ties to the present
community and extended family there; and (8) the likelihood
that allowing or denying the move would antagonize hostilities
between the two parties. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 264 Neb.
232, 647 N.W.2d 577 (2002). This list does not set forth a hier-
archy of factors; instead, depending on the circumstances of a
particular case, any one factor or combination of factors may
be variously weighted. See id.
[14-16] We note that these factors were intended to help
courts assess the potential the move has to enhance the quality
of life of the custodial parent and of the children. As such, in
order for the factors to weigh in a custodial parent’s favor, he or
she must show that the relocation has the potential to enhance
or improve the quality of life for the children and custodial
parent when all eight factors are considered as a whole. While
custody is not to be interpreted as a sentence to immobility, we
think it is important in contemplating a move such as the one
at issue to give due consideration to whether such move indeed
will improve the children’s lives, or merely maintain the status
quo, only in a new location. See Vogel v. Vogel, 262 Neb. 1030,
637 N.W.2d 611 (2002).
We turn to an analysis of the quality of life factors.
a. Children’s Emotional,p hysical,
andd evelopmental Needs
To determine the extent to which the move has the potential
to enhance the quality of life of Chrystal, Lauren, Summer, and
Joseph, we must first consider the impact the move may have
on emotional, physical, and developmental needs of the chil-
dren. The record shows that both Chrystal and Justin are caring
and devoted parents and provide for their children’s emotional,
physical, and developmental needs.
mArANVILLE v. dWOrAk 	255
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 245

drs. Williams and Gilligan, both clinical psychologists, tes-
tified in this regard.b oth doctors met only with the two older
children, Cole and Lauren, not with Summer and Joseph, who
were respectively ages 10 and 6 at the time of the modifica-
tion hearing.
dr. Williams recommended that Cole be allowed to live with
Justin in Lincoln due to Cole’s stated wishes.d r. Williams
testified that the separation of the siblings due to Cole’s living
with Justin in Nebraska would not cause any significant harm,
at least to Lauren and Cole, whom he interviewed. Chrystal did
not oppose this recommendation, and the parties agreed that
Cole’s custody would be changed to Justin.
dr. Williams supported the move to Ohio and indicated that
in his opinion, the move would not be harmful to the children
psychologically.d r. Williams also testified that frequent, regu-
lar contact with a noncustodial parent is beneficial to children,
especially to younger children.
dr. Gilligan testified to the many ways children benefit from
frequent contact with their parents, including in their personal
development, personalities, self-esteem, and self-awareness,
and that they generally do better in social relationships and
their academic achievements are higher.d r. Gilligan did not
express an opinion regarding whether the move to Ohio would
have a negative impact on thed worak children.
The trial court made no specific findings as to the potential
the move to Ohio had to impact the emotional, physical, and
developmental needs of the children.b ased upon the testimony
of experts; the visitation schedule fashioned by the trial court,
which we discuss in further detail below; and both parties’
proven desire to provide for the needs of the children, we con-
clude that the emotional, physical, and developmental needs
of thed worak children will not be negatively impacted by the
move. On the other hand, the evidence does not show that these
needs will be met in any better fashion as a result of the move
to Ohio. As such, this factor weighs neither in favor of nor
against the move to Ohio.
b. Children’sp reference
We next consider the children’s opinion or preference as
to where to live. Lauren expressed tod r. Williams that she
256 	17NE brASkAA ppELLATE rEpOrTS

