In re Interest of T.T.

that Lot 4 was sold, and accordingly, there is no evidence that
the joint tenancy was severed.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that there are no genuine issues of material
fact in regard to delivery of the deed and severance of the joint
tenancy. After a movant for summary judgment has shown
facts entitling the movant to judgment as a matter of law, the
opposing party has the burden to present evidence showing an
issue of material fact which prevents judgment as a matter of
law for the moving party. Martin v. Curry, 13 Neb. App. 171,
690 N.W.2d 186 (2004). See, In re Estate of Ellis, 9 Neb. App.
598, 616 N.W.2d 59 (2000); Sindelar v. Hanel Oil, Inc., 6 Neb.
App. 349, 573 N.W.2d 782 (1998); Weatherwax v. Equitable
Variable Life Ins. Co., 5 Neb. App. 926, 567 N.W.2d 609
(1997); Northern Bank v. Pefferoni Pizza Co., 5 Neb. App. 50,
555 N.W.2d 338 (1996). Phyllis, as the opposing party, has
failed to meet her burden. Accordingly, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
A ffirmed.
in re interest of t.t., A child under 18 yeArs of Age .
stAte of nebrAskA, Appellee , v.
s.Q. And A.Q., AppellAnts.
779 N.W.2d 602
Filed December 8, 2009. 	No. A-09-244.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the
record, and an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the
juvenile court’s findings.
2. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In a juvenile case, as in any
other appeal, before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty
of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter
before it.
3. Juvenile Courts: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Dispositional orders of the
juvenile court are final, appealable orders.
4. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. For an appellate court to acquire
jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order entered by the court from
which the appeal is taken.
176 	18 NebrASkA APPeLLAte rePOrtS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:12 AM CST

5. Final Orders. An order affecting a substantial right made during a special pro-
ceeding is one of three types of final orders defined by Nebraska law.
6. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. A proceeding before a juvenile court is a
“special proceeding” for appellate purposes.
7. Final Orders: Time: Appeal and Error. the continuing order doctrine holds
that when a court’s order is already in place and a subsequent order merely
extends the time that the previous order is applicable, the subsequent order does
not extend the time in which the original order may be appealed.
8. Juvenile Courts: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. the continuing order doc-
trine has been extended to juvenile cases, and the subsequent order does not by
itself affect a substantial right.
9. Final Orders: Collateral Attack: Appeal and Error. An appeal from a subse-
quent order that merely continues the effectiveness of a prior order is an imper-
missible collateral attack on the previous order.
10. Words and Phrases. A substantial right is an essential legal right, not a mere
technical right.
11. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A substantial right is affected if the order
affects the subject matter of the litigation, such as diminishing a claim or defense
that was available to an appellant prior to the order from which an appeal
is taken.
12. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights. the question of whether a substantial right
of a parent has been affected by an order in juvenile court litigation is dependent
upon both the object of the order and the length of time over which the parent’s
relationship with the juvenile may reasonably be expected to be disturbed.
13. Constitutional Law. the object of a gag order is to restrain the constitutional
right of free speech.
14. Constitutional Law: Words and Phrases. the right of free speech is “constitu-
tional bedrock” and a right by which other freedoms, such as assembly and free
press, are given meaning and power. therefore, the right which is the object of a
gag order cannot be considered a “mere technical right.”
15. Constitutional Law: Presumptions. Gag orders are a prior restraint on the right
of free speech, and while they are not unconstitutional per se, there is a heavy
presumption against their constitutional validity.
16. Final Orders: Time. Where the burden of an order is blunted by its brief opera-
tive timeframe when considered in the context of the ongoing case, such fact can
support the conclusion that it did not affect a substantial right.
17. Appeal and Error: Time. A litigant must be able to assess whether a court’s order
is appealable when it is entered, not by what happens in the case thereafter.
18. Constitutional Law. Any attempt to effect a prior restraint is subject to exact-
ing scrutiny.
19. ____. the application of exacting scrutiny to a prior restraint requires a court to
make its own inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of the danger and then to
balance the character of the evil against the need for free and unfettered expres-
sion. the possibility that other measures will serve the State’s interests should
also be weighed.
20. ____. the First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints predi-
cated upon the surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result.
IN re INtereSt OF t.t. 	177
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 176

Only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly,
and immediately cause the occurrence of the danger identified can support even
the issuance of an interim restraining order. In no event may mere conclusions
be sufficient.
21. Constitutional Law: Juvenile Courts. A juvenile court, which is not presump-
tively open, has the power to control extrajudicial comments by the litigants,
provided the restrictions are consistent with constitutional standards.
22. Constitutional Law. to secure a prior restraint, the State has to present evidence
of some compelling interest that would be endangered without the limitation
on speech.
23. Constitutional Law: Juvenile Courts. In considering a prior restraint on paren-
tal speech, the juvenile court must conduct a proper inquiry into the government’s
interests and balance the imminence and magnitude of the danger presented
against the parents’ right to free and unfettered expression.
24. Constitutional Law. A judicial order restraining speech will not be held invalid
as a prior restraint if it is (1) necessary to obviate a serious and imminent threat
of impending harm which (2) cannot adequately be addressed by other, less
speech-restrictive means.
25. Constitutional Law: Minors. A restraint on speech against disclosure to the
public of information about a juvenile because it is in the juvenile’s best interests
is insufficient to justify a prior restraint on speech.
26. Constitutional Law. the fact that at least some of the information restricted by
a gag order is already in the public domain is a factor that reduces the effective-
ness of the gag order, as well as undercuts any claim that the danger of harm
is imminent.
27. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights. Once a plan of reunification has been ordered
to correct the conditions underlying an adjudication under Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 43-247(3)(a) (reissue 2008), the plan must be reasonably related to the objec-
tive of reuniting the parents with the children.
28. Parental Rights. the reasonableness of a rehabilitative plan for a parent depends
on the circumstances in a particular case and, therefore, is examined on a case-
by-case basis.
29. Juvenile Courts: Minors. the Nebraska Juvenile Code must be liberally con-
strued to accomplish its purpose of serving the best interests of the juveniles who
fall within it.
30. Juvenile Courts. Juvenile courts have broad discretion to accomplish the purpose
of serving the best interests of the children involved.
31. Juvenile Courts: Child Custody: Visitation. Psychiatric testing or psychologi-
cal evaluations of a parent may be required to determine the best interests of chil-
dren when issues of custody and visitation are presented.
Appeal 	from 	the 	Separate 	Juvenile 	Court 	of 	Lancaster
County: toni g. thorson, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part
reversed and vacated.
Christopher A. Furches, of Furches Law Office, and David P.
kyker for appellants.
178 	18 NebrASkA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

