In re Interest of Ethan M.

CONCLUSION
Because the requests for admission at issue were com-
pound and unnecessarily complicated, we affirm the district
court’s judgment affirming the county court’s decision denying
McCormick’s motion for the costs she incurred in proving the
matters contained therein.
A ffirmed.
in re interest of ethAn m., A child under 18 yeArs of Age .
stAte of nebrAskA, Appellee , v. theresA s., Appellee ,
And dAniel m., AppellAnt.
774 N.W.2d 766
Filed October 13, 2009. 	No. A-09-282.
1. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions of law, an appellate
court has an obligation to resolve the questions independently of the conclusion
reached by the trial court.
2. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. A county court or separate juvenile court which
already has jurisdiction over the child whose paternity or custody is to be deter-
mined has jurisdiction over such paternity or custody determination.
3. Child Custody. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2740(1)(b) (Reissue 2008), a
custody determination is defined as a proceeding to determine custody of a child
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364 (Reissue 2008).
4. ____. Ordinarily, custody of a minor child will not be modified unless there has
been a material change in circumstances showing that the custodial parent is unfit
or that the best interests of the child require such action.
5. ____. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364(6) (Reissue 2008), a custody modifi-
cation action shall be commenced by filing a complaint to modify.
6. Juvenile Courts: Final Orders. Orders determining where a juvenile will be
placed are dispositional in nature.
7. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. The juvenile court’s jurisdiction over any indi-
vidual adjudged to be within the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247 (Reissue
2008) shall continue until the individual reaches the age of majority or the court
otherwise discharges the individual from its jurisdiction.
8. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Statutes. The juvenile court is a court of limited
jurisdiction. As a statutorily created court of limited and special jurisdiction, a
juvenile court has only such authority as has been conferred on it by statute.
9. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Parental Rights: Proof. When a juvenile court
does not have jurisdiction, it has no power to order a parent to comply with a
rehabilitation plan, nor does the juvenile court have any power over the parent or
child at the disposition hearing unless jurisdiction is alleged and proven by new
facts at a new adjudication-disposition hearing.
IN Re INTeReST OF eThAN M. 	63
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 63
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:13 AM CST

10. Appeal and Error: Words and Phrases. Plain error exists where there is an
error, plainly evident from the record but not complained of at trial, which preju-
dicially affects a substantial right of a litigant and is of such a nature that to leave
it uncorrected would cause a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to the
integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process.
Appeal from the County Court for Sherman County: gAry
g. WAshburn, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
Jerom e. Janulewicz, of Mayer, Burns, Koenig & Janulewicz,
for appellant.
Mark L. eurek, Sherman County Attorney, and Monika e.
Anderson, Special Assistant Attorney General, for appellee
State of Nebraska.
Jason S. White for appellee Theresa S.
William J. erickson, guardian ad litem.
sievers, cArlson, and cAssel, Judges.
cAssel, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Previously, in In re Interest of Ethan M., 15 Neb. App. 148,
723 N.W.2d 363 (2006), we decided that reasonable efforts had
to be made to reunite ethan M. with his father, Daniel M., who
has primary physical custody of ethan pursuant to a divorce
decree. ethan was never returned to his father and is still placed
with his mother, Theresa S. In the instant case, the county
court entered an order adopting a case plan which purported
to terminate almost all of ethan’s parenting time with Daniel;
placed care, custody, and control of ethan with Theresa; and
dismissed the juvenile case. Because the order does not per-
manently modify child custody and is a dispositional order, the
dismissal of this case will render the remainder of the court’s
final order unenforceable. Because the only remaining enforce-
able order regarding child custody is the divorce decree placing
physical custody of ethan with Daniel and neither the court
nor the Department of health and human Services (DhhS)
intended this outcome, we find that the county court committed
64 	18 NeBRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS

plain error in entering such an order and remand this cause for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.
BACKGROUND
ethan is the child of Daniel and Theresa. When they divorced,
Daniel received primary physical custody of ethan pursuant to
a divorce decree. While ethan was in Daniel’s custody, Daniel
lived with and later married Amanda h., who had custody of
her two children. According to our previous opinion, while
Amanda and Daniel lived together but before they married,
Amanda’s two children suffered serious bodily injuries. Both
of Amanda’s children and ethan were removed from the home
and adjudicated to be children within the meaning of Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2004). however, in this time
period, ethan sustained no physical injuries and was not abused
or neglected.
The county court found that DhhS did not have to make
reasonable efforts to reunify the family pursuant to Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 43-283.01(4) (Reissue 2004) because a parent had “sub-
jected the juvenile to aggravated circumstances, including, but
not limited to . . . chronic abuse.” Based upon this finding, the
court placed ethan with his mother, who resided in California.
This was the matter before us in In re Interest of Ethan M.,
supra, where we reversed the county court’s finding regard-
ing reasonable efforts as to ethan because (1) Amanda did not
fulfill the statutory definition of “parent” as to ethan, since she
was not married to Daniel when the petition for adjudication
was filed, and (2) Daniel had not harmed his own children.
We ordered that “ethan should be placed in a situation in
Nebraska that is conducive to reunification with Daniel,” but
did not order that ethan be immediately returned to Daniel’s
custody because Daniel was then married to Amanda, who had
admitted to abusing one of her own children. Id. at 158, 723
N.W.2d at 371.
ethan subsequently returned to Nebraska and resided with
Theresa and her current husband. Upon ethan’s return, DhhS
arranged for supervised in-person visitation between Daniel
and ethan. The visits were to occur weekly. This visitation
began in June 2007. In August, after ethan was hospitalized
IN Re INTeReST OF eThAN M. 	65
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 63

for mental health issues, the visitation became therapeutic visi-
tation, which meant that it was supervised by a mental health
professional. In September, the visitation ceased because DhhS
was unable to find a mental health professional who could pro-
vide supervision. In-person visitation has not resumed. The
only other interaction which ethan has with his father consists
of telephonic visitation which DhhS arranged to occur on
Tuesdays and Thursdays. ethan often ends these telephone
calls quickly or refuses to speak with his father. however, this
form of visitation was ongoing at the time of trial.
ethan has been diagnosed with mental health problems
requiring extensive treatment, including anxiety disorder and
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Psychological reports
did not reach any clear conclusion about the source of ethan’s
problems. however, in totality, evidence adduced from mental
health professionals suggests that ethan’s symptoms are con-
sistent with either (1) Daniel’s abusing either ethan or ethan’s
stepsiblings, which abuse may have been real, greatly enhanced
by ethan’s reports, or imagined, or (2) neglect and numerous
changes. Additionally, the general consensus of the mental
health professionals who have seen ethan is that he is imagina-
tive and does not always tell the truth.
After 	ethan 	returned 	from 	California, 	he 	repeatedly
expressed that he hated his father, was fearful of him, and
believed that he abused children. According to a licensed men-
tal health professional who worked extensively with ethan,
ethan expressed severe anxiety regarding visits with his father.
Further, Theresa may have been making statements to ethan to
encourage him to express his dislike for his father. The record
reflects that ethan did not have such extensive problems in
his relationship with his father after he was removed from his
father’s care but prior to moving to California. At that time,
ethan had regular visitation with Daniel and was not fearful
of Daniel. The records of visitation reflect that there were no
serious problems, but that ethan would often become very
upset when things did not go his way.
Daniel’s living situation has changed because he separated
from Amanda. Daniel was convicted of stalking Amanda and
charged with violating a protection order. Theresa also has
66 	18 NeBRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS

certain problems in that she has a longstanding diagnosis of
bipolar disorder.
Ultimately, DhhS submitted a case plan to the county court
dated January 15, 2009, which recommended that “the care,
custody, and control of . . . ethan be moved to Theresa,” that
telephonic visitation continue, that “ethan’s therapist work[]
with ethan on having contact with his father again sometime in
the future when ethan is ready,” and that the case be dismissed.
At a January 22 proceeding, the court heard Daniel’s objec-
tion to the plan, his motion for a change in ethan’s placement,
and his motion to require DhhS to make reasonable efforts to
reunify him with ethan.
On February 20, 2009, the court adopted the DhhS case
plan. The court found that “the evidence failed to establish that
the plan was contrary to the best interest[s] of the juvenile.”
The court determined that reasonable efforts to reunify were no
longer necessary as to Daniel. In the same vein, the court found
that the permanency plan had changed from reunification with
the father to placement with the mother; ordered that “the care,
custody[,] and control of ethan . . . be placed with Theresa”;
and dismissed the case.
Daniel timely appeals.
ASSIGNMeNTS OF eRROR
Daniel alleges, restated, that the county court erred in (1)
finding that reasonable efforts were made toward reunification;
(2) finding that a lack of progress was made toward reunifica-
tion; (3) finding that Daniel failed to fulfill his burden to prove
that the DhhS case plan was not in ethan’s best interests; (4)
approving and adopting the DhhS case plan, placing custody
of ethan with his mother, and dismissing the juvenile case;
and (5) entering a decision contrary to our previous opinion in
this matter.
STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1] When reviewing questions of law, an appellate court
has an obligation to resolve the questions independently of
the conclusion reached by the trial court. Harvey v. Nebraska
Life & Health Ins. Guar. Assn., 277 Neb. 757, 765 N.W.2d
206 (2009).
IN Re INTeReST OF eThAN M. 	67
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 63

ANALYSIS
Briefly summarized, Daniel’s assignments of error are all
related to the fact that the county court’s order purported to
place custody of ethan with Theresa and practically eliminate
his parenting time, but did not require DhhS to make any
further efforts to reunify him with ethan. Further, the parties
premise their arguments on a belief that the county court’s
order modified the previous custody determination. Thus, in
order to reach Daniel’s assigned errors, we are required to
first determine the effect of the county court’s final order.
Ultimately, we do not reach Daniel’s assigned errors because
we find plain error in the final order.
Final Order Does Not Modify Child Custody.
First, because the parties seem to have interpreted the
county court’s order as a permanent determination of child
custody, we must determine whether the order has such effect.
Daniel’s understanding of the situation is that “custody has
been placed with [the] mother” and that the court’s order “pro-
vides no mechanism to re-evaluate at any time in the future
the re-establishment of visitation between ethan and [Daniel].”
Brief for appellant at 19, 16. The brief submitted by DhhS, the
county attorney, the guardian ad litem, and Theresa explicitly
states that the county court’s order was a “custody determina-
tion.” Brief for appellees at 12. however, we conclude that this
interpretation is not correct. In this instance, because custody
had already been determined pursuant to a divorce decree, a
custody determination would consist of a custody modification
order. Because we conclude that no custody modification pro-
ceeding occurred, the court could not enter an order modifying
child custody.
[2,3] We begin by noting that a county court sitting as a
juvenile court has the power to conduct a child custody modi-
fication proceeding because it has been granted subject matter
jurisdiction to do so. Pursuant to 2008 Neb. Laws, L.B. 280,
the Legislature modified the jurisdiction of juvenile courts and
county courts sitting as juvenile courts so that these courts
could exercise jurisdiction over custody matters when the court
already has jurisdiction over the juvenile for another purpose.
68 	18 NeBRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS

See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-517, 25-2740, and 43-247 (Reissue
2008). In this regard, § 25-2740(3) provides that “a county
court or separate juvenile court which already has jurisdiction
over the child whose paternity or custody is to be determined
has jurisdiction over such paternity or custody determina-
tion.” Pursuant to § 25-2740(1)(b), a custody determination is
defined as a proceeding “to determine custody of a child under
[Neb. Rev. Stat. §] 42-364 [(Reissue 2008)].” Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 42-364 (Reissue 2008) pertains to custody actions includ-
ing those involving “[m]odification proceedings.” Prior to the
passage of L.B. 280, juvenile courts and county courts sitting
as juvenile courts did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
such proceedings.
In the instant case, the county court could have exercised
this jurisdiction to modify custody because ethan was already
within the court’s jurisdiction as a child found to be within the
meaning of § 43-247(3)(a) and a modification is a “custody
determination” pursuant to § 42-364.
however, we conclude that the county court did not exer-
cise such jurisdiction. We conclude that in passing L.B. 280,
the Legislature’s explicit intent was to vest the juvenile courts
and the county courts with jurisdiction to make a custody
determination pursuant to § 42-364 under the same standards
applicable to a custody modification proceeding heard in dis-
trict court. First, L.B. 280 incorporates other statutes which
normally govern the applicable procedure in all other custody
proceedings. Section 25-2740(1)(b) and (3), as amended by
L.B. 280, provides for juvenile courts to have jurisdiction over
“proceedings to establish the paternity of a child under sec-
tions 43-1411 to 43-1418 or proceedings to determine custody
of a child under section 42-364.” Section 42-364 generally sets
forth the procedure and applicable standards for the determina-
tion of custody in paternity actions, dissolution proceedings,
and the modification of custody orders. See, § 42-364 (speci-
fying that it governs actions “under Chapter 42,” which are
dissolution proceedings); State on behalf of Pathammavong v.
Pathammavong, 268 Neb. 1, 679 N.W.2d 749 (2004) (applying
§ 42-364 to custody determination in paternity action). Second,
L.B. 280 does not amend § 42-364, provide a procedure
IN Re INTeReST OF eThAN M. 	69
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 63

separate from § 42-364, or purport to modify any other rule
governing the determination of custody in dissolution proceed-
ings, paternity actions, or modification proceedings. It simply
provides for jurisdiction.
For the sake of completeness, we have reviewed the legis-
lative history of L.B. 280, which shows that in passing L.B. 280,
the Legislature did not intend to modify procedure, but, rather,
intended to expand the jurisdiction of juvenile and county
courts. Senator Arnie Stuthman, in introducing this bill on the
floor of the Legislature, explained the purpose of L.B. 280
as follows:
LB 280 would give juvenile courts the jurisdiction to enter
permanent custody orders for children that are involved in
a juvenile case. In 2003 the Nebraska Supreme Court
handed down a decision, Ponseigo v. Mary W., [267 Neb.
72, 672 N.W.2d 36 (2003),] that has been interpreted by
the courts to mean that the district court has no jurisdic-
tion to decide final custody of children when there is an
accompanying juvenile action. Juvenile courts currently
have no statutory authority to determine custody. Under
the current statute and case law, the district courts and
juvenile courts are unable to address the necessary amend-
ments regarding physical placement or physical custody,
and child support determinations to divorce, modification
cases, or paternity custody actions when the parents were
never married, that may be necessary to achieve perma-
nency for children who have been made ward[s] of the
state. . . . Some children, therefore, remain in limbo in
juvenile court because custody cannot be established in
juvenile court. Giving juvenile courts authority to enter
final custody orders in cases in which the juvenile court is
already involved would provide a timelier placement for
children in state custody.
Floor Debate, L.B. 280, 100th Leg., 2d Sess. 30-31 (Feb. 6,
2008). From Senator Stuthman’s statement regarding Ponseigo
v. Mary W., 267 Neb. 72, 672 N.W.2d 36 (2003), it is readily
apparent that the primary purpose of L.B. 280 was to remedy the
problem that the district court, which normally determines cus-
tody, could not do so when the child was under the jurisdiction
70 	18 NeBRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS

of the juvenile court. In Ponseigo v. Mary W., the Nebraska
Supreme Court determined that the district court did not have
jurisdiction to award grandparent visitation where the juvenile
court had jurisdiction over the minor pursuant to § 43-247(3)
(Reissue 1998). This decision was in part based on the court’s
determination that a juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction
over a juvenile adjudicated to be within § 43-247(3). Thus, it
seems that Senator Stuthman wanted to ensure that there was
a court which could fulfill the role normally played by the
district court in custody determinations—not to change the
nature of custody determination proceedings. Because none of
the additional legislative history indicates any legislative intent
to materially modify the procedure in a custody determination,
it appears that the Legislature simply intended to transplant
custody proceedings from district court to juvenile and county
courts under particular circumstances during certain juvenile
proceedings—not to modify the procedure applicable to a cus-
tody proceeding.
[4] Thus, in the instant case, in order to modify custody,
the county court was supposed to conduct a custody modifi-
cation proceeding in the manner that a custody modification
proceeding is normally conducted in district court. however,
in substance, there was no proceeding that resembled a cus-
tody modification proceeding. First and most importantly, the
county court applied an incorrect standard of proof. Ordinarily,
custody of a minor child will not be modified unless there
has been a material change in circumstances showing that
the custodial parent is unfit or that the best interests of the
child require such action. Heistand v. Heistand, 267 Neb. 300,
673 N.W.2d 541 (2004). In the instant case, the court modi-
fied custody based upon its finding that “the evidence failed
to establish that [DhhS’] plan [which changed custody] was
contrary to the best interests of the juvenile.” This is the cor-
rect standard of proof for the approval of a DhhS case plan
pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-285(2) (Reissue 2008), but it
is not the standard of proof in a custody modification action.
Under the standard the court applied, Theresa received custody
because Daniel was unable to disprove that it was in ethan’s
best interests. Under the custody modification standard, the
IN Re INTeReST OF eThAN M. 	71
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 63

moving party, whether it was the State or Theresa, would have
to prove both that there was a material change in circumstances
and that it was in ethan’s best interests that custody be granted
to Theresa.
[5] Second, the court did not even purport to follow certain
requirements contained in § 42-364 which apply to modifica-
tion actions. Pursuant to § 42-364(6), a custody modification
action “shall be commenced by filing a complaint to modify.”
No such complaint was filed. Theresa filed a “motion for cus-
tody” which she withdrew and is not contained in the record.
Additionally, the court failed to enter a parenting plan or calcu-
late child support. In an action “involving child support, child
custody, parenting time, visitation, or other access,” § 42-364(1)
requires that the final order incorporate a parenting plan and a
child support order. Neither of these items was incorporated
into the final order or discussed on the record.
For these reasons, we conclude that the county court did
not conduct any proceeding which remotely resembled a child
custody proceeding. We hold that where the only issue placed
in front of the county court is whether a case plan is in the
child’s best interests, permanent child custody cannot be modi-
fied merely through the adoption of the case plan. however, we
also emphasize that a case plan could be used to place a child
with a noncustodial parent as a dispositional order under the
continuing supervision of the juvenile court.
Effect of Order.
[6] Because the county court’s order does not modify cus-
tody, we must determine its precise effect. Since the county
court’s order places “custody” of ethan with Theresa, it is
best characterized as a dispositional order. Orders determining
where a juvenile will be placed are dispositional in nature. In
re Interest of Taylor W., 276 Neb. 679, 757 N.W.2d 1 (2008).
Additionally, a dispositional order can include a court-ordered
plan for parental rehabilitation, see In re Interest of Ty M. &
Devon M., 265 Neb. 150, 655 N.W.2d 672 (2003), or services
for the child, see In re Interest of Emily C., 15 Neb. App. 847,
738 N.W.2d 858 (2007). In light of the fact that this is a dis-
positional order and also dismissed the juvenile case, we must
determine its effect on ethan’s placement.
72 	18 NeBRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS

[7] By dismissing the case, the county court terminated its
jurisdiction over the juvenile case. Section 43-247 (Reissue
2004) provides that “the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over any
individual adjudged to be within the provisions of this section
shall continue until the individual reaches the age of major-
ity or the court otherwise discharges the individual from its
jurisdiction.” Thus, the county court had the power to dismiss
ethan’s case and, by doing so, ended the court’s jurisdiction
over the child.
[8,9] Once the county court’s jurisdiction ends, it lacks the
power to enforce its previous dispositional orders. The juvenile
court is a court of limited jurisdiction. As a statutorily created
court of limited and special jurisdiction, a juvenile court has
only such authority as has been conferred on it by statute. In
re Interest of Dustin S., 276 Neb. 635, 756 N.W.2d 277 (2008).
The Nebraska Supreme Court has previously explained what
happens when a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction in the context
of an invalid adjudication. See In re Interest of D.M.B., 240
Neb. 349, 481 N.W.2d 905 (1992). In In re Interest of D.M.B.,
the Supreme Court explained that when a juvenile court does
not have jurisdiction, it has “no power . . . to order a parent to
comply with a rehabilitation plan, nor does the juvenile court
have any power over the parent or child at the disposition hear-
ing unless jurisdiction is alleged and proven by new facts at a
new adjudication-disposition hearing.” 240 Neb. at 352, 481
N.W.2d at 909. Although the context of the instant case is dif-
ferent, the concept is the same. Where a juvenile court lacks
jurisdiction, it lacks the power to require the parties to comply
with its dispositional orders.
Although 	this 	premise 	has 	not 	previously 	been 	made
explicit in the context of a juvenile court’s terminating its
jurisdiction, it has been applied implicitly. When this court
and the Nebraska Supreme Court have reviewed juvenile
courts’ decisions whether to terminate jurisdiction, we have
equated the termination of jurisdiction with the termination
of court-ordered services and out-of-home placement. The
most pertinent example is In re Interest of L.P. and R.P.,
240 Neb. 112, 480 N.W.2d 421 (1992), where in reversing
the juvenile court’s decision to terminate jurisdiction over
IN Re INTeReST OF eThAN M. 	73
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 63

juveniles adjudicated to be within § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue
1988), the Nebraska Supreme Court considered that the chil-
dren would be returned to a potentially abusive parent if the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction were terminated. Additionally,
in In re Interest of Emily C., 15 Neb. App. 847, 738 N.W.2d
858 (2007), this court affirmed the juvenile court’s decision
to retain jurisdiction over a juvenile adjudicated to be within
§ 43-247(3)(b) (Reissue 2004) for truancy because the juve-
nile continued to need an out-of-home placement to deal with
truancy-related issues. Finally, in In re Interest of Vincent
P., 15 Neb. App. 437, 445, 730 N.W.2d 403, 409 (2007), in
affirming a county court’s decision not to terminate jurisdic-
tion over a juvenile adjudicated to be within § 43-247(3)(b)
(Cum. Supp. 2002) for sexually assaulting a child, we consid-
ered the fact that the juvenile “would benefit from continued
therapy and supervision.”
Therefore, it is clear that the termination of the county
court’s jurisdiction over ethan’s juvenile case will render the
court powerless to enforce its dispositional orders, including
the court’s order placing ethan with Theresa. Because the
county court did not permanently modify custody, the place-
ment will become ineffective once the order becomes final. The
sole remaining order controlling child custody is the divorce
decree, which places primary physical custody of ethan with
Daniel. From the face of the county court’s order, it is clear
that this is far from the court’s intended result.
[10] We conclude that the county court’s final order was
plainly erroneous. Plain error exists where there is an error,
plainly evident from the record but not complained of at trial,
which prejudicially affects a substantial right of a litigant and
is of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would cause a
miscarriage of justice or result in damage to the integrity, repu-
tation, and fairness of the judicial process. Worth v. Kolbeck,
273 Neb. 163, 728 N.W.2d 282 (2007). The order’s stated
purpose is to place “care, custody[,] and control of ethan . . .
with his mother, Theresa” as part of ethan’s permanency plan.
Instead, the outcome is that custody of ethan will be placed
with Daniel. We therefore reverse the county court’s termina-
tion of its jurisdiction over ethan’s juvenile case and remand
74 	18 NeBRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS

the cause for further dispositional proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
CONCLUSION
Because the county court’s final order has the opposite of its
intended effect, it constitutes plain error. Because the juvenile
court dismissed ethan’s juvenile case but did not enter any
order having a permanent effect on ethan’s custody, the court
lacks the power to enforce its placement of ethan with Theresa.
The only remaining effective order governing child custody is
a divorce decree which places physical custody of ethan with
Daniel. This is not the placement intended by the county court.
We therefore reverse the order entered by the county court dis-
missing ethan’s juvenile case and remand the cause for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
reversed And remAnded for
further proceedings.
IN Re INTeReST OF eThAN M. 	75
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 63