Murphy v. Murphy

on the nature and circumstances of the current offense, incar-
ceration was necessary and that a sentence lesser than incarcer-
ation would depreciate the seriousness of the crime or promote
disrespect for the law. We conclude that the sentence imposed
by the trial court is not an abuse of judicial discretion.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that Dragoo’s consecutive sentences for DUI
and DUI causing serious bodily injury constitute multiple pun-
ishments for the same offense, a denial of the protection against
double jeopardy. We therefore reverse the district court’s judg-
ment for Dragoo’s conviction and sentence for count I, DUI,
and remand this matter to the district court with directions to
dismiss count I of the amended information. Because there is
not error in Dragoo’s conviction and sentence for count II, DUI
causing serious bodily injury, the judgment of the district court
regarding count II is affirmed.
A ffirmed in pArt, And in pArt reversed And
remAnded with directions to dismiss.
christi mArie murphy, AppellAnt, v.
mAtthew lArue murphy, Appellee .
759 N.W.2d 710
Filed December 2, 2008. 	No. A-08-007.
1. Modification of Decree: Child Support. A request to modify child support will
be denied if the change in financial circumstances is due to fault or voluntary
wastage or dissipation of one’s talents and assets.
2. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists when reasons
or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a
substantial right and denying just results in matters submitted for disposition.
3. Bankruptcy: Words and Phrases. An adversary proceeding is one where, in
bankruptcy court, one party seeks affirmative relief from another. Adversary pro-
ceedings include actions to recover money or property, as well as actions object-
ing to discharge, among others.
4. Bankruptcy: Debtors and Creditors: Alimony. Generally, a bankruptcy dis-
charge does not discharge the debtor from any debt for a domestic support
obligation.
5. ____: ____: ____. A discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2000) does not
discharge an individual debtor from any debt to a former spouse for alimony to,
mUrphy v. mUrphy 	279
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 279
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:15 AM CST

maintenance for, or support of such spouse in connection with a separation agree-
ment, divorce decree, or other order of a state court of record.
6. Bankruptcy: Debtors and Creditors: Divorce. Debts incurred in the course of a
marital dissolution proceeding are not dischargeable in bankruptcy unless (1) the
debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from income or property of the
debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support
of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor or (2) discharging such debt would
result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor.
7. Bankruptcy: Modification of Decree: Alimony. A postbankruptcy alimony
modification violates the discharge injunction of the Bankruptcy Code when the
spouse seeking modification of alimony is merely attempting to reinstate a dis-
charged property settlement obligation rather than being a modification based on
changed circumstances.
8. Bankruptcy: Debtors and Creditors: Divorce. Nonspousal support obligations
or debts incurred in the course of a marital dissolution proceeding are not dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy unless discharging such debt would result in a benefit
to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse, former
spouse, or child of the debtor.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: JAmes t.
G leAson, Judge. reversed and vacated.
Brenda J. Council and Amy L. mattern, of Whitner Law
Firm, p.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
Christopher A. Vacanti, 	of 	Cohen, Vacanti, 	higgins 	&
Shattuck, for appellee.
inbody, Chief Judge, and moore, Judge.
per curiAm.
Christi marie murphy and matthew Larue murphy were
divorced by a decree of the district court for Douglas County,
Nebraska, entered August 25, 2006. Two children were born
to the murphys during the marriage: one born December 12,
1997, and the other born August 30, 2000. This appeal involves
matthew’s request to modify his child support and alimony
obligations because of a 50-percent reduction of earnings stem-
ming from the loss of his employment as a Douglas County
sheriff’s deputy. The district court reduced matthew’s child
support and alimony obligations, but Christi appeals and con-
tends that such reduction was error because matthew’s loss of
280 	17 NeBrASkA AppeLLATe repOrTS