Sarah e. Sujith, Special Assistant Attorney General, for
appellee.
sievers and cAssel, Judges.
sievers, Judge.
this appeal involves a 17-year-old youth, t.t., who was left
by his parents at a Lincoln, Nebraska, hospital under a previ-
ous version of Nebraska’s “Safe Haven” law. the mother and
stepfather, S.Q. and A.Q., respectively, whom we generally
reference throughout as “the parents,” appeal from the decision
of the separate juvenile court of Lancaster County prohibiting
them from disclosing to the public specified information con-
cerning t.t., his medical condition, and his treatment (the gag
order), as well as from the court’s order that they participate in
a pretreatment assessment. We conclude that the gag order can-
not survive constitutional scrutiny, and we reverse, and vacate
that portion of the juvenile court’s order.
FACtUAL AND PrOCeDUrAL bACkGrOUND
S.Q. is t.t.’s biological mother, and A.Q. is t.t.’s stepfather.
On October 28, 2008, S.Q. and A.Q. took 17-year-old t.t. to
a hospital in Lincoln, invoked Nebraska’s Safe Haven law,
and left him there. the version of Nebraska’s Safe Haven law
in effect on October 28 stated in part: “No person shall be
prosecuted for any crime based solely upon the act of leaving
a child in the custody of an employee on duty at a hospital
licensed by the State of Nebraska.” Neb. rev. Stat. § 29-121
(reissue 2008). We note that § 29-121 has since been amended,
although the changes are not germane to this appeal.
the State filed an amended petition on October 29, 2008,
alleging that t.t. was a child as defined by Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 43-247(3)(a) (reissue 2008) because he was “in a situation
dangerous to [his] life or injurious to [his] health or morals”
in that on October 28, S.Q. and A.Q. left him at the hospital
under Nebraska’s Safe Haven law. A motion for temporary
custody was filed and granted that same day. t.t. has been in
the custody of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) since that time. DHHS eventually placed t.t.
with relatives.
IN re INtereSt OF t.t. 	179
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 176

At a hearing on November 24, 2008, S.Q. entered an admis-
sion to the allegations of the amended petition. A.Q. made no
objection to the juvenile court’s accepting the admission and
taking jurisdiction in the matter. by an order filed by the juve-
nile court on November 26, t.t. was adjudicated to be within
the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a) because he was “in a situation
dangerous to [his life] or injurious to [his] health or morals.”
Also pursuant to the November 26 order, S.Q. and A.Q. were
ordered to “not discuss past and ongoing medical treatment
of [t.t.] with the public”—the court designated this portion
of the order as the “additional temporary order.” the record
before us does not indicate at whose instance this gag order
was entered.
On December 10, 2008, DHHS filed a motion to clarify or
amend the November 26 order. On December 11, S.Q. and A.Q.
filed a motion to modify the temporary order. After a hearing
on December 30 on these motions, the court’s order was filed
on January 2, 2009. In that order, the juvenile court stated:
Although disposition has not been entered, it is reason-
able to assume that reunification will be the permanency
goal in this case. [DHHS] is already providing therapeutic
visitation between [t.t.] and his parents to work on the
problems in their relationship and both [t.t.] and his
mother have indicated a desire for further contact. release
of private, sensitive information regarding [t.t.] must be
considered in light of the probable goal of reunification
and [t.t.’s] best interest. Any further public disclosure
by the parent of private medical information to the public
would jeopardize the efforts being made to effect recon-
ciliation and reunification between [t.t.] and his parent
and would be harmful to [t.t.’s] best interest, both in the
long term and short term.
the juvenile court found that it was in t.t.’s “best interest
and it is in furtherance of efforts at reunification” that specific
guidelines be given regarding disclosure or release of t.t.’s
medical information to the public. the juvenile court there-
fore ordered:
[t]here will be no further public disclosure by the parents
of [t.t.’s] private medical information: [t.t.’s] full, legal
180 	18 NebrASkA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

name; [t.t.’s] date of birth; his social security number;
any specific diagnosis that he has been given; any medi-
cation he has been prescribed; names of any providers of
treatment to [t.t.] and type of treatment provided.
In a disposition order filed on February 3, 2009, the juve-
nile court stated that the primary permanency plan for t.t.
was “Independent Living” with an alternative plan of “Self
Sufficiency.” Once again the juvenile court ordered:
there will be no further public disclosure by the parents
of [t.t.’s] private medical information: [t.t.’s] full, legal
name; [t.t.’s] date of birth; his social security number;
any specific diagnosis that he has been given; any medi-
cation he has been prescribed; names of any providers of
treatment to [t.t.] and type of treatment provided.
Hereafter, we will generally reference these two orders by
the term “gag order,” the common colloquial phrase used to
describe orders restricting disclosure or speech. the juvenile
court also ordered S.Q. and A.Q. to “participate in a pretreat-
ment assessment and sign releases of information so that
[DHHS] can provide documents to the evaluator.” S.Q. and
A.Q. now appeal from the district court’s February 3 order.
ASSIGNMeNtS OF errOr
S.Q. and A.Q. allege that the juvenile court erred in (1)
violating their rights to free speech and (2) ordering them to
submit to a pretreatment assessment when the permanency
objective was independent living and not reunification.
StANDArD OF reVIeW
[1] Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the record, and
an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion indepen-
dent of the juvenile court’s findings. In re Interest of Laurance
S., 274 Neb. 620, 742 N.W.2d 484 (2007).
ANALYSIS
Jurisdiction Over Gag Order of February 3, 2009.
[2] In a juvenile case, as in any other appeal, before reach-
ing the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an
appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the
matter before it. In re Interest of Taylor W., 276 Neb. 679, 757
IN re INtereSt OF t.t. 	181
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 176