preferred to remain with Chrystal. There is nothing in the
record regarding Summer’s or Joseph’s preference. Cole pre-
ferred to live with Justin, and the parties stipulated that Cole
would live with Justin. The record does not indicate whether
Lauren, Summer, or Joseph preferred to live in Illinois or Ohio.
We find that due weight should be given to Lauren’s preference
to remain with Chrystal, but that this factor does not weigh
either in favor of or against the move to Ohio.
c. Chrystal’s Enhanced Income or Employment
[17] Next, we consider the extent to which Chrystal’s
income or employment will be enhanced. A custodial parent’s
income can be enhanced because of a new spouse’s career
opportunities, for purposes of determining the potential that
the removal to another jurisdiction holds for enhancing the
quality of life of the parent seeking removal and of the chil-
dren. See McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 264 Neb. 232, 647
N.W.2d 577 (2002). In the present case, Chrystal does not
work outside the home; therefore, her income is completely
dependent upon Jeff. Hill testified that if the family were to
remain in Illinois, Jeff would remain in his current position,
where his income was increasingly affected by commissions
and he would have no opportunity for promotion. While Jeff’s
income in Illinois has been higher than his starting base sal-
ary in Ohio would be, Jeff would have the opportunity for
promotions if he accepts the position in Ohio. Jeff’s income
would also not be dependent upon uncertain commissions.
Additionally, the cost of living in Ohio is significantly less
than that of living in Illinois. For these reasons, we find that
this factor weighs in favor of the move.
d. Improved Housing or Living Conditions
We next consider the degree to which them aranvilles’ hous-
ing or living conditions would be improved.
The trial court found that the family’s housing conditions
in Ohio would be better than what the children enjoyed in
Illinois because Jeff and Chrystal intend to build a seven-
bedroom home in Ohio, whereas they have a four-bedroom
home in Illinois. The court stated that the Ohio home would
be at a “significantly decreased cost.” Chrystal testified that
mArANVILLE v. dWOrAk 	257
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 245

them aranvilles had “somewhat” looked into building a house
in Ohio, although they had made no commitments, and that it
“[m]ost likely” would be a seven-bedroom home. Jeff testi-
fied that they would look for a home of the same size and
with the same amenities as in Illinois. According to Jeff, their
home in Illinois was worth approximately “high 600’s to low
seven” and in Ohio a comparable home would cost “from the
high 200s to the high 300s.”r eal estate taxes in Ohio would
be approximately half of those in Illinois. However, Chrystal
testified that they would live in a community in Ohio similar to
that they live in now. Finally, the cost of living is lower in Ohio
than in the Chicago area.
The children’s living conditions may be somewhat improved
with the move to Ohio. We find that this factor weighs slightly
in favor of the move.
e. Existence of Educational Advantages
[18] We also consider the existence of educational advan-
tages available in Ohio. This factor receives little or no weight
when the custodial parent fails to prove that the new schools
are superior. See, McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 264 Neb. 232,
647 N.W.2d 577 (2002); Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 257 Neb.
242, 597 N.W.2d 592 (1999). There is little evidence regarding
the educational advantages in Ohio versus Illinois.b ecause
Chrystal has not proved that the Ohio schools are superior
to those in Illinois, this factor weighs neither in favor of nor
against the move.
f.r elationshipb etween Children and Eachp arent
We next consider the quality of the relationship between
the children and each parent. It is clear that in this case, each
parent has a very strong bond and relationship with each child.
As such, we must give due weight to the effect that the move
to Ohio may have on the quality of Lauren’s, Summer’s, and
Joseph’s relationships with both Justin and Chrystal.
We have already determined that Chrystal will retain cus-
tody of the three youngestd worak children. As such, her
relationship with them will be largely unaffected by a move
to Ohio.
258 	17NE brASkAA ppELLATE rEpOrTS