employment was the result of his “misconduct.” We agree and,
therefore, reverse.
prOCeDUrAL AND FACTUAL BACkGrOUND
At the time of the dissolution, matthew’s employment as a
deputy sheriff, together with part-time work as a security offi-
cer, provided an income of $70,000 per year. Christi was not
then employed, nor has she been employed since the decree.
Christi was awarded custody of the children, and matthew
was to pay child support in the sum of $1,209 per month for
the support of the two children and $822 per month for one
child. Additionally, matthew was to pay Christi alimony in the
amount of $600 per month beginning August 1, 2006, for 3
years; $450 per month from August 1, 2009, for 2 years; and
$300 per month from August 1, 2011, for 2 years, for a total
of $39,600.
The parties had substantial debt, which was divided between
them by the original decree of dissolution. The only debt rele-
vant in this proceeding was a Citibank credit card debt that
Christi was ordered to pay in the approximate amount of
$7,800. however, after the decree, Christi filed for bankruptcy
and the Citibank debt was discharged by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court. Consequently, that creditor pursued matthew, and he
ultimately settled such debt by a payment of $4,300, for
which he sought credit against child support via this modifi-
cation proceeding.
matthew had a 14-year career with the Douglas County
sheriff’s office, but in February 2006, an investigation concern-
ing him occurred regarding an unreported accidental discharge
of a weapon and k-9 training narcotics being found in his
residence. As a result of that investigation, matthew received a
45-day suspension and he signed an agreement placing him on
a 1-year employment probationary status. matthew admitted
that such probationary status meant that further violations of
department policies and procedures could lead to his termina-
tion. On January 4, 2007, the Douglas County sheriff provided
a disciplinary hearing notice to matthew recounting additional
employment problems, including (1) June 2006, a negative
personnel advisory for damaging a cruiser; (2) July 2006, two
mUrphy v. mUrphy 	281
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 279

3-day suspensions for failing to complete a required report and
failing to place property into evidence; (3) November 2006,
a negative personnel advisory for reporting late for work on
more than one Sunday; and (4) January 2007, a negative per-
sonnel advisory after failing to report for work on Sunday,
December 24, 2006. This notice provided for a disciplinary
hearing to be held January 11, 2007, and set forth the details
of the various rule violations and how such hearing would
be conducted.
matthew testified that the internal affairs investigation into
his employment began shortly after the divorce case was
filed, with Christi’s calling the internal affairs department and
submitting a letter and an affidavit. In her testimony, Christi
denied matthew’s statements, and although she admitted that
her previous attorney sent affidavits and letters to internal
affairs, she testified she could not remember whether that was
done with or without her consent.
A letter from the sheriff regarding the foregoing disci-
plinary investigation indicates that after the hearing, matthew
was “apprised of the options available to [him] in the event
that [he was] terminated or if [he] resigned.” The document
recites that matthew made the decision to resign his employ-
ment effective immediately, and at the bottom of the letter, it
states: “I hereby resign my position with the Douglas County
Sheriff’s Office effective immediately,” followed by matthew’s
signature. Thereafter, matthew secured several low-paying
jobs, mainly in sales, which were unsuccessful. At the time
of the modification hearing on September 26, 2007, matthew
was selling health insurance strictly on a commission basis.
matthew agreed that his earning capacity in that position was
$35,000 per year. The record establishes that as a result of no
longer being a sheriff’s deputy, matthew lost the opportunity
to do part-time security work, and that by June 2007, he was
no longer a certified law enforcement officer.
DISTrICT COUrT DeCISION
After denying Christi’s motion to reopen the record to
introduce evidence concerning matthew’s allegedly untruth-
ful testimony at the hearing denying that he had withdrawn
282 	17 NeBrASkA AppeLLATe repOrTS

approximately $33,000 from the Douglas County employees’
retirement trust fund, the district court entered its decision on
the request for modification on December 19, 2007. The court
modified child support by reducing it to $800 per month for
two children and $585 per month for one child. Such reduc-
tion was based on an annual income for matthew of $35,000
and on a 40-hour workweek at minimum wage, $5.85 per hour,
for Christi. That reduction was retroactive to February 1, 2007.
Additionally, the trial court reduced matthew’s alimony obli-
gation to the sum of $350 per month from February 1, 2007,
through August 1, 2013.
With respect to the Citibank bill, the trial court ordered that
the alimony obligation was subject to a credit in matthew’s
favor in the amount of $4,300, to be repaid by Christi at the
rate of $100 per month via a $100-per-month reduction in
matthew’s alimony obligation for 43 months. In addition,
the court made orders with respect to the parenting plan, but
such are not pertinent to this appeal and therefore are not fur-
ther detailed.
ASSIGNmeNTS OF errOr
Christi assigns to the district court seven errors, which we
consolidate into the following four errors: (1) finding a suf-
ficient change in matthew’s circumstances to modify his child
support and alimony obligations; (2) finding that matthew’s
termination from the Douglas County sheriff’s office was at
the instance of Christi; (3) finding that Christi was indebted
to matthew in the amount of $4,300 for his payment of the
Citibank credit card debt, which would be paid by a credit of
$100 per month for 43 months against matthew’s alimony obli-
gation; and (4) denying Christi’s motion to reopen the record
to introduce evidence that matthew lied under oath when he
denied receiving approximately $33,000 from the Douglas
County employees’ retirement trust fund, which funds should
have been considered as income for purposes of calculating
child support.
STANDArD OF reVIeW
An appellate court entrusts the modification of an alimony or
child support award to the trial court’s discretion and reviews
mUrphy v. mUrphy 	283
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 279

such decision de novo on the record to determine whether the
trial court has abused its discretion. See Crawford v. Crawford,
263 Neb. 37, 638 N.W.2d 505 (2002).
ANALySIS
Matthew’s Change in Job Status as Basis for
Modification of Child Support and Alimony.
In our transcript is a letter of the district judge setting forth
his findings on the motion to modify and directing matthew’s
counsel to prepare a decree “consistent” with these findings.
This letter states in part: “The court specifically notes that at
the instance of [Christi,] [matthew] was terminated from his
employment as a Deputy Sheriff of Douglas County, Nebraska.
[Christi] specifically pointed out to [matthew’s] employer his
violation of rules which caused his ultimate dismissal.” This
reasoning does not find its way into the actual order entered on
December 19, 2007, which is the operative final order under
Wagner v. Wagner, 275 Neb. 693, 749 N.W.2d 137 (2008).
The court’s order simply modifies the alimony award without
reasoning or rationale beyond a finding that there has been a
material change in circumstances. But to the extent that the dis-
trict court’s rationale contained in its letter to counsel was the
basis for the modification, we reject it because such rationale
is not supported by the evidence, is against well-established
precedent, and is untenable.
Although the record has testimony from matthew that his
internal affairs problems began with a telephone call and
letter(s) from Christi, she says that it was her former counsel
who did these things. But, matthew did not produce such com-
munications or establish, irrespective of who communicated
with internal affairs, when the communications occurred, what
was disclosed, and whether matthew’s employer was other-
wise aware of the matters supposedly reported. Far more
important, however, is the fact that at the time of the decree,
matthew was already on probationary status from the investi-
gation, regardless of how and by whom the original internal
affairs investigation was instigated. matthew readily conceded
his awareness that such status meant that further violations
of policies and procedures could result in his termination. In
284 	17 NeBrASkA AppeLLATe repOrTS

short, at the time of the decree, matthew was fully employed
and earning $70,000 per year, but matthew knew he was
“skating on thin ice” with his employer. The evidence is
undisputed that matthew placed himself in a “resign or be
fired” position by four different incidents, cited in the sheriff’s
disciplinary hearing notice, occurring after the divorce case
was filed and while he was on probation, to wit: damaging a
cruiser in June 2006, receiving two 3-day suspensions for fail-
ing to complete a report and failing to place property into evi-
dence in July 2006, reporting to work late in November 2006,
and failing to report to work at all on Christmas eve 2006. In
short, it was matthew who fumbled his probationary status,
not Christi. Therefore, as a factual matter, the district court
is clearly wrong in concluding that Christi caused matthew’s
loss of employment.
The evidence shows that matthew’s conduct while on proba-
tion caused matthew to be in the position that his choice was to
resign or be fired. Thus, from an analytical standpoint, we need
not go back to how and why matthew ended up on probation-
ary status at the time of the divorce; the fact is that such was
his status with his employer, he knew it, and all he needed to
do for 12 months was to follow the sheriff’s rules and proce-
dures—which he, and he alone, failed to do.
[1] We next look at the nature of the acts that caused
matthew’s termination of employment. They may be sum-
marized by stating that he could not live up to his employer’s
performance expectations and requirements, even though he
knew his employment was somewhat tenuous because of his
probationary status. In other words, matthew was clearly
involved in “employee misconduct,” a subject upon which
the Nebraska appellate courts have previously spoken when
a change in employment status and earnings is alleged as
justifying a downward adjustment in the obligor’s child sup-
port or alimony obligation. In Pope v. Pope, 251 Neb. 773,
559 N.W.2d 192 (1997), the court extended the rule from
Ohler v. Ohler, 220 Neb. 272, 369 N.W.2d 615 (1985), to
alimony reduction requests. In Ohler, the rule states that a
request to modify child support will be denied if the change
in financial circumstances is due to fault or voluntary wastage
mUrphy v. mUrphy 	285
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 279

