Parker v. State ex rel. Bruning

SHaun o. parker , d.d.S., appellant , v .
S tate oF neBraSka ex rel . J on B runing ,
attorney general , appellee .
753 N.W.2d 843
Filed August 8, 2008. 	No. S-07-588.
1. Administrative Law: Judgments: Appeal and Error. A judgment or final order
rendered by a district court in a judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court for errors appear-
ing on the record.
2. ____: ____: ____. When reviewing an order of a district court under the
Administrative Procedure Act for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is
whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and
is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
3. Due Process. Procedural due process limits the ability of the government to
deprive people of interests that constitute liberty or property interests within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause.
4. Due Process: Notice. Procedural due process requires that the government provide
parties deprived of liberty or property interests adequate notice and an opportunity
for a hearing.
5. Administrative Law: Due Process: Notice: Evidence. In proceedings before
an administrative agency or tribunal, procedural due process requires notice,
identification of the accuser, factual basis for the accusation, reasonable time and
opportunity to present evidence concerning the accusation, and a hearing before an
impartial board.
6. Records: Appeal and Error. It is incumbent upon an appellant to present a record
supporting the errors assigned; absent such a record, an appellate court will affirm
the lower court’s decision regarding those errors.
7. Rules of the Supreme Court: Constitutional Law: Statutes: Notice. Neb. Ct.
R. App. P. § 2-109(E) requires that a party challenging a statute’s constitutionality
file and serve notice with the Supreme Court Clerk at the time of filing the party’s
brief; strict compliance with § 2-109(E) is required for the court to address a
constitutional claim.
8. Disciplinary Proceedings: Health Care Providers. the criteria to be considered
in determining an appropriate professional disciplinary sanction include the fol-
lowing: (1) the nature of the offense, (2) the need for deterring others, (3) the
maintenance of the reputation of the profession as a whole, (4) the protection of
the public, (5) the attitude of the offender generally, and (6) the offender’s present
or future fitness to continue in the practice of the profession.
9. Appeal and Error. For an appellate court to consider an alleged error, the error
must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party
assigning the error.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: J eFFre
cHeuvront, Judge. Affirmed.
PARkER v. StAtE Ex REL. BRuNINg 	359
Cite as 276 Neb. 359
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:53 AM CST

Jerry 	W. 	katskee, 	of 	katskee, 	henatsch 	& 	Suing, 	for
appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney general, and Lisa k. Anderson for
appellee.
W rigHt, connolly, gerrard, S tepHan, mccormack, and
miller -lerman, JJ.
connolly, J.
I. SummARy
Shaun o. Parker, D.D.S., appeals the State’s disciplinary
action. In November 2006, the director of the Department of
health and human Services Regulation and Licensure (the
Department) revoked Parker’s license to practice dentistry.
Parker sought review by the district court. the court affirmed
the order revoking his license.
on appeal, Parker argues that the State denied him procedural
due process during the disciplinary procedures. he also contends
that the revocation of his license was an inappropriate sanction
for his alleged offense. Because of Parker’s procedural defaults,
we do not address his due process claims. We, however, con-
clude that revocation was an appropriate sanction. We affirm.
II. BACkgRouND
1. parker ’S prior diSciplinary action
In January 2001, the State petitioned for disciplinary action
against Parker’s license to practice dentistry. the State’s peti-
tion alleged in part that from September 1998 through march
2000, Parker obtained prescription drugs for his personal use
by fraudulent prescriptions. In a settlement agreement with the
State, Parker admitted the allegations in the State’s petition. the
agreement noted that in November 2000, Parker completed an
inpatient chemical dependency treatment program at an outstate
recovery facility. the agreement provided that Parker’s dental
license would be placed on probation for 5 years.
2. parker ’S current diSciplinary action
In June 2006, Parker faced another disciplinary action against
his dental license. that action is the subject of the current appeal.
the action stemmed from two separate factual allegations that
360 	276 NEBRASkA REPoRtS

