Trogdon v. Trogdon

the district court’s findings in this regard and reach our own
conclusions. See Conley v. Brazer, 278 Neb. 508, 772 N.W.2d
545 (2009).
[7] While our analysis differs to some degree from that of
the district court, we ultimately reach the same conclusion.
Where the record adequately demonstrates that the decision
of the trial court is correct, although such correctness is based
on a ground or reason different from that assigned by the trial
court, an appellate court will affirm. Corona de Camargo v.
Schon, 278 Neb. 1045, 776 N.W.2d 1 (2009).
CONCLUSION
We conclude that under the applicable zoning regulations,
the extent of the grandfathered nonconforming use of a live-
stock feeding operation is based on the actual use, and not
capacity. Because Cedar Valley consistently reported that there
were 5,000 cattle on its premises, we affirm the district court’s
decision to grant an injunction prohibiting Cedar Valley from
maintaining in excess of 5,000 cattle on its premises as a non-
conforming use.
A ffirmed.
SuzAnne KAy Trogdon, Appellee , v.
BrAdly dAvid Trogdon, AppellAnT.
780 N.W.2d 45
Filed March 2, 2010. 	No. A-08-1323.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a matter of law
which an appellate court determines independent of the conclusions reached by a
lower court.
2. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Personal jurisdiction is the power of a tribu-
nal to subject and bind a particular entity to its decisions.
3. Jurisdiction: Waiver. Personal jurisdiction may be conferred by the conduct of
the parties.
4. Foreign Judgments. Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,
once a support order is confirmed, a party is precluded from further contesting
the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time the
order was registered.
5. Foreign Judgments: Estoppel. When an equitable estoppel defense could
have been raised prior to confirmation of a support order under the Uniform
trOgdON v. trOgdON 	313
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 313
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:13 AM CST

Interstate Family Support Act, such defense is precluded after confirmation of
the order.
Appeal from the district Court for douglas County: mArlon
A. polK, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher A. Vacanti, of Vacanti Shattuck, for appellant.
douglas 	r. 	Switzer, 	of 	Hathaway 	Switzer, 	L.L.C., 	for
appellee.
inBody, Chief Judge, and irwin and CASSel, Judges.
irwin, Judge.
I. INtrOdUCtION
this appeal involves a California divorce decree ordering
child support and spousal support. Pursuant to the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act, Suzanne Kay trogdon ini-
tiated a proceeding to register and enforce that decree in
Nebraska. In her accompanying affidavit, Suzanne alleged that
Bradly david trogdon had not been paying child support or
spousal support and indicated that Bradly owed $249,558.58 in
accrued arrearages.
After a hearing, the district court entered an order “confirm-
ing” the child support and spousal support orders from the
California decree (referred to as the “support orders”). the
court subsequently held additional hearings and ultimately
entered an order consolidating the support orders and prohibit-
ing Bradly from contesting the previously confirmed support
orders. then the parties entered into an agreement regard-
ing the amount of arrearages. the court accepted the parties’
agreement and ordered Bradly to pay $211,444.62 in accrued,
consolidated arrearages.
On appeal, Bradly alleges that the district court erred in
determining that it had personal jurisdiction over him and
erred in not permitting him to raise the defense of equita-
ble estoppel.
Upon our review, we find that the district court had personal
jurisdiction over Bradly because Bradly filed a request for
hearing requesting affirmative relief prior to asserting that the
district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. We also
314 	18 NeBrASKA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