On the other hand, Justin will see the parties’ three young-
est children less if they move to Ohio, and he testified that the
move would adversely impact his relationship with those chil-
dren. In Brown v. Brown, 260 Neb. 954, 621 N.W.2d 70 (2000),
the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that because of the
close relationship and extensive contacts between father and
children, this factor weighed against a long-distance relocation
with the mother. In the present case, although the children were
separated from Justin by a considerable distance by living in
Illinois, should they move to Ohio, that distance would nearly
double. Justin has made every effort to see the parties’ children
as much as possible, missing none of the allowed visitation in
Illinois despite the distance. However, Justin testified that for
several reasons, if the children were to move to Ohio, it would
not be as easy for him to make incidental visits and he would
likely see the children less.
While the move to Ohio will certainly affect the quantity of
time that Justin will spend with the children, given the visita-
tion schedule fashioned by the trial court, together with Justin’s
proven efforts and success in maintaining a close relationship
with the children, we conclude that the quality of Justin’s rela-
tionship with the children will not be negatively impacted by
a move from Illinois to Ohio. This factor does not prevent or
favor the move.
g. Children’s Ties to Each Community
Next, we consider the children’s ties to the present com-
munity, Geneva, as well as their ties to the potential new
community in Akron. Jeff testified that while there are no
family ties to Illinois, Jeff does have extended family, includ-
ing his parents, grandparents, siblings, and nieces or neph-
ews—step-relatives of thed worak children—in the Akron
area. Conversely, the children were established in school in
Illinois and had developed friendships there. As such, this fac-
tor weighs neither in favor of nor against the move.
h. Likelihood of Antagonizing Hostilities
Finally, we consider the likelihood that allowing or deny-
ing the move would antagonize hostilities between Justin and
mArANVILLE v. dWOrAk 	259
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 245

Chrystal. The trial court found that regardless of whether there
is a move in this case, there will be no increase or decrease in
hostilities between the parties, and that it was not likely that
the hostility and dissention between the adults would change
in the future. We agree that the parties are already quite hostile
toward one another. The record shows that the parties have
had significant difficulties with visitation issues while the
children were located in Illinois. Given the additional distance
to Ohio and corresponding travel issues, it is possible that
these difficulties could increase. In any event, we find that the
likelihood the move has to antagonize the hostilities between
Justin and Chrystal does not weigh either in favor of or against
the move.
i. Conclusionr egarding Quality of Life
The trial court found that the quality of life of Chrystal and
the children in her custody would be “negatively impacted”
if Chrystal were not allowed to relocate, due to the possible
decrease in Jeff’s earning capacity and actual earnings which
would create a financial hardship if she were not allowed to
relocate with Jeff. The district court also found that the quality
of life would be improved if Chrystal and the children were
allowed to move.
In our de novo review and in consideration of all eight of
the quality of life factors listed above, we determine that two
factors, the extent to which the relocating parent’s income or
employment will be enhanced and the possible improvement
in housing and living conditions, weigh in favor of the move.
The remaining factors weigh neither in favor of nor against
the move.
(iii) Impact of Move on Contact
Between Justin and Children
[19-22] The third factor in the best interests determination
is the impact of the move on the contact between the children
and the noncustodial parent, when viewed in light of reason-
able visitation arrangements. This consideration focuses on the
ability of the court to fashion a reasonable visitation schedule
that will allow the noncustodial parent to maintain a meaning-
ful parent-child relationship. See Farnsworth v. Farnsworth,
260 	17NE brASkAA ppELLATE rEpOrTS

257 Neb. 242, 597 N.W.2d 592 (1999). Generally, a reasonable
visitation schedule is one that provides a satisfactory basis
for preserving and fostering a child’s relationship with the
noncustodial parent. See Carraher v. Carraher, 9 Neb. App.
23, 607 N.W.2d 547 (2000). Of course, the frequency and the
total number of days of visitation and the distance traveled and
expense incurred go into the calculus of determining reason-
ableness. Id. Indications of the custodial parent’s willingness to
comply with a modified visitation schedule also have a place
in this analysis. Id.
In the present case, we give careful consideration to the
fact that this is not the first time Chrystal has been before
the court asking to move thed worak children a significant
distance away from their father. The first move, in 2004 from
Nebraska to Illinois, reduced Justin’s parenting time from
about 6 out of every 14 days to every other weekend and
certain holidays, approximately 150 days per year. While
that contact has allowed Justin to maintain a meaningful
relationship with the parties’ children, Chrystal now seeks to
move again, this time to Ohio, an even greater distance away
from Justin.
Justin’s visitation with the three youngerd worak chil-
dren would consist of holiday visits in Lincoln as previously
ordered in 2004, one “protracted” weekend each month during
the school year (Thursday evening throughm onday morn-
ing) in Ohio, spring break in Lincoln in alternating years, and
summers in Lincoln from 14 days after school is dismissed
in Ohio until 7 days prior to the commencement of school
in Ohio.
Airfare to Ohio would be more expensive than airfare to
Chicago. According to Justin, airfare to Chicago costs approxi-
mately $200, while airfare to Ohio could cost between $500
and $1,000. Additionally, traveling to Chicago takes Justin
approximately 3 hours total because it is a direct flight. There
are no direct flights from Lincoln or Omaha, Nebraska, to the
Akron area; therefore, it could generally take about 8 hours
to travel there. Justin further testified that because of the
increased distance, he would not be able to drive to see the
children in Ohio as he had in Chicago. Also, Justin testified
mArANVILLE v. dWOrAk 	261
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 245