N.W.2d 1 (2008). Additionally, DHHS has moved to dismiss
the appeal because the order of January 2, 2009, contained an
identical gag order and was a final, appealable order but the
notice of appeal was not filed until February 27, more than 30
days after the January 2 order, and thus, the appeal was filed
out of time. We notified the parties that we would not rule on
the motion to dismiss until after oral argument and submission
of the case for decision.
[3-5] We begin our jurisdictional analysis by noting that
the juvenile court’s order of February 3, 2009, is an “Order
of Disposition” and that such orders of the juvenile court are
final, appealable orders. See In re Interest of Clifford M. et al.,
6 Neb. App. 754, 577 N.W.2d 547 (1998). but here, the State
asserts that both of the parents’ assignments of error involve
matters over which we have no jurisdiction even though this
appeal was filed within 30 days of the February 3 order. It is
well known that in order for an appellate court to acquire juris-
diction of an appeal, there must be a final order entered by the
court from which the appeal is taken. In re Interest of Michael
U., 273 Neb. 198, 728 N.W.2d 116 (2007). Conversely, an
appellate court is without jurisdiction to entertain appeals from
nonfinal orders. See id. While there are three types of final
orders defined by Nebraska law, we find that the jurisdictional
issue here centers on the second of the three types of appeal-
able orders—an order affecting a substantial right made during
a special proceeding. See In re Estate of Rose, 273 Neb. 490,
730 N.W.2d 391 (2007). See, also, Neb. rev. Stat. § 25-1902
(reissue 2008).
[6-9] there is no doubt that a proceeding before a juvenile
court is a “special proceeding” for appellate purposes. See In
re Interest of Walter W., 274 Neb. 859, 744 N.W.2d 55 (2008).
thus, the jurisdictional issue concerning the gag order is
resolved by determining whether the January 2, 2009, order
affects a substantial right as that concept has been articulated
under Nebraska law. the analysis of this issue is undertaken
against the backdrop that the language in the gag orders of
January 2 and February 3 is identical, a fact which necessarily
involves application of the continuing order doctrine detailed
in Federal Land Bank v. McElhose, 222 Neb. 448, 384 N.W.2d
182 	18 NebrASkA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

295 (1986). In McElhose, the Nebraska Supreme Court held
that when a court’s order is already in place and a subsequent
order merely extends the time that the previous order is appli-
cable, the subsequent order does not extend the time in which
the original order may be appealed. this concept has been
extended to juvenile cases, and the Supreme Court has said
that the subsequent order does not by itself affect a substantial
right. See In re Guardianship of Rebecca B. et al., 260 Neb.
922, 621 N.W.2d 289 (2000). the Supreme Court has reasoned
that an appeal from a subsequent order that merely continues
the effectiveness of a prior order is an impermissible collateral
attack on the previous order. In re Interest of Sarah K., 258
Neb. 52, 601 N.W.2d 780 (1999). thus, at first blush it appears
that the parents had to appeal within 30 days of the January 2
gag order because the February 3 order merely continues the
previous order, using identical language. this is the essence of
the State’s argument asserted in the motion to dismiss, that we
lack jurisdiction.
However, the parents counter that the January 2, 2009, order
was merely a “temporary order” and that it is the February 3
order that affected a substantial right under our jurisdictional
jurisprudence. Accordingly, we must delve deeper into the
nature of a substantial right.
[10,11] A substantial right is an essential legal right, not
a mere technical right. In re Guardianship of Sophia M.,
271 Neb. 133, 710 N.W.2d 312 (2006). A substantial right is
affected if the order affects the subject matter of the litigation,
such as diminishing a claim or defense that was available to an
appellant prior to the order from which an appeal is taken. Id.,
citing In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Larson, 270
Neb. 837, 708 N.W.2d 262 (2006). the parents claim that the
February 3, 2009, order affects a substantial right because the
constitutional guarantee of free speech protects their right to
publicly disclose the information about t.t. that is prohibited
by the trial court’s order of February 3.
[12] In In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 470 N.W.2d 780
(1991), disapproved on other grounds, O’Connor v. Kaufman,
255 Neb. 120, 582 N.W.2d 350 (1998), the court said that the
question of whether a substantial right of a parent has been
IN re INtereSt OF t.t. 	183
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 176

affected by an order in juvenile court litigation is dependent
upon both the object of the order and the length of time over
which the parent’s relationship with the juvenile may reason-
ably be expected to be disturbed. And in In re Interest of
Zachary W. & Alyssa W., 3 Neb. App. 274, 278, 526 N.W.2d
233, 237 (1994), an appeal involving grandparent visitation,
we said that the order being appealed was of “sufficient impor-
tance and may reasonably be expected to last a sufficiently
long period of time that the order affects a substantial right of
[the parent].” Consequently, our analysis of the first gag order,
of January 2, 2009, turns to (1) the object of the order and its
importance and (2) the timeframe over which the order can
reasonably be expected to operate.
[13-15] the object of the gag order is clearly to restrain the
parents’ constitutional right of free speech. the right of free
speech is “constitutional bedrock” and a right by which other
freedoms, such as assembly and free press, are given meaning
and power. therefore, the right which is the object of the gag
order can hardly be considered a “mere technical right.” the
orders at issue are obviously a “prior restraint” on the parents’
right of free speech, and while they are not unconstitutional per
se, there is a “‘heavy presumption’” against their constitutional
validity. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546, 558, 95 S. Ct. 1239, 43 L. ed. 2d 448 (1975). thus,
we readily conclude that the object of the January 2, 2009,
order is of “sufficient importance” under the continuing order
doctrine to make it appealable.
We now turn to the second aspect of the substantial right
analysis—the timeframe during which the January 2, 2009,
order was expected to last. this portion of the analysis requires
that we provide some context from the record concerning the
entry of the court’s order on that date.
earlier, we alluded to the entry of the first gag order by the
juvenile court on November 26, 2008. the November 26 gag
order was worded substantially differently from the January
and February orders. the parents and DHHS both found the
November order to be vague or overbroad and moved the
court for modification of such so as to clarify what the parents
could and could not disclose about t.t. A hearing was held
184 	18 NebrASkA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

December 30 on both motions. In this hearing, the mother,
S.Q., explained that she wanted to participate in a state sena-
tor’s task force examining the Safe Haven law and the avail-
ability of services for troubled youth, as well as be involved
in a “support group” for parents of similarly situated youth.
S.Q. testified that the gag order prevented her from, and we
paraphrase, telling “her story” which is intertwined with “t.t.’s
story.” the evidence was that there was a “parents’ roundtable”
discussion as part of the senator’s task force scheduled for
January 5, 2009, in which S.Q. wanted to participate, but she
did not want to violate the court’s order by anything that she
said. evidence was adduced as to why the parents should be
restricted in what they could say about t.t., but we need not
discuss that evidence in our jurisdictional analysis. After the
evidence had concluded, the juvenile court judge announced
that she would issue her order “before the 5th, so [that the par-
ents would] know what the guidelines are.” And the court did
as promised and issued the new and more refined gag order of
January 2, which replaced the November order.
In considering the time over which the January 2, 2009,
order could reasonably be expected to operate, it is important
to note that this order was captioned by the court as, in part,
“Order Continuing temporary Orders; Notice of Dispositional
Hearing.” the January 2 order, after setting forth factual find-
ings, was structured in five paragraphs. the first contained
the gag order under discussion, and the second dealt with a
visitation issue not of import in this appeal. We quote the next
two paragraphs:
All temporary orders shall continue in full force and
effect until further order of the Court.
Disposition on the Amended Petition is scheduled for
January 7, 2009 at 3:00 p.m. at which time parties and
counsel shall appear.
[16] the parents argue that the quoted language limiting
the effectiveness of the gag order “until further order of the
Court” entered in the contextual framework of the upcoming
public meeting on January 5, 2009, plus the pendency of the
dispositional hearing on January 7 means that the gag order
of January 5 could reasonably be expected to operate only
IN re INtereSt OF t.t. 	185
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 176