find that pursuant to Neb. rev. Stat. § 42-743 (reissue 2008),
Bradly was precluded from raising an estoppel argument to
contest the previously confirmed support orders. As such, we
affirm the confirmation of the foreign support orders.
II. BACKgrOUNd
Sometime after the parties’ 1993 California divorce, Suzanne
moved to Nebraska with the parties’ minor child and Bradly
moved to Washington. On March 10, 2008, Suzanne initiated
a proceeding in the district court to register the California sup-
port orders pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act, Neb. rev. Stat. §§ 42-701 through 42-751 (reissue 2008).
As a part of her request, Suzanne filed an affidavit alleging that
Bradly owed $249,558.58 in accrued arrearages.
Also on March 10, 2008, the district court sent Bradly notice
that Suzanne had registered the California support orders in
Nebraska. Pursuant to § 42-740, the court notified Bradly that
he had 20 days to contest the registration of the orders and that
if he did not contest the registration within the 20-day period,
“the Court [would] confirm the Order[s] and enforce [them]
against [him].”
On April 4, 2008, Bradly filed a request for a hearing con-
cerning the registration of the orders. Bradly indicated that he
“dispute[d] the amounts set forth in [Suzanne’s] affidavit and
respectfully request[ed] the court to require strict proof on her
claim of what support amounts are owed.”
On June 19, 2008, a hearing was held. Bradly did not
appear at the hearing, but he was represented by counsel. At
the start of the hearing, Bradly’s counsel indicated that she
was “appearing for the sole purpose of objecting to the per-
sonal jurisdiction over Bradly.” After hearing arguments from
both parties, the court found that it had personal jurisdiction
over Bradly.
After the court determined that it had personal jurisdiction
over Bradly, Bradly’s counsel argued against registration of
the California support orders because Bradly had made direct
payments to Suzanne which were not included in Suzanne’s
calculations of the accrued arrearages. Counsel indicated that
the direct payments exceeded $5,000.
trOgdON v. trOgdON 	315
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 313

despite counsel’s assertions, the court confirmed the regis-
tration of the California support orders pursuant to § 42-742(c).
In its written order, the court found that Bradly did not establish
a valid defense to the validity or enforcement of the registered
support orders under § 42-742(a). the court indicated, “[t]he
[support] orders . . . are hereby confirmed as orders enforce-
able in the same manner and subject to the same procedures as
orders issued by a tribunal of the state of Nebraska.”
After the entry of the confirmation order, Suzanne filed
a motion to consolidate the support orders and calculate the
total arrearages owed by Bradly and filed a motion request-
ing that Bradly be ordered to appear and submit to a debtor’s
examination. Bradly filed a motion to stop enforcement for
past support arrearages. Bradly indicated that Suzanne was
equitably 	estopped 	from 	collecting 	support 	arrearages 	or
accumulated interest. this was the first time this defense had
been raised.
In November 2008, a hearing was held on the parties’
motions. 	Bradly 	appeared 	personally 	at 	the 	hearing 	and
requested to testify concerning his estoppel defense. the court
did not permit Bradly to offer evidence in support of the
estoppel defense after determining that he was precluded from
contesting the previously confirmed support orders because he
could have raised the estoppel defense at the June 2008 confir-
mation hearing. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on
§ 42-743, which states that a confirmed support order cannot
be contested with respect to any matter that could have been
asserted at the confirmation hearing. the parties then reached
an agreement concerning the total amount of arrearages owed
by Bradly, and the court entered an order reflecting this agree-
ment. the court ordered Bradly to pay $211,444.62 in accrued,
consolidated arrearages.
Bradly appeals here.
III. ASSIgNMeNtS OF errOr
On appeal, Bradly assigns two errors. First, he alleges that
the district court erred in determining that it had personal juris-
diction over him. Second, he alleges that the court erred in not
permitting him to raise the defense of equitable estoppel.
316 	18 NeBrASKA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