that because of the increased distance and time, there may be
weekends in which it would not be possible for him to get
to Ohio.
The court did attempt to fashion a reasonable visitation
schedule in light of the distance involved between the two
households, approximately 950 miles, and the split custody
arrangement. The primary difference in Justin’s visitation in
Ohio compared to Illinois would be that the weekend visitation
decreases from every other weekend to one protracted weekend
a month. The holiday, school break, and summer visitations
remain roughly the same. There certainly would be increased
traveltime, expense, and inconvenience to Justin in traveling
to Ohio and, to a lesser extent, the children when they travel
to Lincoln. We conclude that the court’s order allows Justin to
maintain reasonable visitation with the three youngerd worak
children. Although there is an impact on Justin and the children
due to the increased distance apart, we conclude that it does
not prevent the removal of the children to Ohio.
In taking their respective positions in this case, each par-
ent seems sincerely motivated to do what he or she genuinely
believes is in the best interests of the children. Weighing all of
the factors in order to determine whether to permit Chrystal to
relocate with Lauren, Summer, and Joseph is a difficult task.
Where there are no clearly right or clearly wrong answers, it
is particularly important to bear in mind that our standard of
review allows us to give deference to the discretion of the trial
judge, who observed the demeanor of the witnesses as he heard
their testimony. To reverse would require us to find that the
trial court’s decision is untenable and unfairly deprives Justin
of a substantial right or just result. After reviewing each factor
in detail, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in granting Chrystal permission to relocate with the
children to Ohio.
3. visitAtion sChedule
Chrystal asserts that the court erred in setting her parent-
ing time with Cole during the school year and further that the
court’s order was not specific in setting this parenting time.
She also alleges that the court allowed her “extremely limited”
262 	17NE brASkAA ppELLATE rEpOrTS

summer parenting time with all four of thed worak children.
brief for appellee on cross-appeal at 24.
Chrystal was awarded protracted weekend visitation with
Cole once a month in Lincoln, holiday visitation as previ-
ously ordered, spring break in Ohio in alternating years, and
summer visitation in Ohio from the day school is dismissed
in Lincoln until 14 days after school is dismissed in Ohio. We
note that the summer visitation for both parents will result in
the fourd worak children’s being together for all but 1 week of
the summer.
[23-25] The trial court has discretion to set a reasonable
visitation schedule. See McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 264 Neb.
232, 647 N.W.2d 577 (2002). Generally, a reasonable visitation
schedule is one that provides a satisfactory basis for preserv-
ing and fostering a child’s relationship with the noncustodial
parent. See Vogel v. Vogel, 262 Neb. 1030, 637 N.W.2d 611
(2002). The determination of reasonableness is to be made on
a case-by-case basis. Id.
We note at the outset thatd r. Williams testified to the
increased visitation scheduling issues which can occur as chil-
dren get older and become involved in extracurricular activities.
No doubt in a long-distance, split-custody arrangement such as
this one, scheduling parenting time is difficult and neither par-
ent is likely to view the amount of visitation he or she receives
as ideal. Nonetheless, the court must fashion an arrangement
which maximizes time for both parents yet allows the children
as little interruption in their daily lives as possible.
The court’s order setting Chrystal’s monthly parenting time
with Cole mirrors its order for Justin’s monthly parenting
time with Lauren, Summer, and Joseph. With regard to sum-
mer visitation, Chrystal will have substantially less time with
the children than Justin. However, it is Chrystal’s desire to
move to Ohio that precipitated Cole’s change of custody and
the need to fashion a reasonable visitation schedule between
Justin and the remaining children in order to preserve their
relationship. Chrystal’s parenting time with the three younger
children actually increases during the school year as a result of
the change in Justin’s monthly visitation. Chrystal’s summer
parenting time with the three younger children is essentially
mArANVILLE v. dWOrAk 	263
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 245