or dissipation of one’s talents and assets. In Pope, the court
found that the husband’s loss of employment because he was
found asleep on the job was not grounds for reduction of his
alimony obligation.
In Lambert v. Lambert, 9 Neb. App. 661, 617 N.W.2d 645
(2000), the husband was given the option to resign or be
fired after failing a drug test, and as a result, he was earning
approximately half of his previous salary in his new job. We
found, relying on Pope, supra, although noting the conduct in
Pope was of lesser gravity, that the trial court’s reduction in
the monthly alimony and child support payments was error.
In Grahovac v. Grahovac, 12 Neb. App. 585, 680 N.W.2d 616
(2004), we found that an ex-husband’s resignation or early
retirement, which reduced his income, was due to his alco-
holism and his refusal to secure effective treatment and that
thus, the reduction in the ex-husband’s income was not from
good cause so as to entitle him to any reduction in his ali-
mony obligation.
[2] Although in a review de novo on the record we
reappraise the evidence and reach our own independent con-
clusion, we also inquire into whether the trial court’s decision
was an abuse of discretion. See Pope, supra. A judicial abuse
of discretion exists when reasons or rulings of a trial judge
are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a sub-
stantial right and denying just results in matters submitted for
disposition. Id. The district court’s decision granting modifi-
cation in this case is an abuse of discretion, and in reaching
our own conclusion on this record, we would deny matthew’s
request for a downward modification because of his employ-
ment misconduct, which directly caused his earnings to be
cut in half. The overwhelming weight of authority in cases
of this nature goes against matthew and does not support the
trial court’s decision. In the final analysis, placing the blame
for matthew’s termination on Christi is factually incorrect and
fails to acknowledge that matthew caused his own termina-
tion as a deputy sheriff by his failures while on probationary
status. We reverse and vacate the district court’s downward
modification of matthew’s child support and alimony obliga-
tion on the ground of matthew’s reduced earnings.
286 	17 NeBrASkA AppeLLATe repOrTS

Effect of Bankruptcy Discharge of Debt
Christi Was Ordered to Pay.
In the original decree, Christi was ordered to pay a Citibank
credit card debt in the approximate amount of $7,800, but
after the divorce, she filed for bankruptcy and listed it as a
debt to be discharged—which it was. Citibank then pursued
matthew, and ultimately he negotiated a compromise settle-
ment with Citibank to satisfy the debt for $4,300, which he
paid. Therefore, part of the relief matthew sought by motion
was to have Christi reimburse him for that $4,300 by an
offset against his child support obligation. The trial court
granted matthew such relief by reducing his alimony obliga-
tion to Christi by $100 per month for 43 months. We note that
matthew did not allege any material change in circumstances
to justify modification of child support, nor did the trial court
make a finding of a material change in circumstances so as to
justify this modification of the alimony award. Christi argues
that this reduction in her alimony was error because under the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, she is fully relieved of all discharge-
able debts, and that such discharge is binding upon matthew
and the district court.
[3] We note that the evidence shows that matthew was
named in Christi’s bankruptcy filing as codebtor, yet there is
no evidence that he filed an adversary proceeding to contest
Christi’s discharge from liability for the Citibank debt, which
she listed among her unsecured creditors, with the description
“Debtor to pay pursuant to Divorce Decree.” An adversary
proceeding is one where, in bankruptcy court, one party seeks
affirmative relief from another. See Fed. r. Bankr. p. 7001.
Adversary proceedings include actions to recover money or
property, as well as actions objecting to discharge, among
others. See id. Therefore, matthew did not take advantage
of the opportunity to contest Christi’s discharge from the
Citibank debt in her bankruptcy case. Neither party provided
evidence of how Christi’s discharge in bankruptcy affected
him or her financially, other than matthew’s testimony that he
had to borrow $4,300 from his father to pay the settlement he
negotiated with Citibank.
mUrphy v. mUrphy 	287
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 279

