State v. Ramirez

that information required by the applicable statute—in this
case, § 60-498.01(2)—we find that the omission of the second
arresting officer’s signature on the report is a technical defi-
ciency that did not deprive the DMV of jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the sworn report in this case complied
with the statutory requirements of § 60-498.01(2) and that
thus, the omission of the second arresting officer’s signature on
the sworn report was a technical defect and the sworn report
conferred jurisdiction on the DMV. Therefore, the decision of
the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded with
directions to the district court to enter an order affirming the
decision of the DMV in all respects as originally entered by
the DMV.
R eveRsed and Remanded with diRections.
state of nebRaska , appellee , v. alfRedo R amiRez ,
also known as alfRedo stRong , also known
as fast fReddy, appellant.
777 N.W.2d 337
Filed January 19, 2010. 	No. A-09-537.
1. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. Regardless of whether the evidence
is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, and regardless of whether
the issue is labeled as a failure to direct a verdict, insufficiency of the evidence,
or failure to prove a prima facie case, the standard is the same: In reviewing a
criminal conviction, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence,
pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are for
the finder of fact, and a conviction will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial
error, if the evidence admitted at trial, viewed and construed most favorably to the
State, is sufficient to support the conviction.
2. Directed Verdict: Evidence: Appeal and Error. When a motion for directed
verdict made at the close of all the evidence is overruled by the trial court,
appellate review is controlled by the rule that a directed verdict is proper only
where reasonable minds cannot differ and can draw but one conclusion from the
evidence, and the issues should be decided as a matter of law.
3. Criminal Law: Directed Verdict. In a criminal case, a court can direct a verdict
only when there is a complete failure of evidence to establish an essential element
of the crime charged or the evidence is so doubtful in character, lacking probative
value, that a finding of guilt based on such evidence cannot be sustained.
STATe v. RAMIRez 	241
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 241
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4. Directed Verdict. If there is any evidence which will sustain a finding for the
party against whom a motion for directed verdict is made, the case may not be
decided as a matter of law, and a verdict may not be directed.
Appeal from the District Court for Hall County: James d.
livingston, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerard 	A. 	Piccolo, 	Hall 	County 	Public 	Defender, 	for
appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and George R. Love for
appellee.
inbody, Chief Judge, and iRwin and caRlson, Judges.
inbody, Chief Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Alfredo Ramirez, also known as Alfredo Strong or Fast
Freddy, appeals the decision of the district court for Hall
County overruling his motion for a directed verdict at the
close of all evidence, subsequently to which a jury convicted
Ramirez of failure to stop following personal injury accident
and willful reckless driving.
STATeMeNT OF FACTS
In the early morning hours of October 7, 2007, Officer Tony
Keiper, a police officer with the city of Grand Island, was on
patrol in a marked police vehicle in an area which included
several bars and businesses. The traffic along the street was
moving very slowly, and Keiper was patrolling the vehicles for
possible alcohol violations. Keiper was patrolling in the west-
bound lane when he recognized Ramirez driving a white Ford
explorer toward him in the eastbound lane. Keiper recognized
Ramirez from numerous direct and indirect contacts over the
previous 10 years and began to monitor Ramirez through his
rearview mirrors because as Ramirez passed Keiper, Ramirez
had turned up the stereo in the explorer to a very high level.
Keiper slowed to a stop and made a U-turn into the eastbound
lane in order to follow Ramirez and monitor the volume of the
stereo when he observed Ramirez roll through a stop sign and
accelerate quickly onto another street. Keiper lost sight of the
242 	18 NeBRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS

explorer, at which time a group of individuals outside another
bar shouted out to Keiper in which direction the explorer
was traveling.
Keiper accelerated into a primarily residential area and
located the explorer, after he had lost sight of the explorer for
approximately 60 seconds or less when the explorer acceler-
ated through the stop sign. The explorer rested against a tree,
after having hit several parked vehicles, and sustained severe
damage which included the engine pushed into the floorboard,
both right wheels’ tires pulled off the rims, and extensive dam-
age to the passenger side.
Upon arrival at the scene, Keiper did not see Ramirez in the
explorer or anywhere in the immediate area of the accident,
and Ramirez did not return to the scene of the accident anytime
thereafter. There were two other passengers in the car, Izaia
Alvarez and Julio Chamul. Alvarez exited the back seat of the
explorer, having sustained a scrape and a small, open wound
on his head which was bleeding. Alvarez had helped Ramirez
out of the driver’s seat and then gone around to the front pas-
senger side of the explorer in an attempt to help Chamul,
who was unconscious, bleeding, and hanging from the waist
up out of the passenger-side window frame. Keiper instructed
Alvarez not to move Chamul in order to prevent further injury
to Chamul and called for an ambulance. The ambulance arrived
approximately 5 minutes later, just as Chamul started to regain
consciousness. Ambulance personnel treated Chamul at the
scene, but he was not transported to a hospital for further medi-
cal assistance.
Various individuals not involved in the accident started to
crowd around the scene, including Ramirez’ mother, who was
looking for Ramirez. Neither Alvarez nor Chamul indicated
to Keiper the driver’s identity or location; however, at trial,
Alvarez indicated that he had been drinking at a bar with both
Ramirez and Chamul and had left the bar with them, with
Ramirez driving the explorer. Alvarez testified that Ramirez
was also driving the explorer when it crashed into the tree.
Alvarez explained that once the explorer came to a rest, he
got out of the back seat and helped Ramirez out of the explorer
and that he did not see Ramirez again that night. Alvarez then
STATe v. RAMIRez 	243
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 241