Parker (1) allowed his dental partner to use a rubber stamp
bearing Parker’s signature to prescribe controlled substances for
multiple patients and (2) failed to maintain a controlled sub-
stance log for triazolam kept and used in the office.
(a) the Department’s Investigation and the Board of
Dentistry’s Subsequent Recommendation
In January 2006, a Department investigator, Jeff Newman,
received information from a confidential informant. the infor-
mant told Newman that Parker’s dental partner, Carl Braun,
D.D.S.—who 	was 	not 	authorized 	to 	prescribe 	controlled
substances—was using a rubber stamp bearing Parker’s sig-
nature to prescribe drugs for his patients. the Department
began an investigation involving Parker. upon completing the
investigation, Newman drafted a written report of the investiga-
tion and his findings. he submitted the report to the Board of
Dentistry (the Board) for their review and recommendations.
the Board recommended that the Department revoke Parker’s
dental license.
(b) the State’s Petition for Disciplinary Action
Following the Board’s recommendation, the Attorney general
petitioned for disciplinary action against Parker’s license. the
State alleged that Parker’s act of allowing Braun to use the
rubber stamp to issue prescriptions justified discipline under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-147(8) (Reissue 2003). that section pro-
vides that the State may discipline a professional licensee for
“[p]ermitting, aiding, or abetting the practice of a profession
or the performance of activities requiring a license, certificate,
or registration by a person not licensed, certified, or regis-
tered to do so.” the State also alleged that the conduct was a
ground for discipline under § 71-147(2) as dishonorable con-
duct and § 71-147(10) as unprofessional conduct. the State
further alleged that Parker’s failure to maintain a controlled
substance log for triazolam was a ground for discipline under
§ 71-147(10) and (17).
After a hearing before a hearing officer, the director issued
findings of fact and conclusions of law. the director concluded
that Parker’s act of allowing Braun to issue prescriptions without
a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) permit was a ground
PARkER v. StAtE Ex REL. BRuNINg 	361
Cite as 276 Neb. 359

for discipline under § 71-147(8). the director further deter-
mined that Parker’s conduct in allowing Braun to use the rubber
stamp and Parker’s failure to maintain a controlled substance
log for triazolam constituted unprofessional conduct and were
therefore grounds for discipline. the director revoked Parker’s
dental license.
(c) the District Court’s Review of the Director’s Decision
Parker petitioned the district court for review of the director’s
decision. the district court’s subsequent order explained that
Parker did not take issue with the director’s factual conclu-
sions. Parker instead argued the disciplinary process was unfair
and thus it violated his due process rights. the court implicitly
concluded that the State had not violated Parker’s due process
rights. After a de novo review of the record, the court found
clear and convincing evidence that Parker engaged in unpro-
fessional conduct. the court concluded that the revocation of
Parker’s dental license was appropriate under the circumstances.
Parker now appeals the district court’s decision.
3. FactS relevant to tHe Signature Stamp
(a) Braun’s Probationary License
the State alleged that between January 2005 and January
2006, Parker allowed Braun to use a rubber stamp bearing
Parker’s signature to issue prescriptions for controlled sub-
stances. During this period, Braun, like Parker, was practicing
dentistry under a probationary license. one probationary con-
dition required Braun to practice with another dentist holding
a Nebraska license. Another condition provided that until he
completed 2 years of probation, Braun was not to prescribe con-
trolled substances. Braun’s probation began in 2004.
Parker was Braun’s supervisor when Braun began working with
Parker in August 2004. At that time, Parker signed a form for the
Department stating that he had reviewed the Department’s letter
offering Braun a probationary license. that letter explained that
for the first 2 years of his probation, Braun was not to prescribe
controlled substances. Despite the requirement that Braun not
prescribe controlled substances, Parker allowed Braun to issue
prescriptions by using a rubber stamp with Parker’s signature.
362 	276 NEBRASkA REPoRtS