the same as in the previous order, with the exception that the
court did not specifically provide for the two weekend visits
in Lincoln during the summer. Finally, we are mindful of the
court’s interest in keeping all fourd worak children together
when possible.
Given the facts of this case, we find that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in setting Chrystal’s parenting time.
4. visitAtion trAnsportAtion provisions
Chrystal alleges that the trial court erred in ordering the
terms of visitation transportation for effecting the parties’ par-
enting time. The court’s order provides:
26. VISITATION TRANSPORTATION.
A. In regards to transportation for visitation all reason-
able airfare transportation costs incurred for Cole travel-
ing from Lincoln to Geneva, Illinois or Lincoln to the
Akron, Ohio area and back shall be borne by [Chrystal],
as will all reasonable airfare costs for transportation
regarding the Court-ordered visitation for the minor chil-
dren, Lauren, Summer and [Joseph], to travel to Lincoln
from either Chicago or the Akron, Ohio area and back.
All costs of transportation referred to herein apply only
to costs for the children, not for costs to [Justin] or
[Justin’s] family.
b. When it is [Chrystal’s] holiday [Chrystal] shall
provide for the transportation of Cole to [Chrystal’s]
home for visitation, whether it be Chicago, Illinois or
Akron, Ohio, as stated above and if it is [Justin’s] holiday
[Chrystal] will provide the transportation for the minor
children, Lauren, Summer and [Joseph], from her home
to [Justin].
C. Each party is to provide roundtrip transportation
which would include transportation to and from airports
within a reasonable proximity from the respective par-
ty’s home.
Chrystal first asserts that the order is unclear, particularly
in light of paragraph 26C. Our reading of paragraph 26 as a
whole indicates that Chrystal is to provide all of the trans-
portation, including costs and roundtrip transportation to and
264 	17NE brASkAA ppELLATE rEpOrTS

from airports within a reasonable proximity from both her
and Justin’s homes, for all of the children, regardless of who
is exercising visitation. Considering the visitation schedule
ordered by the court, this transportation responsibility relates
to when the three youngestd worak children travel to Lincoln
for holiday, spring break, and summer visitations, as well as
when Cole travels to Ohio for holiday, spring break, and sum-
mer visitations. Justin then would be responsible for trans-
porting himself and any family members, including Cole,
to Illinois or Ohio to exercise his monthly visitation with
Summer, Lauren, and Joseph. Likewise, Chrystal would be
responsible for transporting herself and any family members,
including the children, to Nebraska to exercise her visitation
with Cole in Nebraska.
[26,27] Chrystal also argues that requiring her to pay all
of the airfare costs is unreasonable, particularly given the
deviation in child support the court allowed to Justin for
transportation costs. The matter of travel expenses is within
the trial court’s discretion, and although reviewed de novo on
the record, its determination will normally be affirmed absent
abuse of that discretion. Vogel v. Vogel, 262 Neb. 1030, 637
N.W.2d 611 (2002). There is no immutable standard for the
allocation of travel expenses; instead, the determination of
reasonableness is made on a case-by-case basis. Id. Justin will
clearly incur greater costs in traveling to Ohio for his monthly
visits with the children as a result of the move. We cannot say
that the district court abused its discretion in the allocation of
transportation expenses.
5. C hild support
Chrystal alleges that the district court erred in ordering child
support. She specifically alleges that the order is “conflicting,
confusing and not based on the correct information as to ‘cur-
rent’ child support obligations.”b rief for appellee on cross-
appeal at 29.p rior to the January 11, 2008, order, the court
ordered Justin to pay $2,375 per month in child support for
the fourd worak children. The court’s January 11 order with
respect to child support, which order is accompanied by work-
sheets, provides:
mArANVILLE v. dWOrAk 	265
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 245