for a brief period of time. In short, the parents assert that it
was only a temporary order, and, as noted above, the juvenile
court captioned it as such. An example where the burden of an
order was blunted by its brief operative timeframe when con-
sidered in the context of the ongoing case so as to support the
conclusion that it did not affect a substantial right is found in
In re Guardianship of Sophia M., 271 Neb. 133, 710 N.W.2d
312 (2006). In In re Guardianship of Sophia M., the Supreme
Court reasoned:
Here, the visitation order denied visitation pending the
final guardianship hearing, which was scheduled to occur
approximately 3 weeks later. the court explained that
prior efforts to provide visitation had been unsuccess-
ful and that, with only 3 weeks until the final guardian-
ship hearing and a final resolution of the issue, very
little would be gained by attempting to construct another
visitation arrangement. Further, since the order effec-
tively denied visitation only until the final guardianship
hearing, the length of time that [the mother’s] relation-
ship with [the child] was to be disturbed was brief, and
the order was not a permanent disposition. the fact that
[the mother’s] appeal of the visitation order has delayed
the final disposition of the guardianship proceeding is
unfortunate but irrelevant in our determination whether
the order, when issued, affected a substantial right. the
visitation order did not affect a substantial right and is not
a final, appealable order.
271 Neb. at 139, 710 N.W.2d at 317.
Following the reasoning of In re Guardianship of Sophia
M., we conclude that while the January 2, 2009, order affected
a matter of significance so as to be appealable, the timeframe
during which it was intended to operate was only 5 days, until
the scheduled dispositional hearing on January 7. thus, the
January 2 order, like the order in In re Guardianship of Sophia
M., was a nonfinal order because of the brief timeframe during
which it was intended to operate.
[17] Although the January 7, 2009, dispositional hearing was
actually continued until January 29, such fact does not affect
our analysis or conclusion, because a litigant must be able to
186 	18 NebrASkA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

assess whether a court’s order is appealable when it is entered,
not by what happens in the case thereafter. Accordingly, we
find that the gag order of January 2 was a temporary order that
did not affect a substantial right and that the gag order found
in the dispositional order of February 3 was a final, appealable
order that was to remain in effect until the next hearing that
the court scheduled, for August 7. therefore, we have jurisdic-
tion to consider the merits of the February 3 gag order, and the
State’s motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.
Constitutionality of Gag Order.
the gag order contained within the juvenile court’s dispo-
sitional order of February 3, 2009, is clearly a prior restraint
on the parents’ right of free speech. Although there is no
Nebraska authority dealing with a parent’s right to speak
publicly about his or her minor child, the general consti-
tutional principles relating to prior restraints of speech are
well established.
[18,19] Governmental action constitutes a prior restraint
when it is directed to suppressing speech because of its con-
tent before the speech is communicated. City of Lincoln v.
ABC Books, Inc., 238 Neb. 378, 470 N.W.2d 760 (1991).
While prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se, they bear
a “‘heavy presumption’” against constitutional validity. J. Q.
Office Equip. v. Sullivan, 230 Neb. 397, 399, 432 N.W.2d 211,
213 (1988), quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 95 S. Ct. 1239, 43 L. ed. 2d 448 (1975). “the
Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justifica-
tion for the imposition of such a restraint.’” New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29
L. ed. 2d 822 (1971) (often and hereinafter cited as “The
Pentagon Papers”). Any attempt to effect a prior restraint
is subject to “exacting scrutiny.” See Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102, 99 S. Ct. 2667, 61 L. ed. 2d
399 (1979). Or, as stated in Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842-43, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. ed.
2d 1 (1978):
Properly 	applied, 	the 	[application 	of 	exacting 	scru-
tiny] requires a court to make its own inquiry into the
IN re INtereSt OF t.t. 	187
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 176

imminence and magnitude of the danger . . . and then
to balance the character of the evil . . . against the need
for free and unfettered expression. the possibility that
other measures will serve the State’s interests should also
be weighed.
[20] In The Pentagon Papers, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the constitutional validity of a restraining order
against the publication of governmental documents concern-
ing the war in Vietnam. the government argued that harm to
the national security interests of the United States justified
the restraint against publication. One of several concurring
opinions said:
[t]he First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judi-
cial restraints . . . predicated upon [the] surmise or con-
jecture that untoward consequences may result. . . . [O]nly
governmental allegation and proof that publication must
inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence
[of the danger identified] can support even the issuance of
an interim restraining order. In no event may mere con-
clusions be sufficient . . . .
403 U.S. at 725-27 (brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis sup-
plied). thus, it is apparent that the “bar” to sustain a prior
restraint is high.
there are a number of reported decisions from other juris-
dictions involving judicial restrictions on dissemination of
information about a juvenile court proceeding or the juvenile
involved in such proceeding. Often such cases involve closure
of the juvenile court proceedings or restrictions on what the
media may publish, e.g., In re T.R., 52 Ohio St. 3d 6, 556
N.e.2d 439 (1990) (case involving surrogate parenting agree-
ment, closed court proceeding, and gag order on parties and
their attorneys). In In re T.R., the Ohio Supreme Court found
that the standards used by the trial court for the imposition of
the restraints, “‘scintilla of possibility of harm’” and “‘best
interests of the child,’” were incorrect. 52 Ohio St. 3d at 18,
556 N.e.2d at 451. the Ohio court reasoned that given the
juvenile court’s history of confidentiality, it is possible to rea-
sonably argue that public access is never in the child’s best
interests, but that the standards used by the trial judge gave
188 	18 NebrASkA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

insufficient weight to the public’s interest in access to workings
of the juvenile court and in scrutinizing such.
[21] Gag orders have been held to be a less restrictive alter-
native to restrictions imposed on the media. See Nebraska
Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L. ed.
2d 683 (1976). but this appeal does not involve courtroom clo-
sure or restrictions on the media. In the Ohio case, In re T.R.,
discussed above, the court held that “a juvenile court, which is
not presumptively open, has the power to control extrajudicial
comments by the litigants, provided the restrictions are con-
sistent with [constitutional] standards . . . .” 52 Ohio St. 3d at
21, 556 N.e.2d at 454. the Ohio court also noted that prior
restraints have been used to attempt to protect the privacy
interests of parties to “sensational cases.” Id., citing S.N.E. v.
R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985) (child custody case involv-
ing lesbian mother where gag order was found to be over-
broad), and Mason v. Reiter, 531 So. 2d 348 (Fla. App. 1988)
(contempt citation for violation of gag order in case involving
famous comedian held technically defective). In the Alaska
case, S.N.E. v. R.L.B., supra, a blanket prohibition against all
communications with persons not specified in the order was
held to be unconstitutionally overbroad. In In re Dependency
of T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. 1, 20, 156 P.3d 222, 232 (2007), the
trial court’s gag order prohibiting the father from disseminating
any documents, reports, and orders without permission of the
court and of the children’s guardian ad litem was found over-
broad and the matter was remanded to “[determine] whether a
protective order [was] necessary and, if so, enter a new order
that is consistent with [the father’s] constitutional and statutory
rights.” Although in the present case, the juvenile court’s gag
order is more narrowly tailored, these cases illustrate the exact-
ing scrutiny restrictive orders on speech and freedom of the
press are to receive.
[22,23] In State ex rel. L.M., 37 P.3d 1188 (Utah App.
2001), the trial court’s gag order prohibited all involved par-
ties from discussing the case with the media. the Utah court,
after citation of many of the First Amendment principles we
have outlined above, said that the State had to present evi-
dence of some compelling interest that would be endangered
IN re INtereSt OF t.t. 	189
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 176

without the limitation on speech. the Utah court found that
the State had a compelling interest in maintaining the confi-
dentiality of juvenile court proceedings, which confidentiality
normally serves the best interests of children involved in such
proceedings. Nonetheless, the Utah court could find no evi-
dence in the record that the juvenile court properly discharged
its duty to
(1) clearly identify “the imminence and magnitude of the
[possible] danger,” Landmark Communications[, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. ed. 2d
1 (1978)]; (2) balance the parties’ interests to determine
whose interest deserved the greater protection; and (3) if
the court determined that the State’s interests in protect-
ing [the child at issue] deserved the greater protection, . . .
either (a) explore other possible measures, or (b) narrowly
draft the gag order to ensure that it was no more restric-
tive than necessary to protect the compelling interests. See
id.; see also Procunier [v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.
Ct. 1800, 40 L. ed. 2d 224 (1974)].
State ex rel. L.M., 37 P.3d at 1195. therefore, the juvenile
court’s gag order was vacated, and on remand, the juvenile
court was to conduct a “proper inquiry into the government’s
interests and balance the imminence and magnitude of the dan-
ger presented against [the parents’] right to free and unfettered
expression.” Id. at 1196.
[24] In the Illinois case In re J.S., 267 Ill. App. 3d 145,
640 N.e.2d 1379, 204 Ill. Dec. 30 (1994), the mother filed an
interlocutory appeal of a gag order in a child custody dispute
that resulted in the state’s filing a petition to declare the minor
child neglected. the gag order in In re J.S. prohibited the par-
ties and their attorneys from discussing the underlying case
with members of the news media. the court, while acknowl-
edging the presumption of invalidity of a prior restraint on
speech, said that “‘a judicial order restraining speech will
not be held invalid as a prior restraint if it is: (1) necessary
to obviate a “serious and imminent” threat of impending
harm, which (2) cannot adequately be addressed by other, less
speech-restrictive means.’” 267 Ill. App. 3d at 148, 640 N.e.2d
at 1382, 204 Ill. Dec. at 33, quoting In re A Minor, 127 Ill.
190 	18 NebrASkA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

2d 247, 537 N.e.2d 292, 130 Ill. Dec. 225 (1989) (Minor I).
However, the court distinguished Minor I because the child in
In re J.S. was an innocent victim, not a juvenile criminal sus-
pect as in Minor I, and because in Minor I, the appellant was
a news organization seeking to print information it deemed
newsworthy. the court in In re J.S. then turned to another
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, In re A Minor, 149 Ill.
2d 247, 595 N.e.2d 1052, 172 Ill. Dec. 382 (1992) (Minor II),
which involved a gag order against a newspaper that wanted
to print the identities of child victims of sexual and physical
abuse. the newspaper had secured the identities through court
proceedings rather than by its own journalistic efforts. the
Minor II court found:
[t]he State has an interest in the nondisclosure of the
minor victims’ identities in its role as parens patriae. It
was in its role as parens patriae that the State initiated
these juvenile proceedings to provide shelter and care for
these abused children. the minor victims reside and will
continue to reside in a small community. Public identity
could cause continuing emotional trauma to these unfortu-
nate children and impede the lengthy and difficult healing
process which they must endure. We find that the danger
of public disclosure and the probability of irreparable
adverse effects which such disclosure would entail to be a
compelling State interest at stake in this case.
Coupled with the State’s interest in nondisclosure, we
find that the minor victims themselves have a compelling
interest at stake in this case.
149 Ill. 2d at 255, 595 N.e.2d at 1056, 172 Ill. Dec. at 386.
the court in Minor II emphasized, however, that the children’s
and the State’s compelling interests in nondisclosure must be
weighed against “‘the need for free and unfettered expres-
sion.’” 149 Ill. 2d at 257, 595 N.e.2d at 1056, 172 Ill. Dec. at
386, quoting Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. ed. 2d 1 (1978).
However, Minor II is not a gag order case in the same sense
as the matter before us. rather, it involves an order which
prohibited a newspaper from disclosing the identities of minor
victims of physical and sexual abuse which had been obtained
IN re INtereSt OF t.t. 	191
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 176