With this background, we now turn to the decision that
provides rather comprehensive guidance for us on this issue,
Collett v. Collett, 270 Neb. 722, 707 N.W.2d 769 (2005). Shan
Collett and kimberly Collett were both veterinarians, and the
husband, Shan, borrowed money from a bank to establish a vet-
erinary clinic. The clinic was rather quickly unsuccessful. The
wife, kimberly, had guaranteed the loan. Shan filed a chapter 7
bankruptcy a month before their pending divorce went to trial.
The evidence was that both parties expected that the collateral
would cover the bank debt—which expectation turned out to
be incorrect. The trial court awarded kimberly $1 a year in ali-
mony in march 2002, but in November 2003, the bank obtained
a deficiency judgment against kimberly for nearly $69,000.
That judgment caused kimberly to seek a modification of her
alimony award, alleging a change in circumstances. kimberly
introduced evidence showing that to pay the judgment, she
would be required to pay $800 a month for 122 months, that
an increase in alimony would increase her tax liability by
$161.41 per month, and that her yearly income had decreased
from $52,000 to $38,000 since the divorce, whereas Shan’s
monthly income had increased from $1,400 to $4,000 plus
benefits. The district court modified the alimony award from $1
a year to $950 per month for 123 months, and Shan appealed.
Shan’s main attack on this decision was that it violated the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code as well as the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s modification of the alimony award.
In Collett, as well as in the case before us, the factual pat-
tern is a modification of an alimony obligation to account
for a debt, which an obligated party was able to discharge in
bankruptcy, with the other party being left with responsibil-
ity of the discharged debt. Christi’s argument, similar to the
husband’s argument in Collett, is that her discharge prevents
the reimposition of this debt on her, in effect, via a reduction
in her monthly alimony payment.
[4-6] In our analysis of Christi’s argument, we begin by
looking at the nature of the obligation that was imposed
on Christi via the decree’s provision that she pay, and hold
matthew harmless on, the Citibank debt. The court in Collett,
288 	17 NeBrASkA AppeLLATe repOrTS

supra, held that generally, a bankruptcy discharge does not dis-
charge the debtor from any debt for a domestic support obliga-
tion (but a credit card debt is obviously not a domestic support
obligation), stating:
Generally, a bankruptcy discharge does not discharge the
debtor from any debt for a domestic support obligation.
At the time of Shan’s discharge, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)
(2000) provided in relevant part that a discharge under
that title did not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt to a “former spouse . . . for alimony to, maintenance
for, or support of such spouse . . . in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree or other order” of
a state court of record. Likewise, other types of debts
incurred in the course of a marital dissolution proceed-
ing were not dischargeable in bankruptcy unless: “(A)
the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt
from income or property of the debtor not reasonably
necessary to be expended for the maintenance or sup-
port of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor . . . or
(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the
debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(15). We understand Shan to argue that because
kimberly did not file an adversary proceeding objecting
to the dischargeability of Shan’s indebtedness to the bank
under § 523(a)(15), she cannot now seek a modification
of alimony on the basis of the deficiency judgment which
is related to the debt.
Collett v. Collett, 270 Neb. 722, 729, 707 N.W.2d 769, 775
(2005). As in Collett, matthew did not contest the discharge
of the Citibank debt in an adversary proceeding in Christi’s
bankruptcy. But, in Collett, such fact did not prevent kimberly
from getting the alimony award increased, because, as here,
the original divorce decree awarded alimony and because the
modification was sought on the basis of a change in circum-
stances. The court in Collett noted the facts that the decree
originally included an award of alimony and that the modifica-
tion was sought on the basis of a change in circumstances, and
then said:
mUrphy v. mUrphy 	289
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 279