24. CHILD SUPPORT.
A. Child support should not be changed. The calcula-
tion submitted by [Chrystal] as Exhibit #83 would indicate
that child support should be $2,898 per month when there
are three minor children in [Chrystal’s] custody and one
minor child in [Justin’s] custody. The Court does deviate
downward, however, because of the travel expenses that
[Justin] is likely to have and does order that child support
remain at $2,375 per month when there are three minor
children in [Chrystal’s] custody and one minor child in
[Justin’s] custody.
b. When 	there 	are 	three 	minor 	children, 	Lauren,
Summer and [Joseph], in the custody of [Chrystal] child
support would be in the normal amount of $3,295 per
month based upon the parties’ current earnings. The Court
does deviate 18% as done above for transportation costs
to be incurred by [Justin]. Child support will thus be set
for three minor children at $2,702 per month, for two
minor children at $2,433 per month, and for one minor
child at $1,805 per month.
We find that the child support is sufficiently clear and that
Chrystal has not shown the order to be an abuse of discretion.
The order provides a reason for deviation from the guidelines
and provides for the split custody arrangement. The order
requires Justin to pay child support of $2,375 per month until
Cole is no longer receiving support, at which time Justin’s
child support obligation will be $2,702 per month for three
minor children, $2,433 per month for two minor children, and
$1,805 per month for one minor child.
Chrystal finally alleges that the child support calculation
does not take into account the expenses Chrystal will incur
in traveling to see Cole in Nebraska and the cost of bringing
siblings along to see him. However, at the modification hear-
ing, Chrystal did not produce evidence as to what her travel
expenses would be from Ohio to Nebraska; nor did she indi-
cate that she would exercise every monthly visitation. Further,
since Chrystal is not paying child support and Justin’s child
support is calculated using zero income for Chrystal, there is
no rationale for deviating from the child support guidelines
266 	17NE brASkAA ppELLATE rEpOrTS

concerning Chrystal’s travel expenses. We find that the court
did not abuse its discretion in not considering Chrystal’s travel
expenses in setting child support.
For the reasons set forth herein, we find that the court did
not abuse its discretion in setting child support.
VI. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to award custody of Lauren, Summer, and Joseph
to Justin; in allowing Chrystal to relocate with the children
to Ohio; in determining visitation and allocating visitation
expenses; or in setting child support.
A ffirmed.
stAte of nebrAskA, Appellee , v.
douGlAs e. drAGoo, AppellAnt.
758 N.W.2d 60
Filed November 25, 2008. 	No. A-08-113.
1. Statutes.m atters of statutory construction present questions of law.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On a question of law, an appellate court is
obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached by the
court below.
3. Constitutional Law: Double Jeopardy. Thed ouble Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the
same offense.
4. ____: ____. The protection provided by Nebraska’s double jeopardy clause is
coextensive with that provided by the U.S. Constitution.
5. Double Jeopardy. While thed ouble Jeopardy Clause may protect a defendant
against cumulative punishments for convictions on the same offense, the clause
does not prohibit the State from prosecuting a defendant for multiple offenses in
a single prosecution.
6. Criminal Law: Convictions: Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Whether multiple
convictions in a single trial lead to multiple punishments depends on whether
the Legislature, when designating the criminal statutory scheme, intended that
cumulative sentences be applied for conviction on such offenses.
7. Double Jeopardy: Legislature: Intent. When the Legislature has demonstrated
an intent to permit cumulative punishments, thed ouble Jeopardy Clause is
not violated as long as the court imposes the cumulative punishments in a
single proceeding.
STATE v. drAGOO 	267
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 267