(b) use of the Signature Stamp
After receiving information from the confidential informant
about the signature stamp, Newman and a DEA investigator col-
lected prescriptions bearing Parker’s name from several pharma-
cies in omaha. Several prescriptions had a rubber stamp signa-
ture. the stamped prescriptions were for the following controlled
substances: (Schedule III) vicodin, Lorcet 10, and tylenol #3,
and (Schedule Iv) Darvocet N100 and triazolam .25.1
After Newman and the DEA investigator collected the pre-
scriptions, they made an unannounced visit to Parker’s dental
office to talk with Parker and Braun. Newman later testified that
Parker was cooperative during the visit.
Parker admitted to Newman that the rubber stamp existed. he
told Newman that he and Braun created the stamp to alleviate
any inconvenience for Braun’s patients who needed controlled
substances. Because Braun was not authorized to write prescrip-
tions, Parker had to sign the prescriptions for Braun’s patients.
Parker explained at the hearing that there were times Braun
needed Parker’s signature when Parker was in the middle of a
procedure. Parker stated that having to “de-glove” in the middle
of a procedure and to “re-glove” after signing the prescription
could be time consuming. the alternative was to have Braun’s
patients wait until Parker had finished his procedure. So, accord-
ing to Parker, they used the rubber stamp with Parker’s signature
“to facilitate things,” “just to move things along so patients
wouldn’t have to wait.” Parker explained that the prescriptions
were computer generated with his DEA number and that Braun
would then use the rubber stamp to apply Parker’s signature to
the prescription.
Parker told Newman that he initially provided direct super-
vision of all prescriptions requested by Braun. But once he
became comfortable with Braun’s prescribing habits, he no
longer made contemporaneous reviews of every prescription
Braun issued with the stamped signature. Parker later testified
that he reviewed each prescription when it was written or, if
not then, within 24 hours of the patient’s visit. According to
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-405 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
PARkER v. StAtE Ex REL. BRuNINg 	363
Cite as 276 Neb. 359

Newman, Parker acknowledged that Braun used the rubber
stamp on occasions when Parker was out of the office.
Parker testified that he regularly used the stamp himself. he
also testified he did not know until shortly before his meeting
with Newman that using the stamp could be an issue. he stated
he was not aware of the problem until a pharmacy notified his
office that investigators were pulling the stamped prescriptions.
According to Parker, he and Braun immediately stopped using
the rubber stamp upon learning of the problem.
4. F actS relating to parker ’S F ailure to maintain a
controlled S uBStance log For triazolam
the events leading to Parker’s initial discipline in 2001
would have justified the revocation of his DEA registration as
a practitioner authorized to handle Schedule II through v con-
trolled substances.2 But the DEA agreed not to revoke his DEA
registration if he complied with the terms of a “memorandum
of understanding.” under those terms, Parker agreed that until
January 23, 2006, he would maintain a log of all controlled sub-
stances he prescribed. the State alleged that Parker had admit-
ted his office did not maintain a controlled substance log for
triazolam (a Schedule Iv controlled substance allegedly used in
the office). According to the State, Parker’s failure to maintain
the log was a ground for discipline.
triazolam is a prescription drug that patients brought to their
appointments for possible sedation during their procedures.
Newman testified he had information that if any tablets remained
after the patient’s procedure, the office would use those tablets
for other patients. According to Newman, Parker told him this
procedure had not been in practice for some time, but Parker
admitted that four or five times in the past, he had used the
extra triazolam on his patients. Newman’s investigation report
explained that Parker stated neither he nor the clinic maintained
a controlled substance log for the triazolam.
At the hearing, Parker disputed Newman’s testimony about
the triazolam. Parker testified that to his knowledge, the office
did not keep scheduled substances. Parker acknowledged that in
2 See id.
364 	276 NEBRASkA REPoRtS

the past, other providers in the office may have kept triazolam,
but once he became the owner of the practice, he requested
that the triazolam not be retained in the office. Parker denied
Newman’s allegation that Parker had used the extra triazolam
four or five times.
An employee testifying for Parker stated that Parker did
not authorize the retention of medications in the office. the
employee testified that if any medication remained after the
patient’s procedure, the medication was disposed of in the toilet
or sink.
III. ASSIgNmENtS oF ERRoR
Parker assigns, restated and consolidated, that the district
court erred in (1) deciding the disciplinary process did not
deny him procedural due process, (2) disregarding the hearing
officer’s failure to address Parker’s constitutional arguments, (3)
determining that revoking his license was an appropriate sanc-
tion, and (4) finding clear and convincing evidence that Parker
engaged in unprofessional conduct.
Iv. StANDARD oF REvIEW
[1,2] A judgment or final order rendered by a district court in
a judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act may be
reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court for errors
appearing on the record.3 When reviewing such an order, the
inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported
by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious,
nor unreasonable.4
v. ANALySIS
1. We decline to reacH tHe meritS oF
parker’S due proceSS claimS
[3-5] Procedural due process limits the ability of the gov-
ernment to deprive people of interests that constitute “liberty”
or “property” interests within the meaning of the Due Process
3 Zwygart v. State, 273 Neb. 406, 730 N.W.2d 103 (2007).
4 Id.
PARkER v. StAtE Ex REL. BRuNINg 	365
Cite as 276 Neb. 359

Clause.5 Procedural due process requires that the government
provide parties deprived of such interests adequate notice and an
opportunity for a hearing.6 In proceedings before an administra-
tive agency or tribunal, procedural due process requires notice,
identification of the accuser, factual basis for the accusation,
reasonable time and opportunity to present evidence concerning
the accusation, and a hearing before an impartial board.7
Although the State gave Parker notice and an opportunity to
be heard before the hearing officer, he contends that the State
denied him procedural due process during the disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Specifically, Parker sets out three grounds for his due
process claim: (1) the Attorney general was allegedly involved
in the “closed session investigation”; (2) the Attorney general
allegedly appeared before the Department’s director following
the hearing on the State’s petition; and (3) the State used a con-
fidential informant. As discussed below, we decline to reach the
merits of Parker’s due process arguments.
(a) the Record Fails to Show that the Attorney
general Was Present at the Investigation
or Appeared Before the Director
When the Department receives a complaint that a licensee
has violated the uniform Licensing Law, the Department may
investigate.8 Following the Department’s investigation, the pro-
fessional board may review the investigational file in making rec-
ommendations to the Attorney general regarding the violations
the board has identified and any sanctions the board believes
would be appropriate.9 the board’s recommendations are part
of the completed investigational report that the Department
submits to the Attorney general.10 After the Attorney general
receives the Department’s report, the Attorney general deter-
mines which, if any, statutes, rules, or regulations the licensee
5 Marshall v. Wimes, 261 Neb. 846, 626 N.W.2d 229 (2001).
6 See id.
7 Id.
8 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-168.01(1) (Reissue 2003).
9 § 71-168.01(5).
10 Id.
366 	276 NEBRASkA REPoRtS

has violated and the appropriate legal action to take.11 the
Attorney general may elect to file a petition for discipline,
which occurred here.12
once the State files a petition, the director sets a time and
place for a hearing on the petition and designates a hearing
officer to conduct the hearing.13 here, both Parker and the State
appeared at the hearing and presented witnesses. the hearing
officer also received 16 exhibits. Following the hearing, the
director entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an
order revoking Parker’s license to practice dentistry.
In his first due process argument, Parker claims that the
Attorney general was present at the “closed session investiga-
tion” before the State filed its petition and that neither Parker nor
his counsel were present. Parker argues that he “was not present
at the investigation to hear, much less rebut, the allegations and
evidence against him.”14 he claims the Attorney general was
present and able to submit evidence against him and to persuade
the Board to recommend certain sanctions. Parker further con-
tends that the State denied him due process after the hearing
because it would not allow him to appear when the Attorney
general allegedly appeared before the director acting as the legal
advisor to the Board.
the State contends that Parker has inaccurately described the
discipline process. According to the State, the Attorney general
did not submit evidence against Parker to the Board or otherwise
attempt to persuade the Board to recommend desired sanctions.
moreover, the State disputes Parker’s claims that the Attorney
general personally appeared before the director as prosecutor
and legal advisor to the Board.
Although Parker asserts that the Attorney general was present
during the investigation before the hearing and appeared before
the director after the hearing, he makes these assertions without
any reference to the record. We have not found any evidence that
11 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-171.01 (Reissue 2003).
12 Id.
13 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-153 and 71-155 (Reissue 2003); 184 Neb. Admin.
Code, ch. 1, § 008.01 (1994).
14 Brief for appellant at 12.
PARkER v. StAtE Ex REL. BRuNINg 	367
Cite as 276 Neb. 359

