State v. Blair

fact is that neither what the parties thought the judge meant
nor what the judge thought he or she meant, after time for
appeal has passed, is of any relevance. . . .’” Gutierrez v.
Gutierrez, 5 Neb. App. 205, 217, 557 N.W.2d 44, 52 (1996).
What the decree, as it became final, means as a matter of law
as determined from the four corners of the decree is what
is relevant. Id. Because the decree left unresolved an issue
that the court was required by statute to resolve, it cannot be
a final order no matter how the district court characterized
its actions.
CONCLUSION
Because the decree from which Amardip appealed does not
incorporate a parenting plan as is required by § 43-2929, we
conclude that the decree was not a final, appealable order and
that we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
A ppeAl dismissed.
stAte of NebrAskA, Appellee , v.
steveN r. blAir , AppellANt.
767 N.W.2d 143
Filed May 19, 2009. 	No. A-08-587.
1. Attorneys at Law: Stipulations. The unsupported assertions of attorneys during
court proceedings do not establish the facts asserted unless the other appropriate
parties stipulate to such facts.
2. Courts: Arrests: Records. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3523(2)(c) (Reissue
2008), which requires that the notation of a person’s arrest be removed from the
record if the charges are later dismissed, the person arrested may file a petition
seeking to enforce his or her right to have their record expunged.
3. Courts: Arrests: Records: Proof. A trial court may not grant a person’s petition
seeking to enforce his or her right to have a record expunged under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 29-3523(2)(c) (Reissue 2008) unless the petitioner proves that the charges
against him or her have not been removed from the record.
4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. Where the record adequately demonstrates that
the decision of a trial court is correct—although such correctness is based on a
ground or reason different from that assigned by the trial court—an appellate
court will affirm.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: G reGory
m. schAtz, Judge. Affirmed.
STATe v. BLAIR 	611
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 611
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:15 AM CST

Steven R. Blair, pro se.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss for
appellee.
irwiN, cArlsoN, and moore, Judges.
cArlsoN, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Steven R. Blair appeals from an order of the district court
for Douglas County denying his motions to expunge certain
information from the public record and to return his bond
money. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 1998, Blair was convicted of kidnapping, use of a deadly
weapon to commit a felony, and terroristic threats. In 2003,
Blair moved for postconviction relief. The district court granted
the motion, setting aside Blair’s convictions and sentences and
ordering a new trial. The State appealed to this court.
Before the State’s appeal was heard, Blair filed another
motion—a motion for status of the case on jurisdiction. In that
motion, Blair requested that the district court release him on
bond and appoint counsel for the appeal. While the motion was
under advisement in the district court, we ordered the district
court to rule on Blair’s request for counsel. The district court
granted Blair’s request for counsel but denied the remainder of
Blair’s motion because it lacked jurisdiction.
Shortly thereafter, we dismissed the State’s appeal and con-
cluded that the court lacked jurisdiction due to Blair’s motion
to alter or amend the judgment. See State v. Blair, 14 Neb.
App. 190, 707 N.W.2d 8 (2005). After the State’s appeal was
dismissed, a new trial date was set. Before trial, the county
attorney moved to dismiss the case and the district court
entered an order of dismissal.
After the case was dismissed, Blair filed separate motions for
expungement and return of his bond money. In his motion for
expungement, Blair asked the court for an order expunging from
all official records, other than those nonpublic records retained
by the Omaha police, his arrest, indictment, information, trial,
612 	17 NeBRASKA AppeLLATe RepORTS

and dismissal. In his motion for the return of his bond money,
Blair moved for an order requiring the county court to return
his full bond and asked that a 10-percent administrative fee
be waived.
A hearing was held on May 6, 2008. In an order filed May
14, the district court denied both motions. Blair appeals.
ASSIGNMeNT OF eRROR
Blair argues that the district court erred in determining that
it was without authority to rule on his motions for expunge-
ment of the public record and a return of his bond money.
ANALYSIS
Return of Bond Money.
Regarding the bond money, Blair claims that the district
court had discretion to remit the full amount of his bond. Blair
claims he is entitled to a return of a 10-percent administra-
tive fee, because he did not breach any conditions of release.
The transcript shows that in February 2006, the trial court set
Blair’s bond at $75,000 and ordered Blair to pay 10 percent.
At the hearing, Blair’s counsel stated that Blair received 90
percent of his bond when his case was dismissed, but that a 10-
percent administrative fee was withheld. Blair’s counsel argued
that Blair was requesting that the administrative fee be waived
on the bases that his case was dismissed and his previous con-
victions were overturned.
The State argues that Blair is not entitled to recovery,
because he failed to present any evidence supporting his
motion for the return of his bond money. Specifically, the State
contends that Blair’s counsel’s comments at the hearing are
not evidence and that there is no evidence which shows that
Blair put up his bond or that the entire bond was not returned
to Blair. We agree.
[1] The unsupported assertions of attorneys during court
proceedings do not establish the facts asserted unless the other
appropriate parties stipulate to such facts. Schroeder v. Barnes,
5 Neb. App. 811, 565 N.W.2d 749 (1997). We find that because
the State failed to stipulate that Blair posted his bond and that
it had not been returned and because Blair failed to present
STATe v. BLAIR 	613
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 611