in the course of court proceedings. the Illinois Supreme Court
concluded that a section of Illinois’ Juvenile Court Act autho-
rizing the juvenile court to prohibit newspapers from disclosing
the identities of minors who are victims of sexual crimes was
not an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of the press.
the Minor II court further held that the danger of public dis-
closure and probability of irreparable adverse effects of such
disclosure constituted a compelling state interest, in addition to
the minors’ own compelling interest in freedom from invasion
of their privacy. In the end, the Illinois court concluded that
the First Amendment role of the media was not diminished by
withholding the names of the juvenile victims.
We digress to note that the Nebraska Constitution does
not contain an express right of privacy as does the Illinois
Constitution. See Ill. Const. art. I, § 6. See, also, Ill. Const.
art. I, § 12. In State v. Senters, 270 Neb. 19, 699 N.W.2d 810
(2005), our Supreme Court held that the due process clause of
the Nebraska Constitution does not contain a right of privacy
broader than that recognized under the federal Constitution.
See, also, Hamit v. Hamit, 271 Neb. 659, 715 N.W.2d 512
(2006). And we have found no authority holding that the fed-
eral Due Process Clause protects the anonymity of a juvenile
involved in court proceedings.
returning to In re J.S., 267 Ill. App. 3d 145, 640 N.e.2d
1379, 204 Ill. Dec. 30 (1994), the underlying litigation was
between the parents over custody of the child. the mother
alleged that the father had subjected the child to sexual abuse,
and she wanted to discuss the case with the media, although
there was no evidence that the media was interested in the case.
In upholding the gag order, the In re J.S. court reasoned:
We fail to comprehend how the mother could discuss
with the news media the scandalous, horrendous details
of sexual abuse that she alleges occurred while keeping
confidential the identity of the alleged victim. Under the
facts of this case, we believe that the trial court was cor-
rect to protect [the child’s] anonymity and that it used the
order with sufficient restraint that constitutionally pro-
tected speech was not unduly burdened.
192 	18 NebrASkA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

267 Ill. App. 3d at 154, 640 N.e.2d at 1385-86, 204 Ill. Dec.
at 36-37. However, the case before us involves not a juvenile
victim of sexual or physical abuse, but, rather, a youth who has
behavioral issues at home, in school, and at work—not uncom-
mon issues with some youth—which do not connote the same
need for protection as is present with a minor who is a victim
of sexual crimes. thus, the considerations in In re J.S. which
supported the imposition of the gag order therein are not pres-
ent here.
With the foregoing discussion of pertinent constitutional
principles and representative cases from other jurisdictions in
mind, we turn to the specifics of the gag order before us. the
bill of exceptions before us contains the hearing on the motions
of the parties to clarify and limit the November 26, 2008, gag
order, but not the hearing when that original order was entered.
Nonetheless, we can surmise from the record we do have that
the November 26 gag order arose from the publication of an
article in the Wall Street Journal about t.t. and Nebraska’s
then-existing Safe Haven law. However, the Wall Street Journal
article is not in our record.
t.t.’s therapist testified that t.t. expressed anger and embar-
rassment at having his personal information in the media, but
that it had not interfered with his treatment. However, according
to the therapist, t.t. had had issues since the article came out
with resulting “somatoform problems” such as sleep problems,
increased acne, and increased anger. the therapist testified
that dealing with the anger and embarrassment had become a
“central theme of [t.t.’s] therapy quite often.” In the therapist’s
opinion, disclosure of last name, date of birth, Social Security
number, types of treatment, diagnosis, and treatment provid-
ers should be restricted because such were “things that could
be detrimental to a person’s future or self-esteem.” During the
cross-examination of the therapist, it was suggested that previ-
ous medical records (which the therapist admitted she had not
gotten) revealed that t.t.’s sleep problems and acne predated
the Wall Street Journal article. We note that exhibits included
in our record from the dispositional hearing of January 29,
2009, clearly support the conclusion that t.t. had difficulties
IN re INtereSt OF t.t. 	193
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 176

with sleep and, by inference, acne, before the publication of the
Wall Street Journal article.
the therapist testified that among t.t.’s concerns are the
fact that an Internet search will bring up t.t.’s name and the
Wall Street Journal article; the fact that S.Q., his mother, pro-
vided information to a reporter on how to contact him; and the
fact that the reporter did try to reach him. the therapist stated
that t.t. also told her the article had misinformation about
him. the therapist said that in a therapy session involving t.t.
and S.Q., the article and his anger at S.Q. were discussed, and
that t.t. and S.Q. “are making progress with it.” the therapist
acknowledged that the parents related during therapy that their
intent in providing information for the Wall Street Journal
article was not to hurt or embarrass t.t., but to help others
in similar situations. the therapist said that t.t. has resolved
his negative feelings about that past occurrence, but that he
was skeptical about the expressed motivation of the parents.
the therapist further testified that t.t. told her that he felt it
was intended to hurt and embarrass him and that he would be
upset if new attempts to disclose information about him were
made. the therapist agreed with t.t.’s guardian ad litem that
disclosure of protected health information could impact t.t.’s
future insurability, employability, or admission to college or
the military.
Included in evidence is the therapist’s progress note from a
family therapy session of December 12, 2008, and we quote
the portion thereof relevant to the issue before us:
[t.t.] confronts his mom re Wall Street [Journal] article,
said it “totally exposed me, embarrassed me”. Mom dis-
cusses why she did this — out of frustration. Mom asks
“is there anything in that article that anyone didn’t know
already?” Mom said the article was meant to draw atten-
tion to loopholes in Nebr. care — not to hurt [t.t.] Family
asks how [t.t.] was introduced to Wall Street [Journal]
article and th[e] therapist explained that [the therapist’s
DHHS supervisor] asked her to help [t.t.] understand.
[t.t.] cont. to assert that the article felt negative to him
and very critical. Mom asks him to try looking at article
from a different angle — Sister . . . said she talked to
194 	18 NebrASkA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

reporters for an hour trying to “help all the other kids
out there”. [t.t.] cont[.] to assert why nothing positive
was forthcoming.
t.t.’s mother, S.Q., testified that she did not intend to harm
or embarrass her son and that her goal was to help others who
were in similar situations with their children and struggling to
get services and assistance for them. And she wanted to be able
to participate in the policy discussions with a state senator’s
Safe Haven law task force and the associated “parents’ round-
table” discussion that was to occur on January 5, 2009. She
testified that she was willing not to use t.t.’s name in any of
such endeavors, but that t.t.’s history was a part of that proc-
ess. S.Q. testified that her son had a long history of “mental
health issues” and that the only reason she wanted the language
from the November 26, 2008, order removed was so that she
could participate in the state senator’s task force. In evidence
is a letter of December 17 from t.t.’s therapist to her supervi-
sor, stating:
[t.t.] has reported feeling strongly “embarrassed and
angry” by this having been publicized by his parents.
[t.t.] is a young man dealing with issues of self-
esteem, anger towards his parents (on both sides) and
reported somatoform reactions related to the stress from
this particular situation. I do not believe it is in [t.t.’s]
best interest to have additional protected health informa-
tion disseminated to the general public. In therapy, this
situation continues to be central and of trouble to [t.t.]
the therapist’s supervisor’s affidavit of December 18, 2008,
is in evidence, and it recounts that in a meeting with t.t. the
previous day, she asked him about the Wall Street Journal
article and he told her that he was pretty much “‘over it,’” as it
had been several weeks and he had had time to process his feel-
ings. the supervisor then related that she inquired about how
he would feel if there were an additional release of informa-
tion about him to the public, to which he responded, “‘I know
that won’t happen because you will protect me’” and “‘I don’t
want any other information going out to people about me.’”
the supervisor also included in her affidavit that she had talked
with the people with whom t.t. was placed in foster care and
IN re INtereSt OF t.t. 	195
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 176