helped Chamul, but was instructed by Keiper, who had arrived
on the scene, not to move Chamul. Alvarez testified that he
became upset with Keiper because he would not help Alvarez
provide assistance to Chamul and Alvarez ended up handcuffed
in the back of the police vehicle. Chamul also testified that
he had been drinking with Ramirez and Alvarez that evening
and that the explorer belonged to Ramirez. Chamul testified
that the explorer was registered in Ramirez’ mother’s name
but Ramirez made the car payments on the explorer and drove
it all the time. However, Chamul testified that an individual
named “Creeper” had gotten in the explorer at some point and
was driving it at the time of the accident, although he did not
really remember because he had blacked out as soon as he got
in the explorer after leaving the bar.
Ramirez was eventually charged with failure to stop fol-
lowing personal injury accident and willful reckless driving.
As indicated above, a jury trial was held on the matter, and at
the close of all of the evidence, Ramirez moved for a directed
verdict. The trial court denied Ramirez’ motion, and the jury
convicted him on both counts. Ramirez has timely appealed to
this court.
ASSIGNMeNT OF eRROR
Ramirez’ sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred
in overruling his motion for a directed verdict made at the
close of all evidence.
STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1] Regardless of whether the evidence is direct, circumstan-
tial, or a combination thereof, and regardless of whether the
issue is labeled as a failure to direct a verdict, insufficiency of
the evidence, or failure to prove a prima facie case, the stan-
dard is the same: In reviewing a criminal conviction, an appel-
late court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the
credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters
are for the finder of fact, and a conviction will be affirmed,
in the absence of prejudicial error, if the evidence admitted at
trial, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is suf-
ficient to support the conviction. State v. Banks, 278 Neb. 342,
244 	18 NeBRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS

771 N.W.2d 75 (2009); State v. McGhee, 274 Neb. 660, 742
N.W.2d 497 (2007).
ANALYSIS
[2] Ramirez argues that the trial court erred in overruling
his motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the
evidence. When a motion for directed verdict made at the close
of all the evidence is overruled by the trial court, appellate
review is controlled by the rule that a directed verdict is proper
only where reasonable minds cannot differ and can draw but
one conclusion from the evidence, and the issues should be
decided as a matter of law. McClure v. Forsman, 266 Neb. 90,
662 N.W.2d 566 (2003); Moyer v. Nebraska City Airport Auth.,
265 Neb. 201, 655 N.W.2d 855 (2003).
[3,4] In a criminal case, a court can direct a verdict only when
there is a complete failure of evidence to establish an essential
element of the crime charged or the evidence is so doubtful in
character, lacking probative value, that a finding of guilt based
on such evidence cannot be sustained. State v. Segura, 265
Neb. 903, 660 N.W.2d 512 (2003); State v. Canady, 263 Neb.
552, 641 N.W.2d 43 (2002). If there is any evidence which
will sustain a finding for the party against whom a motion for
directed verdict is made, the case may not be decided as a mat-
ter of law, and a verdict may not be directed. Id.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-697 (Cum. Supp. 2008) provides,
in part:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident upon
either a public highway, private road, or private drive,
resulting in injury or death to any person, shall (1) imme-
diately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident
and ascertain the identity of all persons involved, (2) give
his or her name and address and the license number of
the vehicle and exhibit his or her operator’s license to the
person struck or the occupants of any vehicle collided
with, and (3) render to any person injured in such acci-
dent reasonable assistance, including the carrying of such
person to a physician or surgeon for medical or surgical
treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary
or is requested by the injured person.
STATe v. RAMIRez 	245
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 241

Ramirez contends that the evidence was insufficient to sus-
tain the third requirement of the statute because “reasonable
assistance” is not defined in Nebraska statutes or case law and
that because Keiper instructed Alvarez not to move Chamul,
Ramirez would not have been able to further assist Chamul in
any way, essentially rendering Ramirez’ duty to give “reason-
able assistance” moot. See § 60-697.
The record in this case indicates that Ramirez, Alvarez,
and Chamul were drinking together at a bar on the evening
of the accident. The three individuals left the bar in Ramirez’
explorer, driven by Ramirez. Keiper recognized Ramirez driv-
ing the explorer and lost visual contact momentarily with the
explorer after it rolled through a stop sign and accelerated
onto another street. Shortly thereafter, the explorer hit several
parked cars and made impact with a tree, whereupon it came
to a rest. Alvarez helped Ramirez out of the driver’s seat, and
that was the last time Ramirez was seen by Alvarez that eve-
ning. Meanwhile, Chamul was hanging from the waist up out
of the passenger-side window frame of the explorer, bleeding
and unconscious. Alvarez attempted to remove Chamul from
the explorer, but was instructed by Keiper not to move Chamul
and that an ambulance was on the way.
After viewing all of the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt,
and we need not address Ramirez’ contention that the term
“reasonable assistance” in § 60-697 is undefined because not
only did Ramirez render no assistance, but under these cir-
cumstances, it would not have been reasonable for Ramirez to
believe he could leave the scene even if a police officer later
instructed that no assistance be given to Chamul. The evidence
is sufficient to support Ramirez’ convictions, and the trial court
did not err in overruling his motion for a directed verdict at
the close of all the evidence. Ramirez’ assignment of error is
wholly without merit, and therefore, we affirm.
affiRmed.
246 	18 NeBRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS