In re Estate of Cooper

in accordance with this opinion. Having so concluded, we need
not address the appellants’ remaining assignment of error.
R eveRsed and Remanded foR
fuRtheR pRoceedings .
in Re estate of R ichaRd n. coopeR, deceased .
J oe m. R ichaRdson , successoR peRsonal R epResentative of the
estate of R ichaRd n. coopeR, deceased , et al ., appellees , v .
fiRst tennessee B ank , national association , appellant .
746 N.W.2d 653
Filed March 28, 2008. 	No. S-06-1016.
1. Decedents’ Estates: Appeal and Error. In the absence of an equity question, an
appellate court, reviewing probate matters, examines for error appearing on the
record made in the county court.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On a question of law, an appellate court is
obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached by the
court below.
3. Statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
4. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Absent anything to the contrary, an appellate court
will give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning.
5. ____: ____. When confronted with a statutory construction issue, an appellate court
resolves the issue independently and irrespective of the lower court’s conclusion.
6. ____: ____. An appellate court’s role, to the extent possible, is to give effect to
the statute’s entire language, and to reconcile different provisions of the statute so
they are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.
7. ____: ____. When possible, an appellate court will try to avoid a statutory con-
struction that would lead to an absurd result.
8. Statutes: Decedents’ Estates: Claims: Attorney and Client. Giving the lan-
guage in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2486 (Reissue 1995) a consistent, harmonious, and
sensible construction, it is apparent that the filing of a claim is a separate and
distinct act from the initiation of a legal proceeding to pursue payment of the
claim. Therefore, the filing of a claim does not commence an action and does not
in and of itself require the services of an attorney.
9. Attorneys at Law: Words and Phrases. The term “practice of law” includes the
trial of causes in court and the preparation of pleadings to be filed in court.
10. Decedents’ Estates: Executors and Administrators: Claims: Notice. The filing
of a statement of claim is an administrative step by which the personal represen-
tative is advised, in accordance with the probate statutes, of the identities of the
creditors and the amounts of their claims.
11. Rules of the Supreme Court: Attorneys at Law: States. Neb. Ct. R. of Prof.
Cond. 5.5(c) (rev. 2004) permits a lawyer who is licensed to practice in another
IN Re eSTATe OF COOPeR 	297
Cite as 275 Neb. 297
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:55 AM CST

298 	275 NebRASkA RePORTS
state but has not been admitted to practice in Nebraska to nonetheless on a tem-
porary basis perform certain legal actions in this jurisdiction, so long as those
actions “arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a juris-
diction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.”
Appeal 	from 	the 	County 	Court 	for 	Douglas 	County:
lyn v. W hite, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Richard J. Gilloon, Michelle b. Miller, Charles D. Humble,
and bradley b. Mallberg, of erickson & Sederstrom, P.C.,
for appellant.
kristopher J. Covi, Lisa M. Lehan, and J. Terry Macnamara,
of McGrath, North, Mullin & kratz, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee
Joe M. Richardson.
Michael D. kozlik, of Harris kuhn Law Firm, L.L.P., for
appellee W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Company.
heavican, 	C.J., 	WRight, 	connolly, 	geRRaRd, 	stephan,
mccoRmack, and milleR-leRman, JJ.
milleR-leRman, J.
NATURe OF CASe
In this probate proceeding involving the estate of Richard
N. Cooper, appellee W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Company
(Yates), a claimant, moved to strike two documents entitled
“Statement of Claim” and “Demand for Notice” filed by or
on behalf of another claimant, appellant First Tennessee bank,
National Association (First Tennessee), because neither docu-
ment had been filed by an attorney licensed to practice law in
Nebraska. Following an evidentiary hearing, the county court
for Douglas County determined that the filing of these docu-
ments constituted the unauthorized practice of law in violation
of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-101 (Reissue 1997), sustained Yates’
motions, and ordered both the statement of claim and the
demand for notice stricken from the file.
First Tennessee appeals. We conclude that neither the filing of
the statement of claim by a manager of First Tennessee nor the
filing of the demand for notice by First Tennessee’s Tennessee
attorney who was not admitted in Nebraska constituted the
unauthorized practice of law in Nebraska, and we therefore

reverse the county court’s order and remand the cause with
directions to reinstate both filings.
FACTS
As an initial matter, we note that the events giving rise to
this appeal occurred prior to the adoption of the Nebraska
Supreme Court’s Rules Governing the Unauthorized Practice of
Law, which became effective on January 1, 2008. Accordingly,
we do not refer to these rules.
There is essentially no dispute with regard to the material
facts. Decedent Cooper died testate on November 3, 2005. He
was survived by his wife and several children. Cooper’s last
will and testament was admitted to probate in the county court
on November 17.
The record reflects that First Tennessee is a national bank-
ing association with its principal place of business in Memphis,
Tennessee. First Tennessee asserts that it is a claimant of
Cooper’s estate. On January 17, 2006, Christopher D. brown,
the manager of special assets for First Tennessee, filed a state-
ment of claim on behalf of First Tennessee against Cooper’s
estate in the amount of $1,035,537.32. brown completed the
claim by filling in the blanks on a prepared form identified
as “NCLe Form 313 Statement of Claim” (Form 313). brown
is not an attorney, and he is not licensed to practice law
in Nebraska.
On March 2, 2006, kristen C. Wright, an attorney in Memphis,
filed a demand for notice on behalf of First Tennessee, request-
ing that all orders and other filings relevant to the Cooper estate
be sent to Wright or another attorney at Wright’s office address
in Memphis. Wright is not licensed to practice law in Nebraska,
and at the time she filed the demand for notice, she had not
sought admission pro hac vice.
On June 2, 2006, Yates, another claimant of the Cooper
estate, filed a motion to strike First Tennessee’s statement of
claim on the basis that it was signed and filed by an individual
who was not authorized to practice law in Nebraska. On June
27, Yates filed a similar motion to strike the demand for notice
because it was signed and filed by an individual who was not
authorized to practice law in Nebraska.
IN Re eSTATe OF COOPeR 	299
Cite as 275 Neb. 297

300 	275 NebRASkA RePORTS
On June 20, 2006, and continuing on July 27, the county
court held an evidentiary hearing on both motions. The record
reflects that the hearing also concerned matters not relevant
to the instant appeal. The county court received into evidence
certain affidavits and other documents relative to the motions
to strike.
In an order dated August 18, 2006, the county court con-
cluded that both the filing of the statement of claim and the
demand for notice constituted the unauthorized practice of law
in Nebraska. In reaching this decision, the county court referred
to the unauthorized practice of law statute, § 7-101, which pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows:
[N]o person shall practice as an attorney or counselor
at law, or commence, conduct or defend any action or
proceeding to which he is not a party, either by using or
subscribing his own name, or the name of any other per-
son, or by drawing pleadings or other papers to be signed
and filed by a party, in any court of record of this state,
unless he has been previously admitted to the bar by order
of the Supreme Court of this state. No such paper shall
be received or filed in any action or proceeding unless the
same bears the endorsement of some admitted attorney, or
is drawn, signed, and presented by a party to the action
or proceeding.
With regard to brown’s filing of the statement of claim, the
county court noted that First Tennessee is a corporation and
that corporations cannot appear pro se in Nebraska courts. In
its analysis, the county court relied upon the probate code,
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2484 (Reissue 1995), and concluded that
brown’s filing of the claim on behalf of First Tennessee consti-
tuted the “commencement of a proceeding” on behalf of First
Tennessee, and thus violated § 7-101. Section 30-2484 provides,
inter alia, that “[f]or purposes of any statute of limitations, the
proper presentation of a claim under section 30-2486 is equiva-
lent to commencement of a proceeding on the claim.”
With regard to Wright’s filing of the demand for notice,
although not specifically citing Neb. Ct. R. of Prof. Cond.

5.5(c) (rev. 2005) in its order, the county court appeared to
rely on the rule when it concluded that Wright’s filing of the
demand for notice violated § 7-101. Rule 5.5(c) provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
(c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdic-
tion, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any
jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary
basis in this jurisdiction that:
. . . .
(4) . . . arise out of or are reasonably related to the
lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is
admitted to practice.
The county court determined that Wright’s filing of the demand
for notice “[d]id not arise out of and [is] not reasonably related
to [her] practice as [an] attorney . . . in a jurisdiction in which
[she is] admitted to practice . . . .”
The county court sustained Yates’ motions and ordered First
Tennessee’s statement of claim and demand for notice struck.
First Tennessee appeals.
ASSIGNMeNTS OF eRROR
On appeal, First Tennessee assigns three errors that can gen-
erally be summarized as claiming that the county court erred
(1) in determining that the filing of the statement of claim
constituted the unauthorized practice of law and in striking the
statement and (2) in determining that the filing of the demand
for notice constituted the unauthorized practice of law and in
striking the demand.
STANDARDS OF ReVIeW
[1,2] In the absence of an equity question, an appellate
court, reviewing probate matters, examines for error appearing
on the record made in the county court. In re Trust Created by
Hansen, 274 Neb. 199, 739 N.W.2d 170 (2007). On a question
of law, however, an appellate court is obligated to reach a con-
clusion independent of the determination reached by the court
below. In re Estate of Lamplaugh, 270 Neb. 941, 708 N.W.2d
645 (2006).
IN Re eSTATe OF COOPeR 	301
Cite as 275 Neb. 297

302 	275 NebRASkA RePORTS
ANALYSIS
The Filing of a Statement of Claim in a Probate Proceeding
Does Not Constitute the Practice of Law.
For its first assignment of error, First Tennessee claims that
the county court erred as a matter of law when it concluded
that the statement of claim filed on behalf of First Tennessee
by brown, one of First Tennessee’s employees, constituted the
unauthorized practice of law. First Tennessee asserts that the
filing of the statement of claim did not constitute the com-
mencement of a proceeding or action but instead is an adminis-
trative matter designed to advise the personal representative of
the nature and amount of a claim against the estate. Given the
purpose of the statement of claim, First Tennessee argues that
the statement of claim can be filed by a claimant or a represen-
tative of the claimant without the assistance of counsel and that
such a filing does not constitute the practice of law and does
not violate § 7-101. We agree.
First Tennessee 	refers 	us 	primarily 	to 	Neb. 	Rev. 	Stat.
§ 30-2486 (Reissue 1995) of the probate code and § 7-101,
the unauthorized practice of law statute, in support of its argu-
ment. Yates and the county court refer to these statutes and to
§ 30-2484. We consider these statutes and the jurisprudence
thereunder in connection with First Tennessee’s argument relat-
ing to the filing of the statement of claim.
[3-7] In interpreting the provisions of Nebraska’s statutes,
we are guided by familiar canons of statutory construction.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Citizens for
Eq. Ed. v. Lyons-Decatur Sch. Dist., 274 Neb. 278, 739 N.W.2d
742 (2007). Absent anything to the contrary, we will give statu-
tory language its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. When con-
fronted with a statutory construction issue, we resolve the issue
independently and irrespective of the lower court’s conclusion.
Id. Our role, to the extent possible, is to give effect to the
statute’s entire language, and to reconcile different provisions
of the statute so they are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.
Id. When possible, we will try to avoid a statutory construction
that would lead to an absurd result. Id.
Section 30-2486 governs the manner by which claims are
presented against a decedent’s estate and provides as follows:

Claims against a decedent’s estate may be presented
as follows:
(1) The claimant may file a written statement of the
claim, in the form prescribed by rule, with the clerk of
the court. The claim is deemed presented on the filing of
the claim with the court. If a claim is not yet due, the date
when it will become due shall be stated. If the claim is
contingent or unliquidated, the nature of the uncertainty
shall be stated. If the claim is secured, the security shall
be described. Failure to describe correctly the security, the
nature of any uncertainty, and the due date of a claim not
yet due does not invalidate the presentation made.
(2) The claimant may commence a proceeding against
the personal representative in any court which has subject
matter jurisdiction and the personal representative may be
subjected to jurisdiction, to obtain payment of his or her
claim against the estate, but the commencement of the pro-
ceeding must occur within the time limited for presenting
the claim. No presentation of claim is required in regard to
matters claimed in proceedings against the decedent which
were pending at the time of his or her death.
(3) If a claim is presented under subsection (1), no
proceeding thereon may be commenced more than sixty
days after the personal representative has mailed a notice
of disallowance; but, in the case of a claim which is not
presently due or which is contingent or unliquidated, the
personal representative may consent to an extension of the
sixty-day period, or to avoid injustice the court, on peti-
tion, may order an extension of the sixty-day period, but
in no event shall the extension run beyond the applicable
statute of limitations.
During oral argument, the parties agreed that the form referred
to in § 30-2486(1) that was used in this case is Form 313.
As quoted above, § 30-2486(1) provides that a “claimant
may file a written statement of the claim.” Yates argued, and the
county court agreed, that the filing of a claim constituted the
initiation of a legal proceeding requiring the services of an attor-
ney, and because a corporation cannot appear pro se in litigation,
a lawyer licensed in Nebraska must file a statement of claim on
IN Re eSTATe OF COOPeR 	303
Cite as 275 Neb. 297

304 	275 NebRASkA RePORTS
behalf of a corporation. The county court’s conclusion that the
filing of a statement of claim commenced a proceeding is not
warranted by § 30-2486, other statutes, or our jurisprudence.
[8] Although § 30-2486(1) provides that a “claimant may file
a written statement of the claim,” nothing in the language of
the statute precludes the filing of a statement of claim directly
by an individual or a corporate claimant. More important, else-
where in the statute, subsection (3) distinguishes between the
filing of a claim under subsection (1) and the commencement
of a subsequent proceeding to obtain payment of the claim.
Also relevant is § 30-2486(2), which provides that a claimant
under subsection (1) may thereafter commence a proceeding to
obtain payment. Giving the language in subsections (1) through
(3) a consistent, harmonious, and sensible construction, see
Citizens for Eq. Ed. v. Lyons-Decatur Sch. Dist., 274 Neb. 278,
739 N.W.2d 742 (2007), it is apparent that the filing of a claim
is a separate and distinct act from the initiation of a legal pro-
ceeding to pursue payment of the claim. Therefore, the filing
of a claim does not commence an action and does not in and of
itself require the services of an attorney.
We note that our conclusion that the filing of a claim under
§ 30-2486(1) does not commence a proceeding is supported
by the comment to Uniform Probate Code § 3-804, on which
§ 30-2486 is based. The comment states:
The filing of a claim with the probate court . . . does
not serve to initiate a proceeding concerning the claim.
Rather, it merely serves to protect the claimant who may
anticipate some need for evidence to show that his claim
is not barred. The probate court acts simply as a deposi-
tory of the statement of claim, as is true of its responsibil-
ity for an inventory filed with it . . . .
See 	Unif. 	Probate 	Code 	§ 	3-804, 	comment, 	8 	U.L.A.
236 (1998).
Our conclusion that the filing of a statement of claim does
not commence an action or proceeding for purposes of § 7-101
is consistent with the reasoning employed by other jurisdictions.
In Summit Pool Supplies, Inc. v. Price, 461 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla.
App. 1985), the Florida intermediate court of appeals stated:

[T]he filing of a statement of claim against an estate is not
an appearance in court or the filing of a “pleading” and
therefore is not the practice of law. The filing of a state-
ment of claim in an estate proceeding requires no action
by the court. It is merely a procedural step in the adminis-
tration of an estate whereby the personal representative is
advised, within the statutorily limited time, who the credi-
tors are and what their claims amount to. Thus, the filing
of a statement of claim is nothing more than presenting a
bill to the personal representative in the manner required
by the statute.
Similarly, in In re Estate of Piper, 59 Ill. App. 3d 325, 327, 375
N.e.2d 477, 479, 16 Ill. Dec. 604, 606 (1978), the intermediate
court of appeals in Illinois stated:
Policy considerations support the decision that the fil-
ing of a claim against a decedent’s estate does not con-
stitute the practice of law. The purpose of the statutory
provisions involved here is to facilitate early settlement
of the estates of deceased persons. . . . To require that the
claim of a corporate creditor be filed by an attorney would
counter the informal, summary proceedings established by
the legislature. The requirement would greatly increase
the expense of filing a claim and could discourage the fil-
ing of relatively small but just claims.
Finally, in the related context of the nonclaim statute, Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 30-2485 (Reissue 1995), we have noted in effect
that the filing of claims facilitates and expedites the
proceedings for distribution of a decedent’s estate, includ-
ing an early appraisal of the respective rights of interested
persons and prompt settlement of demands against the
estate. [T]he probate court or the personal representative
can readily ascertain the nature and extent of the dece-
dent’s debts, determine whether any sale of property is
necessary to satisfy a decedent’s debts, and project a
probable time at which the decedent’s estate will be ready
for distribution.
In re Estate of Feuerhalm, 215 Neb. 872, 874-75, 341 N.W.2d
342, 344 (1983).
IN Re eSTATe OF COOPeR 	305
Cite as 275 Neb. 297

306 	275 NebRASkA RePORTS
To the extent the county court relied on § 30-2484, in addi-
tion to § 30-2486 just discussed, as a basis to conclude that the
filing of a claim constituted the commencement of a proceed-
ing, that reliance was also misplaced. Section 30-2484 provides
that “[f]or purposes of any statute of limitations, the proper
presentation of a claim under section 30-2486 is equivalent to
commencement of a proceeding on the claim.” The language
of § 30-2484 draws a distinction between the filing of a claim
and the commencement of a separate proceeding. Further,
§ 30-2484 provides that although not equivalent, the filing of
a claim shall be treated as the “equivalent” of commencement
of a proceeding for statute of limitations purposes. We observe
that application of § 30-2484 is “[f]or purposes of any statute
of limitations” and that by its terms, is limited to the context
of determining whether the statute of limitations on a claim
has run. Thus, the equating of the filing of a claim to the com-
mencement of proceedings is limited to the statute of limita-
tions context, and we have effectively so held in Mulinex v.
Roberts, 261 Neb. 800, 626 N.W.2d 220 (2001).
[9] Having noted that nothing within the relevant probate
statutes necessitates the conclusion that the filing of a state-
ment of claim constitutes the commencement of an action or
proceeding requiring representation by an attorney and that
therefore the probate statutes do not require the conclusion that
the filing of a statement of claim constitutes the practice of law,
we next analyze whether the remainder of our jurisprudence
relative to the practice of law requires such a conclusion. We
have stated that the term “practice of law” includes the trial of
causes in court and the preparation of pleadings to be filed in
court. See State, ex rel. Wright, v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 268
N.W. 95 (1936). We have also stated that
the practice of law would include . . . legal advice to per-
sons represented by the defendant as to their rights in such
cases, the direct and cross-examination of witnesses, the
argument had to the court as to the legal rights of persons
represented by the defendant, and all matters incident and
necessary to the trial of said cases in the justice court. . . .
. . . “It is the character of the act, and not the place
where it is performed, which is the decisive factor.”

See State, ex rel. Hunter, v. Kirk, 133 Neb. 625, 628, 276 N.W.
380, 382 (1937). See, also, Spier v. Thomas, 131 Neb. 579,
269 N.W. 61 (1936) (defining “practice of law” to include
legal advice and counsel with regard to validity and legality
of matters).
[10] The filing of a statement of claim in an estate proceed-
ing requires no action by or in the court. Although a claim is
filed with the probate court, it is not considered a pleading. See
Neb. Ct. R. of Pldg. in Civ. Actions 7(a) (rev. 2004) (listing
allowable “pleadings” as complaint, answer, reply, answer to
cross-claim, third-party complaint, and third-party answer, and
stating generally that “[n]o other pleading shall be allowed”). In
this regard, we have stated that “the county court acts merely as
a depository of the [statement of] claim.” Holdrege Co-op Assn.
v. Wilson, 236 Neb. 541, 546, 463 N.W.2d 312, 316 (1990).
The filing of a statement of claim is an administrative step by
which the personal representative is advised, in accordance with
the probate statutes, of the identities of the creditors and the
amounts of their claims. Although a form for the presentation of
a claim is prescribed by rule, see § 30-2486(1), legal skill is not
required to complete the form. See, Summit Pool Supplies, Inc.
v. Price, 461 So. 2d 272 (Fla. App. 1985); In re Estate of Piper,
59 Ill. App. 3d 325, 375 N.e.2d 477, 16 Ill. Dec. 604 (1978).
In the instant case, brown took the administrative steps of
preparing or causing to be prepared the statement of claim,
signing it, and submitting it for filing with the probate court.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that brown’s filing
of a statement of claim does not constitute the practice of law
described in § 7-101. The county court erred as a matter of
law when it concluded that brown’s filing of the statement of
claim on behalf of First Tennessee constituted the unauthorized
practice of law and ordered the statement of claim struck. Such
order is reversed.
The Filing of a Demand for Notice in a Probate Proceeding by
an Attorney Not Licensed to Practice Law in This State
Is Not the Unauthorized Practice of Law.
For its second assignment of error, First Tennessee claims
that the county court erred as a matter of law when it concluded
IN Re eSTATe OF COOPeR 	307
Cite as 275 Neb. 297

308 	275 NebRASkA RePORTS
that the demand for notice filed on behalf of First Tennessee
by one of First Tennessee’s lawyers, who is not admitted in
Nebraska, constituted the unauthorized practice of law. First
Tennessee argues in effect that the county court misconstrued
rule 5.5(c)(4) of the Nebraska Rules of Professional Conduct
governing the unauthorized practice of law when the court
concluded that Wright’s filing of the demand for notice violated
the unauthorized practice of law statute, § 7-101. We agree with
First Tennessee that the county court erred.
[11] We note that the conduct complained of involves an
attorney and occurred after September 1, 2005, and thus is
governed by the Nebraska Rules of Professional Conduct. As
noted above, rule 5.5(c) permits a lawyer who is licensed to
practice in another state but has not been admitted to practice
in Nebraska to nonetheless on a temporary basis perform cer-
tain legal actions in this jurisdiction, so long as those actions
“arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice
in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.”
Rule 5.5(c) describes activities that although performed by a
lawyer not licensed to practice in this state, nonetheless do not
violate § 7-101.
We 	have 	not 	had 	occasion 	to 	construe 	rule 	5.5(c)(4).
However, we find guidance in the comments that follow the
rule. Comment [5] states in part:
There are occasions in which a lawyer admitted to practice
in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or
suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide
legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction
under circumstances that do not create an unreasonable risk
to the interests of their clients, the public or the courts.
Comment [13] states:
Paragraph (c)(4) permits a lawyer admitted in another
jurisdiction to provide certain legal services on a tem-
porary basis in this jurisdiction that arise out of or are
reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdic-
tion in which the lawyer is admitted . . . . These services
include both legal services and services that nonlawyers
may perform but that are considered the practice of law
when performed by lawyers.

Finally, comment [14] states as follows:
Paragraph . . . (c)(4) require[s] that the services arise out
of or be reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted. A variety of
factors evidence such a relationship. The lawyer’s client
may have been previously represented by the lawyer, or
may be resident in or have substantial contacts with the
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted. The matter,
although involving other jurisdictions, may have a signifi-
cant connection with that jurisdiction. In other cases, sig-
nificant aspects of the lawyer’s work might be conducted
in that jurisdiction or a significant aspect of the matter
may involve the law of that jurisdiction.
We consider the factors listed in the comment quoted imme-
diately above. The record reflects that First Tennessee is a
Tennessee banking corporation, with its principal place of busi-
ness in Memphis, Tennessee, the same city and state where
Wright, the Tennessee lawyer who filed the demand for notice,
maintains her law practice. First Tennessee is a client of Wright.
The request for notice sought to have copies of all filings made
in the underlying estate case mailed to Wright in the same state
where she offices and First Tennessee has its principal place of
business. The “risk” involved to either the client, the public, or
the courts was de minimis. The filing of the request for notice
was effectively an administrative matter and did not in and of
itself involve either rendering a legal opinion to First Tennessee
or engaging in a legal contest on behalf of First Tennessee in
Nebraska. Given these facts, we conclude that the county court
erred as a matter of law when it determined that Wright’s filing
of the demand for notice constituted the unauthorized prac-
tice of law under either rule 5.5(c) or § 7-101 and ordered the
demand struck. We reverse such order.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the county
court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that brown’s
filing of the statement of claim and Wright’s filing of the
demand for notice, each on behalf of First Tennessee, consti-
tuted the unauthorized practice of law in violation of § 7-101
IN Re eSTATe OF COOPeR 	309
Cite as 275 Neb. 297

310 	275 NebRASkA RePORTS
and in striking the statement and demand. Accordingly, we
reverse the county court’s order and remand the cause with
directions to reinstate both filings.
R eveRsed and Remanded With diRections .
state of neBRaska ex Rel . J on BRuning , attoRney geneRal
of the state of neBRaska , appellant , v . R.J. R eynolds
toBacco company et al ., appellees .
746 N.W.2d 672
Filed March 28, 2008. 	No. S-06-1027.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does not
involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law.
2. Contracts: Appeal and Error. The interpretation of a contract involves a ques-
tion of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach
its conclusions independently of the determinations made by the court below.
3. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. before reaching the legal issues presented for
review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction
over the matter before it.
4. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue
1995), the three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal are (1) an
order which affects a substantial right and which determines the action and pre-
vents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a special
proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary appli-
cation in an action after judgment is rendered.
5. Contracts: Arbitration and Award. Arbitration is purely a matter of contract.
6. Arbitration and Award. A party cannot be required to submit a dispute to arbi-
tration unless he or she has agreed to do so.
7. Contracts. A court interpreting a contract must first determine as a matter of law
whether the contract is ambiguous.
8. ____. A contract written in clear and unambiguous language is not subject to
interpretation or construction and must be enforced according to its terms.
9. Contracts: Words and Phrases. A contract is ambiguous when a word, phrase,
or provision in the contract has, or is susceptible of, at least two reasonable but
conflicting interpretations or meanings.
10. Contracts. A contract must receive a reasonable construction and must be
construed as a whole, and if possible, effect must be given to every part of
the contract.
Appeal 	from 	the 	District 	Court 	for 	Lancaster 	County:
paul d. meRRitt , JR., Judge. Affirmed.