IV. ANALYSIS
1. STAndArd of review
A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual
dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law,
which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion inde-
pendent of the lower court’s decision. Steven S. v. Mary S., 277
Neb. 124, 760 N.W.2d 28 (2009); VanHorn v. Nebraska State
Racing Comm., 273 Neb. 737, 732 N.W.2d 651 (2007).
[1] Statutory interpretation presents a matter of law which
an appellate court determines independent of the conclusions
reached by a lower court. Groseth v. Groseth, 257 Neb. 525,
600 N.W.2d 159 (1999). See, also, Wills v. Wills, 16 Neb. App.
559, 745 N.W.2d 924 (2008).
2. perSonAl JuriSdiCTion
[2,3] Bradly first asserts that the district court erred in deter-
mining that it had personal jurisdiction over him. Personal
jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to subject and bind a par-
ticular entity to its decisions. Hunt v. Trackwell, 262 Neb. 688,
635 N.W.2d 106 (2001). Lack of personal jurisdiction may be
waived and such jurisdiction conferred by the conduct of the
parties. Id. For example, a party that files an answer generally
denying the allegations of a petition invokes the court’s power
on an issue other than personal jurisdiction and confers on the
court personal jurisdiction. See id. Similarly, a party who does
more than call a court’s attention to the lack of personal juris-
diction by asking for affirmative relief will not later be heard to
claim that the court lacked jurisdiction over that party. Glass v.
Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 248 Neb. 501, 536 N.W.2d
344 (1995).
On April 4, 2008, Bradly filed a request for hearing in
response to receiving notice that Suzanne was seeking to reg-
ister the California support orders. In the request for hearing,
Bradly did not raise the issue of personal jurisdiction. rather,
he requested a hearing because he “dispute[d] the amounts
set forth in [Suzanne’s] affidavit and respectfully request[ed]
the court to require strict proof on her claim of what support
amounts are owed.” Bradly did not assert that the court lacked
personal jurisdiction over him until the June 2008 hearing.
trOgdON v. trOgdON 	317
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 313

Bradly’s first filing with the court did more than call the
court’s attention to the lack of personal jurisdiction. In fact,
Bradly’s first filing did not even mention the potential juris-
dictional issue. Instead, the filing requested affirmative relief
in the form of a hearing to determine the exact amount of
arrearages owed. Because this filing requested such affirmative
relief, Bradly was precluded from claiming at the June 2008
hearing that the court lacked jurisdiction over him. As a result
of Bradly’s conduct, he waived his right to assert that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Accordingly, this assign-
ment of error has no merit.
3. equiTABle eSToppel defenSe
Bradly also asserts that the court erred in precluding him
from raising an equitable estoppel defense at the November
2008 hearing. Specifically, he alleges that his defense related
not to the validity of the support orders, but to the calculation
of the amount of arrearages owed. Bradly asserts that he did not
have an opportunity to contest the amount of arrearages owed
at the June 2008 hearing where the order was confirmed.
Bradly raised the equitable estoppel defense for the first
time in his motion to stop enforcement for past support arrear-
ages. this motion was filed on October 15, 2008, approxi-
mately 3 months after the court entered an order confirming
the registration of the California support orders. Based on
§ 42-473, the district court did not permit Bradly to raise the
equitable estoppel defense at the November 2008 hearing.
Section 42-743 states: “Confirmation of a registered order,
whether by operation of law or after notice and hearing, pre-
cludes further contest of the order with respect to any mat-
ter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.”
essentially, the court found that Bradly’s defense was untimely
raised because it could have been asserted at the June 2008
confirmation hearing.
In order to address Bradly’s assertions, we must examine
certain provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act to determine whether Bradly could have raised the estoppel
defense at the June 2008 hearing when he was contesting regis-
tration and confirmation of the California support orders.
318 	18 NeBrASKA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

Section 42-741 provides the procedures for contesting the
validity or enforcement of a foreign support order prior to its
confirmation. Section 42-741(a) reads, in part: “the nonregis-
tering party may seek to vacate the registration, to assert any
defense to an allegation of noncompliance with the registered
order, or to contest the remedies being sought or the amount
of any alleged arrearages . . . .” this language indicates that a
party can contest the “amount of any alleged arrearages” prior
to the confirmation of a foreign support order.
Section 42-742 goes on to enumerate the specific defenses
which can be raised when contesting the validity or enforce-
ment of a registered order and the effect of a validly raised
defense. Section 42-742 provides:
(a) A party contesting the validity or enforcement of
a registered order or seeking to vacate the registration
has the burden of proving one or more of the follow-
ing defenses:
(1) the issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction
over the contesting party;
(2) the order was obtained by fraud;
(3) the order has been vacated, suspended, or modified
by a later order;
(4) the issuing tribunal has stayed the order pend-
ing appeal;
(5) there is a defense under the law of this state to the
remedy sought;
(6) full or partial payment has been made;
(7) the statute of limitation under section 42-739 pre-
cludes enforcement of some or all of the alleged arrear-
ages; or
(8) the alleged controlling order is not the control-
ling order.
(b) If a party presents evidence establishing a full or
partial defense under subsection (a) of this section, a tri-
bunal shall stay enforcement of the registered order, con-
tinue the proceeding to permit production of additional
relevant evidence, and issue other appropriate orders.
An uncontested portion of the registered order may be
trOgdON v. trOgdON 	319
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 313