the Attorney general was present during the investigation. Nor
does the record reflect that the Attorney general appeared before
the director concerning Parker’s disciplinary action.
[6] Assuming but not deciding that his argument has merit,
we decline to address the issue. It was incumbent upon Parker
to present a record supporting the errors assigned.15 Absent such
a record, an appellate court will affirm the lower court’s deci-
sion regarding those errors.16 Because we cannot determine from
the record whether the Attorney general was present during
the investigation or appeared before the director, we decline to
address the merits of Parker’s claims.
(b) the Record Fails to Show that Parker
Attempted to Confront or Examine the
State’s Confidential Informant
Parker also contends that the State denied him procedural due
process because it denied him the opportunity to confront and
cross-examine the confidential informant. In his brief, Parker
frames the issue as “[w]hether [he] was denied procedural
due process by the [director] in the crucial initial stages of the
proceedings against him, to wit: (a) the investigation of the
complaint derived from [a] confidential informant . . . .” Parker
argues that he was unable to confront or cross-examine the
confidential informant. the State did not call the informant to
testify at the hearing. the record, however, fails to show that
Parker made any attempts or requests to confront or examine
the informant or that the director or hearing officer denied
any such attempts or requests. Simply put, the record does not
establish that the director or hearing officer denied Parker the
opportunity to examine the informant. So, even if we were to
agree that denying a licensee the opportunity to examine a con-
fidential informant could be a possible due process violation,
here, the record lacks any evidence that Parker was denied such
an opportunity. As stated, an appellant must present a record that
15 See In re Interest of Kochner, 266 Neb. 114, 662 N.W.2d 195 (2003).
16 See id.
368 	276 NEBRASkA REPoRtS

supports the errors assigned.17 We decline to address the merits
of Parker’s argument.
2. parker H aS Failed to comply WitH procedural ruleS
For cHallenging tHe conStitutionality oF StatuteS
[7] Parker also asserts in his brief that “the procedures estab-
lished by the statutory administrative scheme deprived him of
due process on this confidential informant based investigation.”18
Parker does not identify the specific statutes to which he is
referring. But to the extent he is arguing that specific statutes
are unconstitutional, we do not reach this argument. Neb. Ct. R.
App. P. § 2-109(E) requires that a party challenging a statute’s
constitutionality file and serve notice with the Supreme Court
Clerk at the time of filing the party’s brief.19 We have repeatedly
held that strict compliance with § 2-109(E) is required for the
court to address a constitutional claim.20 A review of the record
shows that Parker failed to file with the clerk a notice of a con-
stitutional question.
Parker also argues that another statute, Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 84-917(6)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2006), is unconstitutional. Section
84-917(6)(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that
for petitions for review filed in the district court on or after July
1, 1989, “the court may affirm, reverse, or modify the decision
of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings.” Parker
argues that the statute fails to provide a clear standard for the dis-
trict court regarding the grounds on which it may rely to remand
the case. According to Parker, his due process arguments could
not be addressed “in any meaningful way” under § 84-917.21
Parker therefore argues that the statute is “unconstitutional on its
face, as it works to deny the ability to raise and have considered
violations of constitutional provisions.”22 Again, however, Parker
17 See In re Interest of Kochner, supra note 15.
18 Brief for appellant at 17.
19 See Ptak v. Swanson, 271 Neb. 57, 709 N.W.2d 337 (2006).
20 See id.
21 Brief for appellant at 20.
22 Id. at 22.
PARkER v. StAtE Ex REL. BRuNINg 	369
Cite as 276 Neb. 359

failed to file with the Supreme Court Clerk a notice of a consti-
tutional question as required under § 2-109(E).
thus, we do not address Parker’s claims that the statutes
are unconstitutional.
3. revocation oF parker’S licenSe to practice
dentiStry WaS an appropriate Sanction
Parker also contends that the revocation of his license to
practice dentistry was an inappropriate sanction. he argues
that he was unaware that the use of a rubber signature stamp
was prohibited. he claims that he stopped using it immedi-
ately upon learning that it was prohibited, that no patients were
directly harmed by his conduct, and that he cooperated with the
Department’s investigator.
[8] In Poor v. State,23 we identified criteria to consider in
assessing the severity of a disciplinary sanction imposed upon a
health care professional:
“(1) the nature of the offense, (2) the need for deterring
others, (3) the maintenance of the reputation of the [profes-
sion] as a whole, (4) the protection of the public, (5) the
attitude of the offender generally, and (6) the offender’s
present or future fitness to continue in the practice of
[the profession].”
the director’s revocation of Parker’s dental license was not
the first disciplinary action taken against Parker. In January
2001, the director placed Parker’s license on probation for 5
years after he admitted that he obtained controlled substances
for personal use by fraudulent prescriptions and that he violated
the uniform Controlled Substances Act.
While Parker’s license was still on probation for this prior
misconduct, he agreed to help monitor Braun’s compliance
with Braun’s own probationary terms. Parker knew upon hiring
Braun that Braun was prohibited from prescribing controlled
substances for the first 2 years of his probation.
Despite this knowledge, Parker allowed Braun to issue pre-
scriptions using Parker’s DEA number and a rubber stamp bear-
ing Parker’s signature. Parker admitted that although he initially
23 Poor v. State, 266 Neb. 183, 195, 663 N.W.2d 109, 118-19 (2003).
370 	276 NEBRASkA REPoRtS