such evidence, the trial court did not err in overruling Blair’s
motion to return his bond.
Expungement of Blair’s Record.
[2] As for the expungement issue, Blair claims he should
have his record expunged because he falls within Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 29-3523(2)(c) (Reissue 2008), which states:
In the case of an arrest for which charges are filed, but
dismissed by the court on motion of the prosecuting attor-
ney or as a result of a hearing not the subject of a pending
appeal, the arrest shall not be part of the public record
after three years from the date of arrest.
The State claims that this court is unable to address Blair’s
argument because Blair attempted to invoke a procedure to
expunge his record which is not authorized by § 29-3523(2)(c).
The State notes that § 29-3523(2)(c) appears to apply auto-
matically and does not authorize a person to file a petition
to expunge. We disagree. The language of § 29-3523(2)(c)
appears to be self-executing—specifically, if the conditions fit,
a notation of dismissal shall be made on the defendant’s record.
And therefore, even though Blair did not need to file a petition
to expunge, the fact that he did so does not mean that Blair’s
claim cannot be addressed. Therefore, the trial court erred in
finding that it was without authority to grant Blair’s motion
to expunge.
[3] Although this is true, we conclude, after reviewing the
record, that the trial court reached the correct conclusion for
the wrong reasons. At the hearing on Blair’s motion, Blair’s
attorney asked the court to issue an order for the Omaha police
Department to erase Blair’s charges from his criminal record.
Blair did not present evidence showing that the charges were
still on his record and that expungement was required.
[4] Given this lack of evidence, we cannot say that the trial
court erred in denying Blair’s motion to expunge the record.
Where the record adequately demonstrates that the decision
of a trial court is correct—although such correctness is based
on a ground or reason different from that assigned by the trial
court—an appellate court will affirm. State v. Draganescu, 276
Neb. 448, 755 N.W.2d 57 (2008).
614 	17 NeBRASKA AppeLLATe RepORTS

CONCLUSION
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district
court did not err in denying Blair’s motions for expungement
of the public record and return of his bond money, given
that Blair failed to present sufficient evidence to support his
claims. Therefore, the district court’s order is affirmed in
its entirety.
A ffirmed.
pAmelA s. wilkiNs et Al ., Appellees , v. richArd f.
berGstrom , m.d., AppellANt.
767 N.W.2d 136
Filed May 19, 2009. 	No. A-08-801.
1. Jury Instructions: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Whether a jury instruction
given by a trial court is correct is a question of law. When reviewing questions of
law, an appellate court has an obligation to resolve the questions independently
of the conclusion reached by the trial court.
2. Motions for New Trial: Appeal and Error. Decisions regarding motions for
new trial are directed to the discretion of the trial court, and will be upheld in the
absence of an abuse of discretion.
3. Trial: Waiver: Appeal and Error. Failure to make a timely objection waives the
right to assert prejudicial error on appeal.
4. Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. The failure to object to instructions after
they have been submitted to counsel for review or to offer more specific instruc-
tions if counsel feels the court-tendered instructions are not sufficiently specific
will preclude raising an objection on appeal, unless there is a plain error indica-
tive of a probable miscarriage of justice.
5. Jury Instructions: Proof: Appeal and Error. To establish reversible error from
a court’s failure to give a requested jury instruction, an appellant has the burden
to show that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct statement of the law, (2) the
tendered instruction was warranted by the evidence, and (3) the appellant was
prejudiced by the court’s failure to give the requested instruction.
6. Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a claim of prejudice from
jury instructions given or refused, an appellate court must read the instructions
together, and if, taken as a whole, they correctly state the law, are not misleading,
and adequately cover the issues supported by the pleadings and evidence, there is
no prejudicial error.
7. Jury Instructions. The trial court is not required to give a proffered instruction
which unduly emphasizes a part of the evidence in the case.
WILKINS v. BeRGSTROM 	615
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 615