enforced by all remedies available under the law of
this state.
(c) If the contesting party does not establish a defense
under such subsection to the validity or enforcement of
the order, the registering tribunal shall issue an order con-
firming the order.
Section 42-742(a)(5) clearly provides that if “there is a
defense under the law of this state to the remedy sought,” such
defense can be raised prior to confirmation of a foreign support
order. the Nebraska Supreme Court has previously held that
the doctrine of equitable estoppel is a possible defense in pro-
ceedings concerning the enforcement or modification of sup-
port orders: “[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel could operate
to excuse the payment of accrued child support under appro-
priate factual circumstances.” Truman v. Truman, 256 Neb. 628,
633-34, 591 N.W.2d 81, 85 (1999). Because equitable estoppel
“is a defense under the law of this state,” § 42-742(a)(5), such
a defense could have been raised prior to confirmation of the
California support orders.
[4] Bradly did not raise the estoppel defense at the June
2008 hearing. After the June 2008 hearing, the court entered
an order confirming the registration of the California support
orders. Pursuant to § 42-743, after confirmation of the support
orders, Bradly was precluded from further contesting the orders
with respect to any matter that could have been asserted prior
to confirmation. Because the estoppel defense could have been
raised prior to confirmation of the orders, the district court did
not err in precluding Bradly from raising such defense at the
November 2008 hearing.
In his brief to this court, Bradly asserts that he was not given
an opportunity to contest the amount of arrearages owed at the
June 2008 hearing. He argues that even though the support
orders were confirmed after the June 2008 hearing, the court
stayed the issue of the amount of arrearages owed, and that
his defense is relevant to that issue. Our review of the record
reveals that contrary to Bradly’s assertions, the district court
did not stay the proceedings. Instead, the court specifically
found that Bradly had failed to provide evidence of a valid
defense to the registration and enforcement of the orders. In
320 	18 NeBrASKA APPeLLAte rePOrtS

its written order, the court found, “[Bradly] did not satisfy any
of the enumerated elements set forth in . . . § 42-742(a) or (b)
and therefore, pursuant to . . . § 42-742(c), an order confirming
the registration should be issued.” the court indicated, “[t]he
[support] orders . . . are hereby confirmed as orders enforce-
able in the same manner and subject to the same procedures as
orders issued by a tribunal of the state of Nebraska.”
Moreover, although Bradly argues that he was not given the
opportunity to contest the amount of arrearages at the June
2008 hearing, Bradly’s counsel did assert a defense of partial
payment. Counsel argued that Bradly had paid money directly
to Suzanne and that the amounts of such payments had not
been included in Suzanne’s calculations of the arrearages owed.
Counsel stated that Bradly had paid over $5,000. However,
counsel did not provide any evidence of such payment. Without
evidence to support counsel’s assertions, the court confirmed
the support orders.
[5] Because Bradly could, and should, have raised the
estoppel defense prior to confirmation of the orders, he is now
precluded from raising such a defense. As such, the district
court did not err in precluding Bradly from raising the estoppel
defense at the November 2008 hearing. Bradly’s assignment of
error has no merit.
V. CONCLUSION
We find that the district court had personal jurisdiction
over Bradly because Bradly filed a notice of hearing request-
ing affirmative relief prior to asserting that the district court
lacked personal jurisdiction over him. We also find that pur-
suant to § 42-743, Bradly was precluded from raising an
estoppel argument to contest the previously confirmed support
orders. As such, we affirm the confirmation of the foreign sup-
port orders.
A ffirmed.
trOgdON v. trOgdON 	321
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 313