In re Interest of Matthew P.

The language of the Assignment Agreement is clear and
unambiguous. Omaha College’s rights and obligations under
the 1999 lease were terminated as of October 5, 2001, the
date the Assignment Agreement was executed. The Assignment
Agreement does not provide that Vatterott is liable for any
obligations arising prior to the date of assignment. Absent a
provision obligating Vatterott for liabilities arising prior to the
time Vatterott obtained its leasehold interest in the property,
the lack of privity of estate in this case compels our conclusion
that Vatterott is not liable for Omaha College’s failure to fulfill
Omaha College’s obligations under the 1999 lease.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm.
affirmeD.
in re intereSt of mattHew p., a CHilD unDer 18 YearS of aGe .
S tate of nebraSka , appellee , v .
mattHew p., appellant .
745 N.W.2d 574
Filed February 29, 2008. 	No. S-07-649.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which
an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
2. ____: ____. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning,
and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of
statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster County:
linDa S. porter, Judge. Affirmed.
Dennis R. keefe, Lancaster County Public Defender, and
Sarah P. Newell for appellant.
Gary Lacey, Lancaster County Attorney, Alicia b. Henderson,
and, on brief, Michelle A. Paxton for appellee.
H eaviCan, 	C.J., 	wriGHt, 	C onnollY, 	G errarD, 	S tepHan,
mCC ormaCk, and miller -lerman, JJ.
IN RE INTEREST OF MATTHEW P. 	189
Cite as 275 Neb. 189
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:54 AM CST

190 	275 NEbRASkA REPORTS
S tepHan, J.
Matthew P. was adjudicated as a child within the meaning of
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(2) (Cum. Supp. 2006) after the sepa-
rate juvenile court of Lancaster County found he had committed
an act which would constitute the felony offense of escape from
official detention under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-912(1) (Reissue
1995). Matthew timely appealed his adjudication. We affirm.
FACTS
In a December 1, 2006, dispositional order, the juvenile court
committed Matthew to the custody of the Office of Juvenile
Services (OJS) for “out of home placement at a group home
level of care.” Matthew’s commitment was the result of a previ-
ous law violation. OJS placed him at a Lincoln group home.
Matthew absconded from this placement twice within the first
month. The group home informed OJS that it could no longer
keep Matthew at the facility, and OJS therefore issued a detainer
for his apprehension and detention,1 colloquially referred to as a
“parole hold.” The detainer requested that the Lancaster County
Youth Services Center (LCYSC) hold Matthew until a hear-
ing could be held seeking to transfer him to a higher level of
care. The OJS services officer assigned to Matthew described
LCYSC as a “detention center,” and the record indicates that it
is a secure facility.
Matthew was detained at LCYSC on January 25, 2007. On
February 2, a private transport service coordinated and paid for
by OJS brought Matthew to a medical appointment in Lincoln.
Matthew was transported to the appointment in restraints con-
sisting of “leg irons and handcuffs with a belt.” After the
appointment, he ran away from the transport employee and was
not apprehended until 2 or 3 weeks later.
The State filed a second supplemental petition in the pend-
ing juvenile proceeding alleging that Matthew was a minor as
defined by § 43-247(2) by reason of his actions on February 2,
2007. The State alleged that Matthew had escaped from official
detention in violation of § 28-912(1). After an evidentiary hear-
ing, the juvenile court found that Matthew’s actions constituted
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-411 (Reissue 2004).

an escape as defined and contemplated by § 28-912(1). Matthew
timely appealed this adjudication, and we moved the appeal to
our docket on our own motion under our statutory authority to
regulate the dockets of the appellate courts of this state.2
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Matthew’s sole assignment of error is that the juvenile court
erred in adjudicating him because he did not escape from offi-
cial detention within the meaning of § 28-912(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which an
appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.3
ANALYSIS
Matthew was adjudicated under § 43-247(2), which gives the
juvenile court jurisdiction over “[a]ny juvenile who has com-
mitted an act which would constitute a felony under the laws of
this state.” The State alleged that his actions were in violation
of § 28-912(1), which provides:
A person commits escape if he unlawfully removes him-
self from official detention or fails to return to official
detention following temporary leave granted for a specific
purpose or limited period. Official detention shall mean
arrest, detention in or transportation to any facility for
custody of persons under charge or conviction of crime
or contempt or for persons alleged or found to be delin-
quent, detention for extradition or deportation, or any
other detention for law enforcement purposes; but official
detention does not include supervision of probation or
parole or constraint incidental to release on bail.
This appeal turns on the question of whether Matthew was in
“official detention” at the time he eluded the transport employee.
We note that although the detainer for apprehension and deten-
tion issued by OJS is colloquially referred to as a “parole hold,”
Matthew was not on parole within the meaning of the Office of
2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 1995).
3 Jones v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Cos., 274 Neb. 186, 738 N.W.2d 840 (2007);
Burns v. Nielsen, 273 Neb. 724, 732 N.W.2d 640 (2007).
IN RE INTEREST OF MATTHEW P. 	191
Cite as 275 Neb. 189

192 	275 NEbRASkA REPORTS
Juvenile Services Act, which defines “parole” as “a conditional
release of a juvenile from a youth rehabilitation and treatment
center to aftercare or transferred to Nebraska for parole super-
vision by way of interstate compact.”4 Accordingly, the last
clause of § 28-912(1) does not apply.
[2] In determining whether Matthew was under “official
detention” as defined by § 28-912(1), we are guided by the
familiar principle that statutory language is to be given its
plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not
resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory
words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.5 The statutory
definition of “official detention” is broad and encompasses a
variety of circumstances. In this case, the relevant language in
§ 28-912(1) is “detention in or transportation to any facility . . .
for persons alleged or found to be delinquent . . . or any other
detention for law enforcement purposes.”
On the date in question, Matthew was under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court as a result of his previous adjudication for
committing an act which would constitute a law violation. He
was committed to OJS, which is charged with oversight and
control of certain state juvenile correctional facilities and pro-
grams.6 At the time of his flight, he was placed at a juvenile
detention facility and was in the process of being transported
back to the facility from a medical appointment.
The fact that he was being held in this facility pursuant to
an OJS detainer, as opposed to a court order, is of no signifi-
cance. We have noted that adult criminal offenders who are in
custody “pursuant to commitment by official proceedings” fall
within the definitional scope of § 28-912(1).7 Matthew’s deten-
tion at LCYSC was likewise pursuant to official proceedings. A
juvenile court retains jurisdiction “over any juvenile committed
to [OJS] until such time that the juvenile is discharged from
4 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-403(5) (Reissue 2004).
5 In re Estate of Nemetz, 273 Neb. 918, 735 N.W.2d 363 (2007); Ottaco
Acceptance, Inc. v. Larkin, 273 Neb. 765, 733 N.W.2d 539 (2007).
6 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-404 (Reissue 2004).
7 State v. Farr, 209 Neb. 163, 169, 306 N.W.2d 854, 858 (1981).

[OJS].”8 At the time of commitment, the court is required to
determine the initial level of treatment.9 In this case, the court
ordered initial treatment at a group home level. If OJS proposes
to transfer a juvenile to a higher level of care, it must seek
court approval, which can be given only after OJS establishes
at a hearing that the change is in the best interests of the juve-
nile, with due consideration for public safety.10 OJS can make
an immediate temporary change without prior court approval
under limited circumstances, including when a facility of place-
ment which is not state owned has asked that the juvenile be
removed.11 That is what occurred in this case.
Matthew argues on appeal that because he was committed
to OJS, his running away from the transport officer was simply
“absconding” from an OJS commitment and was not an escape
from official detention.12 He alleges that his actions thus do
not fall under § 28-912, but instead fall under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-410 (Reissue 2004), which provides in part:
Any peace officer, juvenile parole officer, or direct
care staff member of [OJS] has the authority to appre-
hend and detain a juvenile who has absconded or is
attempting to abscond from a placement for evaluation or
commitment to [OJS] and shall cause the juvenile to be
returned to the facility or program or an appropriate juve-
nile detention facility.
He contends that if absconding from an OJS placement consti-
tuted an escape within the meaning of § 28-912, the provisions
of § 43-410 would be unnecessary and redundant.
We are not persuaded by this argument. The placement
or commitment of a juvenile to the custody of OJS does not
necessarily result in official detention within the meaning of
§ 28-912(1). Juveniles adjudicated as delinquent may be placed
8 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-408(2) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
9 Id.
10 § 43-408(4)(a).
11 § 43-408(4)(b).
12 brief for appellant at 14.
IN RE INTEREST OF MATTHEW P. 	193
Cite as 275 Neb. 189

194 	275 NEbRASkA REPORTS
with OJS for evaluation to aid the court in disposition.13 When
committing an adjudicated juvenile to the custody of OJS,
a court must order the “initial level of treatment.”14 Section
43-408(5) provides that “[i]f a juvenile is placed in detention
after the initial level of treatment is determined by the commit-
ting court,” the court is required to hold periodic status hear-
ings. The same statute specifically provides that “[p]lacement
of a juvenile in detention shall not be considered as a treatment
service.”15 Thus, it is possible for a juvenile to abscond from an
OJS placement or commitment without committing the offense
of escape from official detention.
In this case, however, the facts clearly establish that Matthew
was being held in detention pursuant to official proceedings
when he fled from the transportation employee. Accordingly,
the juvenile court did not err in adjudicating Matthew pursu-
ant to § 43-247(2) as a child who has committed an act which
would constitute a felony under the laws of this state. Finding
no error, we affirm the judgment of the separate juvenile court.
affirmeD.
13 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-281 and 43-413 (Reissue 2004).
14 § 43-408(2).
15 § 43-408(5).