that they told her that on “numerous occasions,” he has stated
that he wants this to be a “‘family issue.’” No one testified
about any physical or emotional harm that would come to t.t.
from additional public disclosure of information that would be
above and beyond what he has already experienced as a result
of the Wall Street Journal article.
the juvenile court’s first iteration of the gag order under
consideration was entered January 2, 2009, after the evidence
we have summarized above was adduced. the order made the
following finding: “[F]urther public disclosure of [t.t.’s] pri-
vate medical information is contrary to his best interest. It is in
[t.t.’s] best interest and it is in furtherance of efforts at reunifi-
cation that specific guidelines be given regarding disclosure of
or release of [t.t.’s] medical information to the public.”
[25] We do not disagree with the juvenile court’s conclusion
that further disclosure of t.t.’s private medical information
is not in t.t.’s best interests, because we think the evidence
recited above makes that conclusion inescapable. However,
the fundamental difficulty is that the child’s best interests are
not the standard, nor does the juvenile court’s rationale for
the entry of the gag order comport with the established law
allowing the lawful entry of a judicial order imposing a prior
restraint on speech. the law is clear that our obligation is to
subject a prior restraint on free speech to “exacting scrutiny”
and that such restraints begin with a “heavy presumption” of
unconstitutionality. When we scrutinize the gag order, remem-
bering that it is the State’s “heavy burden” to justify the
restraint, we must assess “the imminence and magnitude of the
danger . . . and then . . . balance the character of the evil . . .
against the need for free and unfettered expression.” Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843, 98 S. Ct.
1535, 56 L. ed. 2d 1 (1978). And in this case, the evidence is
that the parents wish to exercise their right of free speech in
the arena where public policy is formed, rather than merely for
their own personal ends. Given the applicable legal principles
regarding prior restraints on speech, we hold that a restraint on
speech against disclosure to the public of information about a
juvenile because it is in the juvenile’s “best interest,” as the
juvenile court found, is an insufficiently justified prior restraint
196 	18 NebrASkA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

on speech. We now turn to the danger or harm to t.t. and
its imminence.
[26] No witness testified that further disclosure posed immi-
nent physical or emotional harm or danger to t.t. of any
magnitude. the record clearly supports the conclusion that if
t.t.’s parents make further public disclosure about him, his
past difficulties, or his treatment, t.t. will likely be angry and
embarrassed, plus reconciliation with his family will be more
difficult. On the other hand, we remember that the evidence
shows he is “over it” with respect to the Wall Street Journal
article. And, as said in The Pentagon Papers, a prior restraint
on speech cannot be predicated on “surmise or conjecture
that untoward consequence may result.” 403 U.S. at 725-26.
Moreover, while we do not know exactly what was disclosed
in the Wall Street Journal article, it is a permissible inference
that at least some of the information restricted by the gag order
is already in the public domain. thus, this factor reduces the
effectiveness of the gag order, as well as undercuts any claim
that the danger of harm is imminent.
the parents are obviously now aware of how t.t. feels about
their prior disclosures about him in the Wall Street Journal
article and that he, quite understandably, wants his difficul-
ties to be a “family issue.” Whether the parents are acting in
his best interests by further disclosure is not the standard by
which we judge the gag order. Nonetheless, we cannot help
but observe that the parents can be meaningfully involved in
the public policy discussions in which they are interested while
simultaneously striving to minimize discussion of specific
medical information about t.t. Moreover, the juvenile court
can address future parental actions which are not in t.t.’s best
interests because there are remedies within the juvenile system
in the event of future parental actions that are not in a child’s
best interests. the availability of such future remedies would
be “other measures that will serve the State’s interests [that]
should also be weighed.” See Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. ed. 2d
1 (1978). Having said this, we must acknowledge the tension
between the parents’ right to speak about t.t., although doing
so is not in his best interests, and our often-stated doctrine that
IN re INtereSt OF t.t. 	197
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 176

the juvenile court need not wait for disaster to befall a minor
child before acting. See In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 4
Neb. App. 659, 548 N.W.2d 348 (1996), reversed in part on
other grounds 251 Neb. 614, 558 N.W.2d 548 (1997). but, that
doctrine has never been applied in the context of a gag order on
parents involved in the juvenile system.
In the end, we must conclude that the evidence is simply
insufficient, absent conjecture and speculation which we can-
not engage in, to satisfy the State’s heavy burden to justify this
prior restraint on free speech and to overcome the heavy pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality of a prior restraint on speech.
there is no evidence proving imminent harm to t.t. of a mag-
nitude that justifies a prior restraint on free speech. therefore,
we vacate that portion of the juvenile court’s order of February
3, 2009, preventing the parents from disclosing information
about t.t.
Pretreatment Assessment.
S.Q. and A.Q. argue that the juvenile court also erred in
ordering them to submit to a pretreatment assessment when the
permanency objective was independent living and not reunifica-
tion. Once again, before reaching the legal issues presented for
review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether
it has jurisdiction over the matter before it. In re Interest of
Taylor W., 276 Neb. 679, 757 N.W.2d 1 (2008); In re Interest
of Anthony R. et al., 264 Neb. 699, 651 N.W.2d 231 (2002).
the State cites to Neb. rev. Stat. § 43-287.01 et seq. (reissue
2008) and In re Interest of Laura O. & Joshua O., 6 Neb. App.
554, 574 N.W.2d 776 (1998), in support of its argument that
the juvenile court review panel is the only avenue for review in
situations where a dispositional order is entered which differs
from the plan of DHHS and where the party seeking review
believes that the court-ordered plan is not in the best interests
of the juvenile. We agree that is the law.
the State argues that the court order differed from DHHS’
recommendation in that the juvenile court did not order the
recommended psychological evaluation. A side-by-side com-
parison of DHHS’ plan and the court order supports the State’s
argument to a degree. DHHS’ case plan of January 22, 2009,
198 	18 NebrASkA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