provided direct supervision of all prescriptions Braun issued
with the signature stamp, he eventually ceased making contem-
poraneous reviews of every prescription Braun issued.
Parker argues that he was unaware that use of the rub-
ber stamp was prohibited. But he misses the point. he knew
that Braun was not authorized to prescribe controlled sub-
stances and agreed to monitor Braun, yet he allowed Braun to
issue prescriptions using the stamp without contemporaneously
reviewing the prescriptions. In effect, he enabled and allowed
Braun to prescribe controlled substances when Braun was not
authorized to do so. Parker’s conduct trivialized the terms of
Braun’s probation.
We find Parker’s conduct particularly troublesome given that
his own license was on probation at the time. having been
previously disciplined for violations of the uniform Controlled
Substances Act, Parker, an experienced practitioner, should have
understood the magnitude of responsibility the Department
demands 	of 	health 	care 	professionals 	who 	prescribe 	con-
trolled substances.
Parker urges us to consider that he cooperated with the inves-
tigator and that he and Braun stopped using the signature stamp
upon learning that its use was prohibited. the Department’s regu-
lations contain a nonexclusive list of factors that the Department
may consider to determine an appropriate sanction.24 We recog-
nize that included as mitigating factors are “[c]ontriteness and
willingness to cooperate”25 and “[c]orrective efforts . . . related
to the conduct charged, such as changes in practices . . . .”26 But
included as an aggravating factor is “[p]rior disciplinary action,
or misconduct while under discipline . . . .”27 Because Parker
was on probation for prior misconduct involving controlled sub-
stances when the current offense occurred, the presence of the
two mitigating factors is less than compelling. We conclude that
the revocation of Parker’s license was an appropriate sanction.
24 See 184 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 013.03 (1994).
25 Id., § 013.03B5.
26 Id., § 013.03B3.
27 Id., § 013.03A5.
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Cite as 276 Neb. 359

4. W e do not reacH parker ’S F ourtH aSSignment oF error
[9] Although Parker assigns as error the district court’s find-
ing of clear and convincing evidence that he engaged in unpro-
fessional conduct, he makes no argument to support this assign-
ment. For an appellate court to consider an alleged error, the
error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued
in the brief of the party assigning the error.28 therefore, we do
not consider his fourth assignment of error.
We have considered Parker’s remaining arguments and con-
clude that they are without merit.
vI. CoNCLuSIoN
We decline to reach the merits of Parker’s due process claims,
his challenges to the constitutionality of statutes, and his claim
that the district court erred in finding clear and convincing evi-
dence that he engaged in unprofessional conduct. We conclude
that the revocation of Parker’s license to practice dentistry was
an appropriate sanction under the circumstances. We affirm
the district court’s order affirming the revocation of Parker’s
dental license.
aFFirmed .
H eavican, C.J., not participating.
28 Bellino v. McGrath North, 274 Neb. 130, 738 N.W.2d 434 (2007).
crane S aleS & S ervice co ., inc ., appellant , v .
S eneca inSurance company , appellee .
754 N.W.2d 607
Filed August 8, 2008. 	No. S-07-799.
1. Rules of the Supreme Court: Pleadings. Dismissal under Neb. Ct. R. Pldg.
§ 6-1112(b)(6) should be granted only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff
includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that there is some insu-
perable bar to relief.
2. Pleadings: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews de novo a lower court’s
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim.
3. ____: ____. When analyzing a lower court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a claim, an appellate court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true
and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
372 	276 NEBRASkA REPoRtS