Other courts addressing this scenario have rejected argu-
ments that modification of alimony is merely a “repack-
aging” of debts discharged in bankruptcy and thus pro-
hibited by federal law, if the party seeking modification
is able to demonstrate an actual change in financial cir-
cumstances subsequent to the dissolution and bankruptcy
of the former spouse. See, In re Siragusa, 27 F.3d 406,
407 (9th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Smith, 741 So. 2d 420 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1999); In re Marriage of Trickey, 589 N.W.2d
753 (Iowa App. 1998). The court in In re Marriage of
Trickey articulated what we believe to be the correct
analytical approach: “If the modification is essentially a
reinstatement of the property settlement under the guise
of alimony, the modification violates section 524 and is
not permitted. . . . mere attempts to ‘end run’ around a
bankruptcy discharge are not allowed. . . . however, if
the alimony modification merely takes into account the
fact that one spouse would no longer receive the property
settlement payments upon which the original support
award was premised and the discharge results in changed
financial circumstances, then modification will not violate
federal bankruptcy law.” . . . 589 N.W.2d at 757.
Collett, 270 Neb. at 730-31, 707 N.W.2d at 775-76.
[7,8] A postbankruptcy alimony modification violates the
discharge injunction of the Bankruptcy Code when the spouse
seeking modification of alimony is merely attempting to
reinstate a discharged property settlement obligation, rather
than seeking a modification based on changed circumstances.
See In re Siragusa, 27 F.3d 406 (9th Cir. 1994). Clearly,
Collett involves uncontemplated and materially changed cir-
cumstances, because the parties both anticipated that the
collateral would cover the bank debt and that there would
be no deficiency, when in fact, there was a substantial short-
age after the bank disposed of the collateral. Accordingly,
the modification did not violate the discharge injunction of
the Bankruptcy Code. In the present case, matthew did not
plead a change of circumstances as the basis for his requested
modification, nor did the trial court find such a change in
ordering the reduction in alimony, but we need not decide
290 	17 NeBrASkA AppeLLATe repOrTS

whether such shortcomings are fatal to the attempted modi-
fication, because there was a lack of proof of changed cir-
cumstances. The only evidence that remotely resembles any
change is that matthew had to pay $4,300 to Citibank that
he did not anticipate paying, but he introduced no evidence
of how that impacted his overall financial situation, as was
done in Collett. Therefore, because of the lack of a mate-
rial change in circumstances, matthew’s motion concerning
the Citibank account is simply an attempt to reinstate the
discharged Citibank debt—and he did not avail himself of
an adversary proceeding, where he could have contested the
discharge of this debt before the bankruptcy court entered its
discharge. Nonspousal support obligations or debts incurred
in the course of a marital dissolution proceeding are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy unless “discharging such debt
would result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the det-
rimental consequences to a spouse, former spouse, or child of
the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(B) (2000). This “defense”
to discharge can be asserted by a codebtor such as matthew in
an adversary proceeding.
In conclusion, the district court erred in modifying Christi’s
alimony payments, because matthew did not prove a material
change of circumstances, matthew did not challenge the dis-
charge of the Citibank debt in an adversary proceeding, and the
request for modification is merely an attempt to reinstate a dis-
charged debt and, thus, is an “end run” around the bankruptcy
discharge. For these reasons, we vacate the district court’s
modification of Christi’s alimony award.
Reopening of Record.
Christi claims that the trial court should have allowed her
to reopen the record so that she could establish that matthew
lied when he testified that he had not withdrawn approxi-
mately $33,000 from his Douglas County employees’ retire-
ment trust fund. Christi argues that adducing such evidence
would have allowed the court to consider such sum as evidence
of matthew’s earnings and as a basis for calculating child sup-
port—putting his income close to what he earned as a sheriff’s
deputy and thereby preventing the court from modifying his
mUrphy v. mUrphy 	291
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 279

child support and alimony downward. however, our decision
that the court erred in reducing matthew’s child support and
alimony moots this argument. As a result, we need not discuss
this assignment of error any further. See Kelly v. Kelly, 246
Neb. 55, 516 N.W.2d 612 (1994) (appellate court is not obli-
gated to engage in analysis which is not necessary to adjudicate
case and controversy before it).
CONCLUSION
Because matthew’s loss of the job upon which his child
support was calculated, and his alimony was predicated, was
directly caused by his failure to conform to his employer’s
policies and expectations at a time when he was on probation-
ary status, the blame for the loss of his job cannot be laid at
Christi’s doorstep. The loss of the job was due to matthew’s
employment misconduct, and as a result, he is not entitled to
a reduction in his child support or alimony obligations. Thus,
we reverse and vacate the trial court’s decision granting such
modification. Because matthew failed to overcome the effect
of the discharge of the Citibank debt by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court, he was not entitled to a credit of $4,300 by way of a
$100 per month reduction in his alimony obligation, and we
reverse and vacate the trial court’s order extending such credit
to him.
reversed And vAcAted.
sievers, Judge, participating on briefs.
292 	17 NeBrASkA AppeLLATe repOrTS