recommended that S.Q. and A.Q. “participate in psychological
evaluations.” And the juvenile court ordered that S.Q. and A.Q.
“shall participate in a pretreatment assessment.” However, the
State forgets that at the January 29 hearing, DHHS stated it
would be agreeable to have the parents undergo a pretreatment
assessment, rather than a psychological evaluation, and that
DHHS stated it did not have “any problems” amending its rec-
ommendation. because the court order was consistent with the
ultimate recommendations by DHHS to the juvenile court, S.Q.
and A.Q. were not required to appeal to the juvenile review
panel pursuant to § 43-287.01. because we have jurisdiction
over the issue, we now address the merits—whether the juve-
nile court’s order requiring S.Q. and A.Q. to participate in a
pretreatment assessment was appropriate.
[27,28] Once a plan of reunification has been ordered
to correct the conditions underlying the adjudication under
§ 43-247(3)(a), the plan must be reasonably related to the
objective of reuniting the parents with the children. In re
Interest of Mainor T. & Estela T., 267 Neb. 232, 674 N.W.2d
442 (2004). In In re Interest of J.S., A.C, and C.S., 227 Neb.
251, 268, 417 N.W.2d 147, 158 (1987), the Nebraska Supreme
Court said:
Materiality of a provision in a court-ordered rehabili-
tative plan is determined by a cause-and-effect relation-
ship: Does a provision in the plan tend to correct, elimi-
nate, or ameliorate the situation or condition on which
the adjudication has been obtained under the Nebraska
Juvenile Code? An affirmative answer to the preceding
question provides the materiality necessary in a rehabili-
tative plan for a parent involved in proceedings within a
juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Otherwise, a court-ordered
plan, ostensibly rehabilitative of the conditions leading
to an adjudication under the Nebraska Juvenile Code, is
nothing more than a plan for the sake of a plan, devoid of
corrective and remedial measures.
the reasonableness of a rehabilitative plan for a parent depends
on the circumstances in a particular case and, therefore, is
examined on a case-by-case basis. Id. S.Q. and A.Q. argue
that their participation in a pretreatment assessment is not
IN re INtereSt OF t.t. 	199
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 176

reasonably related to the permanency objective identified in
DHHS’ plan, such being independent living.
[29-31] the Nebraska Juvenile Code must be liberally con-
strued to accomplish its purpose of serving the best interests
of the juveniles who fall within it. In re Interest of R.A. and
V.A., 225 Neb. 157, 403 N.W.2d 357 (1987), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Jacob, 242 Neb. 176, 494 N.W.2d 109 (1993).
the juvenile court has broad discretion as to the disposition of
those who fall within its jurisdiction. In re Interest of R.A. and
V.A., supra. Juvenile courts have broad discretion to accom-
plish the purpose of serving the best interests of the children
involved. Id. Juvenile courts have long recognized that psychi-
atric testing or psychological evaluations of a parent may be
required to determine the best interests of children when issues
of custody and visitation are presented. Id.
In the instant case, S.Q. and A.Q. still seek a relationship
with t.t. even though t.t. is working toward independent liv-
ing. S.Q. and A.Q. participate in family therapy with t.t. And,
in the dispositional order, the juvenile court ordered that S.Q.
and A.Q. shall have “therapeutic/supervised” visitation and
reasonable telephone contact with t.t., as recommended by
his therapist.
t.t.’s therapist, a licensed mental health professional, testi-
fied that one of the treatment goals in this case is communica-
tion between S.Q., A.Q., and t.t. the therapist testified that
having S.Q. and A.Q. do a pretreatment assessment would “be
advisable” and would help with the therapeutic treatment of
this family because it “opens avenues for more proactivity”
and would “make things better potentially.” the therapist also
stated that given the situation (i.e., use of the Safe Haven law),
it would be appropriate for the parents to do a pretreatment
assessment to see what issues are involved with the family. the
therapist testified that it would be in t.t.’s, and the family’s,
best interests for S.Q. and A.Q. to do a pretreatment assess-
ment and that such would be helpful even though the perma-
nency goal for t.t. is independent living.
the parents’ participation in a pretreatment assessment does
“tend to correct, eliminate, or ameliorate the situation or condi-
tion on which the adjudication has been obtained.” See In re
200 	18 NebrASkA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

Interest of J.S., A.C., and C.S., 227 Neb. 251, 268, 417 N.W.2d
147, 158 (1987). the adjudication was based on t.t.’s being
“in a situation dangerous to [his life] or injurious to [his] health
or morals,” see § 43-247(3)(a), in that his parents effectively
removed him from his home by leaving him at a hospital under
the then-effective Safe Haven law. A pretreatment assessment
is reasonably related to the rehabilitative plan, even though the
permanency goal is independent living, because S.Q., A.Q.,
and t.t. want a continued relationship and t.t. is still a minor.
Working toward an improved relationship was clearly included
in the juvenile court’s order of February 3, 2009, because
it ordered “therapeutic/supervised” visitation and telephone
contact. the therapist testified that the parents’ participation
in a pretreatment assessment would help with the family’s
therapeutic treatment and would be in t.t.’s, and the family’s,
best interests. Giving the juvenile code a liberal construction,
as we must, see In re Interest of R.A. and V.A., 225 Neb. 157,
403 N.W.2d 357 (1987), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Jacob, 242 Neb. 176, 494 N.W.2d 109 (1993), we find that
the juvenile court’s rehabilitative plan requiring the parents to
participate in a pretreatment assessment was reasonable in this
case. We affirm such order.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we find that S.Q. and A.Q.’s
appeal regarding the order restricting parental disclosure of
information about t.t. was timely. We find that the State
did not introduce evidence of imminent harm to t.t. of suf-
ficient magnitude to overcome the heavy presumption of the
unconstitutionality of the gag order. therefore, we reverse, and
vacate that portion of the juvenile court’s dispositional order of
February 3, 2009.
We further find that the juvenile court’s order requiring the
parents to participate in a pretreatment assessment was timely
appealed, but that the order was reasonable, appropriate, and
supported by the evidence. thus, we affirm such order.
A ffirmed in pArt, And in pArt
reversed And vAcAted.
moore, Judge, participating on briefs.
IN re INtereSt OF t.t. 	201
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 176